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P R E F A C E.
I n  J u ly ,  1946, the M i n i s t r y  o f  E d u c a t io n  o f  the 
N a t i o n a l i s t  Government i n  C h in a  h e ld  an open c o m p e t i t i v e  
e x a m in a t io n  th ro u g h o u t  the  c o u n t r y  i n  o rd e r  to  s e le c t  p o s t ­
g ra d u a te  s c h o la rs ,  who were to  be s e n t  to  v a r io u s  le a d in g  
c o u n t r ie s  in  the w o r ld  to  s tu d y  s u b je c ts  wh ich  the Government 
deemed a t  t h a t  t im e to be o f  g re a t  im p o r ta n ce  f o r  the re­
c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  the  c o u n t r y .  Under t h i s  scheme, the  a u th o r  
was s e n t  to  Great B r i t a i n  to  examine the  system o f  L o ca l 
Government o b ta in in g  th e re .
The p re s e n t  s tu d y  was begun i n  O c to b e r , 1947, when 
i t  was the  o r i g i n a l  i n t e n t i o n  bo th  o f  the M i n i s t r y  o f  E d u c a t io n  
and the a u th o r  to spend a t le a s t  th re e  ye a rs  upon the s u b je c t .  
M eanw h ile , however the p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  i n  C h ina  d e t e r i o r ­
a te d  and the a u th o r  was o b l ig e d  to  te rm in a te  h is  s tu d y  i n  
May, 1949, d raw ing  h is  work to  a c o n c lu s io n  b e fo re  r e t u r n in g  
to  h is  own c o u n t r y .
The im p o r ta n c e  o f  th e  s u b je c t  i s  e v id e n t .  In  B r i t a i n ,  
the l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  have n o t  m e re ly  been r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  
most o f  the  i n t e r n a l  s e r v ic e s  which c a t e r  d i r e c t l y  f o r  the  
w e l fa re  o f  th e  p e o p le ,  b u t ,  th ro u g h  t h e i r  independence o f  the 
c e n t r a l  government, have p la y e d  a la r g e  p a r t  i n  d e v e lo p in g  
and s u s t a in in g  the f a b r i c  o f  democracy th e re .  The v a lu e  o f  
t n i s  system o f  l o c a l  governm ent i n  the  l i f e  o f  the n a t io n ,  
however, has no t been due s im p ly  to  the  e f f o r t s  o f  the l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s .  C e n t r a l  d i r e c t i o n  and superv is ion  have had a p a r t  
to  p la y ,  and though th e y  c l e a r l y  c a r r y  t h e i r  own dangers, 
t h e i r  in f lu e n c e ,  on the  w hole , has been b e n e f i c i a l .  Th is  has 
been l a r g e l y  due to  the  methods by w h ich  the c e n t r a l  go ve rn ­
ment has in te rv e n e d  and i t s  r e s t r a i n t  i n  t h e i r  use.
I n  t h i s  th e s is ,  the  a u th o r  examines ghe most im p o r ta n t  
o f  these  methods. H is  main o b je c t  i s  to see to what e x te n t  
th e  c o n t r o l  o f  government departm en ts  has been, and i n  what 
manner i t  ou gh t to  be? e x e rc is e d  th roug h  the system o f  g r a n ts -  
i n - a i d .  The theme has been touched  upon i n  s e v e r a l  books on 
l o c a l  governm ent; b u t i t  i s  m o s t ly  accorded a p a s s in g  and 
c a s u a l  t re a tm e n t  and th e re  i s  s t i l l  a need f o r  a f u l l e r  exam­
i n a t i o n .  I n  t h i s  re s p e c t ,  he hopes th a t  the p re s e n t  work 
may be o f  some use i n  f i l l i n g  in  the  gap.
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As a s tu d e n t  i n  th e  s o c ia l  s c ie n c e s  has n o t  the  f a c i l ­
i t y  o f  a l a b o r a t o r y  i n  w h ich  to  e xp e r im e n t,  i t  i s  im p o s s ib ­
l e  f o r  him to d e s ig n  any d e v ice  and p u t  i t  i n t o  p r a c t i c e .  
What he can do i s  to  obse rve  the  e x i s t i n g  system, compare 
i t  w i th  o th e rs ,  and make some p ro p o s a ls  f o r  i t s  im provem ent. 
Hence, some p a r t s  o f  t h i s  work are d e s c r ip t i v e  and h i s t o r i ­
c a l ,  and o th e rs  c r i t i c a l .  fo rm e r ,  e f f o r t s  have been
made, as f a r  as p o s s ib le ,  to  b r in g  the  m a t te r  up to  1948. 
Here, government pa p e rs , P a r l ia m e n ta ry  s t a t u t e s ,  and books 
w r i t t e n  by a u t h o r i t i e s  on the s u b je c t  have been f r e e l y  
used. As f o r  the  c r i t i c a l  p a r t s ,  the  a u th o r  owes much to  
the  R eports  and M in u te s  o f  Evidence is s u e d  by v a r io u s  
R oya l Commissions and D e p a r tm e n ta l Comm ittees on L o c a l  
T a x a t io n  and N a t io n a l  o r  L o c a l  E x p e n d i tu re ,  as w e l l  as 
the  o p in io n s  expressed by s c h o la rs  and government o f f i c i a l s .  
He has a lso  c o n s u l te d  p e r s o n a l ly  s e v e r a l  o f f i c e r s  i n  the  
M i n i s t r y  o f  H e a lth  and the  C o rp o ra t io n  o f  the  C i t y  o f  
Glasgow. N e v e r th e le s s ,  the f i n a l  e v a lu a t io n  i s  h is  own.
I n  the  w r i t i n g  o f  t h i s  t h e s is ,  the a u th o r  has endea­
vou red  to use S c o t t i s h  fa c t s  and in c id e n t s  to  a g r e a te r  
e x te n t  than  i s  u s u a l .  Books on E n g l is h  l o c a l  government 
are p l e n t i f u l .  S c o t la n d ,  however, i s  b u t  s c a n t i l y  t re a te d ,  
and an a t te m p t  has been made, as f a r  as p o s s ib le ,  to  m ain­
t a i n  a ba la n ce .
D u r in g  the p r e p a r a t io n  o f  t h is  th e s is ,  many o b l ig a t i o n s  
have been in c u r r e d  which  th e  a u th o r  d e s i re s  to  ta ke  t h i s  
o p p o r tu n i t y  to acknowledge. H is  g r a t e f u l  thanks  are due 
to  h is  s u p e rv is o r ,  Mr. J .  H. fa r r e n d e r ,  whose h e l p f u l  c r i t i ­
c ism  and gu idance have enab led  him to  a cco m p lish  t h is  
work. He a ls o  w ishes to  re c o rd  a d e b t o f  g r a t i t u d e  to  
Mr. B ss lem ont, C i t y  C ham berla in  o f  the  C o rp o ra t io n  o f  th e  
C i t y  o f  Glasgow, who s u p p l ie d  him w i th  in f o r m a t io n  about 
the p r a c t i c a l  f i n a n c i a l  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  th e  C o rp o ra t io n ,  
and to the l i b r a r i a n s  o f  the  M in i s t r y  o f  H e a lth  f o r  the 
f a c i l i t i e s  th a y  accorded him d u r in g  the summer v a c a t io n  
o f  1948.
Lee H s io - s h ih .
May, 1949.
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IHTROPUCTIOH
Tiie question of what relationship ought to exist be­
tween the central government and local authorities is an 
interesting and important one in the field of political in­
stitutions* If we make a surrey of the more important coun­
tries in the world, we can classify them as regards the 
character of this relationship into three main types* There 
is, in the first place, what Lord Passfield termed the Bu­
reaucratic System represented by most of the Continental 
countries, especially the Republic of Prance whose tradition 
is 'the building-up of a consolidated and powerful state by 
means of a great bureaucracy, directed from a single centre, 
and pursuing a uniform policy'* (l) Here local administra­
tion is chiefly entrusted to salaried officials who are some­
times actually appointed, and whose work is closely super- 
wised, by the central authorities* (2) The sole functions of 
local institutions is, therefore, to fulfil the purposes, and 
realise the will, of the 'Executive Government’. Locally 
elected authorities have very imperfect control of internal 
administration* Their estimates (budget) must be submitted 
to a higher authority and often to the central government it­
self for confirmation before action may be taken upon them*
(3) The public services which are classified as 'central' in 
this bureaucratic country are very wide in scope* They in­
clude such services as education, sanitary administration, 
and police, which are administered either solely by central 
departments or by their territorial delegations and agents 
sent out to act within prescribed areas* Local authorities 
have no control over them* What they can take part in are 
merely those scanty and insignificant 'local* matters spe­
cially assigned the to them, and even here the mighty hand
(1) P. Ashley, Local and Central Government, 1906, p*5*
(2) In Prance there is a system of tutelle administrative by 
means of which the central government retains wide powers 
of controlling not only the decisions but even the compo­
sition of local authorities* See W.P. & W.O* Hart, An 
Introduction to the Law of Local Government and Adminis­
tration, 1934, p*304*
(3) A higher authority in Prance enjoys a system of '1*ins­
cription d*office*, that is to say, it can include in the 
budget of any local authority any item relating to an obli­
gatory function of that authority which, in its opinion, 
has been improperly omitted and the local authority becomes 
consequently obliged to raised money for such a purpose*
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of the central authorities is felt. It may he said that in 
France the power of the central government is exercised to 
such an extent that it has practically extinguished the op­
portunity of the people to join in the management of the pu­
blic affairs of their locality.
At the other extreme may he seen the organization of 
local government of the United States where the cities and 
townships are fully independent of the State or the Federal 
Executive departments. Some of them under 'municipal home 
rule' charters are not subject to the interference even of 
the legislatures. Municipalities, whether of council-mayor 
or of council-manager type* are autonomous corporations en­
joying a wide range of administrative freedom. Bach of them 
has its own system of management in public affairs, and there 
is 'nothing in the nature of an administrative hierarchy, and 
nothing in the nature of a national system, whether in educa­
tion, sanitation, collective provision for the dependent 
classes, or means of communication'. (1) The local bodies 
have presented such a remarkable diversity of organisation 
and complexity in the variety of services they provide that 
no coordination and adjustment on a national scale is possi­
ble. There is an anarchy in municipal administration which, 
being in need of a wholesome check and beneficial guidance 
from the superior authorities, is often manipulated by sinis­
ter interests to the detriment of the public. Thus neither 
the French nor the American type of central-local relation­
ship is free from gross disadvantages. To reduce local au­
thorities to the position of mere agencies of the central de­
partments is to kill the vitality of local democracy; while 
complete autonomy tends to make the internal administration 
of the country complicated and confused, and the poor and 
backward authorities are, moreover, deprived of the assis­
tance, financial or otherwise, of superior authorities.
In Great Britain, however, we find a third type of 
relationship between the central and local authority. Here 
the paid officials are subordinate to the wishes of the coun­
cil and its committees. There is no prefect or Minister of 
the central government with power to suspend or dissolve the 
council. The local budget does not have to be approved by a 
central department, nor is it subject to the revision of a 
higher authority. The appointment and dismissal of the offi­
cers is with a few exceptions within the control of the local 
council. But, on the other hand, local authorities are by no 
means free to go as they please. So far as the services of 
national importance are concerned, the central government is
(l) S. Webb, Grant-in-Aid, A Criticism and a Proposal, 1911, 
pp.4-5.
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alert both to restrain and to stimulate. The traditional 
practice of local self-government is wonderfully mixed up 
with* and invigorated by* the superior enlightenment of the 
central departments derived from greater general knowledge* 
wider experience and more highly-trained intellects. And 
the result is that* on the one hand* a large measure of 
independence is left to the local authorities, and on the 
other hand* a certain standard of uniformity is maintained. 
The spirit of compromise has smoothed out many of the sour­
ces of friction between central departments and local coun- . 
cils; and their copperation has ensured great improvement in 
the service as a whole.
The control of the central departments is limited to 
such services as roads and bridges* police and housing* 
health and education* which are regarded as predominantly 
national in character and of general rather than local in­
terest and utility. On the whole, this control has been di­
rected towards securing a certain minimum standard which pu­
blic opinion demands* and not an arbitrary intermeddling 
with local initiative and freedom to experiment. The super­
vision from the centre chiefly takes the form of instruction 
and inspection. It consists of assistance rather than domi­
nation.
The British system* in combining fruitfully the ef­
forts of central and local authorities, owes its success in 
large part to that invention of British political wisdom, 
the grant-in-aid. A partial financial subordination of the 
local to the central authority* a subordination in itself 
highly repugnant to the tr^djjjional British ideas of local 
autonomy* has* nevertheless** to be a valuable device of local 
government. By it* the central departments have sevured* in 
a tactful manner, rights of criticism* supervision and ins­
pection. The instinctive resentment of a subordinate self- 
governing body at external interference has given way to an 
eagerness to acquire advice from the government department* 
when the improvement of the service is to be accompanied by 
a handsome subvention. The central government, on the other 
hand* having fully recognised the importance of the spirit 
of local responsibility, seeks in turn to imspire satisfac­
tory local administration rather than to force it* although 
in regard to many services the power is given to exercise 
compulsion. m
Speaking generally* in the presence of central con­
trol exercised through Exchequer grants, local freedom and 
administrative efficiency have attained an admirable balance. 
The system gives weight to the directions of the central
(1) In particular the power to withhold the grant, a power 
which* however* has only been exercised in one or two 
isolated instances over a long period of years.
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depnrtments and brings the local authorities into the afcbit 
of national policy; and thus, apart from administrative ad­
vantages, enables Ministers to fulfil their general respon­
sibility to Parliament for the oversight of services entrus­
ted to their care, without creating financial irresponsibi­
lity in local authorities, or robbing them entirely of their 
initiative.
In recent years following the expansion of public 
services, some localities have felt to an increasing extent 
that the duties imposed upon them by Parliament are far be­
yond their financial ability. Partly as a result of these 
increased burdens and partly in pursuit of a more egalitarian 
philosophy, there has developed a tendency to adapt the grant 
in aid to take into account the means and needs of local areas. 
A block grant, calculated upon a formula weighted for diffe­
rent needs and responsibilities has been devised in order that 
the rate burdens of different localities might be equalised.
It is expected that with this more considerate and generous 
support from the Exchequer, poor authorities will be able to 
provide services comparable to those of their rich neighbours.
Central control has hitherto been mild and moderate. 
There is as yet no deliberate development of national control 
at the expense of local initiative. Nevertheless, with the 
improvement of social services on grounds of efficiency, there 
is a tendency towards an increase of central government regu­
lations in pursuit of uniform administration. The danger of 
the extension of the power of bureaucracy has been recognised 
and trumpeted from all parts of the country. Proposals have 
been made for the widening of locally controlled resources 
in place of the Exchequer grants. But as a thorough innova­
tion is at present neither practicable nor desirable, the 
remedy still lies in the manner in which the grant-in-aid is 
to be employed. Whatever changes are made, the collabora­
tion between central and local government staffs and the di­
vision of labour, characteristic of the British system of 
public administration, should be preserved. The system is 
preferable to the bureaucratic system of Prance or the Ame­
rican anarchy of local autonomy; and it has developed, in 
the past at least, largely around the grant-in-aid.
In the following pages, we attempt, within the 
wider context of departmental control, to give some account 
of the development of the grant-in-aid system, of the dif­
ferent forms it has taken, and of the different uses to 
which it has been put, and, finally, to evaluate the grant- 
in-aid as a device of government.
PART I
CENTRAL CONTROL 
OVER
LOCAL AUTHORITIES.
5-
CHAPTER I 
LOCAL GOVERHMEHT IS TRAHSITIOH
British Local Self-Government
Britain has long been, and still is» praised by stu­
dents of political science as a paradise of freedom and de­
mocracy* Great scholars, both at home and abroad, with dif­
ferent points of view, and from different angles of observa­
tion, have mostly arrived at the same conclusion, and showed 
a considerable degree of appreciation and veneration* Mon­
tesquieu, in the middle of the eighteenth century, came to 
the conclusion that it was the separation of powers, working 
through a principle of checks and balances between the Crown, 
the Legislature and the Courts of Law, that helped to safe­
guard the freedom of the British people* His theory, though 
based upon a complete misunderstanding of the British Cons­
titution, had, however, secured great applause, and gained 
great influence in the political world* Blackstone, when 
writing his famous Commentaries* borrowed his principal idea 
of the British Constitution from Montesquieu, and indulged 
in an exposition of the principles behind the organisation 
of the central political organs from this point of view*
From that time on, most of the constitutional lawyers fol­
lowed, consciously or unconsciously, along the same line* 
Attention was focussed unanimously upon the outstanding 
features of the political nucleus in London, while the ac­
tual working of British democracy which was carried on si­
lently outside the Metropolis remained completely unnoticed* 
Indeed, up to the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
despite all the great events caused by the innovations of 
poor law relief and public health services, which affected 
the localities and the life of the nation so much, eminent 
constitutional lawyers in Britain, such as Bagehot, Anson 
and Licey, all concentrated their attention wholly on the 
Crown, Parliament and the Courts* Local government still 
found little place in the prevalent textbooks of constitu­
tional law*
It was Rudolf von Gneist, a distinguished GermaA 
scholar more than a century later than Montesquieu, who 
first publicised the importance of British local government* 
Coming to England just after the revolutionary crisis of 
1848 had broken out universally in Europe, he was deeply
-6-
impressed by the stability of British political society, as 
forming a sharp contrast to the conflict and chaos of the 
European world. After a thorough investigation, he concluded 
that the basis and the true originality of British institu­
tions, lay deep beneath the superficialities of the central 
structure of political government. It was British local 
’self-government’, he thought, which marked the keystone of 
success; and the ’glowing centre’ of the Constitution, he 
argued, was the ’administration of localities by unpaid of­
ficers belong to the upper and middle classes, according to 
the laws of the country, through local taxation”. (1)
Indeed, the importance of British local self-govern­
ment, once recognised, is overwhelming. The roots of the 
whole system of British free political institutions, we are 
told, lie deep in the past; and they thrive and prosper in 
every nook and corner in the localities. It is through the 
management of their own local affairs that British people 
are trained in the service of the community and in the exer­
cise of authority. And, most important of all, it is partly 
through the enormous degree of independence they enjoy in 
adapting their special environment and satisfying their spe­
cial requirements, that they learn to appreciate and respect 
the value of freedom and democracy. Sir T. Erskine May had 
this in mind when he wrote the following passages- (2)
England alone among the nations of the earth 
has maintained for centuries a constitutional policy; 
and her liberties may be described above all things 
to her free local institutions. Since the days of 
their Saxon aneestor, her sons have learned at their 
own gates the duties and responsibilities of citizens.
Local Autonomy in Eighteenth-Century Britain
In Britain, the local self-government which Rudolf von 
Gneist admired so much began actually with the downfall of 
the Star Chamber, an instrument of central oppression under 
the Stuarts. Central administrative control firmly establi­
shed by the time of Henry VIII disappeared almost by an ac­
cident in 1642, when, as a result of the abolition of all the 
informal supervisory powers of the Central Government by the 
Long Parliament, local authorities were left entirely free. (3)
(1) See Elie Halevy, A Century of Municipal Progress, pp.15-18.
(2) Prom J.A.R. Marriott, English Political Institutions, 3rd 
ed«, 1925, p.245.
(3) Jennings, Local Government Law, 3rd ed., 1947, p.28.
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From that time on, local autonomy developed rapidly, and it 
became almost complete and unshackled in the eighteenth cen­
tury. Local administration was then chiefly in the hands of 
the Justices of the Peace, (1) who served in a voluntary ca­
pacity, and were the ’unpaid officers belonging to the upper 
and middle classes’.
At first the Justices of the Peace were merely judi­
cial officers, appointed under the Great Seal for the various 
counties, but their duties and their influence increased con­
siderably. (2) Describing this development, Mr. K.B. Smellie 
writes*- (3)
Since the thirteenth century the powers of the 
Justices of the Peace had grown steadily. They groaned 
under a load of statutes. They dealt as they had dealt 
since the thirteenth century with law and order, but in 
the eighteenth century that now included the control of 
liquor, at once the solace of the poor when times were 
quiet, and a stimulant to riot in periods of unrest.
They administered the poor law which the growing tempo 
of economic change made more harsh. To their Blizabe- 
than responsibility for highways and bridges had been 
added that of paving, lighting and cleansing the tho­
roughfares of growing towns. To take a few letters of 
the alphabet only, they had something to do with tape, 
Rates, Recognisances, Records, with Perjury, Piracy, 
and Playhouses, with Disorderly Houses, Dissenters,
Dogs and Drainage.
Though the Justices were as a rule recommended by 
the Lord Lieutenant of each locality and appointed by the 
Crown, they were, however, by no means the agents of the cen­
tral executive. They chose to do what they liked and ne­
glected what they abhored. They declined to take orders or 
tolerate interference from superiors in London. Local autho­
rities were capable of pursuing their own way so independent­
ly that there was no cooperation between them, and little care 
was taken over the possibility of affecting one another.
(1) Here, for convenience's sake, I omit the municipal councils 
of the boroughs, and deal with the counties alone. The re­
ason is that, on the one hand, Britain was, until the end 
of the 18th century, primarily an agricultural country, and 
the problem of local government was essentially one of ru­
ral government, on the other hand, urban communities which 
had received royal charters enjoyed special privileges, and 
thus had an even greater degree of autonomy than their ru­
ral neighbours.
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Their powers were regulated solely by the rules of the com­
mon law and Acts of Parliament, public and private, subject 
only to the remote possibility of interference from the High 
Courts of Justice. (4) A central department had not any co­
ordinate power of legislation by ordinance. It could not 
even supplement statutory laws by issuing orders and regula­
tions to direct or influence the activities of local authorities. 
The Justices of the Courts of quarter Sessions, therefore, 
had a completely free hand in managing local affairs so long 
as their activities did not run counter to the rule of law.
Furthermore, besides the judicial and administrative 
powers which the Justices held already, they acquired also, 
within the limit of each of the counties, real legislative 
powers. This can be illustrated by the case of the so-called 
’Speenhamland Act of Parliament1 of 1795, which shows how the 
'college1 of Berkshire Justices, meeting at the Pelican Inn 
near Hewbury, could initiate its own policy of public assis­
tance as if it were a sovereign body. (5) The Court of quar­
ter Sessions had, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
actually become, according to the Webbs, " an Inchoate County 
Legislature, formulating new policies in respect of the pre­
vention of crime, the treatment of criminals, the licensing 
of ale-houses, the relief of destitution, the maintenance of 
roads and bridges, the assessment of local taxation, and even 
the permissible habits of life of whole sections of the com­
munity. These developments were extra-legal in character? 
they were neither initiated by Parliament nor sanctioned by 
it". (6) kocal government was completely localised and de­
centralised.
The Incompetence of the Justices to Cone 
With Hieing Problems
In the local government of eighteenth-century and 
early nineteenth-century Britain, it is significant that, 
though the powers of local authorities was predominant, it 
was by no means democratic. The Justices of the Peace and 
the municipal councillors were landed gentry and enfranchised 
burgesses of the locality. Since they were not elected by 
the people, or, in the case of municipal corporations before 
1835, not elected by the general body of urban inhabitants, 
but by the small number of ’freemen*, they were not their 
representatives in the true sense of the word.
(2) For the development of the functions of the Justices, see 
ibid., pp.24-31.
(3) Smellie, The History of Local Government, 1946, pp.17-18.
(4) The High Courts of Justice could, whenever required, by
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Xt was this aristocratic local autonomy which im­
pressed Gneist deeply. He praised the honorary offices of 
local government held by the leisured classes, he apprecia­
ted the amateur character of the local services financed 
solely from local rates, and, above all, he admired the pa­
rochial freedom and independence which obtained in every 
locality. The ideal state of local administration which he 
conceived, however, was one where the essential objects of 
government were the administration of justice and police, 
the control of the militia, and the supervision of labourers.
It was workable only in a period when the country was pre­
dominantly rural in character— -a situation when local admi­
nistration could be handled with little or no difficulty and 
a highly specialist local governmental machine was not re­
quired. It is no wonder that when the irresistible storm of 
industrialisation and urbanization swept over the country, 
and new devices had to be planned and carried out to meet the 
urgent requirements of new conditions, he saw in them an in­
dication of moral breakdown and degradation in the British 
Constitution. He deplored ’the suppression of the old parish 
constables by an army corps of gendarme*’, and lamented the 
downfall of British ’self-government’ when the administration 
of the Poor Law was to be conducted by ’a corps of ten thou­
sand bookkeepers and clerks’. He thought that the government 
of the country had become* ’bureaucratic in its main branches’ 
in consequence of the introduction of trained staffs of paid 
officials into the civil service; that the best forces were 
withdrawn gradually from municipal life; and that the whole 
government was 'dependent more and more upon a constantly ex­
tending system of Boyal Commissions and Ministerial Rescripts'. 
In a word, every innovation which occurred throughout the 19th 
century was in his eyes a sign of miserable decadence; and the 
political institutions of Modern Britain were, as an inevitable 
result, regarded for the most part as nothing else than pro­
ducts of the decay of all that had been grand and true in the 
past. (7)
The admiration whieh Gneist dedicated to the role 
played by the amateur Justices in the British Constitution of 
the eighteenth century was excessive. For the ’Great Unpaid*’ 
seldom fulfilled their responsibility satisfactorily. Even in
the procedure of Certiorari or Quo Warranto, keep local 
authorities (and administrative author!ties in general) 
within the bounds of law appointed by the Legislature.
(5) Sir Earnest Barker, The Development of the Public Services 
in Western Europe, 1944, p.33.
(6) Webbs, The Parish and the County, p.482.
(7) Redlich & Hirst, Local Government in England, Vol.II, p.329.
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the days prior to the Industrial Revolution, when local go­
vernmental affairs were relatively simple and spasmodic, 
these country gentry and nobility who did not possess any 
special knowledge or receive any special training, had al­
ready found themselves despairingly bewildfed with their 
multifarious and toilsome duties* "Such an infinite variety 
of business has been heaped upon them", said Blackstone in 
1765, "that few care to undertake and fewer understand the 
office"* As time went on, local affairs swelled and expanded 
continuously* The more they were required to perform, the 
worse their situation became. Professor Halevy writesi- (1)
The difficulty was not only that the society which 
the Justices of the Peace had to administer was more 
numerous than it had been one century earlier; it was 
also more complicated. It was not only that a more nu­
merous population wanted more roads, it wanted better 
roads than a contemporary of William III. and Marlborough 
could have dreamt of. It was not only that more crimi­
nals had to be sent to gaol; modern philanthropy could 
simply not put up with the rough and careless treatment 
to which the early eighteenth century was content to 
submit criminals. Hence, whether it was a problem of 
building or managing a prison, an amount of technical 
knowledge was required, which it was absurd to suppose 
the average Justices of the Peace possessed, unless we 
assume that the mere fact of being a man of leisure and 
of having public duties forced upon him, trains a man 
adequately for the fulfilment of these duties...*
The incompetence of the Justiwes was further accen­
tuated by the fact that they were entirely shut out from the 
instruction and assistance of the central authorities* Con­
sequently they were even unable to preserve internal security.
The gentry, by reducing the control of the central 
government to practically nothing, had deprived themselves 
of its help in suppressing disorder and crime. England 
was a cotintry with no police, and was apt to be proud of 
the fact. "They have an admirable police in Paris", 
wrote John William Ward, "but they pay for it dear enough. 
I had rather half a dozen people's throats should be cut 
in Ratcliffe Highways every three or four years than be 
subject to domiciliary visits, spies, and all the rest of 
Pouche's contrivances"* Perhaps so; but more and more 
people were beginning to believe that, as the volumn and 
complexity of modern society became greater, something
(1) Halevy, op. cit., pp.24-25*
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had to be done to change this state of old-fashioned 
eighteenth-century anarchy, (1)
It was a great blunder that Gneist should have denoun­
ced the efficient police forces established throughout the 
country under state financial aid after 1856 to take the place 
of the useless parish constables, and the competent paid staffs 
appointed by the local councils and boards of guardians, as a 
constitutional degradation. "To a mind unfettered by formulas 
and antitheses'1, writes Dr. Redlich, (2) "it must be plain 
that a great industrial society of the nineteenth century can­
not be governed in the style of the seventeenth or eighteenth. 
It requires for its public work and enterprises a large, high­
ly trained, and technical staff of officials".
Industrialisation and the Conception of 
Positive Government
The old-fashioned local governmental machine was, as 
we have seen, crippled in the face of the increasing mass of 
duties which it had to undertake. Already in the latter part 
of the eighteenth century the Justices of the Peace had ap­
peared to be incapable of performing their functions properly. 
But as industrialisation was then in its preliminary stage, 
there were not many serious consequences to be faced. At the 
some time, the contemporary opinion towards the functions of 
government was still that of a negative one, so the laggard­
ness and the incompetency of some of the local authorities 
were not by any means regarded as critical. This attitude was 
seen even in the Victorian Agex-
To the Victorians, municipal government was a 
negative affair, to be invoked only in the last resort 
when the community was threatened with some dire evil 
and the machinery of private enterprise had unaccomutably 
broken down. There was a tardy and reluctant admission 
that municipal action was unavoidable in certain utili­
tarian and financially unprofitable fields; but a strong 
individualist feeling, epitomized in the social philo­
sophy of Herbert Spencer, denied that local authorities 
should be allowed to embark upon activities other than 
those which the exigencies of the time rendered impera­
tively necessary. (3)
1) Ibid., p.26.
2) Redlich & Hirst, op.cit., Vol.II., p.410.
3) Robson, The Development of Local Government, 1st ed., p.183.
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The beginning of the nineteenth century, however, saw 
a radical change iil^social and economic conditions of the co­
untry. Following the development of the Industrial Revolu­
tion, people began to gather round the places where there were 
factories. Hew black smoky towns were in rapid formation, and 
the old ones underwent a mushroom growth. Tue proliferation 
of population in congested acres of jerry-built hovels, the 
primitive method of the disposal of sewage and refuse, the 
frightful condition of streets and sanitation, all these meafct 
a choice between new administration and nation-wide disease 
and plague, (l) The occasional riots which arose in some places 
against factory-owners and the increasing number of outlaws on 
the highways which threatened the security of life and proper­
ty called for a more efficient police force than the unpaid 
constables. The existence of unemployment in the urban areas 
whicn was more alarming than the former agricultural vagrancy 
created a new problem for the foor Law. Moreover, industrial 
development required a good transport system, and the making 
of canals and the improvement of roads had to be undertaken.
A provision of new services to cope with all these 
new problems was imperative. As these were largely municipal 
problems, the movement for carrying out such servioes as the 
creation of new police forces, the lighting and paving of 
streets, the disposal of sewage and refuse, the provision of 
a wholesome water supply and that of medical services and 
hospitals, came for the most part from the towns. Sometimes 
the corporations took the initiative. More often it was a 
group of manufacturers or other residents who saw that there 
were problems to be solved. Another impetus to the establish­
ment of local services came from a reaction against the social 
evils of an early industrialism conducted on a laisses-faire 
philosophy. Already at the end of the eighteenth century and 
the beginning of the nineteenth, a number of speculative move­
ments aiming at political and social amelioration had generated 
and spread over the whole country. These movements were chief­
ly led by writers and propagandists who ’envisaged Utopias 
which would allow the nation to enjoy the benefits of the In­
dustrial Revolution without its evils*. (2 ) In response to 
this opinion, the social services and public utility services 
began to spring up in some large municipalities. Houusing, 
gas, water, electricity, local street transport, clinics, 
and welfare centres, etc., entered one after another into the 
field of local administration. These were attempted>not only
( 1 1 Guy Hunter, The British Way of Local Rule, 1943, p.10 .
(2 )  Lord Snell, The Town Council, See A Century of Municipal 
Progress, pp.7 0 -7 1 .
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to avoid undue monopoly and exploitation by private entre­
preneurs, but were also directed towards a desire ’for social 
justice, for freedom and beauty, and for the better appor­
tionment of all those things that make for a good life1. (1) 
Following the great advance in the science of preventive me­
dicine and engineering, there was a further drive for social 
reform— -the improvement of the environment and the preven­
tion of disease. Later on, the education of the general pu­
blic also became one of the main concerns of local authorities.
(2) Parliament later adopted most of these experiments so 
that eventually many social services embodied social measures 
of national scope such as Old Age Pensions, and health and 
unemployment insurance.
The success of these municipal movements stimulated 
enlightened public opinion to realise that public amenities 
could only be secured when more governmental services were 
supplied; and that governments should engaged not merely in 
preventing wrong things from being done, but in bringing it 
about that right things should be done. (3) At the present 
time, local authorities are no more regarded as what the Ame­
ricans term mere 'night-watch dogs', but as 'social welfare 
agencies'. It is unanimously demanded that the local services 
for which the ratepayers pay should add to the reasonable ame­
nities of the local area. Every qualified citizen in the lo­
cality is entitled to demand that he should receive in return 
healthy conditions and security up to the full value for his 
money. He may also inquire whether the local area can extend 
the range of its activities to the advantage of its inhabitants 
and of the general good. (4)
With this change in the conception of the proper func­
tions of government, and, in consequence, the expansion of 
governmental activities, there has been a great innovation 
in the local administrative machine. The amateur efforts of 
the unpaid country gentries which proved to be inefficient or 
even harmful have been replaced by the highly skilled adminis­
tration of a troop of well-trained staff. In order to meet 
the thousand-and-one employments which the government of a
(1) J. J. Clarke, The Local Government of the United Kingdom, 
1945, p.899.
(2) 'The purpose of the public elementary school is to form 
and strengthen the character, and to develop the intelli­
gence of the children entrusted to it'. See Introduction
to the Code for English public elementary schools as issued 
by the Board of Education from 1904 to 1926.
(3$ Graham Yallas, Government. See Public Administration,
Vol.VI., no.1, Jan., 1928, p.3.
(4) Lord Snell, op. cit., p.71.
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large modern city involves, a great number of specialists 
is appointed. Efficiency is essential to fulfil the insa­
tiable requirements of modern’life, and government must be 
positive before it can meet the approval of its citizens.
The Growth of Departmental Control
Industrialisation not only stimulated an increase in 
local activities in the early nineteenth century, it also 
gave birth to central administrative control. Though for a 
short time under the Tudors and earlier Stuarts the national 
Government attempted to control the activities of county 
Justices and parish Vestries, it appears that for nearly 
two hundred years after the civil war, the King's Government 
at Westminster lost all interest in local administration.
There was at that time no such organization as the Local 
Government Board or the Ministry of Health to take charge of 
local authorities. Before 1782 there was not even a separate 
Home Office. Until that date internal affairs were assigned, 
along with Irish matters and foreign relations with the Sou­
thern States of Europe, to the Southern Secretary of State.
(l) Even as late as in 1815, the Home Office only required 
an establishment of two under-secretaries and eighteen clerks. 
121
Although in those days the executive powers of the State 
had already been concentrated in a committee of the Privy Coun­
cil—  the Cabinet— a Ministry was not able to do anything 
beyond the impregnable frontiers of the law as interpreted by 
an independent judicature. Since there was no central control, 
the defects of local government went unchecked and unremedied. 
Mo civil servants watched for inefficiency, and no Parliamen­
tary representatives drew any attention to that part of the 
services of the community which affected the condition of the 
national life so closely and deeply. Progress, therefore, 
was slow and halting. (5)
(1) Sir E. Barker, op. cit., p.33.
(2) J. E. Jarratt, Changes of Relations Between Local Autho­
rities and Central Departments. See Public Administra­
tion, Vol. VIII, No.l, Jan., 1930, p.59. It has been 
cynically pointed out by Dr. Redlich that central control 
was politically unnecessary because the class which sat 
in Parliament was identical with the class which ruled 
the counties and controlled municipal government.
(3) Jennings, The Municipal Revolution, A Century of Munici­
pal Progress, pp.64-65.
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It was only when the civic disaster to which the In­
dustrial Revolution had given rise became apparent that Par­
liament began to seek for a remedy. Private local legisla­
tion was no longer adequate to meet the urgent requirements 
of the nation. All sorts of general Acts were rushed thro­
ugh Parliament to solve each particular civic problem. Thus 
the Poor Law Act of 1834 sought to keep down the tremendous 
cost of poor rates, the Highway Act of 1835 to remedy the 
appalling condition of the parochial roads; the Public Health 
Act of 1848 to stem the tide of death and disease caused by 
the insanitary conditions of life in the crowded industrial 
centres. But Parliament being a legislative assembly could 
do nothing more than the laying down of general principles 
according to which local administration should be directed.
It was too busy and in many respects ill-equipped to deal with 
minor local affairs. Besides, the grave issues caused by in­
dustrial problems required quick and constant adjustment.
They demanded a more flexible instrument of regulation than 
Parliamentary statute and judicial ruling. Since 1834, Par­
liament has entrusted the actual control of local adminis­
tration to various government departments---a measure which 
has made for greater efficiency and flexibility of control.
The government department possesses the information and tech­
nical knowledge necessary to give advice and wholesome super­
vision respecting local services. (1) Powers may be granted 
more readily; under some statutory provisions, local authori­
ties can acquire the power to act by the sole permission of 
the government department concerned; (2) and many of the pro­
visions which formerly had to be incorporated into local Acts 
may now be incorporated in provisional orders. (3)
(1) Professor Dicey pointed out that it is futile for Parlia­
ment to endeavour to work out the details of large legis­
lative changes. Such an endeavour only results in cum­
bersome and prolix statutes. See the Law of the Consti­
tution, 8th ed., 1915, p.50. J. S. Mill also thought it 
true that *a numerous assembly is as little fitted for the 
direct business of legislation as for that of administra­
tion* • Representative Government, 1861, Chap.V*, p.235.
(2) For instance, every town and country planning scheme, e- 
very clearance order or redevelopment order under the 
Housing Act, 1936, and every compulsory purchase order 
made under almost any Local Government Act, enables a 
local authority, with the sanction of the appropriate 
central department, to acquire new powers.
(3) Although such orders, made by the appropriate department 
at the request of the local authorities concerned, are to 
be scheduled to Provisional Orders Confirmation Bills for 
the sanction of the House of Commons, they are seldom
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In recent years, Parliament has conferred more and 
more power upon government departments, in the form of de­
legated legislation, to control local affairs. Services ad­
ministered by local authorities which are of national impor­
tance command the attention of, ^nd receive assistance from, 
central authorities. IncreasinglvjSxchequer grants are made 
to improve these services, especially where local resources 
are too meagre to meet urgent requirements. Inspectors are 
sent out to see whether services are properly done, and give 
advice as to how things can be improved. Regulations and 
circulars are issued from time to time setting forth the prin­
ciples and general policy to be observed by local authorities, 
•and suggesting to them the possible way of getting beneficial 
results. The hand of the central government is felt in prac­
tically every subsidised services. It is as a partner, how­
ever, and not as a master that the government departments de­
vote themselves to the careful control of local administra­
tion.
rejected. Moreover, this process can be even further 
simplified by means of issuing statutory special orders 
which become operative after ’lying on the table’ for 
a given number of days. In both these cases, Parliament 
retains formal control; in the latter case, it is little 
more than a form. See C. K. Allen, Bureaucracy Trium­
phant, 1931, p.26.
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CHAPTER I I .
FORMS OF CENTRAL CONTROL.
Autonomous l o c a l  governm ent i n  B r i t a i n  re c e iv e d  i t s  f i r s t  
b lo w  un de r the  Poor Law Amendment Act o f  1834. S ince  th a t  t im e  
the  c e n t r a l  government has endeavoured to  take  p a r t  i n  the  
i n t e r n a l  a d m in is t r a t io n  which the  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  p r e v io u s ly  
m o n op o lized . The c o - o p e r a t io n  has ta ke n  the fo rm  o f  a s e p a ra t io n  
o f  la b o u r ,  the  a c tu a l  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  the s e r v ic e s  b e in g  l e f t  
to  the  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  w h i le  th e  f u n c t io n  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  
governm ent has been to  a s s is t ,  s u p e rv is e  and c o n t r o l .  As the 
s e r v ic e s  concerned  have tended, i n c r e a s in g ly ,  to  be re ga rded  as 
o f  n a t i o n a l  im p o r ta n ce , th e y  have a t t r a c t e d  g r e a te r  a t t e n t i o n  
from th e  Government a t  W e s tm in s te r .  Of re c e n t  yea rs  the  
Government has k e p t a v e r y  f i r m  watch on the  p ro c e e d in g s  o f  the  
l o c a l  c o u n c i l s .  T h is  c o n t r o l  has take n  s e v e r a l  fo rm s , and to  
e s t im a te  how im p o r ta n t  a r o le  th e  c e n t r a l  d e p a r tm e n ts  have 
p la y e d ,  we must c o n s id e r  t h e i r  methods o f  c o n t r o l  i n  some d e t a i l .
1. Power to  Is s u e  R u le s . O rders  and R e g u la t io n s .  ( l ) .
The power o f  c e n t r a l  de p a r tm e n ts  to  is s u e  r u le s j ” o rd e rs  and 
r e g u la t io n s  was f i r s t  recommended by  the R oya l Commission on th e  
Poor Laws i n  1834 who th o u g h t  t h a t  th e  Poor Law Com m iss ioners 
o f  the  O e n t r a l  Board s h o u ld  "be empowered and d i r e c t e d  to  frame 
and e n fo rc e  r e g u la t io n s  f o r  th e  government o f  workhouses, and 
as to  th e  n a tu re  and amount o f  th e  r e l i e f  to  be g iv e n  and the
la b o u r  to  be exac ted  i n  them", and th a t  such r e g u la t io n s  s h o u ld
as f a r  as m ig h t  be p r a c t i c a b le ,  "be  u n i fo rm  th ro u g h o u t^  th e  
c o u n t r y "  ( 2 ) .  T h is  power to  make r e g u la t io n s  was s u b s e q u e n t ly  used 
to  the  f u l l e s t  e x te n t  by the c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  cha rge  o f  
p o o r  r e l i e f .  By a m u l t i t u d e  o f  r u le s  and o rd e rs  t h a t  d e fy  re v ie w , 
a l l  t h a t  concerned  o u td o o r  and in d o o r  r e l i e f ,  sch o o ls  and h o s p i t a l s  
and asylums f o r  th e  p o o r  was r e g u la te d  i n  such p r e c is e  d e t a i l  t h a t  
tne  p o o r  laws them selves sank i n t o  c o m p a ra t ive  i n s i g n i f i c a n c e  
b e fo re  th e  p o o r  law o r d e r s ,  so f a r  as th e  a c tu a l  work o f  a d m in i­
s t r a t i o n  was concerned . There was in d e e d  p r a c t i c a l l y  n o th in g  l e f t  
w h ich  was n o t  r e g u la te d  by o rd e rs  and i n s t r u c t i o n s .  The t im e  o f
nr The te r m in o lo g y  o f  s t a t u t e s  i s  so c h a o t ic  t h a t  o f f i c i a l  names 
o f  a d e p a r tm e n ts  v a r io u s  a c t i v i t i e s  are d i f f i c u l t  to  d i s t i n ­
g u is h .  I t  seems b e s t  to  a p p ly  th e  te rm  * ru le *  o r  ♦ r e g u la t io n *
to  the o rd in a n c e  w h ich  a f f e c t s  a c la s s  o f  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  
and the  term  ’ o rd e r*  to t h a t  wh ich  a f f e c t s  any one l o c a l  au tho­
r i t y  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  See S i r  Joan Maud, L o c a l Government i n
(3, pp-176-7-
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r i s i n g  and r e t i r i n g  o f  workhouse paupers , the  amount o f  soap 
g iv e n  to  each pe rson , the p r e p a r a t io n  o f  fo o d ,  the bap tism  o f  
i n f a n t s  b o rn  i n  the  workhouse, and many o th e r  m in o r  m a tte rs  
were the  s u b je c ts  which the  c e n t r a l  de partm en t ne ve r g o t  t i r e d  
o f  d e a l in g  w i t h .  As a r e s u l t ,  the l o c a l  p o o r  law  a u t h o r i t i e s  
and t h e i r  o f f i c e r s  were, to  use Dr, R e d l ic h *s  words, • so o v e r ­
dosed w i th  o rd e rs *  th a t  a lm ost eve ry  a c t  seemed to  be pe rfo rm ed 
u n d e r  a p r e s c r i p t i o n  o f  the  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y .
A lth o u g h  i t  has o f t e n  been s a id  th a t  the e x te n s iv e n e s s  
o f  c e n t r a l  a d m in is t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  poor law  r e l i e f  was an 
e x c e p t io n a l  case i n  the B r i t i s h  l o c a l  government system, n e ve r­
th e le s s ,  c o n s id e ra b le  powers have a ls o  been g iv e n  to  o th e r  
governm ent departm ents  by Px^ar 1 i  amen t a r  y  s t a t u t e .  Under s e c t io n  
143 o f  the  P u b l ic  H e a lth  Act, 1936, th e  M in i s t e r  o f  H e a lth  was 
empowered to  make r e g u la t io n s  f o r  the  p r e v e n t io n  and t re a tm e n t  
o f  i n f e c t i o u s  d is e a s e s .  E x te n s iv e  powers have a ls o  been g iv e n  
to  c e n t r a l  depa rtm en ts  to  make r u le s ,  o rd e rs  and r e g u la t io n s  
i n  re s p e c t  o f  e d u c a t io n ,  h ighways, p o l i c e ,  h o ua in g  and town and 
c o u n t r y  p la n n in g ,4
Such powers have n o rm a l ly  been g ra n te d  i n  re c e n t  y e a rs  
as a r e s u l t  o f  the  e xp ans io n  i n  the  p r a c t i c e  o f  d e le g a te d  
l e g i s l a t i o n .  P a r t l y  due to  th e  g row ing  c o m p le x i ty  and t e c h n ic a l  
c h a r a c te r  o f  l o c a l  governm ent and p a r t l y  to  an in c re a s e  i n  th e  
b u s in e s s  o f  P a r l ia m e n t  as f u r t h e r  s u b je c ts  have been b ro u g h t  
w i t h i n  th e  sphere o f  S ta te  a c t i v i t y ,  p a r l ia m e n ta r y  t im e  no 
lo n g e r  a l lo w s  o f  d e t a i l e d  l e g i s l a t i o n .  A t t e n t io n  i s  g e n e r a l l y  
c o n f in e d  to  m a t te rs  o f  p r i n c i p l e  o n ly ,  ( l )  and governm ent d e p a r t ­
ments p ro ce e d  to  f i l l  the l e g i s l a t i v e  s k e le to n  w i t h  o rd e rs  and 
r e g u la t i o n s .  W ith  t h i s  power i n  hand, the  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  
a re *no  lo n g e r  c o n te n t  to p r o v id e  by o rd e rs  and r e g u la t io n s  what 
s h a l l  be done o r  what may be d o n e ',  th e y  c o n s id e r  i t * d e s i r a b l e  
to  p r o v id e  a lso  how i t  s h a l l  be done*. ( 2 ) .
11, C o n t r o l  o v e r  O f f i c e r s . Speaking g e n e r a l ly ,  a 
l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  i n  B r i t a i n ,  e s p e c ia l l y  a m u n ic ip a l  c o r p o r a t io n ,  
en jo ys  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  freedom  i n  the  c r e a t io n  o f  a d m in is t r a t i v e  
m a ch in e ry .  I n  the  fo r m a t io n  o f  a l o c a l  c o u n c i l  by d i r e c t  o r  
i n d i r e c t  e le c t i o n ,  no c e n t r a l  de pa r tm en t can e x e r t  any in f lu e n c e  
w ha tsoeve r, A lo c a l  c o u n c i l  c a n n o t be d is s o lv e d  by  any admin­
i s t r a t i v e  a c t io n  o f  the  c e n t r a l  government, however much i t  may 
n e g le c t  i t s  d u t ie s .  Even i n  the  fo r m a t io n  o f  com m ittee s , l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  are s t i l l  l a r g e l y  f r e e  from  d e p a r tm e n ta l  c o n t r o l .  
P a r l ia m e n ta r y  s t a t u t e s  m ig h t  r e q u i r e  th a t  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  shou ld  
a p p o in t  such and such com m ittees  f o r  c e r t a i n  pu rposes , e .g . 
watch, e d u c a t io n ,  a l lo tm e n ts ,  h e a l th ,  p la n n in g ,  e tc .  ; b u t  
c e n t r a l  departm ents  have no r i g h t  to  i n t e r f e r e ,  excep t i n  some 
cases where th e  membership o f  th e  com m ittee  must depend on a
u y .  S i r ^ f o i in  Maud, op. c i V 7  p 7 l7 9 .  ‘
(2 )  . J e n n in g s , L o c a l Government Law, 3 rd . e d . , 1947, p. 223.
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scheme s u b je c t  to  i t s  a p p ro v a l .  A p a r t from  these  s t a t u t o r y  
commit te e s , however, l o c a l  c o u n c i l s  have com p le te  freedom to  
a p p o in t  w ha te ve r com m ittees they  l i k e ;  to  c o -o p t  upon any 
com m ittee  persons who are  n o t  members o f  the  c o u n c i l ,  s u b je c t  
o n ly  to  th e  l i m i t a t i o n  t h a t  t h e i r  number must n o t  exceed one 
t h i r d  o f  the  w ho le ; and to  d e le g a te  any o f  i t s  powers to  a 
com m ittee  o th e r  tha n  those  r e l a t i n g  to  th e  r a i s i n g  o f  r a te s o r  
th e  b o r r jw in g  o f  money, ( l ) .
N e v e r th e le s s ,  d e p a r tm e n ta l  c o n t r o l  o ve r c e r t a i n  l o c a l  
o f f i c e r s  i s  more s i g n i f i c a n t ;  though i n  g e n e ra l  l o c a l  au tho ­
r i t i e s  have com p le te  freedom  to  a p p o in t  such o f f i c e r s ,  w i th  
such q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  and a t  such s a la r ie s  as they  t h i n k  f i t ;  
and th e y  h o ld  o f f i c e  o n ly  d u r in g  the p le a s u re  o f  the  em p loy ing  
c o u n c i ls .  Even b e fo re  t o t a l  f i n a n c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  Poor 
Law s e r v ic e s  was t r a n s f e r r e d  to  the  S ta te  (2) the  c e n t r a l  
governm ent hadf e x t r a o r d in a r y  power to  in te r v e n e  w i t h  re g a rd  to  
p o o r  law o f f i c e r s .  The a p p o in tm e n t o f  a l l  ’ s e n io r  p o o r  law 
o f f i c e r s *  (3 ) and th e  f i x i n g  o f  t h e i r  s a la r ie s  had t o  be re p o r te d  
to  the  government d e p a r tm e n t and to  g e t i t s  a p p ro v a l ;  though 
i n  f a c t  i t  was the  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  th a t  employed and p a id  f o r  
the se  o f f i c e r s .  The c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  m ig h t  a ls o  d e f in e  th e  
d u t ie s  to  be p e rfo rm e d  by o f f i c e r s  concerned w i t h  the  r e l i e f  o f  
the  p o o r ;  and the  c h i e f  o f f i c e r  was r e q u i r e d  to  c a r r y  on the 
whole co rrespondence  i n  re s p e c t  o f  t h i s  s e r v ic e ,  keep th e  accoun ts  
and r e p o r t  to  the c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y .  F u r th e rm o re , th e  l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  had n o ^ r ig h t  to  d is m is s  an o f f i c e r  w i t h o u t  the  
c o n s e n t o f  the  d e pa rtm en t,  (4 )  w h ich , on the  c o n t r a r y ,  m ig h t  dismijiur 
o r  suspend any o f f i c e r  whom i t  c o n s id e re d  u n f i t  f o r  o r  incom ­
p e te n t  to d is c h a rg e  h is  d u t ie s .
(1 ) G.M. H a r r is ,  L o c a l  S e lf-G o ve rn m e n t i n  B r i t a i n ,  p p . 60-61 .
(2 )  By th e  N a t io n a l  A s s is ta n c e  A c t, 1948.
(3 )  A c c o rd in g  to  th e  P u b l ic  A s s is ta n c e  O rder o f  1930, the  s e n io r  
poor law  o f f i c e r s  in c lu d e d  th e  m e d ic a l  o f f i c e r s ,  m a s te rs , 
m a trons , r e l i e v i n g  o f f i c e r s ,  p u b l i c  a s s is ta n c e  o f f i c e r ^ ,  
s u p e r in te n d e n ts ,  s tew a rds , c h a p la in s  and s e n io r  nu rses .
(4 )  The c o n t r o l l i n g  power o f  th e  c e n t r a l  depa rtm en t i n  t h i s  
m a t te r  m ig h t  be i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F ie ld  v P o p la r  Borough 
C o u n c i l  (1929) 1 K.B. 750, where a borough c o u n c i l  had 
reduced the  s a la r y  o f  th e  s e n io r  s a n i t a r y  i n s p e c t o r  f i t h  
th e  consen t o f  th e  M in i s t e r ,  the o f f i c e r  n o t  h a v in g  been 
d ism isse d  o r  re s ig n e d  o r  consen ted  to  th e  re d u c t io n ,  and 
i t  was h e ld  t h a t  the  c o u n c i l  had no power to  mako th e  
reduc t i o n .
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I f  t h i s  s h o u ld  happen, i t  n i g h t  r e q u i r e  the l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  
to  a p p o in t  a f i t  and p ro p e r  pe rso n  i n  h is  p la c e ;  and m ig h t  
i t s e l f  a p p o in t  the o f f i c e r  i n  d e f a u l t  o f  the  p o o r  law a u t h o r i t y .  
P ens ions , aga in , c o u ld  o n ly  be g ra n te d  i f  the  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  
agreed. Indeed , the powers o f  th e  c e n t r a l  depa rtm en t re g a rd in g  
p o o r  law  o f f i c e r s  were so e x te n s iv e  th a t  i n  c e r t a i n  c irc u m s ta n c e s  
th e y  had to do what the  c e n t r a l  departm ent t o l d  them, re g a rd le s s  
o f  the  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  in s  t ru e  t i o n s . (  1 ) .  I n  t h i s  manner, the 
a d m in is t r a t i o n  o f  the Poor Law i n  B r i t a i n  was b ro u g h t  c lo s e ly  
u n d e r  th e  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  d e p a r tm e n t.
The P u b l ic  H e a l th  A c t o f  1875 c o n ta in e d  a g e n e ra l  p r o ­
v i s i o n  t h a t  where any p a r t  o f  the  s a la r y  o f  a l o c a l  h e a l th  
o f f i c e r  was p ro v id e d  o u t  o f  the moneys v o te d  by P a r l ia m e n t ,  the  
Q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  c o n d i t io n s  o f  appo in tm en t, d u t ie s ,  s a la r y  and 
te n u re  o f  o f f i c e ,  m ig h t  be r e g u la te d  by the L o c a l  Government Board. 
(S e c t .  191 .) The S a n i t a r y  O f f i c e r s  O rd e r o f  1910 p ro v id e d  t h a t  
a l l  m e d ic a l  o f f i c e r s  o f  h e a l t h  and in s p e c to r s  o f  n u isance s , one 
h a l f  o f  whose s a la r ie s  was p a id  from  c e n t r a l  fu n d s , sh o u ld  n o t  
be removed from  o f f i c e  w i th o u t  the  co n sen t o f  the  L o c a l 
Government Board . ( 2 ; .
The re c e n t  p r o v is io n s  on t h i s  s u b je c t  may be seen in  
the  L o c a l Government Act o f  1955 w h ich  ag a in  s t i p u la t e d  t h a t  the  
c l e r k  o f  a co u n ty  c o u n c i l  as w e l l  as a c o u n ty  m e d ic a l  o f f i c e r  o f  
h e a l t h  sho u ld  n o t  be d is m is s e d  w i t h o u t  the co n se n t o f  th e  M in i s t e r  
o f  H e a lth ,  and t h a t  the M in i s t e r  sho u ld  have the  power to  make 
r e g u la t io n s  r e l a t i n g  to  the  mode o f  a p po in tm en t,  s a la r y ,  and 
te n u re  o f  o f f i c e  o f  m e d ic a l  o f f i c e r s  o f  h e a l t h  and s a n i t a r y  
in s p e c to r s .  The h a t t e r  powers were extended to  m e d ic a l  o f f i c e r s  
o f  h e a l t h  and s a n i t a r y  in s p e c to r s  o f  p o r t  h e a l t h  d i s t r i c t s  by 
the  P u b l ic  H e a lth  Act, 1956. I t  i s  a lso  to  be n o te d  i n ' t h i s  
c o n n e c t io n  t h a t  the  a p p o in tm e n t and rem ova l o f  c h i e f  c o n s ta b le s  
are  s u b je c t  to the a p p ro v a l o f  the  Home S e c r e ta r y ;  and t h a t  the  
M in i s t e r  o f  T ra n s p o r t  can in te rv e n e  i n  th e  case o f  s u rv e y o rs  and 
e n g in e e rs  i f  th e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  accepts a p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e i r  
s a l a r i e s  from  the c e n t r a l  de p a r tm e n t.  A p a r t  from  these , l o c a l  
governm ent o f f i c e r s  o v e r  whom the c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  e x e rc is e  
c o n t r o l  are the  in s p e c to r s  o f  w e ig h ts  and measures and the  gas 
m e te rs ,  and a g r i c u l t u r a l  ana lys  t s .  ( 3 ) .
I I I .  C o n t r o l  Through I n s p e c t io n  and I n q u i r i e s , A f u r t h e r  
method by which the  c e n t r a l  departm ents  Save e x e rc is e d  c o n t r o l  
o v e r  l o c a l  government i s  by the  appo in tm en t o f  in s p e c to r s  i n  th e  
case o f  th e  p o o r  law, p u b l ic  h e a l th ,  p o l i c e  and e d u c a t io n  s e r v ic e s .
XT] 3TF*John Maud, op. c i t . , p . 19*.
12. a i r  A r th u r  Jlewsholme, ih e  M i n i s t r y  o f  H e a lth ,  1925, p . 38.
(3 )  G. M. H a r r is ,  op. c i t . , p. 91.
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The p r i n c i p l e  o f  * in sp e c  t a o i i x  t y  • as in v e n te d  and promoted by 
Jeremy Bentnaa has tu rn e d  o u t  to  be one o f  tne  most u s e fu l  and 
im p o r ta n t  f u n c t io n s  i n  B r i t i s h  p u b l i c  a d m in is t r a t io n .  The 
p r i n c i p l e  was f i r s t  adoptod b y  Lo rd  Grey* s Government i n  1833, 
and in s p e c to r s  were s e n t  round  the  c o u n t r y  to  see t h a t  the 
F a c to ry  Acts  were b e in g  observed  i n  th e  m a n u fa c tu r in g  d i s t r i c t s .  
I n s p e c t io n  was f u r t h e r  recommended by the  R oya l Commission i n  
the f o l l o w in g  ye a r, .w h ich  advocated  c o n s ta n t  s u p e r v is io n  o f  p o o r 
law  a d m in is t r a t io n  by  A s s is ta n t  C om m iss ioners. F o l lo w in g  on t h i s  
recommendation the T o o r  Law A c t,  1834, p ro v id e d  f o r  the  
a p po in tm en t o f  A s s is ta n t  Comm issioners who were se n t o u t  to  
in s p e c t  the a c tu a l  work  o f  l o c a l  poor r e l i e f .  Under the  e n th u s ­
i a s t i c  s t im u lu s  o f  Edwin Chadwick, th e y  d id  most u s e f u l  work, 
l e t  the. a t te m p t o f  the c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  to  c o r r e l a t e  and 
c o n t r o l  the  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  p ro vo ke d  a s to rm  o f  
o p p o s i t i o n ;  and th e  * th re e  Bashaws o f  Somerset House1, as the  
C e m tra l  Board o f  Poor Law was then  nicknamed, were e v e n tu a l ly  
removed i n  th e  fa ce  o f  th e  s t ro n g  a t ta c k s  o f  Te u lm in  Sm ith  and 
B en jam in  D i s r a e l i .  N e v e r th e le s s  the  system o f  the  in s p e c to r a te  
s u r v iv e d .  I t  has s in ce  become an e x t re m e ly  v a lu a b le  method 
w h ich  has h e lp e d  ’ to  o b ta in  th e  advantages o f  e f f i c i e n c y  w i th o u t  
th e  in cu b u s  o f  b u re a u c ra c y * .  ( 1 ) .
The in s p e c to r s  are the  eyes and ears and tongues o f  the  
c e n t r a l  government. Most o f  them have been h o n e s t ,  cap ab le , and 
w e l l  p a id  e x p e r ts .  T h e i r  c lo s e  a cq u a in ta n c e  w i t h  l o c a l  needs 
enab les  them to keep the  c e n t r a l  depa rtm en ts  f u l l y  in fo rm e d  o f  
the  l o c a l  c o n d i t io n s  as w e l l  as the m e r i t s  o r  d e fe c ts  o f  the  
r e s p e c t iv e  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  the  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  t h e i r  s e rv ic e s .  
They go abou t to  see w he the r the law  and o rd e rs  is s u e d  by the  
departm en ts  are d u ly  and c o m p le te ly  c a r r ie d  o u t ,  and use t h e i r  
own judgem ent and e xp e r ie n c e  to  a id ,  adv ise  and warn. In  t h i s  
way, the  c e n t r a l  de pa r tm en t i s  ab le  to  ge t a f i r m  fo o th o ld  i n  
l o c a l  a d m in is t r a t io n ,  and to  take  the  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  improvements."
I t  has been s a id  t h a t  an in s p e c to r  i s  * a  c o l l e c t o r  and 
d i s t r i b u t o r  o f  in fo r m a t io n *  who combines * the t e c h n ic a l  know­
ledge  o f  an e x p e r t  w i th  som eth ing  o f  the  l o c a l  knowledge o f  an 
i n h a b i t a n t * ;  and who can a p p ly  * the  e xp e r ie n ce  o f  one d i s t r i c t  to  
th e  re q u ire m e n ts  o f  a n o th e r,  and the  m e r i t s  o f  one a u t h o r i t y  to  
the  d e fe c ts  o f  a n o th e r* .  M oreover, w i th  in f o r m a t io n  from 
in s p e c t io n s  i n  a l l  p a r t s  o f  th e  c o u n t r y  a c c u m u la t in g  i n  the  
c e n t r a l  o f f i c e s ,  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  o f  th e  r e s p e c t iv e  government 
depa r tm en ts  are b e t t e r  q u a l i f i e d  to  r e p o r t  to  P a r l ia m e n t  from  
t im e  to  t im e  upon the  c o n d i t io n s  o f  a d m in is t r a t io n ,  and to  
p ropo se  such amendments to  th e  law as are shown by e x p e r ie n c e  
to  be n e ce ssa ry  o r  d e s i r a b le ;  and a t  the same t im e  to  gu ide  and 
d i r e c t  th e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  a lo n g  the p a th  marked o u t  by the  
law . ( 2 ) .
T i l  f f e d l i c S T S ^ l i r s t ,  op,s c i t . ,  v o l .  1 1 . , p . 251.
(2 )  I b i d . ,  p. 248 e t  seq.
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Tne inspector may also hold a local inquiry wherever a 
central department thinks it necessary or desirable to do so 
in ©raer to enable it to exercise properly its discretion in 
confirming or refusing the applications of local authorities 
for loans or other matters. (2). At these inquiries the 
inspector who presides as the representative of the central 
department hears the case for and against the locajL authority.
He may summon witnesses, examine them on oath, Mall for the 
production of books and papers, and charge the cost to the 
local authority concerned. (2).
The local inquiries held by inspectors give invaluable 
assistance to the central authorities. The late Lord Long, who 
had himself been Parliamentary Secretary and President of the 
Local Government Board, and in this capacity had seen, and 
taken decisions upon, a number of reports made by inspectors, 
gave the Royal Commission on Local Government, (1925), the 
following summary of his uiews on the merits of this procedure :-
< ( 3) .
I have always thought— and I have had considerable 
experience, because I was six years Under-Secretary and five 
years President— that the inquiries conducted by the inspectors 
are among the very best forms of inquiry that you can possibly 
have. The President of the Local Government Board has the 
power to associate with the ordinary inspector an expert or a 
barrister, or any one else whom he thinks may assist the inspector 
if he anticipates exceptional difficulties; and I cannot call to 
mind at this moment a single case in which the reports made by 
the inspectors were not remarkable alike for their clearness and 
their impartiality.5
The extent of the supervisory functions which have been 
exercised by the inspectors over pauperism and poor relief may 
serve as an illustration of the great influence inspection may 
exert upon local government.
11) The central department also holds local inquiries in regard 
to matters in respect of which it is an appellate authority, 
e.g. appeals under the town and Counlfr Planning Act. 1947 etc.
(2) Section 290 of the Local Government Act, 1933, provided for 
the holding of inquiries by government departments and the 
giving of evidence by witnesses at such, and prescribed 
penalties for failure to attend. The section related to 
inquiries directed by the Home Secretary, the Minister of 
Health, the Minister of Transport, or any board of 
Commissioners.
(3) First Report on Local Government, Cmd.2506/1925, pp. 17L-2.
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Before the recent alteration in the Poor Law, I lj Britain was 
divided into several large districts for the purpose of inspection. 
There was a general inspector in charge of each district whose 
work it was, not only to watch local authorities and report their 
doings to the central department, but also to give them friendly 
and trustworthy instruction. He could visit and inspect every 
workhouse or place in which any poor person in receipt of relief 
was lodged, and could attend any meeting of .a county or county 
borough council or committee or sub-committee held for the relief 
of the poor, and take part in their deliberations and discussions; 
but he had no right to vote at the meeting. (2) It was his duty 
to keep close contact with the public assistance authorities in 
orier to guide them on a policy approved by the central department. 
Some of his advice might not altogether be acceptable to the 
authorities. In that case, he had to smooth away unnecessary 
causes of friction by tactful persuasion. In the last resort, he 
might make an adverse report to the department when, if necessary, 
a peremptory order could be used to secure the compliance of the 
authorities with the wishes of the department. In fact, the 
opinion and advice of the inspector was frequently sought and 
followed. Most of the local authorities looked to him for infor­
mation about successful methods of administration elsewhere in his 
district. Besides, the public assistance officers often found it 
helpful to discuss matters informally with the inspector before an 
official communication was sent to the central department. It was 
spmetimes desirable that the authority should be informed as to 
the views the central authority were likely to take of any proposa}. 
In this case, the inspector was the proper man for them to consult. 
This often facilitated the official correspondence between the 
local council and the central department. (3) The Royal Commission 
on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress, which reported in 190$, 
expressed the view that the control exercised by government depart­
ments over public assistance authorities, depended always for its 
efficiency on the existence of a staff of peripatetic agents of the 
department who could keep the local administration constantly under 
observation, help the department to form its judgements and convey 
to the local authorities the advice and instructions in which the 
policy of the department was from time to time embodied. It is 
not inappropriate, that Poor Law inspectors were referred to in the 
same report by a witness as the 'confidential advisers and friends' 
of the local authorities.
In spite of the usefulness ofthe system of inspection, it
has not however been extensively used. It has been applied to only
TlJ Sot fcsicu/^  bk. 173 - L .
(2) Section 9, Boor Law Act, 1930.
(3) John Moss, the Ministry of Health in Relation to Public
Assistance; Journal of Public Administration, vol. XVll,
Mo. 3, July, 1939, p. 242.
-24-
two other important local government services, namely, police 
and education; and in both cases this was due to the necessity 
of grants in aid. (1).
The Inspectors of Constabulary appointed by the Home 
Secretary inspect each force annually and make a report. Local 
authorities have to receive a certificate of efficiency before 
they qualify for the 50 per cent, grant.
The inspection of education has had a history almost as 
long as that of the Poor Law services. The powers of the central 
department in this service are described in the Grant Regulations 
under the Sducation Act. 1921. These provided for the inspection 
of schools in order that the Board of Education might be satisfied 
that a local authority had performed its duties under the Act, 
and complied with the regulations and supplied such information 
and returns as the Board required. Section 77 of the Sducation 
Act, 1944, also made it the duty of the Minister of Sducation 
’to cause inspections to be made of every educational establishment 
at such intervals as appear to him to be appropriate, and to 
cause a special inspection of any such establishment to be made 
whenever he considers such an inspection to bo desirable’.
As the functions of His Majesty's Inspectors of Schools 
are mainly to assist the localities, they have done admirable 
work for the development of educational services, and so are, 
as a rule, welcomed by the local authorities.
IV. Confirmation of Schemes and Bye laws. During recent 
years there has been an extension of the practice of tequiring 
local authorities to submit schemes to the central departments, 
showing how the local authority intends to carry out its duties 
under various Acts. This relates to such matters as the schemes 
for the administration of Public Assistance under the Local 
Government Act of 1929; the schemes under the Housing Act, 1936, 
and the Education Act, 1944; and the Town and Country Planning 
Schemes under the Acts of 1932 and 1947. As the scheme usually 
imposes additional obligations and confers additional powers on 
the local authority, it must be confirmed by the central depart­
ment before it can come into force.
The power of the central authority in sanctioning admini­
strative schemes may be seen best in ,the Town and Country Planning 
Act, 1932, and the Housing Act, 1936. In the former case, local
I D  til ere were, however, also inspectors of the Road Department 
of the Ministry of Transport who inspected regularly the
highways of the country; inspectors of the Boarc of Trade
who ensured that Heal standards of weights and measures 
confornfjjwith the national standards; and inspectors of the 
Board of Control who visited mental hospitals frequently and 
made reports.But these were of minor importance.
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authorities were empowered to make schemes 'with the general 
object of controlling the development of the land comprised 
in the area to which the schemes applied, of securing proper 
sanitary conditions, amenity and convenience, and of preser­
ving existing buildings and other objects of architectural, 
historic, or artistic interest and places of natural interest 
or beauty and generally of protecting existing amenities whether 
in urban or rural portions of the area*. The Act required 
that, before the p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  a scheme, the local authority 
concerned should first pass a resolution and acquire the 
approval of the Minister of Health. When the scheme was drafted, 
it should be submitted to the Minister for his approval, and 
he might approve with or without modification. When this was 
done, the scheme $ad to be laid before both Houses of Parliament. 
During the process of confirmation, any person aggrieved was 
entitled to make representations to the Minister, or make an 
application to the High Court on the ground that the scheme was’ 
ultra vires or that it did not follow the procedure prescribed 
by the Act. When objections were made to the Ministerfc he had 
to hold a local enquiry before he confirmed the scheme.
The same principle applied to the procedure for schemes 
under the Housing Act of 1936. Ministerial approval had to be 4 
acquired in order to secure the enforcement of a housing scheme. 
This might involve an application for grants fpr building or 
the raising of a loan to meet such expenditure. Both the 
clearance orders and re-de*®lopment schemes also required the 
approval of the Minister. Besides, where there was a necessity 
to purchase land compulsorily for whatever purpose, the local 
authority might, instead of applying for a provisional order as 
was the case before, submit a draft compulsory purchase scheme 
to the Minister, whojhad power to confirm it and thus gave it 
legal effect without'^being laid before Parliament.
In order to make the administrative schemes of the 
local authorities comply with the policy of the Government, , 
central departments have sometimes worked out model schemes.
If local authorities want to draft a scheme different from the 
model ones, they have to show good reasons; otherwise they may 
fail to obtain the necessary confirmation.'
Apart from the administrative schemes, there are many 
occasions when a local authority has to make byelaws under 
general statutory powers. Of these byelaws, those which are 
concerned with the public health require the confirmation 
of the Minister of Health; while those passed in the interest 
of law and order must be sent to the Home Office, subject to 
the possibility of being annulled within forty days by an Order 
in Council. In Scotland the Scottish Office is £he confirming 
authority. The rule of procedure for the making of byelaws 
requires that a period of at least one month must elapse before
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application is made to the confirming authority; and in the 
interval, notice of the intention must be locally advertised, 
so that persons who object can make representations to the 
confirming authority.
Although the powers to make byelaws are usually vested 
by law in the local authorities as a right, it may be a duty to 
exercise these powers when the Minister thinks it appropriate. 
Section 61 (1) of the Public Health Act, 1936, for example, 
provided that 'every local authority may, and, if required by 
the Minister, shall'make byelaws for certain purposes. If thqy 
failed to do so, the Minister had tfce power to act in default.
Just as in the case of the administrative schemes, 
government departments tyave, for most of the purposes for which 
byelaws can be made, issued models in order to avoid deviations. 
Local authorities, therefore, are not able to enjoy much freedom 
and discretion in the matter. They have to consult the central 
officials during the preparation of a new or revised series of 
byelaws; and the result always represents a gradual elimination 
of any proposed deviations. £=*#•. If they should defy the policy 
of the central authority, the latter always has power to amend 
or reject.
The power and influence of government departments in the 
confirmation and revision of byelaws is significant.1 Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that whenever a byelaw is ultra vires or 'un­
reasonable', the person aggrieved is entitled to appeal to the 
Court, and that the department's approval is of no avail if a 
byelaw is held to be illegal.
Advisory Control. In addition to the supervisory and 
coercive functions of the central departments, and their powers of 
confirmation of local administrative schemes and byelaws,
Whitehall takes up a further responsibility, namely, the provision 
of expert advice on all the problems of local government. The 
wide knowledge and experience which the centra^ authorities have 
accumulated are available to local authorities. This is of 
extreme value to local councillors and officials. A collection 
is made of the successful experiments in economical or efficient 
administration which have been worked out by some active author­
ities; and of statistics relating to the costs of various 
services in different countries and boroughs. (1). The results 
of these investigations are put entirely at the disposal of the 
local authorities by means of circulars and memoranda.'
The information and advice provided by these numerous 
circulars and memoranda cover a host of topics. The communication
ITT Sir John Maud, op. cit., p. 193.
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may take the form of a summary of a new Act, printed with notes 
explaining the meaning and policy of the Act and the manner in which 
it will be applied, so that there shall be no excuse for the local 
authorities failing to understand its terms or their duties in 
carrying the new legislation into effect. As statutes and orders 
have grown rapidly both in complexity and size of recent years, 
this sort of explanatory matter has become indispensable. Some 
problems present unusual difficulties, and expert advice is very 
necessary. How to eradicate bugs from dwelling houses, for example, 
or how to deal with^unusual disease of Psittacosis or ?arrot 
disease, are questions which have been made the subject of 
reports issued by the Ministry of Health with great assistance to 
the people who have to deal with them. The admirable work which 
the Local Government Board has done for the local authorities in 
this respect is revealed by Sir Arthur Hewsholme in the following 
passage:- (1)
....In the history of the Board, and especially from 
1890 onwards, many printed reports giving the results of sanitary 
and epidemiological investigations by medical inspectors let 
light into the dark places, and fom§d models for local health 
officers of methods of investigation. The publication of weekly 
returns of notifiable diseases and the issue of reports, the 
deliberate object of which was to bring into the limelight 
districts with excessive mortality, did much to favour reform.1 
Reference may be made for instance to Dr.S.W.Wheaton's report 
on the Incidence of Enteric Fever in the different sanitary 
districts of the County of Durham; and to three reports on 
Infant and Child Mortality and a report on Maternal Mortality 
in the different sanitary areas of England and Wales which were 
issued from the Medical Department of the Board and which left 
backward authorities no excuse for making further default in 
measures to secure improvement....
In addition to shorter pamphlets and a mass of statist­
ical information, the government departments also publish annual 
reports stating the general progress which has been made by 
local authorities all over the country during the year. The 
observations which are contained in these reports always serve 
as a good reference for local government officials. It may be 
found, fo^instance, from the statistical survey that one 
authorities* refuse at half the cost per head of another. If 
txiis is pointed out, the second authority may be able to find 
out where its system is wasteful, and, in the face of publicity 
local pride may encourage it to make improAeats. So we may say 
that, although these circulars and memoranaa have not the force
riT The~M inis try of Health, 1925, pp. 24-25.
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ji statutory regulations, the instructions and directions 
supplied and the expert information made available are of 
great service to local authorities.
Apart from this means of communication, local govern­
ment officials can always apply to the appropriate government 
department for expert advice on any problem. The question 
raised by the local authority may be one over which the depart­
ment has no legal control, yet even in this case, they will 
meet with a courteous response, and an opinion is usually 
given which will help the authority a great deal. Sometimes 
local officials may even go to London and discuss difficult 
problems in a private interview with the senior officials or 
the expert advisers at Whitehall. "All this;1 writes Dr.Finer, 
"improves local administration, adds to the knowledge of the 
central authorities, evokes the gratitude of the local author­
ities, and leads them to look to the central departments as 
benevolently concerned with the improvement of local govern­
ment"*! I}.
The advisory function of the central departments is 
facilitated by certain consultative committees. These committees 
are a means whereby the departments consult about and investigate 
the subjects which they are concerned with, and inform them­
selves of the views and wishes of local authorities. Some of 
these committees are of a permenant nature. The Ministry of 
Health, for example, has an Advisory Committee on Water Supply 
which has in recent years issued several instructive reports. 
There are also the committees concerned with Insurance and 
Pensions. The Ministry of Sducation ham also consultative 
councils which have been given special educational problems to 
consider and report upon. Of these the Consultative Council 
for Broadcast Adult Education and that for Broadcasting to the 
Schools may be mentioned. (2).
VI. Appellate Functions. Government departments are als* 
empowered to hear appeals in certain administrative actions.
They can settle or arrange for the settlement of disputes between 
local authorities or between a local authority and a private 
individual. These functions of a judicial or a quasi-judicial 
kind are laid out in the Acts concerned with such matters as 
education, public health, highways, housing, and town and country 
planning. Thus, for example, if a dispute were to arise between 
a local education authority and the manager of a school not 
provided by the authority, the Board of Sducation would have to
T1). Herb’orlrFiner, Principles of Local Government Law, Chap. tf.
(2/. Sir John Maud, op. cit., p. 194.
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make a decision, usually after holding a local inquiry at 
which all parties could he heard. The decision so made by the 
Board would be regarded as final and conclusive. (l). Again, 
under section 268 of the Public Health Act 1875, it was provided 
that if a local authority to3k up responsibility for the upkeep 
of a road which has previously been private, and then claimed 
repayment from the people living beside it, the persons affected 
could address a memorial to the Local Government Board stating 
the grounds of their complaint. In this case, the department 
was authorised to make whatever decision it thought equitable, 
and the order which it issued was binding and conclusive on all 
parties. Elsewhere, provision has been made that appeals against 
the refusal of a local authority to allow ’interim development* 
in any area covered by a town and country planning resolution 
should go to the Minister of Town and Country Planning; that 
appeals in respect of ribbon development should go to the Minister 
of Transport; and, in a most common case, that if the District 
Aiditor disallow some item of expenditure and surcharged it to 
the responsible member of the local authority, the Minister of 
Health might be asked to remit the surcharge.
The rapid accumulation of judicial powers by the ex­
ecutive since the beginning of this century Mas excited much 
criticism on the ground that it encroaches on the sphere of the 
courts of law. Attacks have also been directed towards the 
manner and procedure whereby the departments administer this 
judicial function. In particular the methods of these depart­
mental tribunals, have been regarded as objectionable on the 
following grounds;- (i) The departmental tribunals are not 
necessarily public; they work in the dark and decide legal issues 
by methods of their own manufacture, (iij There is often no oral 
hearing of theiy parties(iii) The decisions made by the depart­
ments are in many cases final and conclusive; there is no possibil­
ity of appeal. This not only deprives the subject of an important 
means of redress, but also removes an effective stimulus to 
careful judgement. (iv) There are frequently no recorded pre­
cedents; the decisions, therefore, lack certainty, uniformity 
and continuity. (v> No teasons are necessarily given for the 
decision of the departments, so that there is no means of knowing, 
as of right, on what evideace the decision has been Maiod.(3j.
The cumulative effect of these shortcomings is described 
in the late Lord Chief Justice’s much mentioned book:- (3).
177 Section 29, the Sducation Act, i§21.
2/. C.K. Allen, Bureaucracy Triumphant, 1931, p. 7 & pp. 64-65.
3). Lord Hew art, The New Despotism, pp. 48-49.
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«
How is it to be expected that a party against whoa a 
decision has been given in a hole-and-corner fashion, and with­
out any grounds being specified, should believe that he has had 
justice? Even the party in whose favour a dispute has been de­
cided must, in such circumstances, be tempted to look upon the 
result as a mere piece of luck# Save in one or two instances, 
none of the departments publishes any reports of its proceed­
ings, or the reasons for its decisions, and as the proceedings 
themselves, if any, are invariably held in secret, even 
interested parties have no means of acquiring any knowledge of 
what has taken place, or what course the department is likely 
to take in future cases of the same kind that may come before 
it. A Departmental tribunal is, however, in no way bound, as 
a Court of Law is, to act in conformijy with previous decisions, 
and this fact is commonly regarded as one of the reasons for the 
policy of secrecy. Others may think that the Department is 
afraid to disqlose inconsistencies and a want of principle in 
its decisions. However that may be, the policy is fatal to the 
placing of any reliance on the impartiality and good faith of 
the tribunal. It is a queer sort of justice that will not 
bear the light of publicity.*
Nevertheless, in spite of all these criticisms, the 
appellate function of the central departments is a very useful 
device for the settlement of administrative disputes. The 
departmental tribunal has the advantages of cheapness and ex­
pedition. In cases where justice can only be done if it is 
done at a minimum cpst, such tribunals may be preferred to the 
ordinary courts of law. In addition, a special court may be 
better for the exercise of a special jurisdiction, for, very 
largely, the question assigned to the departments for decision 
are concerned with technical matters, and therefore require a 
special knowledge rarely available either to magistrates or 
judges, and often demand the interpretation of a government 
policy rather than the maintenance of a system of rights,
With regard to the system of administratioe tribunals, Prof­
essor Laski sets forth the following argument:- (lj.
*
....Anyone who compares its results with the unhsppy 
consequences of allowing the ordinary Courts to have juris­
diction over workmen's compensation or the powers of the 
district auditor will, I suggest, be inclined strongly to the 
viewj^in the positive state, the ordinary courts of law are 
rarely suitable for work of this kind. Their canons of sta­
tutory interpretation are wholly defective for the purpose 
of the modern state; and they lack the knowledge necessary 
for the construction of proper aflminjstrative standards. It 
must be remembered that most of this jurisdiction is concerned
XTJ Laski, Parliamentary Government in England, 1938, pp. 354-5.
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with questions of 'reasonableness' in policy; and it is dif­
ficult to see why a judge's view ©f'reasonableness* is more 
likely to be right than that of a Minister who may have to 
answer for his view in the House of Commons. If, moreover, 
every case involving such questions could be transferred to 
a court of law the process of administration would become h 
impossible, and the courts would be overwhelmed with business....
As a matter of fact, the appellate functions of the 4 
departments are not an important element in central control.*
They may have the advantage of producing uniformity of admin­
istration, but they give little effective control over the 
general policy of local government. (2). Besides, so far as the 
practical working of the system is concerned, there is no sign 
of its being abused. While acting as an administrative tribunal, 
government departments are as a rule scrupulous intthe protection 
of private rights. The Committee on Ministers* Powers emphat­
ically pointed out in their report in 1931 that, they saw nothing 
to justify any lowering of the country's high opinion of its 
civil service, or any reflection on its sense of justice, or 
any ground for a belief that the constitutional machinery was 
developing in a wrong direction. (3).
Yll. Power of Action in Default. Some of the Government 
departments have been armed by Parliamentary statute with ample 
pmwers to deal with local authorities which default in the 
exercise of their functions. Thus, under section 299 of the 
Public Health Act, 1875, the Minister was given power to appoint 
a person to enforce performance of duties by a sanitary author­
ity 'where it had failed to provide sewers or to maintain 
existing sewers, or to provide an adequate water supply, or 
where danger arose to the inhabitants by reason of the in­
sufficiency or unwholesomeness of the existing water supply*.(A) 
The Ministry of Agriculture has been empowered to intervene 
when a council fails to carry out the provisions of the Diseases 
of Animals Acts or the Small Holdings and Allotments Acts.
Similar provisions may also be found in the Public Health Act, 
1936; the Housing Act, 1936; the Rural Water Supplies and Sew­
erage Act, 1944; The Education Act, 1944; etc., where the
Tl} Laski, Parliamentary Government in England, 1938, pp. 354-355.
(2) Jennings, Local Government Law, 3rd eft., p. 255.
(3) Cmd. 4060/1931, p. 7.
(4) This section was repealed by the Local Government Act, 1929,
sect. 57(4), in respect of district and non-county borough 
councils; but is now contained in the Public Health Act, 1936, 
sec t. 332.
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Minister concerned, after holding a local inquiry when necess­
ary, may take am order directing the defaulting authorities to 
discharge their proper functions; or, if the default is on the part 
of the county district councils, transferring their functions 
to the appropriate county councils or to himself, the expense 
in either case being thrown on the defaulting authorities^ He 
may even apply for the Mandamus to enforce his directions.
Again, under an Order in Council of 1931, the Minister of Health 
may advance so far as to supersede a local authority altogether 
if they fail to carry out certain of their duties. In the case 
of the Boards of Guardians at Poplar, Chester-le-Street and 
Beawelty, the Minister has removed them and nominated Commissioners 
in their place. (1).
nevertheless, great though such powers seem to be, they 
are seldom used. The severity of their enforcement is liable 
to create a very bad relationship between the Minister and the 
defaulting authorities. ”They give”, writes Dr. Jennings, ’what 
has been called a 1 big stick* with which to threaten to beat the 
authority. The Minister rarely threatens. Central control 
would be entirely ineffective if there were antagonism between 
the central and the local authorities. Far more can be done by 
suggestions than by threats....” (2).
7111. Power to Obtain Reports. In the matter of control, 
it is of the utmost importance jrhat central departments should 
have the right to receive various reports §nd financial and 
statistical returns from local authorities." For, by these the 
supervising departments are able to test, the efficiency or 
progress of the services administered io*Jthe localities.
The best example of this sort of control can be seen in 
the relation between local authorities and the Ministry of Health. 
In order to understand what work has been done, and how it is done, 
the Minister of Health has laid upon the local medical officers 
a duty to make periodical reports on the sanitary conditions of 
their districts. The report takes the following form:-
(1) Weekly returns stating the cases of infectious 
disease notified to them during the preceding week.
(2) Annual reports concerning— -
(a) the chief sanitary circumstances as to water supply; 
river polution; drainage and sewerage; closet accommodation; 
scavenging; sanitary inspection of the districts; premises 
controlled by special ordinances, such as lodging houses,
TT) Sir John Maud, op^cit., p.189.
(2) Jhnnings, op. cit., p. 257.
-33-
offensive trades, cellar dwellings, slaughter-houses, etc, ; 
food and milk; inspection of workshops, shops, etc.
(b, the sanitary administration, including the work 
of sanitary inspectors, health visitors, and tuberculosis nurses; 
administration of special ordinances; and the work in public 
health laboratories.
(c/ the vital statistics of the districts.
(3; Special reports on the prevalence of tod control 
over any case of plague, cholera, or smallpox or of any serious 
outbreak of epidemic disease in the districts, (lj.
With this constant source of detailed information at kand, 
the Minister not only knows how the laws of public health are 
being carried out in the different parts of the country; he also 
has a clear summary of the existing defects not yet remedied, 
and can tell where to direct his instructions and advice.
IX. Audit. Government audit is another means whereby the 
central department is able to check the illegal or undesirable 
activities of local authorities. Under this system local 
authorities, except borough councils (in the circumstances ment­
ioned later), cannot spend money as freely as they can collect 
it; they must submit all their accounts each^year to the district 
auditors appointed by the Minister of Health.
The system of the district audit was first applied to 
the Board of Guardians in 1844, and then to the sanitary districts 
in 1872, to the county councils in 1888, and to the parish 
councils and meetings in 1894. All the accounts of these author­
ities were put within the purview of the system. In the case of 
borough councils, the situation is rather different. They are for 
the most part exempt from the obligation of submitting their 
accounts to the district auditors. (2). Only those accounts of 
the boroughs which concern housing, education, and police are 
under their control. For grants are payable only to a local 
authority whose accounts have been passed in this way. The 
general accounts of the boroughs are as a rule audited by three 
amateur ajfritors: two "elective auditors" elected by the local 
government electors for the boroughs, and one appointed by the 
mayor who is known as the "mayor’s auditor".
l|i Sir Arthur Hewsholme, op. cit., pp. 42-48.
2} Scottish burghs, however, cannot enjoy the same freedom with
regard to system of audit as the English boroughs.* The
accounts of all Scottish local authorities, including such 
big towns as Edinburgh and Glasgow, are similarly audited 
by one or nore persc&ns appointed by the Secretary of State 
for Scotland.
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Nevertheless, a borough council may by means of a resolution 
adopt either the system of district audit or the system of 
professional audit.
By the Local Government Act of 1933, it was provided 
that a district auditor has the duty—
(a) to disallow any item^ which is contrary to law;
(b) to surcharge the amount of any expenditure dis­
allowed upon the person responsible for incurring or author­
ising the Expenditure;
(c) to surcharge any sum which has not been duly brought 
into account upon the person by whom that sum ought to have 
been brought into account;
(d; to surcharge the amount of any loss or deficiency 
upon any person by whose negligence or misconduct the loss or 
deficiency has been incurred;
(e) to certify the amount due from any person upon 
whom he has made a surcharge; and
(f> to certify at the conclusion of the audit his 
allowance of the accounts, subject to any disallowances or sur­
charges which he may have made. '(*>.
Under the provision of the Local Authorities (Expenses)
Act, 1887, no expenses paid by an authority could be disallowed 
by the auditor if they had been sanctioned by the Minister of 
Health, <*>. This measure was intended to reduce the number of 
surcharges. It did not however, mean that Ministerial sanction 
could legalise illegal expenditure. It only removed it from 
the jurisdiction of the auditor, leaving the ratepayers still 
the right to resort to the Courts/^Normally the sanction has 
been given only to expenditure which, though open to objections 
on technical grounds, was in itself reasonable or even necessary. (9 
In using this power, the Minister has been subject to the 
limitation which was expressed in the report of the old Local 
Government Board for 1887;-
" The power of sanction is intended to be used in those 
cases where expenditure is incurred bona fide but in ignorance 
of the strict letter^ of the law, or inadvertently without the 
observance of the requisite formalities, or under such circum­
stances as make it fair and equitable that the expenditure should 
not be disallowed by the audit. We do not regard the Act as 
intended to supply the want of legislative or pther authority 
for particular expenditure or classes of expenditure, and as 
justifying us in giving prospective sanction to recurring 
expenditure.1'
XT] This is later incorporated~in the~provisomto~smJction~228Ci) 
of the Local Government Act, 1933.
(2) fl.J. Warren, English Local Government System, 1946,p. 15 5.
Report of the Ministry of Health. 1938-39, 004.6089^.133.
See sect. 228 of the Local Government Act/193^ But the
auditors in Scotland who are paid by local authorities 
have no powers of surcharge or disallowance, though they 
must submit a report to the Secretary of State, who de­
cides all questions raised therein.
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Moreover, any councillor or officer who has been surcharged 
by the district auditor has a right of appeal tothe high Court 
or the Minister. (1) in most cases, appeals go to the 
Minister. Acting as a court of appeal, the Minister has power 
to decide 1 ox/yierits* of the case. In other words, he may 
relieve an individual member from personal liability if ho is 
satisfied that the complaint ought to be excused as his action 
is the result of error of judgement, as distinct from wilful 
disregard of clear statutory direction, or corrupt intent.
The district auditors are open to receive complaints 
from ratepayers. Although such complaints seldom occur, the 
existance of thin right on the part of the ratepayer can un­
doubtedly reduce the possibility of extravagance in admini­
stration. Further, if the Minister suspects irregularity or 
malpractices, he can at any time, subject only to three days 
notime given to the local authorities, order the auditor to 
conduct an extraordinary audit. (2)
Although it is true that district auditors are app­
ointed and paid by the Minister of Health, and that their 
duties and the districts in which they act are also assigned 
by him, they do not in fact belong to his department. Their 
function is quasi-judicial, and so they are allowed, at least 
in theory, to remain independent of the Minister. They do 
not take orders from him. But whatever their constitutional 
position may be, they are, in practice, very useful to the 
Minister. For with the power to disallow or surcharge local 
expenditure, they can to a great extent do away with oorrupt- 
ion, misappropriation and waste, and, at the same time, help 
the central departments to discourage or prevent local 
government financial activities, in certain undesirable dir­
ections. Moreover, apart from the use of its penal powers, 
the district audit system exercises a salutory influence 
upon local authorities through the general annual review of 
the accounts of the authorities audited, and the criticisms
TIT Where the decis ion relates to a sum exceeding""£500, the 
appeal lies only to the High Court. It was also decided in the 
case of the King v. Minister of Health, ex parte Dore (1927),
2 K.B.,p. 765, that where an appeal to the High Court has been 
made, the alternative right to the Minister is lost; and if 
the Court upholds the decision of the district auditor, the 
Minister has no power to remit the surcharge. See W. A.Robson, 
The Development of Local Government, 1st. ed. , pp. 341-342.
(2) Jennings, Central Control, op. cit., p. 433.
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and suggestions for improvement which are made in the audit 
reports. In cases of serious criticism, it is the practice 
of the government departments to communicate with the author­
ities to ensure that the suggestions are fully considered and 
that steps are taken to effect improvement. (1) The result 
is said to be generally satisfactory.
Power to Sanction Loans. The power of the central 
departments to control the borrowing of local authorities is 
an effective means by which the departments can keep a firm 
hand on local financial activities. This has been especially 
true during the last seventy yaars because of the growing 
necessity on the part of local authorities to raise loans for 
the erection of permanent works.
In spite of the warnings by some economists that with 
increasing demands for capital expenditure,-^the extent of public 
debt is liable to cause serious problems in^future, no local 
authority, as a matter of fact, does finance the whole of its 
activities solely out of current revenues/4|Publie borrowing, 
though a great mischief if not done with great care and suit­
able supervision, may, however, be a useful and even indispen­
sable device in the hand of a wise and enterprising local 
authority. On the one hand, it is impossible for a local 
authority to overburden the ratepayers of one particular year 
with the whole expense of some extensive and costly scheme; 
on the other hand, it will be more equitable and desirable to 
spread the cost of permanent works over a period that will have 
the benefit of the expenditure. (2)
Local authorities receive their powers to borrow from 
certain general statutes and private Acts. In the latter case, 
no connection with the central department is required, but the 
power to borrow under general statutes can only be exercised 
with the consent of the sanctioning authority. (3) This is less
Tl) Ministry of Health ftepsrt,"“ 1936-3^7"GidT 551675^1761
(2) J.H. Burton, Loans and Borrowing Powers of Local Authorities, 
1924, p.5. It is interesting to note that Sir Ernest Benn has 
emphatically denounced public debt, and considered it a shame
for the people to ’live on posterity’ by pledging the future to 
pay for their present delights and necessities. See Benn,
Debt, 1938, p. 2.
(3) This is in the case of transport, the Minister of Transport; 
of electricity, the Elec trie ifr Commissioners; of gas, the Board 
of Trade; and in general and for water supply, the Minister of 
Health.
U) Fair lie, Municipal Administration, p. 333.
Sir I.G. Gibbon, Borrowing by Local Authorities, Journal 
of Public Administration, Vol. VI., No. i, Jan. 1928, p. 20.
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costly, more expeidi tious, and simpler tnan to promote a 
private bill, and so Is more commonly used. (1) The Local 
Government Act of 1933, (which directly followed the Public 
Health Acts of the previous sixty years) empowered local 
authorities to borrow for the purpose, inter alia, "of acquiring 
any land which they have power to acquire, for erecting any 
building which they have power to erect, for executing any 
permanent work, for providing any plant, or for doing any other 
thing which they have power to execute, provide or do*. It also 
provided that the sanctioning authority was to determine the 
period within which the local authority should repay the sum 
borrowed. Usually, the period within which a loan must be re­
paid is fixed according to the particular matter for which it is 
required and is based upon the probable useful life of the work; 
the maximum is generally sixty years, though in some instances 
eighty years have been approved. The total sum which may be 
borrowed by a local authority is left to the Minister of Health 
to settle in the li$it of the financial resources of each part­
icular authority. (3)
In making an application for sanction to borrow, the 
local authority must furnish certain information which must be 
accompanied by figures showing, inter alia, the population of 
the district; its rateable and assessable value; the existing 
debts both as regards the special purpose and as regards the 
total for all purposes; the amount of the proposed loan; the 
purpose for which it is required; the suggested period within 
which the money would be redeemed; and copies of plans, schemes 
and detailed estimates where the purpose involves the carrying 
out of works. This should also be followed by a statement of 
unused borrowing powers and sinking funds or redemption funds 
in hand— analysed under services and undertakings, (3)
Under the practice of loan sanction, it is customary 
for the Minister concerned to consider the question of the 
desirability and reasonableness of the scheme submitted, the 
general question of the necessity for the proposal, and whether 
the liability is balanced by an asset, but also in particular, 
at the same time, to see how the total indebtedness of the local
TT} Altogether only about lOjTof the money raised~on loan by-” 
local authorities obtains sanction from Parliament by means of 
Local Acts. See E, L. Has luck, Local Government in England, 1936, 
P. 118,
T 3) Barratt, Your Local Authority, p,134, 1946.
(3) Burton, Local Authority Finance, Accounts and Auditing,
2nd and retf. ed., 1932, vol. 1,pp. 23-24.
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authority will be affected by the proposal, so as to avoid 
the calamities of bankruptcy. It is the duty of the central 
government to intervene for the preservation of the credit of 
local authorities in general and for the protection of the 
ratepayers of the future in the particular area in question, (l)
In this respect, there is very close cooperation between the 
sanctioning department and the Ministry of Health, which has 
the greatest all-round knowledge of the quality of administration 
in each locality. The central department must be satisfied that 
the particular works are well and economically planned and 
suitable for what is required. Account is also taken of whether 
there is mame other work# of more argent necessity which the 
local authority should carry out before the particular scheme 
which is proposed. (2)
With a view to ascertaining the actual necessity or
advisability of the scheme proposed by the local authority, the
government usually holds a local inquiry before granting the 
sanction. The ratepayers are consulted; the site of the 
proposed building or works or apparatus is examined; and 
private persons and other local authorities are encouraged to 
give evidence or to produce arguments agfcinst the proposal.
This may be seen in the case of Hull in 1931, when the city 
wanted to replace gas lighting in the streets by electricity, 
and asked for a loan of £67,000 to do it, A local inquiry was 
held in which the representative of the gas companies had a 
chance to participate in the argument. He stated reasons for 
objection to the scheme from the point of view of economy.
As a result, the Minister decided that electricity might be 
used for the main streets, but that gas should be retained for
the side streets. (3)
Under modern conditions, where few local authorities 
are le to fulfil their functions properly without occasional 
loans, this involves very close control indded. Every local 
authority is obliged, even in its normal expenditure, to be 
prudent and to avoid becoming regarded a# extravagant by the 
central authorities, lest a loan should in future be difficult 
to secure. Control over loans goes beyond the actual objects 
for which the loan is required; it is a general control over 
local financial administration. (4)
Tl) J.E.Jarratt, Changes of Relations between Local Authorities 
and Central Departments, public Administration, vol, Vlll., 
no. 1, Jan., 1930, p. 62.
(2) Royal Commission on Local Government, Minutes of Evidence,
vol. 1, p. 57.
(3| H. Finer, Municipal Trading, 1941, pp. 135-136.
(4) Jennings, Local Government Law, 1947, pp. 248-9.
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The power to sanction loans, however, has other purposes than 
simply to secure administrative efficiency and economy; it may 
be used to further Government policy. Largely through its 
effects upon building activity, the power to control local 
borrowing, plays an important part in policies for controlling 
the level of employment or the disposal of scarce supplies of 
raw materials. (1)
XI. Control Through Grants. Apart from the various 
types of central control whicE have been described above, there 
remains probably the most important and effective one, naiely, 
control through grants-in-aid. (2) It is our purpose, below, 
to examine in some detail the part that has been played by this 
controlling device in tne development of the relationship 
between central and local government.
As will be seen later, the original purpose of the 
grant-in-aid was to stimulate the local services which were 
considered to be of national importance, and to relieve the 
ratepayers of the poor localities which were overburdened 
by the grorwing expenditure in these services. But by and by, 
on the principle that those who* pay the piper call the tune, 
it served to intensify and enhance the control wielded by the 
central departments. Today, in nearly all the important local 
services, Exchecquer grants have been so extensively employed 
that local government would be impossible were they to cease, 
and local authorities thrjugh their dependence upon pecuniary 
assistance from the Government are inevitably obliged to 
submit to the direction of the central departments. The Home 
Office pays half the cost of the local police, for example, 
but only when one of their Inspectors has certified that the 
particular body of police is being maintained efficiently in 
all respects.
TTJ T^eeT White Paper on£mpioyment_Policy,Gmd.6527T
(2) ’Grant-in-aid* is understood as’a subvention payable from
the ExcheMquer of the United Kingdom to a Local Governing 
Authority, in order to assist the authority in execution of some 
or all of its statutory duties. The subvention may be an isolated 
payment, but is usually recurrent ot annual. It may be a matter 
of statutory obligation or dependent on the recurring decision 
of the Minister in charge of a particular department. It may be 
unconditionally of fixed amount, or variable according to the 
circumstances of the time. Most important of all, its variable 
amount may be dependent on the growth of population, or of a 
particular section of it, on the amount of some particular 
service, on the number of officers appointed, or the sum of their 
salaries, on the expenditure of the receiving Authority, on the 
fateable value of its district, on the efficiency of its work, or 
on some other condition’. Sydney Webb, op. cit., p. 6.
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Tne large grants administered by the Ministry of E ucation 
empower the Minister to penalize a local education authority 
for any neglect of the conditions which he re4uires them to 
fulfil. As a result, he nas practically full control of the 
staffing and building of every publicly maintained school, 
and the functions of the local education authority are substan­
tially confined to deciding the best methods of carrying out 
his directions.
The threat of withdrawal in the case of grants has 
had considerable effect in making the most backward author­
ities aware of their responsibilities for maintaining and 
improving their grant-aid^services. Pecuniary inducement 
has proved to be more effective and much less invidious in 
winning local obedience than legal proceedings or orders of 
the central executive. (1) "Whether any new branch of the 
Local Government service", wrote Sydney Webb, "hardens into 
a stagnant bureaucracy, smothered in red tape and rendering 
the very minimum of utility to the community; or blossoms 
and develops into an ever-improving, ubiquitously-serving 
agency for really accomplishing the object for which it was 
established, depends very largely on the particular conditions 
upon which its Grant# in Aid is made. In short, if we seek 
to estimate the real as distinguished from the nominal 
Constitution of the United Kingdom of the Present day— - 
if we have regard to the actualities of administration 
rather than to the items of pageantry— -we may come to the 
unexpected conclusion that the Grant in Aid, mere financial 
adjustment though it seems to be, is more and more becoming 
the pivot on which the machine really works". (2)
(!) H. Hobhouse, Local Government and State Bureaucracy in
Great Britain. See G.M. Harris, Problems of i.ocal Government, 
1911, pp. 399-400.
(2) Webb, op, cit., pp. 2-3.
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CHAPTER III.
CEBTRAL COUTROL OVER VARIOUS SERVICES
I* Pon-r Law Administration.
The old system of British local administration, as 
we hare seen, collapsed before the unaYoidable demands of 
industrial development; and it was this collapse which, in 
the early decades of the nineteenth century, made it neces­
sary to establish central departments with administrative 
control over local authorities. This practical requirement 
was first recognised by some eminent thinkers who expounded 
it on theoretical grounds. The most influential among them 
was Jeremy Bentham who, after many years of agitation for 
legal and Parliamentary reform, devoted his old age to de­
signing a comprehensive scheme for a new system of govern­
ment, based on the principle of utility. He argued that 
in order to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number, the interest of the locality should be subservient 
to the interest of the nation as a whole, and hence that 
there should be a close control by the representatives of 
the whole• Accordingly, some active and powerful depart­
ments, inspired by the fullest and most advanced knowledge 
attainable, should rule over the local authorities and es­
tablish a uniform system of local administration, putting 
the most salutary principles into operation in ail parts 
of the country, (l)
In the reaim of practical administration, Bentha­
mism was recommended by the Royal Commission on the Poor 
Laws in 1834, and was enacted by the Poor Law Amendment 
Act of the same year. (2) The Act set up the Poor Law 
Commissioners as the central poor law department, and gave 
them wide powers of controlling the poor law guardians 
which it established* The Benthamite system of detailed 
supervision and control over local authorities was contra­
ry te the British tradition of self-government, but the 
grave fears then hekd of national bamkruptcy^ resulting 
from the confusion, inefficiency and wild extravagance of 
poor relief, provided strong motives for the acceptance of 
the principle* (3)
(1) E.L. Hasluck, Local Government in England, 1936, p.77.
(2) The principle was not extended to municipal corpora­
tions*
(3) In 1795, a meeting was held by the Justices of the 
Peace for Berkshire at Speenhamland, which decided to
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The newly established. Poor Law Commission was gi­
ven power to issue to all poor law guardians (1) over the 
country general orders regulating their duties under the 
Act. But these orders were subject to several safeguards; 
they had to meet the approval of the Home Secretary before 
hand; and had to be laid before Parliament wheremthey might 
be disallowed. In practice^, in order to avoid these in­
conveniences, the Commission performed its work, as far as 
possible, by issuing speciai/orders affecting only the indi­
vidual unions to which they were addressed. The orders had 
considerable scope; they might direct action of almost any 
kind, and they covered almost every conceivable subject con­
nected with the management or relief of the poor. (2) Ac­
cording to the Act of 1834, the Commissioners were authori­
sed to make rules and regulations ’for the government of 
workhouses and the education of the children therein, the 
management of poor children, the superintendence of child­
ren’s institutions, the apprenticing of poor children, the 
guidance and control of guardians and parish officers, the 
keeping, auditing, and allowing of accounts, the making of 
contracts, and expenditure on poor relief. In order 
to see that these orders and regulations were carried out, 
and that the work of the guardians was properly done, ins­
pectors were sent out to keep contact with local authori­
ties. They came to every board of guardians and visited 
all the workhouses. They also attended and spoke at the 
sittings of the guardians disseminating good advice which 
the central department had distilled from the failure and 
success of the various separate authorities it surveyed. 
(Sect. 21.) The Commissioners had also a right to pres­
cribe^ the qualifications, duties and salaries of the paid 
officers of the local boards appointed by the guardians or 
overseers (Sect. 46.) These officers as well as the mas­
ters of workhouses were made subject to the orders of the
adopt a scale of relief to give the recipient the 
equivalent of a labourer’s wages. This lead had been 
followed in other parts of the country and thus created 
a tremendous increase in poor relief expenses.
(1) The local boards of guardians as established by the Act
of 1834 were elected bodies. This principle of elec­
tion which is now the major characteristic of British 
local government owes its origin to this Act.
(2) It was said that the order might deal with such matters
as the procedure at the meetings of the guardians them­
selves, the time when the paupers in workhouses should 
get up in the morning, the kind and amount of food they
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Commissioners; they could he removed by them, and could 
not be dismissed without their consent. (Sect. 48.) This 
was undoubtedly a very effective means for the Commission 
to enforce its orders and regulations. (4) The Commission 
had also special powers of restraint over the sale of land 
and the making of loans. (Sect. 58.) It was empowered to 
order the alteration and enlargement of workhouses and* 
with the consent of the guardians» the building of new 
workhouses. (Sects. 23 & 25) It could also unite parishes 
for relief purpose* and alter the boundaries of such unions. 
(Sect. 26 & 32.)
Indeed, the power of the three Commissioners was 
so great and their control over local poor law services so 
severe that, in spite of the enormous relief which the sys­
tem brought to the ratepayers, (5) it provoked attacks 
from all sides. Popular opinion was set against the highly 
centralised control of the Commissioners. In electioneering 
meetings and in the Press they were the target of malignant 
criticism, and even bitter personal abuse. Disraeli des­
cribed Chadwick, then Secretary of the Commission, as a 
’monster in human shape', and the Times regarded the new 
poor law as 'worse than Egyptian bondage'. ($) The unpo­
pular principle of 'less eligibility' and the ruthless 
enthusiasm of Sir Edwin Chadwick even provoked riots in 
some quarters. People really thought that the purpose of 
the 'three Kings of Somerset House' was to punish poverty, 
and proposals for their downfall were widespread. As they 
were an independent body uncontrolled by any Minister and 
with no one to defend them in the House of Commons, their 
position was very difficult. At first they could rely 
upon some protection from the Whigs who, as the party in
should receive,the conditions under which they might 
be allowed tobacco, and thefplaces where they might 
smoke. See Maltbie, op. cit., p.28.
(3) Jennings, Central Control, op. cit., pp.431-432.
(4) The power of removal was used often enough in later 
years to make its existence a reality, and naturally 
involved a great deal of control over the whole body 
of local poor law officials. It was estimated that 
during the 3 years, 1902-1904, there were 115 such 
removals, and half as many more resignations forced by 
fear of removal. See A.L. Lowell, The Government of 
England, 1920, Vol. II., p.286.
(5) The poor rate which was more than six million pounds 
in England and Wales alone in 1814, and seven millions 
in 1832, had“ educed to 5 millions within 10 years
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power, had established them; but presently they were left 
helpless. In 1847, as an inevitable consequence, the Com­
mission was dissolved, and all its functions were transfer­
red to a Poor Law Board responsible to Parliament through 
its President, sitting as a Minister of the Crown. The 
functions of the Board were again transferred,together with 
those concerning public health services, to the Local Go­
vernment Board in 1871, and finally to the Ministry of Hea­
lth in 1919. But all these transferences did not bring 
about any alteration in the law and practice regarding the 
powers of the central department and its methods of con­
trolling local poor law authorities. Indeed, the power 
which the Minister of Health inherited from the early Poor 
Law Commissioners to control poor relief services was so 
great and complete that, until the recent reorganization,
(l) it was never surpassed. There was no local function 
which was so closely and meticulously controlled by the 
central authorities as the Poor Law service#
In spite of the strictness of the control of the 
central department in this service, however, it seldom in­
voked any complaints from local authorities. Until public 
assistance was made a national obligation in 1948, a happy 
partnership between local authoriti es and the Ministry of 
Health was maintained largely through the skill and under­
standing of the permanent staff of the Ministry in their 
exercise of control. (2)
What was given to the central government in 1834 for 
the poor law services has also been indirectly sewured for 
other services with varying degrees of intensiveness during 
the last hundred years through the development of the grant 
in aid system.
II. Public Health Services.
In its report issued in 1834, the Hoyal Commission 
on the Poor Laws had assumed that the real problem of the 
poor law lay in the numbers of the able-bodied unemployed. 
But Chadwick as Secretary of the Commission had no sooner 
set his office working than he discovered that the problem 
of poverty was in fact chiefly the problem of ill health.
after the establishment of the Poor Law Commission in 
1834. See S. Buxton, Finance and Politics, Vol.I., 
p.31, footnote.
(6) Sir Arthur Uewsholme, The Ministry of Health, 1925, p.4.
(1) Under the National Assistance Act, 1948, out-door relief 
was transferred t &  the State.
(2) C. Barratt, Your Local Authority, 1946, p.148.
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In order to reduce the poor rates, the prevention of sick­
ness and the improvement of sanitary conditions was of vi­
tal importance, for sickness was the major cause of desti­
tution. Chadwick*8 view was shared by not a few of the 
leaders of social reform in his day, and Parliament was 
obliged to implement an inquiry into this significant pro­
blem. From 1840 onwards several investigations were made 
under Parliamentary direction. The ’Report on the Sanita­
ry Conditions of the Labouring Population of Great Britain* 
chiefly written by Chadwick himself and published in 1842 
in three large volumes was an authoritative presentation 
of the medical aspects of the social life of the people in 
that period, (l) His proposals as regards the necessary 
steps to be taken for the betterment of public health were 
again confirmed by a Royal Commission in its reports in 
1844 and 1845.
The agitation for sanitary reform finally gave 
birth to the first Public Health Act and the Nuisance Re­
moval and Diseases Prevention Act in 1848, which provided 
a strong measure of central control modelled on the Poor 
Law system of 1834. A General Board of Health was esta­
blished with the First Commissioner of Works as chairman.
The Board was empowered to appoint inspectors to assist in 
the superintendents and execution of the Act; its chief 
functions being*- (2)
(a) To direct an inspector to hold an inquiry when 
one-tenth of the inhabitants of a place petitioned 
for the setting up of a local board of health, and 
on the basis of its report the Act might be applied 
either by Order in Council or by Provisional Order.
Ill
(b) To receive and determine appeals by surveyors 
against dismissal by local boards of health.
(c) To approve the appointment and removal of medical 
officers of health and to determine their duties.
(1) The Commission's Report pointed out that at that time 
*the annual loss of life from filth and bad ventilation 
are greater than the loss from death or wounds in any 
wars in which this country has been engaged in modern 
times*. See Sir George Newman, The Health of the Peo­
ple, A Century of Municipal Progress, pp.159-160.
(2) Jennings, Central Control, op. cit., pp.438-439.
(3) These local boards were to be responsible for water, 
drainage, management of the streets, burial grounds, 
and the regulation of offensive trades.
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(d) To approve the establishment of offensive trades, 
to hear appeals as to new streets, to approve tne
creation of public walks and pleasure grounds, etc.
(e) To give consent to borrowing by local boards.
(f) To exercise certain compulsory powers when the Pri­
vy Council ordered the temporary application of 
the Nuisances Removal and Diseases Prevention Act 
during the time of an epidemic.
(g) To compel the application of the Act to places 
where the ordinary annual death-rate exceeded 23 
per 1,000.
Although the General Board*s power of control over 
local boards was extensive, it was in fact much weaker than 
that enjoyed by the Poor Law Commissioners. The holders of 
the important posts of clerk, medical officer of health and 
inspector of nuisances were to be appointed by the local 
boards and removed by them. Only in the case of the medi­
cal officers of health was the approval of the General Board 
required. The power to appoint auditors was also left in 
the hands of the local boards. The weakness of the scheme 
lay especially in the fact that it gave the central autho­
rity much opportunity to irritate local authorities withput 
supplying it with enough power to overcome their active of 
passive resistance to reform.
Despite the ravages of epidemic cholera which occur­
red in 1831 and again in 1847, no serious attempt at cen­
tralisation to cope with the urgent need for vigorous public 
health schemesmet with acceptance from the public. Public 
opinion still resisted central control, perhaps as there 
was not as yet any Exchequer grant in this department to 
soften the harsh voice of central dictation. The work thus 
began in a hostile atmosphere. Chadwick and Southwood 
Smith were both too autocratic and unaccommodating in their 
official work to make any compromise with local or popular 
sentiment. Angry opposition was aroused. As a result, the 
General Board was abolished in 1854 by Parliament through 
the joint efforts of Disraeli and John Bright, and Chadwick 
was obliged to relinquish his office. In spite of the dis­
interested zeal and immense diligence he had devoted to the 
public service, the nation enjoyed his retirement. "AEscul- 
apius and Chiron, in the forms of Mr. Chadwick and Dr. Sout­
hwood Smith", wrote the Times, "have been deposed, and we 
prefer to take our chance of cholera and the rest than to 
be bullied into health.••.England wants to be clean but not 
to be cleaned by Chadwick.••.It was a perpetual Saturday 
night; and Master John Bull was scrubbed and rubbed and 
small-tooth-combed till the tears ran into his eyes and his 
teeth chattered, and his fists clenched themselves with woe- 
ry and pain"•
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A new Board, which in fact consisted of only a paid 
president responsible to Parliament, was established with 
substantially the same power. It too ceased to exist in 
1858, with the result that the local government powers 
which belonged to it were transferred to the Home Office, 
the scientific and medical functions to the Privy Council, 
and those concerned with/ contagious disease to the Var 
Office. Ill
In the meantime the agitation against autocratic 
control was somewhat appeased. But the problem of public 
health remained the same or even more acute. Between 1858 
and 1871, epidemics of diphtheria, typhus, cerebro-spinal 
meningitis, cholera, yellow fever and cattle plague broke 
out here and there intermittently. The nation was again 
alarmed; and a Royal Sanitary Commission was eventually 
set up in 1869 which reported in 1871. It recommended that 
the administration of the laws concerning the public health 
and the relief of the poor should be vested in one powerful 
Ministry so that these two closely related services could 
be run uniformly, economically and efficiently. Such a Mi­
nistry should avoid taking to itself the actual work of lo­
cal government. It should direct and supervise in such a 
way as not to injure local initiative. ” It will have to 
keep all local authorities and the officers in the active 
exercise of their own legally imposed and responsible func­
tions” ; suggested the Report, "to make itself acquainted 
with any default and to remedy it; it will have also to 
discharge to a greater extent its present duties.••.namely, 
to direct inquiries, medical or otherwise, to give advice 
and new plans when required, to sanction some of the larger 
proceedings of the local authorities, to issue provisional 
orders subject to Parliamentary confirmation, to receive 
complaints and appeals, to issue medical regulations in 
emergencies, and to collect medical reports”. (2)
Acting upon these recommendations, Parliament es­
tablished the Local Government Board in 1871 in which tere 
combined the Medical and Veterinary Department of the Privy 
Council, the Local Government Act Department of the Home 
Office (which dealt mainly with loans to municipal corpora­
tions and urban areas), the Registrar General's Office, and 
the Poor Law Board itself. Like most of the other 'boards', 
the Board was only a board in name. It was for practical 
purposes a department presided over by a Minister. Its
(1) Smellie, op. cit., pp.60-61.
(2) Jennings, op. cit., pp.440-441.
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first permanent secretary was Tom Taylor who, as early as 
1857, had advocated that inspection from the centre should 
be coujiled with grants in aid for approval policies; and 
this idea was so well accepted and proved so beneficial in 
practice that it played a great part during the next fifty 
years in helping the development of central control. (1)
An Act of 1872 provided additional power for the 
Local Government Board, and at the same time amended the 
constitution and powers of local sanitary authorities. In 
1875, all the laws concerning public health were consoli­
dated in a great Public Health Act. Under this Act the Lo­
cal Government Board was authorised to hear and determine 
appeals, to approve regulations and byelaws, to act in de­
fault of action by a sanitary authority, to give consent 
to dealing in land, to make provisional orders, to appoint 
inspectors and hold inquiries, to make numerous orders, to 
sanction loans, etc. (2) The power of the Board to control 
public health and local government were again modified by 
later statutes, especially by the Local Government Acts of 
1888 and 1894. Every statute which conferred any power on 
a local body was apt to contain some provision involving 
action by the Local Government Board, or at least contem­
plating its intervention. As a result, the powers of the 
Board were scattered through innumerable statutes, and were 
constantly being enlarged. (3)
During the present century there has been an expansion 
in the field of local public health services by the addition 
of services for maternity and child welfare, and the treat­
ment of mental deficiency, venereal diseases and tuberculo­
sis* Before 1929 these services received percentage grants 
from the Exchequer and consequently invited detailed central 
control. Since then, however, the percentage grants on 
these services have been replaced by a general block grant.
(1) Smellie, op. cit., p.62.
(2) Jennings, op. cit., p.441.
(3) Of the later statutes which succeeded the Act of 1875 
in the last century, the most important from the stand­
point of central control were the Rivers Polution Acts, 
the Canal Boats Acts, the Housing of the Working Classes 
Acts, the Public Health (Water) Act, 1878, the Infect­
ious Diseases (notification) Act, 1889, the Public 
Health Amendment Act, 1890, the Isolation Hospitals 
Acts, 1893 and 1901, and the Infectious Disease (Pre­
vention) Act, 1890. Others such as the Factory and 
Workshop Acts and Petroleum Acts were mainly under the
s Home Office; and the Animals Diseases Acts and Sale of 
Food and Drugs Acts were under the Board of Agriculture.
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Under this arrangement the Minister of Health seems no lon­
ger interested in the detailed control of each particular 
branch of the public health services, but confines himself 
to making sure that a reasonable standard of efficiency and 
progress is being maintained. In order to attain this pur­
pose, he conducts a periodical survey of the health services 
of each authority. "The object of these surveys’*, stated 
the annual report of the Ministry of Health in 1931, "has 
been to obtain a broad general view of the health perfor­
mance of the local authority, where it is good as well as 
where it is defective, and they, therefore, range over a 
wide field, including not only the services which were for­
merly grant-aided, but such services as control and
treatment of infectious diseases, lunacy, water supply, 
sewerage, supervision of the food and milk supplies, and 
the transferred poor law medical services’*. It added that, 
"it is anticipated that these surveys of health services, 
by the opportunities for consultation and for the pooling 
of information which they provide, will enable the Minister 
to be of assistance to local authorities in the discharge 
of thiir health functions, without impinging on due local 
responsibility".
Since the passage of the Rational Health Service 
Act in 1946, a large proportion of the former local health 
services, including the management of hospitals, have been 
transferred to the State. These transferred services are 
administered by the newly established Regional Hospital 
Boards and Local Hospital Management Committees. The new 
ad hoc bodies as well as the local health authorities are 
controlled by the Minister of Health and the Scottish De­
partment of Health. It is anticipated that in the interests 
of the cohesive planning and efficient management of the 
health services, the central department will continue to 
collect and supply expert and technical advice.
III. Police.
Although the essential requirement for the mainte­
nance of internal peace and security was realised in Bri­
tain in medieval days, there has never been such a tho­
rough central control over the police force as is to be 
found on the Continent. Towards the end of the 13th cen­
tury, a voluntary system of *watch and ward* became esta­
blished in some boroughs. In the counties, Justices of the 
Peace as Crown nominees answerable to the Privy Council 
originated at about the same time. They were empowered,
-so­
under the Riot Act, 1328, to appoint a parish constable 
in every parish, (l) but as the Justiwes were members of 
the local gentry, and local services were simple and tri­
vial, there was in fact little or no direct administrative 
control from the central authority. Such control as did 
exist was through the judicial process of verdict by the 
King’s judges on those individuals, local authorities, or 
justices of the peace, who had not carried out their com­
mon law or statutory duties. (2)
The gradual urbanisation of the country and se­
rious internal troubles caused by occasional bad harvests 
and unemployment later brought about the necessity of en­
larging and improving the police power. The old parish 
constable was inadequate and incompetent to cope with the 
rising problem. To meet the situation, 1829, Mr. Ro­
bert Peel introduced and Parliament passed a Metropolitan 
Police Bill which placed the new professional full-time 
police force for London under the direct control of the 
Home Secretary. (3) Exchequer assistance haa u e ea given 
in respect of this force as early as 18335 and after nu­
merous changes, the amount was fixed in 1878 at the equi­
valent of a rate of 4d. levied over the Metropolitan Police 
District. In addition, certain small charges in respect of 
this force were placed upon the Exchequer from time to time 
in compensation for the special services of a national cha­
racter rendered by the force.
Under the Special Constables Act, 1831, the justices 
were further authorised to appoint special constables to 
augment the existing forces. These might be enrolled volun­
tarily or by compulsion, any person who refused to serve be­
ing liable to a fine of not more than £5. Nevertheless, the 
amateur police force proved to be more and more incompatible 
with the rising needs of modern society. So in 1833 the 
Lighting and Watching Act was passed which provided that any 
town with a population of 5,000 or more could appoint paid 
local watchmen. Under the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835, 
a Match Committee was to be elected every year by the town 
council to take charge of the ’watching’ or policing of the 
borough* This Committee was required to appoint a sufficient
(1) Clarke, County Council, 1941, pp.18-19.
(2) H. Finer, The Police and Public Safety, A Century of 
Municipal Progress, p.273.
(3) In 1856 the system was changed, and the Metropolitan \A 
Police Force was put under the control of Commissioners A 
subordinate^ to the Home Secretary.
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number of paid constable8 to form a permanent force, and the 
town council was given authority to make a special borough 
watch rate in order to meet its cost. The Act contained no 
provision for any supervision, inspection, audit, control, 
or grant-in-aid by the central authority, and the corpora­
tions were left entirely independent/ as regards both con­
trol and financial aid.
From 1835 to 1856, Act after Act was passed in order 
to establish an efficient constabulary force in every loca­
lity of considerable size. According to the County Police 
Act, 1839, the justices in quarter sessions were empowered 
to raise and equip a permanent paid constabulary in any 
county or any division of a county on the model of the Me­
tropolitan and Borough police. The justices were given the 
general management of the new police force, but certain po­
wers of control and supervision were conferred on the Home 
Secretary which he had never had with regard to borough po­
lice. The justices were required to report to the Secretary 
of State the number/ of constables appointed and obtain his 
approval for any subsequent increase or diminution in the 
number. The Secretary of State was authorised to make rules 
for the ’government, pay, clothing and accoutrements, and 
necessaries* of the force; his approval was also necessary 
’for the appointment of the chief constable; (1) for the 
plans of all police stations, strong rooms and lock-ups; 
and for the fees to be charged in respect of the service of 
summonses and other special services by the constables*. (2) 
The permissive provisions of the 1839 Act, however, 
did not produce the result intended. County authorities 
were either negligent in tackling the problem, or afraid 
that the establishment of such a force would throw additio­
nal burdens on the ratepayers. In the meantime, public opi­
nion grew gradually in favour of a general and uniform con­
stabulary force which would ensure more effectively the
(l) In the caBe of a borough the power of the watch committee 
to appoint the chief constable is not subject to the ap­
proval of the Home Secretary, though in the counties as 
well as in the boroughs the chief constables can be dis­
missed without reference or appeal to the central autho­
rity. As regards the subordinate policemen, they are 
paid, promoted and dismissed at pleasure without refe­
rence or appeal to the central authority. Besides, in 
the matter of prosecutions the chief constable has, as 
\ a rule, a very free hand. The Home Office seldom, if
ever, interferes except in a case of murder. See G. M.
/ Harris, Municipal Self-Government in Britain, 1939,
pp.226-227.
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prevention of crime and security of property. As a result, 
the County and Borough Police Act was passed in 1856 which 
made it compulsory upon the justices throughout Britain to 
appoint a force for all parts of their county not served by 
a borough force. Government inspectors were appointed, to 
whom all police authorities in boroughs and counties were 
required to make an annual report of their work. The ins­
pectors were required to visit and inquire into the state 
and the efficiency of the police in every borough and coun­
ty, and to report the same to the Secretary of State. But 
at that time the champions of centralisation remembering 
the fate of the first Board of Public Health, were moderate 
in their demands. So, despite the far-reaching power of 
inspection which war given to the Home Office, it secured 
no right to impose its will directly upon any local autho­
rity, or to issue orders to any local constabulary. In or­
der to give a practical value to the results of the reports 
and inspections, a grant of one-quarter of the cost of the 
pay and clothing of the force was provided by the Exchequer 
upon a satisfactory report being made by the inspectors.
The power to withhold the grant on the ground of lack of 
efficient administration was also conferred upon the Home 
Secretary. T m s  has been a powerful instrument ootn in 
maintaining a desirable standard in the police force and 
in encouraging some of the smaller and inefficient police 
forces to amalgamate with the county force. (5) Under the 
Act, the local police authorities, for the first time, 
found their administration subjected to a searching form 
of central control, with the possibility of losing a sub­
stantial grant if their force failed to attain the standard 
of efficiency required. (4) This soon proved to be a very
(2) Cd.7316, 1914, pp. 242-243. These provisions still re­
main effective.
(3) Smellie, op. cit., p.106-7.
(4) If a police force obtained the certificate of efficiency, 
payment of the grant in aid was allowed in respect of 
such expenditure on pay and clothing as had been autho­
rised by the Secretary of State. Payment was not made
in respect of any augmentations to the strength of a 
force or any alteration in pay or clothing which had not 
received the approval of the Secretary ofState. In this 
way the machinery of the grant in aid gave the Secretary 
an almost equal measure of control over the police ex­
penditure of both counties and boroughs. See Cd. 7316, 
1914, pp.247-8.
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effective method of central control, for though no police 
authority was compelled to qualify for the grant, in prac­
tice, as the amount at stake was substantial, councils 
dared not refuse the grant lest the rates be increased. 
Moreover, the refusal of a grant was in itself a condemna­
tion of the efficiency of the local authority, and much 
could be made of this at local elections, (l)
The grant was increased to one-half the cost of pay 
and clothing in 1874, and, under the Police Act, 1919, it 
was enlarged to cover one-half of the whole approved ex­
penditure of the forces.
It should be noted that when the county councils were 
created in 1888,it was provided by the Local Government Act 
th*tthe powers and the duties of the county justices with 
regard to the police should be transferred to a Standing 
Joint Committee consisting of an equal number of represen­
tatives of the county council and of the quarter sessions.
At the same time, the direct grant in aid was replaced by 
the system of assigned revenues, though county and borough 
police forces remained subject to the inspection by the 
Inspectors appointed under the Act of 1856, and payment of tfte.
Exchequer contribution was still dependent on the certi­
ficate of efficiency. (2) The only change was that the old 
scrutiny of expenditure by the Home Office ceased. (3)
The extent of central control over the police forces 
was further enlarged by the Police Act,1919, simultaneously 
with the increase of the grant in aid. The Home Office was 
authorised, after consultation with the Police Council, 141 
to make regulations for the government, mutual aid, pay, 
allowances, pensions, clothing expenses, and conditions of 
service of the police forces. Thise powers were strengthened 
by the Police (Appeals) Act, 1927, which provided that any 
member of a police force was entitled to appeal to the Home
(ll Jennings, Central Control, op. cit., pp.436-7.
(2; If the certificate of efficiency was withheld by the Home 
Secretary in respect of a county or county borough force, 
a sum was forfeited to the Exchequer and charged to the 
Exchequer Contribution Account equivalent to half the cost 
of pay and clothing. In the case of a non-county borough 
maintaining a separate police force, a sum equivalent to 
one-half the cost of pay and clothing of the force was 
transferred by the county council from the Exchequer Con­
tribution Account and applied to the general purposes of 
the county, i.e., if a non-county borough was inefficient, 
the county and not the Exchequer received the benefit of 
the penalty entailed.
(3) Cd.7316, 1914, p.247.
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Secretary if he were dismissed or required to resign#^*
The Police (Appeals) Act, 1943, extended the right to ap­
peal to questions of reduction in rank or rate of pay. (5)
So the ultimate, if not the day-to-day, control of person­
nel;^  was placed in the hands of the central department. 
Furthermore, all policemen have to take an oath of allegience 
to the King, that is, to the Central Government and not the 
local authority; and the laws which they enforce are for the 
most part national and not local in origin.
Although the administration of the police is control­
led in detail hy regulation or order, there is no severe 
friction between police authorities and the Home Office.
This is partly due, no doubt, to the fact that Home Office 
control is accompanied by an ample grant, and that the ins­
pectors are few in number, and do not inspect very frequent­
ly. But as a rule the orders and wishes of the Home Office 
are accepted, and both the members of the local authority 
and the chief constables are glad to have the expert advice 
of the Inspector from the central government. Besides, 
central control is rendered less apparent by the fact that 
the police authorities are neither dii^ectly responsible nor 
responsive to the electorate. (6) Some would even remark 
that police administration is not a local government service 
at all. i H
Generally speaking, the system of inspection and the 
requirement of a certificate of efficiency from the Home 
Secretary as a condition of receiving the Exchequer contri­
bution are effective in bringing the police forces of the 
country up to a common standard of efficiency. But the ar­
rangement still has some defects which are often criticised. 
The system equips the Home Secretary only with the means to 
inflict the severe penalty of depriving the local authority
(4) The Police Council is a body constituted by the Act, on 
which are representatives of the Police Federation for 
the lower# ranks?and the chief constables of the police 
authorities*
(5) Wade & Phillips, Constitutional Law, 1948, 3rd ed., p.164.
(6) In the case of a borough,CT°l*ce service is administered 
by the watch committee appointed by the council yet in­
dependent of it, subject only to the all-important mat­
ter of financial control which enables the council in­
directly to impose its will on the watch committee in 
some directions by withholding sanctions to expenditure.
On the other hand, in the county where the standing 
joint committee is the authority, the county council has 
eventless concern with the constabulary.
(7) Barratt, op. cit., p.151.
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of the whole of the Exchequer grant by withholding his cer­
tificate where there are very grave shortcomings. He has 
no power to exact some lesser penalty for the purpose of 
day-to-day administration by withholding such portion of 
the grant as he thinks fit. (1) It would be desirable, 
moreover, that, in addition to the grant’s depending on 
expenditure, there should be some other grant in the dis­
cretion of the Home Secretary to be applied in cases where 
the local authorities are required to undertake special 
duties or to incur increased expenditure at the request of 
the central authority. Again, according to the provision 
of the 1856 Act, the certificate required for grants iB one 
which will prove that the force is ’maintained in a state 
of efficiency in points of numbers and discipline’. The 
scope of the measurement of efficiency is indeed too limi­
ted. The Inspectors can do nothing to improve the forces 
which, though reasonably efficient in respect of numbers 
and discipline, are not properly maintained or equipped in 
other respects which are of no less importance in the dis­
charge of their ordinary lodal duties as well as of such 
special services as may be required of them in emergencies.
IV. Highways.
The highways in Britain were, in the earliest times, 
maintained and repaired, according to the common law, by 
the inhabitants at large in the area through which the ways 
passed. As early as 1555, it was provided by a statute 
that the parishioners were liable to four days (subsequently 
extended to six days) personal service of eight hours each 
per annum for this matter; but as such a system worked bad­
ly, by 1691, a permanent highway rate was introduced to 
replaced the statutory personal labour of parishioners.
This was followed later by the formation, under the Highway 
Act of 1835, of highway boards and highway districts employ­
ing a paid surveyor. (2) Soon experience proved that the 
parish unit was too small, and the Public Health Act, 1848, 
made the new Local Boards of Health, as the urban sanitary 
authorities, the surveyors of highways, thus making the
(1) in practice it is most unusual to.finally withhold the 
grant, but it is comparatively common to delay payment 
of the grant for a few months until a local authority 
has promised to rectify some defect in administration.
W. D. Bushell, Central Control of Local Government; see 
G. II. Harris, Problems of Local Government, 1911, p.392.
(2) The Town Improvement Clauses Act, 1847, legalised the
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fir8t breach in the ancient parish autonomy. In 1894, high­
way boards were abolished, and the newly constituted rural 
district councils were made the highway authorities for pa­
rochial highways* Since 1929, rural districts have again 
been exempted from their duties of highway maintenance. Un­
der the Local Government Act of that year, county borough 
councils have control over all highways in the county bo­
rough* and the county councils are the ajrthorities for 
classified roads in urban areas and all highways in rural 
districts, while urban authorities have full control of 
all unclassified roads and streets.
Although the reform of the highway laws was brought 
forward just at the time when poor law administration had 
assumed a very high degree of centralisation, the Highway 
Act of 1835 did not give any powers of control to the cen­
tral authority. On the contrary, as the Webbs have pointed 
out, by reducing the control of the justices over any ’pa­
rish, township, tithing, rape, Till, wapentake, division, 
city, borough, liberty, market town, franchise, hamlet, pre­
cinct, or any other place or district maintaining its own 
highways*, it increased the autonomy of all these ’little 
republics* whose administration, as a result, was practically 
free from any external supervision, control, or even audit. 
Xii In the ensuing thirty years, the efforts of the Home 
Office were generally directed towards the enlargement of 
the administrative unit for rural road management and the 
granting to magistrates in quarter sessions of some general 
supervising and controlling power. The Home Office did not 
succeed until the enactment of the Highway Act of 1862 which 
empowered the justices in quarter sessions to combine, com­
pulsorily, parishes into highway districts under highway 
boards. Owing to inertia and negligence on the part of the 
Home Office, however, the Act did not achieve much success. 
The central authority abdicated voluntarily from leadership, 
and there was no advice as to policy or administrative di­
rection given to the justices. This naturally led to *a 
diversity of action and a confusion of areas* which made 
local government much more entangled. (2) The attitude of
office of town surveyor, which was confirmed by the 
Public Health Act, 1848.
(1) Webbs, The Story of the King’s Highway, 1913, p.204.
(2) Some quarter sessions took action under the statute, 
and began to form highway districts. Other did nothing. 
Of those that took action, some adopted the petty ses­
sional division as the unit of area; others chose rather 
the area of the poor law unions formed under the 1834 
Act; whilst others again, constructed brand-new areas
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the Home Office and its harmful effects on the highway ser­
vice are described by the Webbs in the following terms:- 
"Even if it does as much as send out a circular, it seems to 
consider it beyond its duty to take any steps to get the lo­
cal authorities to take action, or to call upon them to re­
port annually what action they are taking, or to supervise, 
from year to year, how they are administering (or possibly 
not administering) the powers entrusted to them. Least of 
all does the Home Office seek to guide the action of the 
local authorities, or even to bring about any uniformity of 
policy among them; though in one field after another the 
lack of such direction has produced disaster", (l) This 
situation was slightly improved after the enactment of the 
Public Health Act, 1872, which provided for the union of 
highway and public health administration, and thus transfer­
red all highway administration to the jurisdiction of the 
Local Government Board.
As mentioned above, highway construction and repair 
had suffered greatly from parochial administration. There 
was no statutory obligation for the parishes to construct 
new roads, and so, rural areas in particular, were indiffe­
rent to the needs of new through traffic which grew rapidly 
with the expansion of the factory system. Turnpike trusts, 
therefore, began to spring up and secure Statutory authority 
to build new strong roads as a private commercial enterprise, 
with toll bars placed across the roads in order to levy tolls 
from the users. It was usually provided that on the expi­
ration of the tru8ts,or in the event of default offthe trus­
tees, or of a deficiency in the trust funds, these roads 
should become a charge on the highway rate.
Although the need of the main lines of communication 
were thus catered for, the inconvenience of the toll bars 
became a great nuisance to the public. There were protests 
and disturbances in various parts of the country, particu­
larly the ’Rebecca Riots* in South Wales from 1839 to 1842. 
Apart from this, there was, again, what Sir James Macadam 
described as ’the calamity of railways* which caused a de­
cline in the funds of the turnpike trusts. Many turnpike 
trusts collapsed, and the burden of the maintenance of their 
through roads fell upon the highway rates. Eventually, 
Parliament had to take action, and in 1862 provided a sum 
of £250,000 for the purpose of making grants to highway au­
thorities in the form of a quarter of the cost of maintain­
ing disturnpiked roads. This was reinforced, under the pro­
vision of the Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act, 1878,
corresponding neither with the poor law union nor the 
petty sessional division. See ibid, p.209.
(l) Ibid., pp.208-9.
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when every disturnpiked road became a ’main* road and one- 
half of the cost of maintenance was to be paid from county 
funds to the highway authority if the roads were maintained 
to the satisfaction of the county surveyor. By the Highway 
Act, 1882, the Government grant was again increased by one- 
half, so that only a quarter fell on the district directly. 
The Local Government Act, 1888, transferred the entire! re­
sponsibility for main roads to the newly-established county 
councils; and the existing Exchequer grants for main roads 
were discontinue*/ under the assigned revenues system. (1) 
The decline of main road traffic in the face of com­
petition from the railways, did not last very long, for the 
growth of bicycle and still more of motor traffic made* 
roads far more important than they formerly were. The con­
sequent demands for improvements to meet modern requirements 
accentuated the shortcomings of the highway system; it was 
obviously unreasonable to let the ratepayers of the locality 
bear the whole charge of these improvements; it was equally 
clear that in order to obtain an effective national trans­
port system, the central government would have to exercise 
more control over the actions of highway authorities. Pro­
vision was made by the Development and Road Improvement 
Funds Act, 1909, and the Finance (1909-10) Act, 1910, for 
giving assistance from a Road Improvement Fund which was 
created for this purpose. A new central authority, i.e., 
the Road Board, was set up and empowered to construct and 
maintain any new roads (including bridges) by itself for fa­
cilitating traffic in any part of the United Kingdom, and 
to make advances, either by way of loan or grant, to county 
councils or other highway authorities for the construction 
of new roads or the improvement of existing roads. The fund 
available for these purposes was, under the latter Act, e- 
qual to the net proceeds of the duties on motor spirit and 
the licences for motor cars.
In spite of the rapid development in the use of 
highways and the immense e# amount of money which had been 
allocated for their improvement, the control of the central 
authority was still quite insufficient. The Local Govern­
ment Board had done very little to improve or to standardise 
local road administration. It did not trouble itself even
(l) Most of the other discontinued grants were charged upon 
the revenues then assigned to county and county borough 
councils; but this was not done in the case of the main 
road grant. However, it has generally been neld that 
the free balances on the Exchequer Contribution Accounts 
were intended to cover one-half the cost of main roads. 
See Cd.7315, 1914, p.44.
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to collect information regarding the condition of the main 
roads towards which it payed; it did not send any inspector 
of roads out to learn the facts; it did not report to Par­
liament on roads; in fact, it did not even bother to address 
to the local authorities so much as a circular of enquiryJ
(1) As regards the powers and duties of the Road Board, 
they were also far from being satisfactory. So we find that 
in 1913 the Webbs were still making severe criticisms of 
central control in the matter of hignway administration.
They found that:- (2)
 The county councils themselves are under no su­
pervision. It is a strange anomaly that the impor­
tant public service of highways, which costs us out of 
public funds practically as much as the whole of our 
payments, private and public, for medical attendance, 
or as much as the whole cost of our relief of the poor, 
and not far short of what we spend on public education, 
is the only public service which may never be mentio­
ned in the House of CommonsI Ho Minister of the Crown, 
and no Government Department, has any responsibility 
for the management of even the most important national 
thoroughfares. It follows, apparently, that the House 
of Commons has no opportunity of criticising the state 
of the roads, or of remedying any grievance connected 
with them. Except now (1913) to the limited extent of 
the duties of the Road Board, no item on the Istimates 
permits a discussion; and no question as to the state 
of the roads is even allowed to be put to the Govern­
ment in the House Qf Commons. This is not due merely 
to the fact that road maintenance is one of the func­
tions of Local Government. With regard to practically 
every other branch of local administration---police, 
education, poor relief, sanitation, lunacy, or liquor
licensing any malfeasance or non-feasance can at any
rate be made the subject of a question in the House of 
Commons, so that any administrative scandal or public 
grievance may be brought to light. With regard to the 
maintenance of roads, and it seems with regard to this 
subject alone, the House of Commons, the "Grand In­
quest" of the nation, is, inadvertently, by the un­
foreseen effect of past neglect, and its own red tape, 
even to this day blind and deafj
(1) Webbs, op. cit., p.247.
(2) Ibid, pp.244-5.
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This criticism was not without its effect. People 
began to think it necessary that there should be new depart­
ment of State concerned with Transport as a whole, to secure 
uniformity in the standard of maintenance for roads. Accor­
dingly, a Ministry of Transport was established, under the 
Ministry of Transport Act, 1919, to exercise extensive po­
wers over all forms of transport service. (1) The former 
Road Board was replaced by a Statutory Road Committee. Ac­
ting through this Committee, the Minister of Transport could 
construct and maintain new roads and bridges, and, for this 
purpose, he might acquire land for the road itself, and also 
up to 220 yards on each side from the middle of the road, 
and sell, lease, or manage this land, which might have been 
improved in value because of the road. If he could not ac­
quire the land on reasonable terms, he might apply to the 
Development Commissioners, who might make an order, without 
a Provisional Orders Confirmation Act, authorising compul­
sory purchase. The Minister was also given power, with the 
approval of the Treasury, to make advances, by grant or 
loan, on such terms and conditions as he thought fit, for 
the construction, improvement or maintenance of roads, brid­
ges or ferries. He might not, however, without thefconsent 
of the local authority, or of the Minister of Health, imposed 
conditions which might entail expenditure by a local autho­
rity. He was enabled, by agreement with a local authority, 
to pay half the salary and the establishment charges of their 
engineer and surveyor, provided the conditions of appointment 
and service were subject to his approval. (2)
In 1920, the yield of the new licenses on motor 
vehicles was ordered to be paid into the Road Fund. The 
amount of these new revenues wasfso considerable that it was 
’raided1 again and again by successive Chancellors to meet 
the urgent needs of other purposes. In addition, under the 
Local Government Act,1929, some of the Road Grants were dis­
continued. In spite of these deprivations, however, the 
Minister of Transport still had substantial funds to assist 
road developments. The more the highway service became 
grant-aided, the stricter was the control of the Minister.
As a matter of fact, the all-round control of the highway 
service had by now become so essential that, even where road
|l) The new Ministry had control over railways; light rail­
ways, tramways, canals, waterways, and inland naviga­
tion; roads, bridges, and ferries, and vehicles and 
traffic thereon; and harbours, docks and piers. See 
Jennings, op. cit., pp.449-450.
(2) Clarke, Local Government, of the United Kingdom, 1945, 
pp.454-455.
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grants were reduced under the Act of 1929,a considerable 
degree of central control was provided. (1)
In general terms, the departmental control of high­
way maintenance, has,until recent years, been confined to 
the more important traffic routes or classified roads, and 
directed towards technical matters concerning the design 
and layout of main roads and road-making materials. (2)
How, however, the problem of road transport has 
emerged from one of simply providing roads to one of regu­
lating road traffic and maintaining the safety of the po­
pulation. The powers of the central department have been 
correspondingly expanded. The Road Traffic Act of 1930, 
for example, enabled the Minister, inter alia# to issue 
directions for the guidance of users of roads, known as the 
Highway Code. Again, under the Road Traffic Act, 1934, it 
was provided that the direction as regards speed limits 
given by the local authorities should receive the consent 
of fche Minister, and on the other hand, that the Minister 
Bhould have power to give this direction where the local 
authority had failed to do so. Similarly, schemes for foot- 
passenger crossings required the approval of the Minister of 
Transpoet. The local authorities were required to execute 
any workB which might be regarded as necessary for road safe­
ty, but if they defaulted, the Minister might execute the 
works and recover the cost from them.
Control of trunk roads has given rise to very lit­
tle friction between central department and local authority. 
Where such friction has arisen, it has been usually with 
regard to traffic safety control. The Minister of Transport 
has been criticised for an over-bearing attitude in such 
matters as the provision of street crossings and Belisha 
beacons and the de-restriction of speed-limits, etc., which 
could best be judged by people on the spot. Complaints have
(1) Section 104 of the Local Government Act, 1929, provided 
that the Minister of Health might reduce the grant pay­
able to any council by such an amount as he thought fit, 
if the Minister of Transport certified that he was sa­
tisfied that the council had failed to maintain their 
roads or any part thereof in a satisfactory condition.
(2) The trunk roads were taken away from the county councils 
and vested in the Minister of Transport under the Trunk 
Roads Act of 1936 and 1946. For these the Minister as­
sumed the powers of the highway authorities. The Minis­
ter meed not undertake the necessary work directly but 
may arrange for the local highway authority to carry out 
the work as his agents for a period of two years, the 
Minister reimbursing the local authority for all the 
expenses.
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been often made that the Minister has asked for the provi­
sion of more pedestrian crossings and Belisha beacons than 
were really necessary, and that he has insisted on having the 
full number supplied before he.gave any grant. The result tas 
wSt? that local authorities hate^xo waste money and incur 
traffic disturbances in order to obtain the grant. Never­
theless, whatever the truth of these complaints, (1) it 
must be conceded that the central department has not acted 
without local knowledge. Its decisions have been based 
chiefly upon the reports of the divisional road engineers 
attached to the regions in question. (2)
V. Education.
In the matter of public education, England lagged 
far behind Scotland. In Scotland the importance of educa­
tion had already been recognised at the end of the 15th 
century; and, after the Reformation, owing to the wisdom 
and energy of John Knox, every parish in Scotland had its 
school and its schoolmaster, with statutory obligation up­
on the heritors;" acting together with the kirk sessions, 
to provide and maintain it. This system of national educa­
tion was strengthened and made more complete after the pas­
sing of the Act of 1696 (C.26). (3) England, however, pre­
sented a different case. Prior .to 1870, there was no na­
tional system for education at all. Education was a matter 
of private and voluntary effort, provided mainly by chari­
table or religious zeal. In 1807, Whitbread promoted in the 
House of Commons a Bill, modelled on the Scottish system, 
providing for the establishment of a school in every parish 
the cost of which might be defrayed out of the rates. But 
it was rejected by the House of Ldrds. Continuous efforts 
were made by Brougham and other reformers, but they were 
doomed to failure as the political theory of laissez-faire 
was still too firmly entrenched. It was in 1833 that the
(1) G.M. Harris, Municipal Self-Government in Britain, 1939, 
pp.229-230.
(2) Apart from the powers mentioned, the Minister was gran­
ted power to settle the disputes arising from the county 
and the county district councils with regard to the pro­
blem of delegation of unclassified roads under the Local 
Government Act, 1929 (Sect.35). He might, under the 
Street Playgrounds Act, 1938, hold a local public inqui­
ry so as to revoke or alter the order of a local autho­
rity which restricted the use of specified roads by ve­
hicles during stated hours in order to make such roads 
safer as playgrounds for children.
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House of Commons for the first time voted the parsimonious 
educational grant of £20,000 in favour of the two private 
associations, the British and Foreign Schools Society and 
the National Society, for the erection of school houses.
(4) This grant became annual, and by 1839 it increased to 
£30,000.
But the contribution of such a small amount of money 
had very little, if any, effect for the betterment of edu­
cation in the country as a whole. A large proportion of 
children were still deprived of iastruction owing to the 
insufficient supply of schools. Besides, most of the schools 
at that time were poorly equipped. The seriousness of the 
problem was brought to light by the indefatigable inquiries 
of the Manchester Statistical Society which showed in one of 
its reports that out of 12,117 children in Manchester, only 
252 were in attendance at day schools and 4,680 at Sunday 
schools. This dreadful situation was much the same in other 
industrial towns. In Lancashire, for example, it was stated 
that out of every ten children of school age, four went to 
no school at all, three went to Sunday schools only, two at­
tended the comparatively worthless dame and common day schools, 
and one attended schools which, if they won a little praise, 
were still far from being satisfactory. (5) Something, there­
fore, had to be done in order to supply cheaper and better 
education for the people; and popular opinion was in favour 
of State action.
In 1839, a Special Committee of the Privy Council, 
presided over by the Lord President, was established by Order 
in Council to administer the annual grant voted by the House 
of Commons. (6) The Committee appointed a permanent staff 
which included two inspectors of schools, and from this time 
forward education in Britain began to acquire the character 
of a public service. The work of the Committee was, however, 
by no means free from difficulties. First of all, it had to 
secure the cooperation and understanding of the churches by 
which most of the schools had been maintained. Owing to the 
traditional freedom which they had acquired in the management 
of their schools, the two religious societies were suspicious 
of, and opposed to, any external intervention. The first
(3) ©«• K«-Ha?*4e C. de B. Murray, How Scotland is Governed,
1947, p.180.
(4) The reason why this grant assumed the form of a vote in 
supply was that it did not require the consent of the 
Lords. See Graham Balfour, Educational Systems of Great 
Britain and Ireland, p.2.
(5) Frank Smith, The Nation’s Schools,op. cit., pp.223-5.
(6) This was again in order to avoid the opposition of the 
Lords.
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proposal of the Committee to establish a State training 
college for teachers, accordingly, encountered so much an­
gry attack that the scheme was hurriedly withdrawn; and 
the Government narrowly escaped defeat when the annual 
grant for education was discussed in the House of Commons.
It was after this capitulation of the Committee that Sir 
James Kay-Shuttleworth was called in to be the Secretary. 
Unlike Chadwick’s tactlessness in his dealing with the 
Poor Law and public health, Sir James won his way through 
by incessant persuasion and compromise. His success was 
remarkable; for he not only won the support of the chief 
religious organizations, but also initiated wise principles 
of State control. He secured the right of inspection in 
all aided schools, (1) and through his inspectors he gave 
stimulus and guidance to every part of the country; he es­
tablished the pupil-teacher system which replaced the very 
much inferior monitorial system;^he made the teaching profes­
sion more attractive and raised the standard of the quali­
fications of teachers; he devised maintenance grants for the 
schools; he extended State aid to other religious communions; 
he planned and directed many experiments to demonstrate im­
proved methods of teaching; he even established a training 
college for teachers at his own expense in Battersea, and 
made it so successful that the churches which had wrecked 
the plan of the Government a few years earlier, began to 
imitate his methods and assure a supply of trained teachers.
ill
In 1846, the first grants were made in aid of teachers’ 
salaries; and in 1853, capitation grants were introduced to 
meet expenditure as a whole. These grants increased gradual­
ly so that by 1861 they reached a total of £842,000. By 
that time an Act of Parliament had already been passed (1856) 
which established the office of Vice-President of the Commit­
tee of the Privy Council on Education and made the adminis­
tration of grants come under the control of a Minister res­
ponsible to Parliament, acting under the general authority 
of the Lord President of the Council. The Vice-President 
in the year 1861 was Robert Lowe. With a view to producing 
a better effect by the use of this ample contribution, he 
formulated the system of payment by results which made the 
amount of the grant depend upon the efficiency of each school, 
the test of efficiency being an examination by one of Her
(1) The Committee issued minutes to explain the conditions 
upon which grants would be given. When the grants in­
creased, the conditions became more strict, and the 
schools earning grants were compelled to submit to re­
gular inspection.
(2) Frank Smith, op. cit., pp.226-7.
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Majesty’s inspectors. 1 If the system will not be cheap", 
he said, "it will be efficient; and if it will not be effi­
cient, it will be cheap". Bad schools lost their subsidies, 
and it was reported that in four years the annual grants 
fell to £636,000. m .
Another achievement of Robert Lowe’s was the pu­
blication of a Revised Code of all the Minutes issued by 
the Education Department, which had been codified for the 
first time in the preceding year. This Educational Code 
contained all the rules and regulations set out systema­
tically, which should be observed by the school managers 
if they were to get their grants. In the provision of 
capitation grants, for example, the Code required that "the 
building must satisfy the inspector, the teacher must be 
certificated, proper registers must be kept, and needlework 
must be taught to girls. The grants could be reduced for 
faults of instruction or discipline, for failure to remedy 
defects or supply adequate apparatus, and for insufficiency 
of staff, and were not to exceed the amount of school fees 
and subscriptions, or 15s. per scholar in average attendance. 
Most important of all, one-third of the sum claimable on 
attendance was to be forfeited for failure in each of the 
three subjects, reading, writing and arithmetic". (2)
Thus before assuming any direct responsibility for 
the provision and maintenance of education, either by the 
central or the local authorities, Britain had gained govern­
mental inspection of schools and a public code of education 
through the medium of Exchequer grants.
The most obvious defect of British education at that 
time was that the schools were still maintained on a volun­
tary basis. There was as yet no attempt on thepprt of Par­
liament to establish a compulsory system. Though a sort of 
’attendance grant’ had been introduced to encourage local 
managers of schools to do their best to attract more children, 
the state of things remained not much improved. There was 
no means of compelling the children to go to school, (3) or 
of compelling school managers to provide sufficient accom­
modation. All that the State could do was to assist and 
encourage voluntary effort and private initiative in the 
building of new schools and the maintenance of old ones.
The public, however, was meantime becoming more and more 
aware of the dangers which might result from a deficiency
(1) Graham Balfour, op. cit., pp.17-19.
(2) Frank Smith, History of Elementary Education, pp.255-6.
(3) As a matter of fact, no child need receive any instruc­
tion unless it happened to be a pauper, a criminal, or
a child of a soldier, or at work in a factory. See Red-
lich & Hirst, op. cit., Vol.II., p.226.
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in national education. The factors behind this movement 
are revealed in a passage in Frank Smith’s essays- (1)
Events in the ’sixties’, both at home and abroad, 
emphasized the national aspects of education. Indus­
trial rivalry was growing more acute, and manufactu­
rers began to realised that other countries were becom- * 
ing more successful competitors. Through the Great 
Exhibition of 1851, and through later continental ex­
hibitions, they saw new evidence of the fruits of tech­
nical training, and the application of science to the 
industrial arts. Vars in other countries also showed 
that national education might even be a form of natio­
nal defences the better educated Northern StateB of 
America had defeated the Southern States; the Prussians 
in 1866 had defeated the Austrians, and the victory was 
described as the victory of the elementary school tea­
chers, for the schools of Prussia had implanted a new 
discipline and a new national spirit in the people.
But even more significant than these lessonB was the 
realisation that the Reform Act of 1867 had enfranchi­
sed a host of uneducated voters in the country, and that 
a dangerous political experiment was in process. Oppo­
nents of a compulsory system were converted to its need, 
and Robert Lowe’s famous phrase, MWe must educate our 
Masters”, expressed the view that the State’s respon­
sibility could no longer be evaded....
The problem was tackled courageously for the first 
time in Mr. Gladstone’s first administration. W.E. Forster 
introduced an Elementary Education Act in 1870 which pro­
vided that in districts where there were no voluntary sch­
ools complying with the requirements of the code, or where 
the accommodation was insufficient, school boards should 
be formed to supply the deficiency. The expenses of such 
boards in the erection and maintenance of public elementary 
schools, so far as they were not met out of fees and Govern­
ment grants, were to be charged upon the rates of their res­
pective areas. (2) The boards were also empowered to make 
byelaws to enforce the attendance of all children between 
the ages of five and thirteen. (3) If a board failed to do
(XJ The Nation’s Schools, op. cit., p.231.
(2) If the rating authority failed to pay the amount speci­
fied in the precept issued by the school board, the 
board might, without prejudice to other remedies, appoint 
an officer with all the powers of a rating authority. 
Another remedy was by mandamus. Redlich & Hirst, Vol.I.,
p. 186.
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its duty, the Education Department had power to appoint 
another board to supersede it* The number of members on 
a given school board was also to be fixed or approved by the 
Education Department in each case according to population.
(4) Besides, the Department could, with its usual powers, 
conduct inspections and demand returns; it could sanction 
the actions of the local boards and superindend the allo­
cation of Parliamentary grants according to the principles 
of the educational code for the time being in force.
In 1876, an Act was passed to provide all school 
districts where school boards did not exist with School 
Attendance Committees in order to enforce attendance at the 
voluntary schools. The Committees were appointed annually 
in boroughs by the municipal councils and in other school 
districts by the Guardians. Moreover, by the Elementary 
Education Act of 1880, all children from five to ten years 
of age were compelled to go to schools as ’full-timers1. 
Since then.the school age had been raised continuously; and 
by the Abolition of Pees Act, 1891, elementary education 
was made free as an additional grant of 10s. per scholar 
in average attendance was provided for all free school ac­
commodation. The effect of this movement was remarkable.
A universal and compulsory public elementary education was 
achieved.
(3) In this place the Act for Scotland was again much more 
progressive in its principles than its English counter­
part. Sect.69 of the former provided that: ’It shall 
be the duty of every parent to provide elementary edu­
cation in reading, writing and arithmetic for his chil­
dren between five and thirteen years of age, and if un­
able from poverty to pay therefor, to apply to the pa­
rochial board of the parish or burgh in which he re­
sides, and it shall be the duty of the said board to 
pay out of the poor fund the ordinary or reasonable 
fees for the elementary education of every such child, 
or such part of such fees as the parent shall be unable 
to pay, in the event of such board being satisfied of 
the inability of the parent to pay such fees....* The 
provision was definitely compulsory. On the other hand, 
the corresponding section in the English Act made edu­
cation not compulsory but permissive. ’Every school 
board*, it ran, ’may’ (not shall) ’from time to time, 
with the approval of the Education Department, make bye- 
laws for all or any of the following purpose: (l) Re­
quiring the parents of children of such age, not less 
than five years nor more than thirteen years, as may be 
fixed by the byelaws, to cause such children (unless 
there is some reasonable excuse) to attend school....
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During this time the school hoards had made great 
progress. The aim of the Government was chiefly directed 
towards improving the equipment of voluntary schools as 
well as increasing the number of scholars in attendance. 
Increased grants, moreover, had from time to time been 
forwarded to them.
In 1899, the central education authority was re- 
. constituted. Under an Act of Parliament of that year, the 
Board of Education was set up to deal with the education 
of the country. The Act also extended for the first time 
the power of central inspection to the secondary and tech­
nical scfiobls which were then still in the hands of private 
organisations.
There was, however, a reaction against the ad hoc 
form of administration in 1902, and the Education Act of 
that year made a great effort to absorb the voluntary 
schools into the national system and to place the finan­
cial responsibility for their maintenance on the local 
education authorities. All the school boards and the school 
attendance committees were abolished and their functions 
were transferred to the new authorities. It was provided 
that, apart from the voluntary schools, higher education 
should be handled solely by the county and the county bo­
rough councils; while elementary education was made the res­
ponsibility of the councils of county boroughs, non-county 
boroughs with a population of over 10,000, urban districts 
with a population of over 20,000, and the councils of coun­
ties for their areas outside those boroughs and urban dis­
tricts. As the difficulty which previously stood in the way 
of bringing education into the general scheme of Exchequer 
subsidies waB removed by the Act, central control assumed 
a more effective form. The Act also provided that the edu­
cational expenditure of all the local education authorities 
should be audited by the Board. So, for the first time in 
British history the expenditure of voluntary schools and 
that of boroughs on higher education was brought under the 
review of independent governmental auditors. (5)
(4) The members of the board, whose number was not to be 
less than 5 or more than 15 except in the metropolis, 
might either be male or female, lodger or householder, 
resident or non-resident. In a municipal district the 
board was to be elected by the burgesses, elsewhere, 
and in the metropolis, by the ratepayers, both men and 
women. In order to safeguard religious minorities, a 
system oflfcumulative votes was introduced.
(5) Hitherto borough accounts had been audited by borough 
auditors. While the accounts of all other local autho­
rities had been audited by the Local Government Board,
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From 1902 to 1944 the efforts of Parliament were 
chiefly directed towards the development of special ser­
vices in education. In 1906 came the provision of meals, 
in 1907 the provision of play centres, of school camps 
and of medical inspection of school children, in 1909 the 
provision of/ medical treatment, in 1910 vocational gui­
dance, and in 1913 special treatment for mentally deficient 
children such as had already been estahlised in 1893 and 
1899 for blind, deaf, defective, and epileptic scholars. 
Efforts were also made to raise the school age and to as­
sist the reconstruction of school buildings and the reor­
ganization of the voluntary schools to meet the needs of 
advanced education. Exchequer grants were accordingly in­
creased, and the control of the Board of Education became 
more detailed and strict.
The power of the central authority culminated 
in the Education Act of 1944 which transformed the Board of 
Education into a Ministry. The new Minister was effective­
ly authorised ’to promote the education of the people.... 
and the progressive development of institutions deveted to 
that purpose, and to secure the effective execution by local 
authoriti es, under his control and direction, of the na­
tional policy for providing a varied and/comprehensive edu­
cational service in every area’; and local authorities were 
required within the twelve months from the 1st April, 1945, 
to estimate their immediate and prospective requirements in 
the light of the new developments and to prepare development 
plans therefor and submit them to the Minister for his ap­
proval.
The most important powers which the ICiniiter ac­
quired under the Act were those to partition the areas of 
counties ’into such divisions as may be conductive to ef­
ficient and convenient administration’, and to sanction the 
schemes of the county councils for the purpose of delegating 
their functions relating to primary and secondary education 
to ’divisional educational executives* representing one or 
more county districts. (1) The Minister inter alia could 
ask the local authorities to submit for his approval schemes 
for the improvement of secondary education and determine by 
what stages these schemes should be put into operation. He 
could appoint the Governors of an auxiliary secondary school,
municipal expenditure had never run the gauntlet of an 
independent audit.
(l) But the council of any borough or urban district whose 
population was not less than 60,000, or whose total 
children in its elementary schools were not less than 
7,000, was allowed to be excepted from any such scheme 
of divisional administration.
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and could by regulations determine how the provision of 
county colleges should be administered. He was authorised 
also to make regulations for the payment of grants to per­
sons, other than local aducation authorities, in respect of 
expenditure incurred by them for the purpose of educational 
services or educational research. He might by order require 
that local education authorities should provide medical in­
spection and treatment as well as meals and milk to children 
and young persons attending maintained schools and colleges.
He could recognise and certify candidates for the teaching 
profession, and settle disputes between local education au­
thorities and the managers and governors of the aided schools. 
Lastly, if the local education authority failed to fulfil 
any of its duties, the Minister of Education might hold a 
public inquiry and make such order as he thought necessary 
which could be enforced by writ of mandamus issuing out of 
the King’s Bench Division of the High Court of Justice.
The power of the Minister to inspect^was^also ex­
tended under the Act and subsequent regulatiorfsjjjjrfif&pendent 
schools which did not receive any financial assistance ei­
ther directly or indirectly frwm the State. w»ae« aabsactd.
If the premises were regarded as unsuitable for a school, 
or if the instruction given was insufficient, or the pro­
prietor or any teaSber was not a proper person to hold such 
an office, the Minister was enabled to enforce the closing 
of the school or to disqualify the particular person.
Indeed, the power of the Minister to control the 
education of the country has grown to such)*extent that it 
exceeds anything attained in other local services except 
Poor Law relief. This has of course been largely the re­
sult of the enormous amount of money which has been contri­
buted by the Exchequer in aid of education and the relative 
incapacity of private and local bodies to meet the expan­
ding costs of such a service. In a recent regulation issued 
by the Government, it was provided that the payment of an 
education grant waslto be conditional upon the Minister’s being 
satisfied that the authority had complied with the require­
ments imposed upon it by the Education Act and had supplied 
punctually the information and returns required by the Mi­
nister. If the Minister is not satisfied on any of these 
points, he may withhold or make a reduction from the grant. 
i n  Such a regulation cannot be lightly ignored.
The education grant is in practice made up of a
(l) See the Education (Local Education Authorities) Grant 
Regulations for England and Wales, 1948, Ho.334 and the 
Education Authorities (Scotland) Grant Regulations, 1948, 
Ho.961 (S.69), p.4.
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very large number of small grants each paid in respect of 
a specified item of service in education. These small 
grants are all conditional upon the school’s being maintained 
efficiently, and, for the most part, made to vary roughly 
with the amount of work done. They are made either, depen­
dent on the number of children in average attendance, or on 
special welfare services being provided in schools, or on 
the provision of schools without fees, or of schools for 
special classes, or of instruction in special subjects, or 
else on the building of new schools, training colleges, 
hostels, etc. How these services are to be made available 
is set put in the code, in some cases in great detail. iii 
If the inspector of the central government reports any item 
of service to be not in compliance with these conditions, 
the central department withholds or reduces the grant in 
respect of that particular item. In this way in ensuring 
more effective control, the Minister of Education need not 
be driven, like the central department of police, to a 
bare choice between making and withholding the grant. There 
is some measure of elasticity and variation with which he 
may impose a punishment.
Although the Ministry of Education is more concerned 
with the routine of administrative detail than other depart­
ments which deal with branches of local government, it does 
not appear that this has met with any strong objection, so 
far, on the part of the local authorities. In spite of the 
fact that the legal position would allow of considerable do­
mination on the part of the Minister, from the outset the 
relationship between them has, in general, been most effi­
ciently and tactfully handled. The central department has, 
in practice, regarded its relationship with local education 
authorities as being a partnership. This sense of partner­
ship has been shown by the Minister’s readiness to set up 
expert committees on particular aspects of education, to 
give the local experts and administrators ample chance to 
appear and discuss before him, and to allow local experi­
ments where national policy was not at stake. It is be­
cause of this that the visits of the inspectors have been 
generally welcomed in spite of their enthusiasm in carrying 
out their duties. The goodwill which they have shown and
(1) If, for instance, the local authorities proposed to
teach cookery to children in elementary schools, it was 
said that they should, at each class, conform to 30 or 
40 separate regulations which not only prescribed the 
qualifications of the teacher, but limited the size of 
the classes and the number of hours, instruction, and so 
forth. See Bushell, op. cit., p.388.
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the assistance which they have offered have unconsciously 
strengthened the hand of the central department without 
creating any opposition from the local authorities, tl)
Despite an absence of friction, in general, between 
the central and the local authorities, certain minor dis­
agreements have, however, emerged. In the first $lace, the 
Acts and Regulations relating to educational administration 
are too numerous and complicated, demanding a considerable 
amount of office work. For the purpose of claiming the 
grants many forms have to be filled up, and particulars 
checked, and consequently a very large staff of civil ser­
vants has to be maintained both at the offices of local au­
thorities and at the office of the central department with 
consequent inefficiency and delay. Complaints, for example, 
have been generally made against the severe delay in ob­
taining approval of plans for new schools which the local 
education authorities have promoted. (2) In Scotland re­
gret has also been frequently shown concerning the strict­
ness of the conditions which the Scottish Education Depart­
ment has laid down as regards the plans and designs for all 
new school buildings if the grants are to be obtained. As 
these plans and designs are to be submitted to and approved 
by the Department, the architect which the Department em­
ploys may alter or disapprove them as he thinks fit. The 
result is that there is *a deplorable tendency to repeat 
the same type of school building all over the country, in 
defiance, or at least disregard, of all local variations 
whether of architecture, available materials or even cli­
mate*. (3) There is something too in the charge that be­
cause of the excessive detail required in stipulations for 
grants there is inevitably a tendency for the governors and 
managers of schools and local education authorities to ig­
nore true educational aims, and to consider rather how, with­
in the wording of the Regulations, the highest money grants 
may be obtained. h i
VI. Housing.
Prior to the first world war housing wasJnot a pu­
blic service, although local auth orities in Britain took 
responsibility long ago for the sanitationjand quality of 
houses. It was only towards the end of^iast century that 
the shortage of houses for the poorer workers began to force 
itself upon public attention; and the problem was tackled 
for the first time on national lines by the Royal Commission 
on the Housing of the Working Classes, 1884, and the passing
(l) Barratt, op. cit., p.149. (2) Harris, op. cit., p.163.
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of the Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890. Very si­
milar to the subsequent housing legislation, the Act dealt 
with (i) the demolition of individual unhealthy dwelling 
houses, (ii) the clearance of unhealthy areas, and (iii) 
the provision of new dwellings for the working classes.
The Act also provided for periodical inspections ofkhe dis­
trict with a view to ascertaining whether any dwelling house 
therein was in a state so dangerous or injurious to health 
as to be unfit for human habitation.
The problem, however, was not solved by the mere 
passing of the Act. Ho strenuous effort was made by the 
local authorities to cope with housing requirements, owing 
to the considerable expenditure involved. At the same time 
the increased cost of building, higher rates of interest, and 
more stringent building regulations issued by the Local Go­
vernment Board, h i  militated further against the provision 
of houses. The outcome was that houses could not be provided 
with a charge which the average person could pay. From 1910 
onwards up to the outbreak of the 1914-18 war, the number of 
houses built by private enterprise decreased rapidly, and 
the shortage, especially of the houses for the lower paid 
workers, began to become acute. A Land Enquiry Committee 
reported in 1914 that there was a shortage of housing ac­
commodation in most towns; that most urban workmen lived in 
congested areas, and that 5 to 10 per cent lived in slums.
The Committee therefore recommended that in order to effect 
reforms an obligation should be imposed upon every local au­
thority to make |*a complete survey of housing conditions 
and to prepare a scheme with a view to raising the standard. 
They also proposed an annual block grant in aid of local 
rates to facilitate this undertaking.
The situation became more serious still owing to 
the cessation of building during the 1914-18 war. In 1919 
returns from local authorities indicated a minimum need of 
400,000 houses. The country could not afford to wait for 
the slow grinding of the laws of supply and demand any more; 
State interference became inevitable. So the Housing, Town
TSy C. de B. Murray, op. cit., pp.130-131.
(4) Bushell, op. cit., p.388.
(1) In former days the miserable houses that were being built 
had one merit* cheapness. As the public authorities in­
terfered and gradually forced up the standard of housing 
by means of byelaws, they also forced up the cost of the 
house, and therefore the rent. The result was that the 
supply of cheap houses was actually diminishing while 
the number of families who could hot afford an economic 
rent for a decent house was increasing.
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Planning, etc. Act was passed in that year as an emergency 
measure. Every local authority was asked to survey the 
housing needs of its district and prepare and carry out a 
housing scheme, subject to the approval of the Ministry of 
Health, providing for the whole of working-class needs so 
far as they were not likely to be met by other agencies; 
the State indulging for the first time in financial co-op­
eration with local authorities, and undertaking to bear any 
burden in excess of 0 local rate of Id. in the £. Lump­
sum grants were also offered to private builders under the 
Housing (Additional Powers) Act, 1919. A Housing Advisory 
Council and a Commission on Standardization were appointed, 
and arrangements were made for the supply of materials 
through the Building Materials Department (closed down in 
1921). Thereafter Act after Act was passed providing for 
different types and amounts of housing grant|. The law 
was consolidated in 1925, but this Act was in its turn re­
pealed and reenacted with amendments in the Housing Act of 
1936.
While Exchequer subsidies had their various effects 
on the building and re-conditioning of houses, according to 
the policy of the Government at the time, (1) they also 
served to extend the power of the central department. This 
can best be seen in the stipulations ofjthe Housing Act of 
1936. 7
On the whole, the Minister was enabled to act in a 
directive and advisory capacity and dealt solely with local 
housing authorities which were, under the Act, chiefly res­
ponsible for the housing administration. As regards the 
provisions for securing the repair, maintenance and sani­
tary condition of houses, for example, the Minister might 
isBue a ’Manual on Unfit Houses’ or other regulations from 
time to time indicating a standard of fitness which was to 
be regarded asfa minimum for a habitable house, and which 
every local authority wasjobliged to apply* The local au­
thority had the power to declare any area to be a clearance 
area. In doing so they were to transmit to the Minister a 
report whereupon they might , after Ministerial confirma­
tion, either order the demolition of the buildings in the
(1) The 1919, 1923, 1924 and 19^6 Acts were directed main­
ly towardsathe encouragement of the building of new 
houses fox^working classes; the 1926 Act dealt chiefly 
with the reconditioning of cottages for rural inhabi­
tants; the 1930, 1933 and 1938 Acts with clearance areas 
(in which case all buildings were to be demolished) and 
improvement areas (in which case some houses could be 
demolished and others would be repaired and overcrowding
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area, or purchase the land comprised in the area and under­
take themselves the demolition of the buildings thereon.
In the former case, the owner affected might lhake an objec­
tion to the Minister so as to secure a remedy. The Minis­
ter, while exercising his quasiSjudicial functions, was to 
do so in accordance with the rule of natural justice, (that 
is to say, he should hear the case with both sides present,) 
and could hold a public inquiry in order to consider the 
condition of the area.
The local authority was also empowered to pass a 
resolution declaring an area to be a redevelopment area, (2) 
and to define it on a map. A copy of the resolution and the 
map were to be sent to the Minister. Within six months af­
ter the passing of the resolution, or within such extended 
period as the Minister might allow, a Re-development Plan 
was to be prepared and submitted to him. If no objections 
were made, the Minister might approve the plan with or with­
out modifications. Otherwise he should cause a public local 
inquiry to be held. (Sect.35.)
In respect of the abatement of over-crowding, the 
Minister had considerable power to supervise and direct. It 
was provided that every local authority should cause an ins­
pection of its district with a view to ascertaining what 
dwelling-houses therein were over-crowded, and to prepare 
and submit to the Minister a report showing the result of 
the inspection and the number of new houses required in order 
to abate overcrowding. The local authority was required 
further to submit to the Minister its proposals and buil­
ding schemes, and, for this purpose, might acquire by agree­
ment land, subject to conditions imposed by the Minister. 
(Sect.73.) The Minister had, inter alia# power to revoke 
unreasonable byelaws with respect to new streets or buil­
dings which were in force. He might also give directions 
to the authority for the protection of the beauty and ameni­
ties of the locality. (Sect.142.) If differences were to
would be abated by special byelaws); and the 1935 and 
1938 Act8 with the gross evil of overcrowding.
(2) A re-development area was an area in which the following 
conditions existed, viz.,
(a) that the area contained 50 or more working-class 
houses;
(b) that at least 1/3 of the working-class houses in 
the area were: (i) overcrowded; or (ii) unfit for 
human habitation; or (iii) so arranged as to be 
congested;
(c) that the industrial and social conditions/of the 
district were such that the area should be used to
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arise between two authorities in relation to the provision 
of houses, the matter might he referred by either authority 
to the Minister whose decision was to be final and binding 
on the authorities. (Sect.82.)
Apart from the general power to approve and direct, 
and to settle disputes in his quasi-judicial capacity, ex­
amples of which have been outlined, the Minister could also 
exercise his default powers should a local authority prove 
obdurate. If a council failed to exercise its powers, it 
was within the competence of the Minister to order it to 
perform its duties, and even in the last resort to make an 
order rendering any of the relevant powers exercisable by 
himself. (Sect.170.)
Generally speaking, the power granted to the Mi­
nister of Health over local housing services was not very 
great. Most of his powers as stipulated in the Act were 
passive powers; he was authorised to check and supervise, 
but he did not enjoy much discretionary power in issuing 
orders and regulations, and could hardly compel local au­
thorities to do what he thought fit. The duties which the 
local authorities were obliged to perform, and the manner 
in which they should be dome, were, in the main, prescribed 
by statutory provisions in some detail, leaving little room 
for the Minister’s advice. It was only in the slum clea­
rance procedure that the Minister really enjoyed a substan­
tial power, but even that power was quasi-judicial in cha­
racter and not administrative. His decision was by no means 
final. The fact that Ministerial decision could be brought 
before the High Court was in any event a sufficient guaran­
tee against arbitrary rulings. Even with respect to the 
Minister’s default powers,there was no sign of strong admi­
nistrative control. It has often been said that the machi­
nery was slow and(cumbrous, and in practice the power was 
seldom exercised. The fact that the Minister had to deal 
with 1716 separate authorities was in itself an administra­
tive defect. It was an arrangement hardly conducive to eco­
nomy and efficiency. (1)
nevertheless, to say that the housing administra­
tion was not closely and minutely governed by the central 
department is by no msand an assertion that central control 
was ineffective; for after all the Minister still had the 
power of financial control. If he was satisfied that a lo­
cal authority had failed to perform any of its duties under
a substantial extent for housing the working clas­
ses; and
(d) that it was expedient in connection with the pro­
vision of housing accommodation for the working 
classes that the area should be re-developed as
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the Housing Acts, or failed to observe any condition at­
tached to the payment of/grants, he might at any time with­
hold the whole or any part of a contribution which he had 
undertaken to make to that authority, (Sect.113.)
This legislation is still, with very minor modifi­
cations, in operation, and determines the present position 
of the local authorities.
VII. Town and Country Planning.
It is only of recent years, in Britain, that town 
and country planning has been regarded , independently, as 
a service of national importance, though some steps have 
long been taken along this line under the Public Health 
Acts dealing with sanitary conditions in towns. The con­
trol of water-supply, the making of sewers,the paving of 
streets, the prevention of obnoxious trades, the regula­
tion of new structures,etc., being the important items of 
public health service, have no doubt done immeasurable 
good to the normal development of the towns at the same 
time. But the real difficulty of the Public Health Acts 
was that they did not go far enough to affect a fundamen­
tal reorganization of the municipalities. They might have 
prevented the building of a house which was injurious to 
the health of its inhabitants, but had no concern with the 
amenities and beauty of the country as a whole. They only 
regulated minor defects; they did not change them. Bad lay­
out of buildings existed long before the passing of the Pu­
blic Health Acts, for the Industrial Revolution had already 
done its worst. The system which was fundamentally unsound 
could only be improved when a far-sighted, wholesome deve­
lopment had been planned. "Public Health law came a cen­
tury too late% writes Dr. Jennings, "It shut the door\sta- 
ble after the horse had escaped....It has enabled locaf^au- 
thorities, so far as they were willing, to control the de­
velopments which have taken place since 1870. The real 
harm had been begun one hundred years before". (2) What is 
more, house building had for a long time been a matter of 
private enterprise. The motives behind, and the chief con­
siderations for, the erection of a house were the making of 
a profit. Little attention had been paid to its future
a whole. (Sect.34.)
(1) L. R. Connor,Urban Housing in England and Wales, Journal 
of the Royal Statistical Society, Part I., 1936, p.33.
(2) Law Relating to Town and Country Planning, 1st ed., 
p.3.
-78-
social effect. The public health authority only determined, 
in relation to the land used and the rest of the built-up 
area.whether it was desirable in the public interest that 
these things should be done. They did not ’proceed them­
selves to develop this land’, nor had they ’established any 
plan for general development by private persons’. The plan­
ning of new developments, or the modification of the exis­
ting system in accordance with plans, therefore, could only 
be -dome effectively by separate enactments.
As town planning is chiefly concerned with the re­
conditioning and the redevelopment of house building, its idea 
may be said'to have originated in the early Housing Acts* 
Provisions for rudimentary civil planning may be found in 
the Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1885. They were con­
solidated and amended in the Housing of the Working Classes 
Act, 1890, which conferred upon local health authorities the 
powers to compel the repair of property unfit for human ha­
bitation. The Housing, Town Planning, etc., Acts of 1909 
and 1919 both extended powers of town planning in the inte­
rest of local authorities. The latter Act even provided 
for a 50 per cent grant to encourage then in the work of 
slum clearance. In 1925, a separate Town Planning Act was 
passed, (l) and it was again consolidated in the Town and 
Country Planning Act, 1932. According to these Acts, local 
authorities were left with ample room for discretion and 
initiative. On the one hand, no Exchequer money was invol­
ved, and, on the other, the powers under the Acts were so 
wide that there was practically no limit to the amount of 
control which a local authority could impose on land if they 
weremprepared to pay for it. (2) According to the Town Plan­
ning sections of the 1919 Act, for example, local authorities 
were given great powers and facilitated procedure to prepare 
or adopt a scheme without the necessity for them to obtain 
the approval of the Minister of Health; and, under the 1932 
Act, there were no compulsory duties on local authorities to 
prepare schemes, unless the Minister required them to do so.
(3) As a matter of fact, the powers of the local authori­
ties under these Acts were not effectively exercised except 
where there were Exchequer subsidies for such services as 
slum clearance and the abatement of overcrowding.
Following on the publication of the Barlow Report 
in 1940 and both the Scott and the Uthwatt Reports in 1942, 
an Act was passed in 1943 setting up the Ministry of Town
(1) This Act did not apply to Scotland.
(2) G. M. Harris, op. cit., pp.155-6.
(3) Clarke, op. cit., p.378.
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and Country Planning to deal exclusively with this impor­
tant problem. But it was not until the passing of the Town 
and Country Planning Act in J944 that the first grant in 
aid of this service was made. From that time onwards, the 
controlling power of the central department has been stren­
gthened in proportion to the increase of the grants; and it 
culminated in the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947.
Under this Act the Minister is empowered, first of 
all, to establish a Central Land Board whose personnel is 
totally under his control. lii He may give directions of 
a general character to the Board as to how their functions 
should be performed, (Sect.3.) and the Board are required 
to make to him a report each year on the exercise and per­
formance by them of their functions during the year. (Sect.
2.) The Minister may also, with the consent of the local 
authorities concerned, or otherwise after holding a local 
inquiry, make an order establishing a joint board as the 
local planning authority for the areas of any two or more 
county or county district councils, or for any parts of 
those areas. (2)
Under the Act, every local planning authority 
has a duty to carry out a survey of their area and to submit 
to the Minister a report of the survey together with a de­
velopment plan, indicating the manner in which they propose 
that land in that area should be used and the stages by 
which any development should be carried out. The Minister 
may approve any development plan either with or without 
modification, and if any development plan, report or pro­
posal for alterations or additions is not done to his satis­
faction, he may, after carrying out any survey ^lich appears 
to him to be expedient, make a development plan, or amend it 
to his liking. He may even authorise the planning authority 
for any neighbouring area, or any other local planning autho­
rity, to submit a plan to him for his approval. (Sect.7.)
The power of the Minister to make regulations ahd 
orders is very extensive. He can prescribe not only the 
form of any notice, order or other document to be issued by 
any local authority, but also anything in particular which 
would be good for the purpose of the Act. (Sect.111.)
(1) The Minister might determine the number of the members of 
the Board (not exceeding 9) to be appointed and the tenure 
and vacation of their office. The appointment of the se­
cretary and other officers and servants by the Board 
should be done with his approval. (Sect.2.)
(2) This Order should be laid before Parliament and could only 
be effective if either House did not pass a resolution to 
annul it within a period of 40 days.
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He may give directions to any local planning authority, 
requiring that any application for permission to develop 
land, shall be referred to him instead of being dealt with 
by the local planning authority. The decision of the Mi­
nister on any application referred to him is final. (Sect. 
15.) On the other hand, where application is made to a 
local planning authority for permission to develop land, 
and refused, the applicant may appeal to the Minister, 
who has the power to allow or dismiss the appeal. Where 
any land is designated by a development plan as subject to 
compulsory acquisition by the appropriate local authority, 
then if the Minister is satisfied that the land is required, 
he may authorise the council to acquire the land compulso­
rily.
It should be noted that the default power of the 
Minister under the 1947 Act is also very great. If he is 
satisfied, after holding a local inquiry,---(a) that the 
council of any county borough or county district has failed 
to take steps for the acquisition of any land which in his 
opinion ought to be acquired to carry out the development 
plan, or (b) that any local authority has failed to carry 
out, on land acquired by them, any development which in 
his opinion ought to be carried out; he may by order require 
the council or authority to take such steps as might be spe­
cified for acquiring the land or carrying jjthe development, 
as the case may be. (Sect. 1000)
In order to help authorities to carry out their 
work wffectively, the Minister is empowered to make regu­
lations, with the consent of the Treasury, for the payment 
of grants to these authorities. The grants are payable 
only when the local authorities fulfil such conditions as 
are prescribed in the regulations, or comply with such re­
quirements as the Minister may from time to time make.
(Sect.95).
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CHAPTER IV.
RECENT. TRENDS IN CENTRAL CONTROL.
I. The Intensification of Departmental Control, Fro* 
the short review in the prececing chap ter JM®&ntrol exercised 
by various government departments over several important 
local government services, it is apparent that the hand of 
Whitehall has been growing stronger steadily in the course of 
the last hundred years. The gradual intensification of 
departmental, pressure was first seen in those services which 
received percentage grants from central authorities. This is 
especially true in the case of the public health services 
prior to the Local Government Act of 1929. The Minister 
wielded considerable power to give or to withhold the various 
percentage grants for special health services and assumed 
great influence over local authorities in their administration 
of these services. Complaints were already being made from 
various parts of the country that the increase in central 
supervision in these services was liable to undermine the 
initiative of local authorities. But in spite of this attack 
the controlling power of Whitehall continued to expand, owing 
to the increasing dependaace of the local authorities upon 
the central government for financial assistance.
All the percentage grants for public health services 
were discontinued by the 1929 Act. This, however, did not 
mean the abolition or diminution of central supervision.
4Uite the contrary, the Minister was equipped with much 
greater power. He might reduce the sum payable to any local 
authority under the block grant scheme, by whatever amounts 
he thought just, if he were satisfied that the councils had 
failed to achieve or maintain a reasonable standard of 
efficiency and progress in the discharge of their functions, (t) 
That is to say, the controlling power of the Minister was 
enlarged to cover the whole field of public health instead 
©f the specified branches of the service as was the caseiForrnerly. 
Similar power was given by the same Act to the Minister of * 
Transport so that he could also reduce the grant if he were 
satisfied that the councils had failed to maintain their 
roads or any part of them in a satisfactory condition. But 
further, and what is more important, the Minister of Health 
was empowered also to exercise his power of reducing grants 
if he were satisfied that the expenditure of the councils 
had been excessive and unreasonable, having regard to their
TIJ Sect. 104 of the Local Government Act, 1929.
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financial respurces and other relevant circumstances. In 
other words, the Minister had indirectly obtained the means 
of controlling every part of local government which might 
involve expenditure.
The fact that the central departments have become 
more inclined in recent years to regard local authorities as 
little more than their agents can also be seen in the tone 
ef the language which they use to the latter. Traditionally, 
local authorities were the masters of internal administration. 
They had provided, far a long time, many important services 
in which the central government played no part. When the 
Government started in the middlm of the last century to join 
in the work of the local authorities, they were extremely 
careful not to go so far as to invoke antipathy or objection. 
Instead of commanding arbitrarily, they chose the way of 
persuasion and monetary inducement. Apart from the Poor Law 
administration which has been a special case in the British 
system of central-Aoc al relationships, government departments 
were always modest in their attitude towards local authorities. 
But the voice of Whitehall grew harsher as local authorities 
were reduced more and more into the condition of beggars for 
Exchequer grants. In the explanation of this phenomenon, a 
passage from Professor Robson’s newly revised book is 
instructive;- (lj
In the so-called financial crisis of 1931 the 
central government exercised a dominating influence 
of an unprecedented kind over local authorities. In 
the course of the panic measures> which were taken by 
the Government to reduce public expenditure at the 
very time when it should have been increasing, the 
then Chancellor of the Exchequer instructed the assoc­
iations of local authorities that in order to ’lighten 
the heavy burden at present borme by the community’ 
they were to review the whole field of local expend­
iture in order to effect reductions at the earliest 
possible moment. At the same time the Minister of 
health, uSing language without precedent in the 
history of his department, announced in a circular 
that as regards salary reductions his Majesty’s 
Government did not think it practicable to impose 
any hard-and-fast rule on local authorities.
"impose* was a new word for the central government 
to employ towards the ancient counties and proud 
cities of Britain. Yet it was one to which they were 
soon to become accustomed, for the National Economy Act,
 1931, enabled the Government to make Orders in Council
Xl) I. A.Robson, The Development- of Local Government, Revised 
and Enlarged 2nd.ed., 1948, p. 32.
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for the purpose of effecting economies in regard to 
education, police, roads, etc., and also "for 
imposing duties on local authorities in conn­
ection witu the administration of any such 
service.. .
The power of central departments to subjugate local 
authorities is not merely a momentary phenomenon belonging 
to a state of emergency; it is a part of a long term trend. 
The existence of a power to withhold a grant has become 
nothing but a restriction of local authorities to a bare 
choice between doing a thing in their own way at the expense 
of their ratepayers, and doing it in the way thought best 
by a government department at the partial expense of the 
Exchequer. Local authorities are more likely to subject 
themselves to the dictates of the central power especially 
as their financial condition becomes weaker every day, due 
to the incessant expansion of their expenditure without 
any corresponding increase in the resources which they 
themselves can control. This movement can be seen in the 
recent procedure for obtaining grants on local surveyors 
salaries. A generation ago, in accordance with the Ministry 
of Transports Circular 162 (Roads), 1922, the Mini st er might 
pay half the salary of the surveyor, provided only that the 
conditions of appointment and service were subject to his 
approval. But under the system which was stipulated in 
their circular 604 (1947), each appointment was to be 
advertised, and the Minister required that the names and 
qualifications of the unsuccessful candidates^ as well as 
the application and testimonials of the person appointed^ 
should be supplied bo supplied’ to him. "It is not unfair 
to conclude", writes Mr. J.M. Hawksworth, "that the 
Ministry are thus seeking to provide themselves in each 
case with information which would enable them to review 
the local authority’s choice between competing candidates 
as well as to approve the person selected".
Yet, this is simply trivial compared with the 
power ©f control which the Education Act of 1944 has 
conferred upon the Minister of Education. Section 1 (i) 
of the Act declared that the newly-established, Minister 
should have the duty "to promote the education of the 
people.... and progressive development of institutions 
devoted to that purpose, and to secure the effective 
execution by local authorities, under his control and 
direction, of the national policy for providing a varied 
and comprehensive educational service in every area".
This pronounces a new relationship between the government 
department and local authorities. In the past they were
XT) S oie d ev e 1©pmen ts in Lo c ai Gove mm en t, 1944-48;” the 
Journal of Public Administration, vol.XXVl, no. 4, Winter No., 
1948, p.268.
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ref erred to as partners in education, and the same polite 
language is now still prevalent. But the Act provided for 
♦control and direction* which is the language of a principjjM 
and agent. (1) Moreover, apart from this enormous power to 
control and direct, the Act also equipped the Minister with 
an extraordinary power to prevent the unreasonable exercise 
of their functions by local education authorities, which in 
an idea entirely new to the administration of education.
Section 68 of the same Act reads as follows ;-
If the Minister is satisfied either on complaint 
by any person or otherwise, that any local education 
authority or the managers or governors of any county 
or voluntary school have acted or are proposing to 
act unreasonably with respect to the exercise of 
any power conferred or the performance of any duty 
imposed by or under thin Act, he may, notwithstanding 
any enactment rendering the exercise, of the power or 
the performance of the duty contingent upon the 
opinion of the authority or of the managers or governors, 
give such directions as to the exercise of the power 
or the performance of the duty as appear to him to 
be expedient.
This means that the local education authorities are 
no longer regarded as capable of exercising freely the powers 
which they derive from the law, within the limits laid down 
by legislation, or regulations made under statutory authority. 
Their discretionary power is challenged; and the Minister can 
overrule them on his own initiative at any time without the 
need of waiting for a complaint in order to act. "Parliament 
confers powers on local authorities", writes Professor Robson,
"and the Courts are available to see that they ar^lxceeded or 
abused. But henceforth the Minister is deemed to be the (final 
repository of reason and his decision cannot be challenged either 
in the Courts or directly in parliament. His opinion, moreover, 
is placed above the views of the local electors. (2)
n i  The relation of partnership"also existed in other services 
of national importance except the Poor Law which had never 
recovered from the absolute subordination of local authorities 
to the central power laid down in the Poor Law Act, 1834.
Professor Robson had pointed out that the Poor Law also used the 
same language, ’control and direction* to describe the relation­
ship between the central department and the local authorities as 
the Education Act, 1944. Op. cit., p. 33.
(2) Ibid., p. 34.
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Though this is essentially a description of the legal sit- 
uation-a situation mitigated in practice by the personal 
restraint of the people concerned, this far-reaching and 
absolute control is bound to permeate and influence the 
relationship between the Ministry of Education and local 
education authorities. (lj
The tendency is apparent." The principle of what Mr." 
Hawksworth called 1 the doctrine of legislative precedent* 
may have a great part to play in other fields of local 
government services. He pointed out that once a particular 
type of provision has received Parliamentary sanction, it 
becomes easier to insert a similarly drafted provision in a 
subsequent statute, and still easier with each repetition.
This has already been revealed in the Children and the 
National Assistance Acts of 1948. Under these Acts, the 
powers and discretions of local authorities are expressly 
to be exercised under the ’general guidance* of the appropriate 
Minister. If such a change becomes general, its effect will 
inevitably be * the complete abdication by the local authorities 
of the right to think and act for themselves*; and ’their 
transformation into mere receptacles for Government policy. (2)
nr~ During the two years after the passing of the Education
Act, 1944, the Minister of Education issued 120 circulars, 
170 administrative memoranda and numerous pamphlets with 
draft statutory rules and orders. H.M.Inspectors have 
also started to play a more important role in this 
movement towards ’centralization*. They keep an eye on 
every trivial matter. Even if a head teacher wishes to 
send a party of children on an educational visit to a 
local works or an educational film, he must give seven 
days* notice to the inspector and obtain his approval:See 
Alderman J. W. F. Hill, address to the Omnfermmce of the 
Association of Municipal Corporations, October, 1946.
Local Government Chronicle, Oct. 12. 1946, p.845.
(2) f. A.Robson, the Central Domination of Local Government;
Political Quarterly, January-March, 1933, vo 1, IV., no. 1.
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II. The Nationalisation of Local Services. The other conspic­
uous tendency in recent years, affecting the relationship 
between the central and local authorities, has been the 
nationalisation and transference to public boards of certain 
local services. This has been due partly to the growing 
importance of the service, which has called for centralised 
management, and partly to the increasing financial difficulties 
on the part of the local authorities in maintaining such 
services. The loss of these local functions and responsibilities 
to central authorities has undoubtedly weakened and impaired 
some of the vigour of local government.
Licensing Passenger Road Service. Under the provisions 
of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, the licensing of passenger road 
services was taken away from local authorities and given to 
the Area Traffic Commissioners set up in 12 large regions.
The chairman of each bpdy of Commissioners is a whole-time 
official amd is appointed for 7 years by the Minister of 
Transport. The other two part-time Commissioners are selected 
by the Minister from panels prepared by the county councils 
and the urban authorities in the particular area. The 
Commissioners are empowered to issue all licences, and regulate 
all routes and services, and are subject to the Minister’s 
general directions. A Commissioner appointed from one of the
panels may continue to serve after he has ceased to be a
member of the local authority which appointed him; and he is
in any event in no way responsible to the local authority for
the decisions of the Traffic Commission.
Trunk Roads. The Trunk Roads Act, 1936, transferred from 
the county councils to the Minister of Transport the full 
responsibility for the maintainance and improvement of some 
4,500 miles of the more important roads, used largely for 
through traffic and described as ’trunk roads’. (l)
The system wan further extended, by the addition of 
3,685 miles of important highways under the Trunk Roads Act,
1946. The Ast, at the same time, authorised the Minister to 
direct by order, that any existing road shouldabe deemed a 
trunk road -fwlifcfo was applicable to the main highways in 
tne county boroughs, (and large burghs in Scotland) and the 
County of London (excluding those in the City of London;.
Though, the Minister was empowered to delegate functions in 
respect of the national routes to county borough or urban 
district councils, this did not, however, affect the basic
Tl) This change^ however? did not affect roads within the
County of London or within any county borough or large 
burghs in Scotland.
-87-
fact taat responsibility for the trunk roads had passed 
from local authorities to the central government.
Civil Airfields. In 1945, a White Paper on British 
Air Services announced that all the locally owned transport 
airfields, required for scheduled air services, would be 
acquired and managed by the Ministry of Civil Aviation.
Under the policy of the Government, about half the municipal 
aerodromes serving important centres of population were to be 
transferred to the central authority. It was said that the 
transfer of this service would prevent a loss to the local 
authorities which .would result from its heavy capital and 
• •latfthance.expendi ture; and that many of these privately- 
owned and municipal airfields had during the war been re­
quisitioned by the State and developed at the expense of 
Bublic funds, and so acquisition by the State would be an 
economical and simple solution, of the problems of de-re- 
quisitioning. Q.)
Hospitals. The Minister of Health was authorised 
to take over all the locally-owned hospitals under the 
National Health Service Act, 1946. Local authorities ti|us 
lost one of their most important and promising services.
The only contact which local authorities, henceforth, could 
have with this part of the national health service was that 
the Regional Hospital Boards were to include among their 
members persons appointed after consultation with the local 
health authorities in the area. These persons would form 
only one out of four categories of persons who were to be 
included on the Boards. They would not serve in a represent­
ative capacity, and were to be appointed by the Minister.
The Boards being the agents of the Minister were to 
be his strategic planners. Subject to his general approval 
of their plans and his financial control, they were given as 
much freedom as possible, and it was their duty to assess the 
hospital requirements of their area. They had to review and 
organise to the best advantage all existing resources, to 
analyse the need for improvements and developments and gen­
erally to secure a proper and sufficient service. They would 
be responsible for administering the whole service, largely 
through the Hospital Management Committees appointed by them.
Public Assistance. Under the Unemployment Act, 1934, 
the responsibility for the care of the able-bodied unemployed, 
who had exhausted their rights to unemployment insurance, was 
transferred from local public assistance authorities to an 
Assistance Board.
Tl) C«id. 6712/1^)45, para. 19
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This was followed in 1940, by a similar transference of re­
sponsibility for granting additional assistance to old age 
pensioners and widow pensioners orer 60. The comprehensive 
scheme of social security embodied in the Hational Assistance 
Act, 1948, continued the morement, in conferring the duty of 
making cash payments, whether by way of insurance benefit or 
by way of assistance, on the newly established Hational 
Assistance Board.
The Act placed a liability on county and county borough 
councils to proride residential accoafldation for the old and 
infirm who needed care and attention,' and temporary acconSdation 
for people in urgent need of it owing to unforseen circumstances, 
such as fire, flood or eviction. It also gare those councils 
powers— which the Minister might conrert into duties— to make 
arrangements for the welfare of handicapped people, such as the 
blind and the crippled. Under the Act, users of the councils*
homes pay for their board and lodging and other amenities--
which may include clothing, tobacco and sweets, books and other 
recreations. The charge varies between the full cost and a 
minimum of 21s. a week, according to the resident's ability to 
pay. (2) Those who cannot afford to pay the minimum charge and 
at the name time have 5s. left as pocket money are helped by 
the National Assistance Board.
Passenger Road Transport Service. In 1934, the London 
Passenger Transport Board was set up to take ever not only the 
underground railways and motor-bus services owned by commercial 
companies, but also numerous tramways and trolley-bus under­
takings owned and operated by the London County Council and 
other local authorities in the Metropolitan region. This move­
ment has since become general. The Transport Act, 1947, 
provided that the British Transport Commission might prepare 
for any area, approved by the Minister of Transport, a scheme 
for the co-ordination of passenger transport services serving 
the area, whether by road or rail; and for the provision of 
adequate, suitable and efficient passenger road transport 
services. The scheme might involve the transfer of railway and 
canal undertakings to State ownership and specify the categories 
of road motor carriers which should be nationalised.
Electricity Undertakings. Under the Electricity Act, 1947, 
the generation and distribution of electricity was transferred 
from the control of local authorities to a central body, the 
British Electricity Authority, and 14 Area Electricity Boards.
TaT See Ministry #f Health Circular* 87/19487
(l) Old Age and Widows’ Pension Act.
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The British Electricity Authority consists of 12 members, 
while each area board consists of 9 members, all appointed
by the Minister of Fuel and Power. The North of Scotland
Hydro-Eleqtrie Board exercises generation and distribution 
functions. On each area board other than the North of Scot­
land Hydro-Electric Board is imposed the duty of acquiring, 
from the British Electricity Authority, bulk supplies of 
electricity and of carrying out an efficient and economical
distribution of supplies to persons in their area.
In adaition to specific responsibility for generation 
and mains transmission the Central Authority also has general 
responsibility for co-ordination ofpiistribution of electricity 
by the Area Boarcs;and a general control of policy and finance. 
This provides one of the major advantages of a national system, 
in giving an opportunity to view the situation as a whole, to 
keep the combined organisation in step within the overriding 
requirements of the national economic situation, and to ensure 
that limited resources are used to the best advantage. (1;
Nevertheless in this nationalisation scheme, local 
authorities are more heavily involved than in those previously 
mentioned; for 340 out of 448 undertakings were theirs before 
the service was transferred, and they have had to lose trading 
profits which relieved local rates a great deal.
Gas Supply. The Gas Act, 1948, was designed to im­
plement the policy of the Government to nationalise the Gas 
Industry. Unaer the Act it was provide that the gas under­
takings of (inter alia; local authorities should be transferred 
to the appropriate area boards. There were to be 12 area 
boards for the United Kingdom, 3,ncluding one for Scotland 'and 
one for Wales and Monmouthshire. These boards were to consist 
of not less thai| 6 nor more than 8 members to be appointed 
by the Minister.
The powers and duties of the area gas boards include :- 
I a) The manufacture, or purchase in bulk, of gas; (bj the dis­
tribution of gas; (cj the manufacture of coke, by-products, etc. ; 
and (d/ the suppLy, on hire or otherwise, of gas fittings, etc.'
Bection 2 of the Act provided for the establishment of 
a Gas Council, charged with the duty of advising the Minister 
on questions affecting the gas industry and promoting the 
efficient performance by area boards of their functions.
Tl) Municipal Journal and Local Government Administration, 
Vol.56, No.!2890, July 2, 1948, p. 1284.
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Tae Gas Council were to con^pjjse:- (a) a chairman and deputy 
chairman appointed by the Minister and (b* the remaining members 
who were to be the persons for the time being holding office as 
chairmen of area boards.
The Act also required the appointment of a Gas Consult­
ative Council for the area of each atea beard. These councils 
were to consist of a chairman and not less than 2u nor more than 
30 other members appointed by the Minister, of whom not less than 
one-half nor more than three-quarters were to be appointed from 
a panel of persons, nominated from  amongst members of local 
authorities. The gas consultative council for each area is 
required to consider any matter affecting the supply of gas in 
the area, including the variation of tariffs and the provision 
of new or improved services, and to report thereon to the area 
board.
The Minister may give to the area boards, or to the gas 
council, such directions of a general character as appear to him 
to be necessary in the national interest. Before giving any 
general direction the Minister must consult the Gas Council, and 
before giving any direction to a particular area board, the 
Minister must consult that board. Every area gas board and the 
gas council are required to make an annual report to the Minister 
on their operations during the year; and the Minister is required 
to lay before each House of Parliament a copy of these reports, (l)
Such are the main schemes which affect local authorities. 
It would appear that the competence of local authorities will be 
greatly affected in the future by the present tendency towards 
the nationalisation of important industries and services.' The 
nationalisation movement, in theory, is not, itself, directed 
specifically against local government initiative, but against 
private enterprise and a profit motive that disregards sAcial 
obligations.
In the debate upon the Transport Act ( 1947*, for example, 
the Lord President considered that the case for public ownership 
rested in part on the alleged inability of the competitive 
system to 1 guarantee that the transport needs of a less re­
munerative kind would be met”. (2)
it has been suggested, too, that private enterprise can 
no longer supply the capital required for the development necess­
ary in modern times in the key services.
55 Loca l Government  Chronicle , no. 4269, 1948^ p. 1012. 
(2) Hansard, Vol. 431, cm 1.2080.
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jja so far as the nationalisation thesis is based upon a claim 
for the superiority of public over private enterprise with 
regard to greater financial resources or greater social respon­
sibility, there is clearly no essential quarrel with the local 
authority. Its merits are also those of municipal service, as 
indeed are some of its disadvantages, the chief being, that 
public service offers to the personnel, operating it, perhaps, 
toe small a regard for virtue and too mild a penalty for incom­
petence.
The nationalisation project, has ^ ©wever.,had, in practice, 
a centralizing tendency. The advantages of central control for 
the purpose of making a national plan and for spreading costs over 
the whole population, have led to a treatment of local public 
initiative that has differed little from that accorded to private 
concerns.
In the debate upon the Transport Act (1947), for example, 
the Minister of Transport argued that only through a "unified 
system, in which the cost (could; be spread over the whole 
system (could; rural and sparsely populated areas" get the 
transport facilities they needed, (1).
The advantages of centralized direction, allowing of the 
most rational disposition of scarce national resources and an 
equitable distribution of rewards and demands over the whole 
population, may well prove too much for traditional local govern­
ment to withstand. A national plan for production, employment 
or welfare can hardly be implemented without some loss of status 
to the local authority, unless very special consideration is given 
to preserving it."
*quite apart, however, from the local government issue, 
centralization has been regarded by some observers as a very 
mixed blessing. It has been suggested that a concern as large as 
the British Railways, for example, cannot really be managed, 
efficiently and economically from a central headquarters in London;^ 
that a centralized over-bureaucratic system will fail to have the 
the elasticity and adaptability for effective commercial manage­
ment, and that modem nationalisation should only be a step to 
something better.
TTJ daasard, If*1.431, cel. 1623.
(2) See:- Gilbert Walker, The Transport Act, .1947, alee the 
Economic Journal, March, 1948, Vol. LV111., No. 229,
pp. 14-16.'
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Tais danger is no doubt significant, and is in fact, 
in part, being realized. Its remedy, however, may net necess­
arily be feund in res taring the status ef local government,4 In 
so far as the problem is being met, at the present time, it is 
being met by a form ef administrative decentraliiation,- by the 
establishment ef area and regional beards wbich are but local­
ized representatives ef a central authority. Though these beards 
have in some cases a local discretion, they have no democratic 
reference and do net correspond with any unit suitable for self- 
government. There would appear to be a danger that, should 
the present movement continue, the administrative region and 
board may progressively replace the local authority.
Such are the recent trends in government as they affect 
local authorities. Certain theoretical considerations arising 
from this movement are examined below, (l).
H I  See:- CUkter Y
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CHAPTER V.
LOCAL AUTONOMY versus CENTRAL CONTROL.
From the outline presented above, it is apparent that 
free and admirable as it is still, British local government 
has undergone a significant change during the last hundred 
years. This change, though in large part a necessary product 
of changing social, economic and political conditions, has 
given rise to great controversy among students of govern­
ment, - a controversy, at its extremes, between the advocates 
of local autonomy and those of departmental control.
It has often been said that British people are differ­
ent from their continental neighbours in their f instinctive 
scepticism about bureaucratic wisdom1. By comparison, they 
have been, and largely still are, free from the interference 
of central administrative authorities in their local affairs. 
This local autonomy has had valuable consequences in a pol­
itical sense, in providing an education in participation in 
government in the localities, and at the same time in stim­
ulating local pride in civic achievement. The mass of citi­
zens, in a system of genuine local government, can be brou­
ght into intimate contact with the persons responsible for 
decisions, and public opinion can play an effective role in 
the formulation of local policy. People are always interested 
in the things closely connected with their daily life, and 
if these matters can be brought under the influence of th­
eir own decision and management, they feel responsible for 
their success or failure. The mere thought that they have 
rights and duties to ask about things which happen in their 
neighbourhood and to consider the welfare of the local 
community is, in itself, of great value in supplying the 
raw material for democratic government. This educational 
purpose can never be attained under a system of government 
from without. Unless there is a minimum provision for self- 
help and for responsiveness to opinion, people find that 
politics are too remote from them and become frustrated 
and inert. The policy of the governing machine may be well 
meant in conception, and efficient in application, but 
unless it can arouse an eagerness to participate in the 
mind of the citizen, it is of an inferior order.
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Failure to get or.inary citizens into clise touch with 
public affairs has two opposite dangers. On the one hand, there 
is a danger that the control of the citizens generally over their 
government will become slack and ineffective, and will thus invite 
corruption and sinister privilege in the State. On the other 
hand, owing to the lack of a generally diffused knowledge of the 
real nature of government business, the citizen^ are liable to 
burst into occasional gusts of discontent and excitement, causing 
unreasonable demrmds to be made. It is only through an intimate 
relationship with the persons responsible for government that the 
citizens can truly understand the conditions and limitations 
under which public affairs are carried on. The success of repre­
sentative government, therefore, largely depends upon the mainten­
ance of local democratic institutions.
Independently of the great educational value of a system 
of local autonomy, it must also be recognised that the local 
inhabitants must be best acquainted with the immediate circumstance- 
es of the neighbourhood, and aught to have the best knowledge as to 
the means of doing what is wanted. If public affairs are to be 
done in greater efficiency and in greater economy, it is imperative 
that the governing body should have the great advantage of disquss- 
ion directly or indirectly with the governed from time to time. 
Moreover, in determining what is requisite for the health and 
comfort of a population, its density and its wealth, its industrial 
character and occupation, varieties of soil and climate, and the 
habits ef the PJp®J>l£, must all be taken into account. It is, 
consequently, inVrfirerests of government that a degree of elasticity 
and adaptability to special requirements should be preserved. 
Accordingly, government functions which affect solely or mainly 
the inhabitants ef a lecality should, wherever possible, be 
placed under the special control ef this locality in order that 
the suggestion and criticism ef its inhabitants, backed by a 
power of appointment and dismissal, may bring about, an adaptation 
of administrative activities to its peculiar needs.; These 
advantages, are absent in a centralised government. In the words 
of Professor Laski:- (l).
...We cannot realise the full benefit of democratic 
government unless we begin by the admission that all 
problems are not central problema, and that the results
XI] Laski, Grammar of Politics, 2nd ed., 1931, pp. 411-2.
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ef problems net central in their incidence require 
decision at tne place, and by the persons, where and 
by whoa the incidence is aest deeply felt. Aaeng tue 
inhabitants ef sane given area, that is te say, there 
is a censcieusness ef ceaaen purpeses and coaaen needs 
by which they are differentiated from the inhabitants 
ef ether are as.,.. Administration frea witheut lacks the 
vitalising ability to be respensive te local opinion.
It is bound, in the nature of things, to aiss shades 
and expressions of thought and sentiaent the perception 
ef which are in a real degree urgent te the success of 
adainistratien. And such governnent is bound, almost, 
inevitably, te aia, not at variety, but at uniformity.1 
It will seek to aeet, net the special wants ef Liverpool, 
but those wants which are siailar to wants just net in 
Hereford or Leicester. It cannot grasp, in other words, 
the genius of place,...
Aaong the other aerits of local autenoay, we should take 
into account its ability te lessen the pressure ef local affairs 
upon the central govemaent. As the functions ef governaent 
becoae increasingly extensive and complex day after day, care has 
to be taken that central authorities are net overloaded with work. 
Moreover, since those who control adainistratien under a systea 
of local autenoay have to provide for its cost, they are the best 
guarantees ef eceneay in adainistratien. (1),
One ef the greatest values which attaches, te the systea 
of kecal autenoay, however, lies in its being capable ef providing 
the Beans for important experiment in social matters. It encour­
ages local authorities to plan for themselves what steps they should 
take in coping with special problems. These experiments, when 
successful, can be enacted in general law and applied te ether 
places. Many of the aest useful previsions of the Public Health 
Acts for example, have been based on experiments first carried out 
in special areas; soae of the aest fruitful methods ef technical 
instruction and higher education have also first been tried by 
enterprising local authorities. Such experiments have the great 
advantage ef being made on a comparatively small scale under widely 
different circumstances. These help to restrict the danger which 
aay be inherent in their failure, and so are liable te minimize 
the cpst involved. (2),
IT) See Mr. Leoiard Ceurtney* s answer totheRoyal^o amiss ion 
on local Taxation, G— 9528, 1899, p.88.
(2) H. Hebhouse, op. cit., p. 401.
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Gentral direction as ajrule means one plan, and one method 
of dealing with the problem involved. And this one plan 
may easily fail to be the right one. Politics rarely 
present us with problems to which, beforehand, we "know 
definite correct answers, and it is consistent with the 
modesty of our knowledge and the frailty of the human agent 
to follow J.S.Mill in a belief that * while mankind are 
imperfect —  there should be different experiments of 
living.*
These advantages of local self-government may easily 
be lost through the development of central administrative 
control. As Mr. Murray writes:- *Bureaucracy stifles init­
iative, freedom invites it. Bureaucracy means uniformity, 
one pattern everywhere; freedom allows diversity, the 
individual expression of ideas and designs*. (1) At the 
same time, however, it is equally true that complete 
autonomy in the localities is, under modern conditions, 
impractical and harmful. In the first place, to leave 
local authorities in complete freedom to pursue their 
own way is to encourage chaos in administration and dan­
ger of insecurity. For, undoubtedly, great variety in local 
administration often leads to anomalies and complications 
and their inconveniences. Thus, for example, it would be 
intolerable if the regulations for bicycles, motor cars 
and locomotives varied in every district. It would also 
create tremendous confusion if the standard of weights and 
measures were different from place to place. Uniformity in 
such matters can, as a rule, be secured partly by making 
the law general throughout the country and partly by 
requiring the sanction of a central department to the 
regulations of each local authority.
Secondly, if local authorities were left entirely 
free from interference, then the laggard, backward and 
poor authorities would invariably fail to undertake any 
toilsome enterprise. They may even give up services which 
are of vital importance to the security and comfort of 
communal life. They may, for example, be negligent in the 
prevention of disease or the maintenance of roads; or may 
be reluctant to provide wholesome water supplies or adequ­
ate street lighting. They may refuse to establish any 
public library and remain adamant against the endowment 
of educatioh to their children. In other words, a backward 
authority may be hostile to every proposal except one for 
reducing the cost of its services to itself. In order to 
provide adequate services, it requires stimulation, advice, 
moral encouragement and financial assistance from the 
central departments.
{ 1) G. deB.Murray, How Scotland is Governed, 1947, pp.210-11,*
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Las tly, it is urged by many critics that free local 
government is liable to be attended by petty jobbery or cor­
ruption and is often manipulated by sinister interests in the 
locality, - a shortcoming which can only be checked by a 
system of audit by impartial Government officials.
The problem of local government has to be discussed in 
the light 4f the fast that the pursuit of the common good 
of the community and the preservation of a minimum standard 
of welfare on ajnational scale have now become possible andf 
at the same time, mandatory objectives of government. With 9 
the development of modern transport and communications, 
localities are no longer self-sufficient or isolated, and the 
maladministration of one area has a rapid effect on its neigh­
bours. There exist means of co-ordination and correction and 
these must be employed. Similarly, quite apart from the contr­
ol necessary to deal with occasional corrupt practices and ma­
tters where uniformity throughout the country is essential, 
central direction is indispensable in preventing all important 
local services from falling below a certain level. For, al­
though it is true that different localities have different 
needs to be satisfied, yet there remains a requirement in 
common, namely, that a minimum standard of decency and amen­
ities for all citizens should be achieved and maintained. It 
is because of these requirements that the central departments 
have to assume, in some measure, the position of superintend­
ent and adviser to the local authorities.
The same position is reflected in the legal framework 
of local government. Whatever views may be held regarding 
the origin of local institutions, or what they should be in 
an ideal state, the authority of every minor governmental 
organ in Britain to-day is an artificial entity created by 
the state, or at least recognised by it.' A local authority 
exists generally as a corporate body by the favour of, and 
in accordance with, the law, having duties towards the general 
community and holding its rights from it —  rights which have 
been granted for the common weal. (l).So it is natural that, 
for the fulfilment of this purpose, it has to give up the
claim to an entire freedom to act.
There is, however, a large variety of gradations between
autonomy and subservience. The control of the central author­
ity may be more or less extensive, taking within its scope
various
(1) Sir G. L. Gomme, Principles of Local Government, 1897, p. 1.
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sections of local activity; it may be a complete statutory 
power to command or merely a power to help and advise.
Broadly speaking, the ways in which a central depart­
ment can help a local authority are intellectual and finan­
cial. The intellectual help would appear to be a pure gain.
It has often been said that, with a staff equipped with 
greater knowledge and greater capacity, central authorities 
are able to give wholesome instructions to local authorities. 
J. S.Mill, for instance, was of the opinion that in the det­
ails of management, the local authority will generally have 
the advantage; but in comprehension of the principles even 
of purely local management, the superiority of the central 
government is prodigious. In his celebrated book on Repres­
entative Government he gave one of the axioms of public 
administration;-(1)
The authority which is most conversant with 
principles should be supreme over principles, while 
that which is most competent in details should have 
the details left to it. The principal business of 
the central authority should be to give instructions, 
of the local authority to apply them. Power may be 
localised, but knowledge to be most useful must be 
centralised.
With a view to fulfilling this duty of disseminating 
experience and knowledge, it is desirable that the central 
departments should have the right to inspect and to acqu­
ire information from local authorities. It must avail it­
self of the advice of local government officers whose prac­
tical experience is of particular value in relation to the 
services which are locally administered.Without the help 
of the local officers it is often difficult to assess the 
probable effect of schemes which are conceived in the cent­
ral departments.
The central departments may also criticise the merits 
and demerits of the administration of local authorities and 
make proposals for new undertakings. When they proceed to 
compare methods and suggest experiments, they are able to 
do so from an ampler view than the vast majority of local 
bodies. Consequently, they will, as a rule, be more discrim­
inating and less partisan in their interpretation of the 
results they encounter.
(1) Chapter XV. et seq.
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Central administrative control of an advisory char­
acter can be invaluable when it is used in a moderate and 
healthy way. Local self-government in Britain has always 
been praised as being able to serve as a social and pol­
itical education of its citizens. But * it is a poor schoo­
ling1,writes Dr.Redlich, ’ which leaves the children to 
grope along in ignorance. The true education is that which 
provides the means of making ignorance aware of itself and 
able to profit by knowledge. A system of local government 
without such an ideal department as Mill conceives, would 
resemble a school in which there is no schoolmaster but 
only pupil teachers who have never themselves been taught*.
(i).
Local authorities may also derive assistance from 
central departments through financial measures. Financial 
help of various types has become a considerable and indis­
pensable feature of the relationship betwwen central and 
loc^al government. But, unlike the educative function, it 
has proved a two-handed instrument from the point of view 
of the localities. Several types of financial assistance 
and influence have been discussed in general terms above.
A particular form, the Exchequer Grant-in-Aid, is (2) 
the central subject of study in what is to follow.
(1) Redlich and Hirst, Local Government in England, 1903,
Vol. 1., pp. 183-4.
(2) See above, Chapterfll, Sections IX^XI.
PART I I .
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
SYSTEM OF EXCHEQUER GRANTS.
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CHAPTER VI.
EXCHEQUER GRANTS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE.
In the Middle Ages, many of the most expensive and 
most important institutions now maintained by local govern­
ment in Great Britain had no existence. Even as late as the 
15th century, citizens were not required to pay for comp­
ulsory education, purific ation of sewage, street lighting 
or police. Public welfare in the localities depended 
mainly upon voluntary contributions, local government 
finance being practically negligable. (1).
It was only when the problem of poor relief became so 
critical in Britain in the latter half of the 16th century 
that the levying of a poor rate was made a legal obligat­
ion upon the local inhabitants. The Act passed by the Scots 
Parliament in 1579 and the English statutes of 1599 and 
1601 both mark the genesis of the local rating system. (2). 
Afterwards, the contributions of the inhabitants in each 
local community to the expenses incurred in common purposes 
expanded year after year, until at the time when Rudolf 
von Gneist paid his visit to Britain, half-way through the 
19th century, the expenditure of local government in this 
country was financed predominantly out of rates, -' a pro­
vision which he thought chiefly responsible for the merits 
of local self-government. Since then, however, there has 
been, again, a considerable change.
(l) As to the situation of that time, the description by 
Professor Cannan is of interest:- 1 The cost of public 
works was to some extent defrayed by the benevolence of 
private individuals and religious houses. Testators bequ­
eathed property for building or maintaining bridges, as in 
the case of the Bridge House estates of the Gity of London. 
Monks improved the roads in the neighbourhood of their 
convent; an excellent half-mile of road across the flood- 
lands of the Thames still testifies to the energy of the 
monks of Abingdon, The preamble of an Act of*1554 ( 1 Mar.,
St.,3, 0,6.) tells us not only that the road5* between 
Gloucester and Bristol, one of the most important cross­
roads in the Kingdom, had so fallen into decay that many 
passengers had lost their lives on it, but also that it had ^ 
been formerly * well repaired by the devotion of divers good 
people1. * The History of Local Rates in England, 1896, p. 7.
(2) 39 Eliz. G.3. and 43 Eliz. G.2
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At the present timsjrates are by no means the only 
source of local fevenue; nor are they the chief source. This 
is particularly true with the poorer areas where the rateable 
value per head of inhabitant is low. Besides the rates, the 
revenue needed by a local authority can be derived from three 
other sources, namely, (a) income from corporate property and 
estate; lb) trading revenues and other income from charges for 
services not wholly borne by rates; and (c) grants and sub­
sidies by the State. (1).
It is the last mentioned source of local revenue that 
is our chief concern. But before entering into this subject, 
a brief account of the general character of l^cal incomes will 
help to indicate its significance.
The income a local authority derives from corporate 
property and estate, forms, as a rule, only a minor part of 
local revenue. There are cases where lands and buildings 
have belonged to local communities for years and produce  ^
revenue in the form of direct payments from their tenants^
But though some authorities are wealthy in such properties, (2) 
most of them gain hardly anything more than a trivial sum out 
of them.
The trading revenues and income from charges for 
services not wholly borne by rates, occupy a more significant 
place in local finance. At the same time, however, the expen­
diture on the establishment and maintenance of these trading 
services is also very high. Although some local authorities 
have run successful enterprises and have used the profit as 
a means of reducing rates, the view is gradually gaining ground 
that trading enterprises should aim at balancing income with 
expenditure. With some services there is even a strong induce­
ment to supply at a loss. (3). Where there is a gain, the 
tendency is to apply surpluses to the relief of the consumer 
and to build up revenues for further improvement and developmen __ _____ _ ____ i  LlL.
(if j;a. Warren7 English Lo c al Government System, 1946,p. 62.
, Loans are excluded because in the strict sense of the word 
they are not a type of local income. The ratepayers of 
future years are responsible for repayment together with 
loan charges.
(2) In Scotland local authorities have traditionally owned more 
property than in England. The income from the Common Good 
in some places is a substantial supplement to rates.
(3) The fact that Parliamentary legislation often compels locaj. 
authorities to provide water and cemeteries despite the 
heavy cost in certain areas is an example of this.
(4) H. Finer, Municipal Trading, 1941, London, p. 153.'
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Only a very small portion of the profit is used for relief 
of the rate burden.
It is estimated that in 1938 only £16 mn.^  of the 
total income of local authorities in Britain was derived from 
interest on the investment of reserves and pensions funds, and 
from rents on municipal estates, together with a further £10 in. 
from the profits of trading services. (lj In comparison with 
an income of £191.4 mn. from rates and £140.2 mn. from Exchequer 
grants in England and Wales alone for the same year, O )  these 
sums are not very considerable.
As for the two principal sources of local revenue, 
namely, rates and Exchequer grants, a more detailed consideration 
is required. A century ago local government services were 
sufficiently simple and cheap to require a relatively small 
rate and for there to be little need for external support. 
Increasing incustrialisation during the 19th century, however, 
called for greater responsibility on the part of local author­
ities to provide services for the security and welfare of the 
public. More services meant more expenditure, but the resources 
of local taxation remained much the same. In meeting the 
situation, local authorities fell into a miserable and distressed 
condition with their ratepayers subject to heavy tax burdens. (3)
fl) . K. Ilicks, Public Finance, 1947, London, pp. 93-94.
(2/ Ministry of Health Report, Gmd. 6468/1943.
(3) The table illustrates the increasing amount of the average 
local aate per head in England and Wales from 1884 to 1935.
Year 1884-5 1894-5 1904-5 1914-15 1924-25 1954-35
Amount 
£ s d 0 19 1 1 2  6 1 13 4 1 19 11 3 13 3 3 15 10
See:- Sir Gwilym Gibbon, The Expenditure and Revenue of Loqal 
Authorities, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. 
XCIX, 1936, Table VII., Appendix, p. 509.
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The problem was further intensified by the fact that 
the burden of local taxation fell exclusively on the owners 
ana occupiers of real property. This meant that one section 
of the community, those who owned lands and estates, chiefly 
of the agricultural class, were obliged to pay for services 
which were of benefit to the whole community. The unfairness 
of this sort of local taxation clearly needed correction, and 
early in the 19th century, the agitation of the agricultural 
class for relief began to gather strength. It was in response 
to this agitation that the grant-in-aid system came into being - 
a system which was to have a history of expanding functions 
and increasing importance, until it came to play the leading 
role in local government finance.
Prom being a device used to redress the grievances of 
agricultural interests, the grant-in-aid has been developed as 
an instrument to provide substantial assistance to local 
authorities for services of national importance and of latter 
years to produce^more equitable distribution of rate burdens 
in the localities. (1) This development has been accompanied 
by a great increase in the sums of money involved. (2) It has 
been estimated that in 1830 the aggregate amount of the 
historical Survivals* of grants did not exceed £100,090, and 
by 1840 £500,000. But by 1860 it reached £1,000,000, and 
doubled again by 1870, until at the end of the last century, 
when Lord Farrer estimated that the subventions to local 
authorities reached 24< of the national revenue, it reached 
£12, 000, 000.
(T) Sir Edward Hamilton in his Memorandum on Imperial Relief 
of Local Burdens, prepared for the Royal Commission on 
Local Taxation appointed in 1896, points out the situation 
at that time, as follows: * In order to keep pace with the 
growth of local needs all over the country - such as better 
drainage and water supply, improved lighting and policing, 
better roads and streets, new municipal buildings, more 
efficient administration of the poor law and care of pauper 
lunatics, better primary education and housing of working 
classes - there has been a constant increasing expenditure 
to be met by local authorities, and, as a result thereof, a 
constantly increasing demand on their part for relief from 
the pressure of rates incidental to property, out of the 
public and common purse to which the whole community contri­
butes*. See C. 9528/1899, p. 11.
(2) During tie earlier stages not a few of the great statesman, 
including Glads tome, were vehemently opposed to the use of 
grant. Even nowadays champions of local autonomy still watch 
with regret, but helplessly, the increasing use of grant-in-aid.
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The development hatf been so great that Sidney Webb, when 
publishing his celebrated book on the Grant in Aid, in 1911, 
found it most reasonable to predict that * by 1920, when the 
total revenue of the national Government will probably exceed 
£200,000,000, the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the day will 
find himself paying away to the local authorities as much as 
a quarter of all he receives, or £50,000,000 sterling*. His 
prediction of the total national revenue was, as a matter of 
fact, far below the actual amount, owing to war loam expend­
iture, pensions, etc. But his forecast as regards Exchequer 
grants was well-nigh correct. For the grants for England and 
Wales in 1919-20 were £48,000,000 and in 1920-21 nearly 
£62,000,000. (1) . After 1929, owing to the complete derating 
of agricultural land and the derating of three-fourths of 
industrial and freight-transport undertakings by the Local 
Government Act, the amount of central aid increased by leaps 
and bounds, the amount for 1929-30, for instance, being 
£107,800,000. By the year 1943-443 the latest year for which 
statistics are available, it amounted to £204, 10 0,000.(2).
The same striking tendency can also be seen in the case of the 
single local authority. To take at random the Borough of 
Southgate as an example, Government grants received, amounted 
in 1941 to £98,751: in 1945, to £284,387; and in 1946, they 
reached £452,911. (3).
The increasing use of Exchequer grants as a means for 
meeting local needs has been so outstanding that in recent 
years the importance which they occupy in local government 
finance outweighs that of the rates. The transition is 
indicated in the following table:- (f|>)
Sums provided from Percent age from
Rates Grants Rates . Grants
£m. £m.
1884-5 25.7 87*6 12*4
1904-5 56*0 19.6 74*1 25.9
1913-14 71*3 22.5 76*1 23*9
1927-28 166.7 86.2 65*9 34*1
1932-33 146.3 120.5 54*8 45*2
1938-39 191.4 140.2 57.7 42.3
1939-40 201.3 181.9 52.5 47.5
1940-41 203.9 226.0 47*5 52*5
1941*42 198.9 278*3 41*7 58*3
1942-43 200*4 248*1 44*7 55.3
1943-44 204.1 228.4 _____ 47j*2_ 52.8
A Century of Municipal Progress, 
of Health Report, cmd. 7441/1947,
1935, pp. 382-3. 
p. & Cd. 6089/1939,
\i; a n  Kuox
Laski, etc.,
(2) Ministry 
P.268.
( 3j See the Municipal Journal, Vol. 56. No. 2881, Apri 1 30, 1948. 
P.799.
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It will be seen that out of the total provided from 
rates and grants,f the percentage from rates fell from 87.6 
in 1884-85 to 47.2 in 1943-44, the lowest being 41.7 in 1941- 
42, while that from grants rose from just over twelve to 
nearly 53. Thus, considering rates and grants alone, the Ex­
chequer bears a heavier responaibility than the ratepayers in 
local government finance.
British local self-government has been possible in the 
past through the fact that the money which local authorities hmve 
spent has been taken chiefly from local ratepayers to whom 
those authorities owed political responsibility. How, the 
balance has been shifted, largely through the growth of the 
system of Exchequer Grants. We shall examine in more <Jetail 
the growth of that system, its functions and its value#
T4) S tafisties prior to 1905, see Sir Gwilym Gibbon, op. cit., 
p. 484; those after 1913, produced according to Ministry of 
Health Reports: Cmd.6089/1939; Gmd.6468/1943;Cmd.6562/1944 ; 
Cmd. 7119/1946; and Cmd. 7441/1947.
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CHAPTER VII.
EARLY GRANTS IN AID TO LOCAL AUTHORIBIES.
I! Eayiy Subventions towards Local Services of 
 National Importance.
Although most of the powers of central control 
exercised from Whitehall have been the result of Ex­
chequer grants in aid of local services, paradoxically, 
the first effort of the Central Government to acquire 
such control in the last century was not accompanied 
by a grant. The Poor Law Amendment Act in 1834 equip­
ped for the first time the Poor Law Commissioners with 
full powers of control over the elected local boards 
of guardians, but no relief was granted towards Poor 
Law expenses from the Exchequer. The Poor Law Commis­
sion which was appointed in 1832 by Lord Brougham had, 
in fact, in its report, considered the advantages which 
were thought likely to be secured if the Poor Law ad­
ministration could be made a national instead of a lo­
cal charge. Considerable sums would be saved in liti­
gation and removals'*, the Report runs, "and a still 
larger sum might be saved by substituting the systema­
tic management of contractors and removable officers 
for the careless and often corrupt jobbing of uneduca­
ted, unpaid, and irresponsible individuals.H (1) Yet, 
while the opinion of the Commissioners was generally in 
favour of making th» relief of destitution a national 
charge, they did not formally recommend it. They did 
not even deem it fit and proper to propose a special 
grant in aid of the local Poor Law services.
The first Exchequer grant was, however, made 
in 1833 for the purpose of building new schools in Eng­
land and Wales. It was a mere pittance of £20,000, and 
was administered in accordance with the suggestions of 
two religious organizations---the British and Foreign
School Society and the National School Society which,
by their voluntary efforts, did most of the educational 
work then carried on in England for the children of the 
poor. The grant was forwarded annually, but with little
(l) First Report Poor Law Commissioners, pp.148 et. sq.
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improvement. For the first five years ending 1838, the 
total sum was hut £104,955* i n  Nevertheless, the scope 
of the grant was enlarged gradually. In addition to as­
sistance towards the cost of building new schools, the 
Government later gave grants to enlarge, repair, and fur­
nish the old ones, and to make some meagre equipment a- 
vailable. In 1839, a Committee of the Privy Council was 
set up to take charge of their allocation, and the Central 
Government became a partner in the work of providing ele­
mentary education for poor children.
Meantime, towards the close of Lord Grey’s Govern­
ment in March, 1834, the question of the burdensome nature 
of local rates was seriously engaging the attention of 
Parliament. Lord Althorp, then Chancellor of the Exche­
quer, moved the appointment of a Select Committee to in­
quire into the county rates in England and Wales, and to 
report what regulations might be adopted to diminish the 
pressure of local burdens on owners and occupiers of land, 
ill
After a thorough investigation, the Committee 
pointed out in its report that certain charges heretofore 
borne on local rates, such as those connected with pri­
sons, criminal prosecutions, and inland communications, 
Hwere charges of national importance and general utility", 
and proposed that some pwrtion of such charges might pro­
perly be placed on national funds. (3) The direct effect 
of these recommendations was that, in the following year, 
1835, provision was made by Lord Melbourne’s Government 
for £80,000 to be paid out of public revenue in order to 
meet half the expense of prosecutions at assizes and quar- 
' ter sessions, and £30,000 to meet the cost of removing 
convicted prisoners from local prisons to the convict de­
pots and hulks.
Proposals for a further grant were made by a 
Royal Commission, appointed in 1836 to consider the best 
means of establishing an efficient police force in the 
counties of England and Wales. In 1839, a Report was pu­
blished suggesting that, in order to secure a more effec­
tive organization for maintaining public order and secu­
rity, a quarter of the cost of the contemplated consta­
bulary force should be defrayed out of the public central 
funds. The legislation which followed upon this Report
(lV J.W. Grice, National and Local Finance, 1910, p.14.
(2) As the reform of the Poor Law was then under consi­
deration, poor rates were excluded from the purview 
of the inquiry.
(3) Memorandum by Sir E.W. Hamilton in C.9528 (1899) p.11.
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however, made no provision for a State contribution 
towards such a force, but merely authorized the justices 
of the quarter sessions to increase county rates for the 
purpose of establishing county ahd district police for­
ces. The metropolitan police force, however, was in a 
special position. Since 1829, the Central Authority had 
made a grant of £60,000 towards its cost and the force 
was placed under the direct control of a commissioner 
dependent solely upon the Home Secretary. The grant was 
increased in 1839 as a result of the extension of the 
original police district, and by 1842 the sum had arisen 
to £98,567. i n
II. .The Repeal of the Corn Laws and its 
Effect on Local Rate Relief.
So far, Exchequer grants had been regarded as 
a meanB of contributing on a national scale towards 
services of national importance. Now, they were to be 
considered more particularly as an instrument for the 
relief of the agricultural interest. By 1845, after 
four years of Sir Robert Peel's second administration 
with its policy of tariff reform, although high duties 
on imported corn still remained, many duties upon a- 
gricultural produce had been reduced or swept away, and 
the agricultural interest was already clamouring for 
compensation. In this year, a member of Parliament, Mr. 
Miles, moved that, in the disposal of the budget surplus, 
due regard should be had to the claims of the agricultu­
ral interest, and proposed that the State should not only 
bear the whole cost of assize prosecutions, and of the 
maintenance as well as the conveyance of committed pri­
soners, but should also contribute half the cost ofl coun­
ty prisons and coroner's inquests, and the whole cost of 
the registration of voters. These charges for England 
and Scotland he computed at £350, 000.
Sir James Graham, then Home Secretary, objected, 
firstly, on the ground that, the burden of poor relief 
which constituted a first charge on land had been appre­
ciably diminished since the amendment of the Poor Laws; 
secondly, because land had no right to claim exemption 
from burdens, so long as it enjoyed a protective tariff, 
which had been imposed in consideration of those burdens.
(1) J.W. Grice, Ibid, p.20.
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Sir Robert Peel added a further, and somewhat doubtful, 
argument against the motion* the proposed transfer of 
local burdens to the Consolidated Fund would not really 
benefit the agricultural interest; for the cost of the 
services would certainly increase, and the more that was 
imposed on that fund the more would ratepayers, who were 
also taxpayers, have to contribute to it.
No step was taken by the Government until, in 1846, 
Sir Robert Peel proposed in the House of Commons to re­
peal the Corn Laws, with its immediate consequence that 
the agricultural industry was to lose the benefit of 
Protection. The proposal aroused great agitation in 
both Houses. Many of Peel's old followers representing 
agricultural interests were on the point of turning 
against him, and it was in a desire to win back their 
support, that he agreed to transfer a part of the local 
burdens from the rates to the Exchequer. The State was 
in future to pay the whole cost of assize prosecutions, 
and the maintenance as well as conveyance of convicted 
prisoners; to pay half the cost of medical relief in 
England and Scotland; to provide salaries in Poor Law 
schools and those of Union auditors; and also to under­
take the whole cost of the Irish constabulary. The a- 
mount of all these concessions was estimated at £341,000; 
(1) and Sir Robert Peel pointed out in justification 
that in almost every case the grant would result in more 
economical and efficient administration and increased 
central control. These proposals were approved by a 
Select Committee appointed by the Lords; and they were 
carried into effect by the succeeding Ministry.
The Protectionist Party, however, was by no 
means satisfied with this arrangement. They maintained 
that 'the whole of the local taxation of the country for 
national purposes fell mainly, if not exclusively, on 
real property, and bore with undue severity o.n the occu­
piers of land, in a manner injurious to the agricultural 
interests of the country, and otherwise highly impolitic 
and unjust*. (2) This argument was brought forth in a 
long debate initiated by Mr. Disraeli in 1849. He main­
tained that the poor rate, the highways rate and the coun­
ty rate were all applied to national purposes and there­
fore should be borne by the Consolidated Fund. But these 
proposals were eventually defeated.
(1) C. 9528 (1899) p.12.
(2) Disraeli’s motion, March 1, 1849, 3 Hansard, vol.103, 
p. 11.
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Early in 1850, however, Mr. Disraeli launched a 
second attack hy moving for a Committee to consider 
the Poor Laws with $ view to mitigating agricultural 
distress, (l) He made some modifications in his propo­
sals this time with more restricted claims for relief.
His motion was again rejected, but by a majori­
ty of only 21.
This favourable situation in the Commons was 
soon followed by a Select Committee set up in the Lords 
to inquire into the grievances of ratepayers. It was 
presided over by Lord Portman; and after hearing a 
large number of authoritative witnesses, it came to 
the following conclusions:
(a) That poor relief was a national object to 
which every description of property ought 
justly to be called upon to contribute; but, 
until some means could be found of defining 
'stock in trade' with sufficient accuracy 
for assessment purposes, it would be neces­
sary to continue to exempt it from its le­
gal liability.
(b) That, although several items of union and 
county expenditure were charged, and others 
might conveniently be charged, on the Conso­
lidated Fund, it was not expedient to provide 
out of that fund for the general maintenance 
of the poor; and
(c) That any plan for assessing personal property 
in aid of the rates would have to be consi­
dered in minute detail, especially as to the 
allocation of money so raised. (2)
The agitation for further grants towards poor relief was 
thus temporarily reduced.
III. A Solution of the Problem of Local 
Tqx Burdens in Police> Highways and Poor Relief Ser­
vices.
After the lapse of a period of more than ten years, 
the permissive system for rural police provided by the Act 
of 1839 proved to be a complete failure. Some of the Coun­
ties and boroughs failed to adopt the Act simply because 
of the opposition of the justices; others through the re­
fusals of the people to increase rates. In those places 
where the constabulary forces had been established, the
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requirements as regards numbers, training, quality, and 
discipline were far from being satisfactory. In 1853 a 
Select Committee was appointed by the House of Commons 
to suggest means of improvement. It strongly recommen­
ded that in order to put an end to a chaotic situation, 
uniformity of arrangement was required throughout Great 
Britain, and declared itself in favour of finanaial aid 
from the Exchequer without detriment to local manage­
ment •
A Bill was accordingly introduced by Sir George 
Grey, the Home Secretary in Lord Palmerston's first Mi­
nistry, in 1856, to give effect to these recommendations. 
It made it compulsory upon the justices to appoint a 
force for all parts of their county not served by a bo­
rough force. Government inspection was introduced; and 
an Exchequer grant of a quarter of the cost of police 
pay and clothing (3) was provided, upon satisfactory re­
ports being made by the inspectors. T m s  Bill passed to 
become the famous County and Borough Police Act (19 & 20 
Viet. c. 69.), and marked a distinctive turning point in 
British police history.
As in the case of poor relief, the Central Govern­
ment at first did not undertake to relieve local burdens 
in highway administration by Exchequer grant. It planned 
for the economy of the administration; but still made lo­
cal highway authorities responsible for all the expvnses. 
In 1864, the question of turnpike trusts and tolls, which 
had engaged the attention of a Select Committee 28 years 
fciflore (1836), (4) called for a further investigation.
By this time the financial condition of the trusts and the 
burdens of the ratepayers were getting badly in need of 
attention. Owing to the spread of railways, traffic on 
the roads was principally local with the result that the 
tolls levied at turnpikes were mostly paid by neighbouring 
ratepayers. The levies were highly inconvenient to the 
public and harmful to local business. The Select Commit­
tee appointed by Lord Palmerston’s Cabinet to inquire into 
this subject expressed exactly the same opinion as its 
predeeessor to the effect that the system of tolls was
|l) 3 Hansard, vol.108, p.1026.
2) C. 9528 (1899), p.13.
3) The Police (Expenses) Act, 1874, increased the propor­
tion of the police grant to one-half of the cost of 
pay and clothing; and the Police Act, 1919, made the 
amount of grant equivalent to one-half of the net ex­
penditure (approved) of police authorities.
(4) House of Commons Paper, No.547 of 1836.
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both costly and injurious. The expenses of management 
were enormous and wasteful, and the costs of collection 
were heavy, and, in consequence, the Committee were 
strongly of the opinion that the turnpike trusts should 
be abolished.
As a result of these recommendations, the turn­
pikes gradually disappeared throughout the country, and 
the maintenance of the roads became a charge on the rates 
and was administered under the supervision of the rate­
payers. The area of local liability was enlarged by the 
Act of 1878 (41 & 42 Viet, c.77.) which provided that 
half the cost of main roads was to be defrayed out of 
county rates. The burden of the districts and the pa­
rishes was thus greatly diminished.
Side by side with the extension of the area of 
financial responsibility in highway administration, the 
same development was forced upon the working of the new 
Poor Law. The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 had made 
compulsory the formation of a common fund in each Poor 
Law Union to pay the establishment charges. This fund 
was established out of contributions from each composite 
parish, not in proportion to its rateable value, but ac­
cording to its actual expenditure on poor relief with 
the result that poorer parishes were obliged to assume 
heavier responsibilities. The situation was rendered 
even more severe by the harsh provisions of the time- 
honoured law of settlement. (1j In 1848, however, an 
Act was passed to redress this grievance by imposing the 
whole coBt of the maintenance of the irremovables upon 
the Union. Union, therefore, instead of parish, was to 
be the financial unit of poor relief.
With regard to the Metropolis, a more advanced
step was taken to solve the problem. Hitherto the un­
equal pressure of poor relief charges in the metropolitan 
parishes had revealed the defect of the system more clear­
ly than elsewhere. Low valuation^ and extraordinarily 
high expenditure in the poorer unions called for an ur­
gent and effective remedy. To meet the case, the Metro­
politan Poor Act of 1867 provided for the establishment
(1) By the Irremovable Poor Act of 1847, it was provided 
that persons who had lived 5 years, instead of the
former practice of 3 years, in any one parish, should
not be removed therefrom, but should become ghargesb le 
to it so long as residence therein continued.
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Qf a Metropolitan Common Poor Fund, to be supplied from 
levies over the whole metropolitan area on the basis of 
rateable value. Out of this fund were to be paid the 
particular charges which were not supposed to vary to 
any considerable extent according to efficiency of ad­
ministration. (l)
IV. Plans for Rate Relief in the Sixties 
and the Early Seventies.
After the passage of the County and Borough Police 
Act of 1856, the improvement of the police administration 
in the counties and boroughs was considered highly satis­
factory and Exchequer grants began to be regarded as a 
convenient device for securing feentral control, avoiding 
friction, and increasing the efficiency of administration. 
But it was, after all, a device to be used sparingly, and 
Parliament was reluctant to extend its application. In 
the sixties and the early seventies, a somewhat mistrust­
ful legislature was confronted with all manner of plans 
for rate relief, favouring this or that section of the 
community. Sir Massey Lope's various motions on behalf 
of the owners of agricultural land, and Mr. Goschen's 
proposals which were chiefly in favour of the occupying 
tenants in urban areas, led to several passionate dis­
cussions in Parliament in the years from 1868 to 1870.* 
Finally, a Select Committee presided over by Mr. Goschen 
was appointed in 1870 to inquire into 'the progressive 
increase of local taxation, with special reference to 
the proportion of local and imperial burdens borne by 
the different classes of real property in the United 
Kingdom as compared with the burdens imposed upon the 
same classes of property in other European countries'.
(l) These were; (l) Pauper Lunatics; (2) fever or small­
pox patients in asylums; (3) medicine and medical 
and surgical appliances supplied to those in receipt 
of relief; (4) all salaries and cost of rations of 
officers, managers, and dispensers, provided that 
their appointment is sanctioned by Poor Law Board;
(5) compensation to dismissed medical officers; (6) 
fees for registration of births and deaths; (7) vac­
cination fees; (8) maintenance of children in dis­
trict, separate, certified and licensed schools; (9) 
relief of destitute persons certified by the auditors, 
and provision of casual wards under the Houseless 
Poor Acts of 1864-65.
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The famous report 4>f this Committee addressed 
by Mr. Goschen to the Treasury in March 1871 (1) showed 
that in about 30 years rates in England and Wales had 
risen from £8,000,000 to £16,000,000. The Committee 
suggested a division of the rates between owners and 
occupiers, and thought it better to carry out a reform 
which would harmonise with the two great principles of 
local taxation, namely, contribution according to bene­
fit and contribution according to ability. Their inves­
tigation had proved that 'while house property was hea­
vily taxed, the burdens on land, which for the most part 
were hereditary, were not heavier than they had been on 
past occasions and were less heavy than in most foreigh 
countries'; and that the real grievances of local finance 
in Britain were grievances not of the agricultural land­
owners, but of the urban occupiers who bore the whole 
burden of an increased expenditure which benefited the 
urban landlords and raised urban rents.
In 1871 two Bills were, accordingly, introduced 
by Mr. Goschen which provided that the Inhabited House 
Duties should be levied by, and paid to, local authorities, 
and that the payment of half the rates should be trans­
ferred from occupiers to owners. These Bills, however, 
were not favoured by those who advocated relief of local 
burdens in the interests of landowners. They were drop­
ped eventually, having served no other purpose than to 
cool the ardour of Sir Massey Lopes and the squires.
In the following year, Sir Massey Lopes came 
forward in the House of Commons demanding the recognition 
of poor relief as a national liability. In this he failed, 
but persisted with another resolution to the effect that 
the Government should bear the whole cost of administering 
justices, half the cost of police, and half the cost of 
pauper lunatics, because, to use his own words, 'the e x- 
penditure for such purposes was almost entirely indepen­
dent of local control'. He estimated that, to carry out 
this suggestion, an increased charge on the Consolidated 
Fund of just over 2 million pounds would be required. (2)
(l) Reprinted in 1893 as House of Commons Paper Ho.201
of 1893. £
(2) Viz:-In England.....................    .1,626,000
In Scotland 245,000
In Ireland (where the whole cost 
of police was already met out
of public fund)............   166,000
Total..........£2,037,000
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In spite of the opposition of the Government, this 
resolution was carried by a majority of 100. (1) Mr. 
Gladstone, however, neglected to act upon this decided 
expression of opinion on the part of the House of Commons. 
Nothing was done except in 1873 a special grant of £100,000 
was voted to meet half the salaries of medical officers of 
health and inspectors of nuisances. There was an ample 
surplus in the Exchequer at Mr. Gladstone’s disposal; but 
instead of offering it to the local authorities in the 
form§ of grants-in-aid, he preferred to continue the re­
duction of the sugar duties and of the income tax.
V. Disraeli's Government and an Extensive Use 
of Exchequer Grants.
In 1874, Mr. Disraeli, whose principle it was to 
offer relief in local taxation, was installed in Downing 
Street. In his first budget, the new Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Sir Stafford Northcote, agreed to the use of 
the huge surplus bequeathed to him by his predecessor,
Mr. Gladstone, for the relief of the taxpayer ratepayers. 
He increased the grant in aid of police in England and 
Scotland from a quarter to a half of the cost of the pay 
and clothing. He provided for a grant-in-aid of 4s. 
weekly per head for pauper lunatics, and contributed a 
compensation in respect of rates to all parishes which 
contained Government property. These additional subven­
tions amounted at the time to £1,250,000.
These proposals were favourably accepted by Par­
liament. They did not, however, meet with Mr. Gladstone’s 
approval. He pointed out that they contained no safe­
guard against local extravagance and no guarantees of 
improved administration. Besides, they meant ’a transfer 
from a fund supported by property to a fund supported by 
property and labour jointly*. Indeed, the budget of 1874 
has not found favour in the eyes of some students of go­
vernment. Dr. Redlich even condemned it as the starting 
point in a record of degeneration. "The earlier grants- 
in-aid11, he wrote in 1903, "were for national purposes, 
and were intended to secure efficiency. The later grants 
assume more and more the character of mere doles to re­
lieve some favoured class out of the purse of the general 
taxpayer"• (2)
(1) C.9528, 1899, pp.16-17.
(2) Redlich & Hirst, Local Government in England, 1903, 
Vol.I., p.161.
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Following the grants for police and pauper lunatics 
of 1874, Mr. Disraeli’s Government proceeded three years 
later to relieve still further the local authorities, in 
this case from the obligation of providing prison accom­
modation in counties and boroughs for prisoners awaiting 
trial and serving short-sentences. (1) An Act of that 
year (40 & 41 Viet. C.21.) provided that all prisons be­
longing to any local prison authority were to be trans­
ferred to the Home Office, and the expenses of maintain­
ing both prisons and prisoners were thenceforth made a 
national charge. Similar provisions for Scottish and 
Irish prisons were made in separate Acts of the same 
session.
VI. The Intensification of Rate Distress.
This piecemeal remedy, however, did not solve 
the problem. (2) The situation was rendered even more 
serious, owing, to a general declind in agricultural 
prosperity, coupled with a rise in urban expenditure 
resulting from the new costs of education (3) and sani­
tation.
(1) Convict prisoners’ maintenance and penal establish­
ments had long been provided by the Central Exchequer.
(2) During this period, in addition to the grants men­
tioned, a sum of £250,000 was voted in 1882 and sub­
sequent years to enable the Government to further its 
assistance for the disturnpiked and main roads in En­
gland and Scotland. A further grant was made for these 
roads in 1887, when Mr. Goschen in his first Budget 
gave another £250,000 to the county authorities, and 
thus relieved them of half of the liabilities, which 
had been thrown upon them by the Highways and Locomo­
tives Amendment Act of 1878.
(3) The greatest development of education came after 1870. 
In that year elementary education was made a local 
government obligation. School Boards were set up to 
administer it, and substantial education grants were 
introduced. See Maureen Schulz* The Development of Hie* 
Grant System, in Essays in Local Government, 1948,
p.116.
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From 1883 to 1885, there was constant contention 
in Parliament over the question of the readjustment of 
local burdens. The problem was raised by Mr. Pell who 
moved 'that no further delay should be allowed in grant­
ing adequate relief to ratepayers in counties and bo­
roughs in respect of national services required of local 
authorities'. He denied that an increase in the subven­
tions would lead to increased extravagance; and contended 
that the Exchequer grants which had been provided in 1874 
in aid of local authorities were no longer sufficient, 
more especially so because of the growing expense on 
education, (l)
Against this view, there were those, such as Sir 
Charles Dilke, then President of the Local Government 
Board, who opposed the further transferance of local 
charges to the national purse, and argued that the sub­
ventions of 1874 had only served the purpose of accele­
rating the increase of expenditure on police and pauper 
lunatics. (2) Mr. Gladstone also thought that the sub­
ventions had allowed of the local authorities being 
'pressed or forced to much augmentation of expenses'; 
and that they led to waste and over centralisation. He 
did not deny the injustice of laying the supply of local 
wants exclusively on visible property, but he protested 
against remedying one injustice by the perpetuation of 
others. ’'Every time we place a grant in aid upon the Con­
solidated Fund", he argued, "we commit the offence of 
laying upon labour a very large proportion of the charge 
heretofore borne by property". (3) He, therefore, satis­
fied himself in declaring that no further relief should 
be given by way of Exchequer grant until a complete 
scheme had been entered upon for the reform of local 
government•
Fell'8 motion was rejected, and in its place an 
amendment moved by Mr. Albert Grey and supported by the 
Government advocating the view that relief to ratepayers 
'should be by the transfer to local authorities of the 
revenue proceeding from particular taxes or portion of 
taxes', (4) was carried by a majority of 13. This, how­
ever, was followed, a few days later, by a memorial pre-
(1) 3 Hansard, Vol.278, p.437.
(2) 3 Hansard, Vol.278, p.486. He showed that in 1871 
the expenditure of police in counties was only 
£784,000, but in 1877 it arose to £1,000,000; while 
in boroughs, the corresponding figures were: 1871, 
£503,000; 1877, £733,000. The lunacy grants had risen 
from £337,000 in 1876, to £412,000 in 1881.
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sented by 31 members of Parliament stating that their 
support of the Government fhad only been given on the 
understanding that the amendment implied an intention 
to deal promptly with the question*. (5)
In 1884» seeing that the government had, mean­
while , shown no sign of performing its promise, Hr. Pell 
renewed his attack and succeeded in carrying a resolu­
tion which deprecated 'the postponement of further mea­
sures of relief, acknowledged to be due to ratepayers 
in respect of local charges imposed on them for national 
services'* (6)
In spite of these repeated warnings, the Liberal 
Government still took no steps for relieving local taxa- 
tion---an omission which caused great dissatisfaction on 
the part of the ratepaying&nterests. Finally# in 1885 
when a Budget Bill was put forward which proposed an 
alteration in the Death Duties, affecting real as well 
as personal property, Sir Kiohael Hicks-Beach moved an 
amendment to it on the ground that no fresh taxation on 
real property should be sanctioned until SF1B0S effect 
had been given to the two resolutions concerning measures 
of relief to the local ratepayers. f7) This amendment 
was passed, and the Liberal Government accordingly re­
signed.
During the next year^ m t h e  the political turmoil 
which resulted from the fall and accession of two Govern­
ments and another dissolution of Parliament did not allow 
the question of local taxation to receive attention, ex­
cept for the passage OJ a resolution, moved by Hr* Thorold 
Rogers, and aimed at a readjustment of local taxation be­
tween owners and occupiers, so that the former should bear 
at least one-half of the burden.
In January 1887, Hr, Goschen succeeded Lord 
Randolph Churchill as the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
Lord Salisbury's second administration. Hr. Goschen had 
long been mindful of the problem of local burdens, but, in 
hi8 first Budget, he confined himself to making two minor 
concessions in favour of the agricultural interest, while 
preserving the bulk of his proposals fsr relieving local 
taxation to be dealt with in his contemplated plan of lo­
cal government reform. One of these concessions, as we
3 Hansard, Vol.278, p.522.
4) 3 Hansard, Vol. 276, p.454.
C.9528, p . 18.
,6( 3 Hansard, Yol* 286, p*1023. 
7) 3 Hansard, Yol.295, p*1421.
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have seen above, (1) was to double the existing grant 
in aid of disturnpikeat and main roads to the counties, 
while Ireland was to receive an analogous grant for the 
promotion of arterial drainage. The other conceded to 
farmers the choice of being assessed for income tax on 
their actual profits instead of on the arbitrary basis 
of one-third of the rent. (2)
(1) See ante. p.lib.
(2) Or, previous to 1894, one-half.
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CHAPTER VIII.
MR. GOSCHEM'S SCHEME OP ASSIGNED REVEMTJES.
The year 1888 marked a great event in British 
local government history. On the one hand, county coun­
cils were brought into existen ce by an Act forwarded 
by the President of the Local Government Board, Mr. Rit­
chie; on the other hand, Mr. Goschen devoted himself to 
the first serious, attempt to deal with the question of 
the relationship between ratepayers and taxpayers in a 
comprehensive manner.
There were two cardinal purposes in Mr. Goschen's 
financial proposals; (a) to simplify the chaos of imper­
ial and local finance by discontinuing the greater part 
of grants-in-aid, and substituting other revenues of a 
local character in their place; and (b) to make the sub­
stituted revenue larger than the revenue surrendered, 
and so provide relief to ratepayers from sources which, 
as far as possible, should be local in origin and expan­
sive in character.
The grants-in-aid which Mr. Goschen proposed to 
discontinue were as follows*-
1. In England and Vales— - 
Disturnpiked and main roads.••.250,000
Poor Law grants ...........290,000
Criminal prosecutions.••••••••.145,000
Police (London, counties and
boroughs) ••••••...........1,430,000
Pauper lunatics  .....   485.000
Total.................. £2,600,000
2. In Scotland--
Roads..............    35,000
Medical relief............... ..20,000
Police......................    155,000
Pauper lunatiCB.............. 90.000
Total.................. £300,000
3. Ireland— -Mil.
Total.........................  £2,900,000
In lieu of these discontinued grants-in-aid,
Mr. Goschen proposed to assign the following revenues as 
compensation:-
(l) To hand over the bulk of the Excise licences, 
which he regarded as "to a considerable extent 
local in their nature1* to the local authorities
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in England and Scotland. They were termed 
Local Taxation Licences, and yielded about 
£2,900,000 at the time. (1)
(2) To impose new licence duties on houses and 
racehorses, carts and wheels.
(3) To assign half the probate duty to local au­
thorities. (2)
The second proposal provoked such opposition in 
Parliament that it was finally withdrawn. The first was 
carried, and benefited local authorities to the extent 
of £400,000 in England, and £18,000 in Scotland. Ireland, 
whose grants-in-aid remained untouched, got no benefit 
from this arrangement, but a sum of £40,000 each year 
out of the Consolidated Fund was voted in Parliament in 
favour of Ireland so that she might, be under no disad­
vantage as compared with the other two countries.
Mr. Goschenls third proposal was also carried.
His reason for choosing the probate duty as a tax to be 
partially applied in relief of local burdens was* that 
it was the only tax which fell exclusively on realised 
personalty; and he thought that by handing over one-half 
the proceeds of the probate duty to the local authori­
ties, it would serve 'as a contribution from personalty 
in aid of local rates. It was, moreover, a growing tax, 
and, as the burdens of the ratepayers were growing, it 
was hoped that the automatic increase of this assigned 
tax 'would enable the local authorities to meet their 
heavier burdens without having constant recourse to agi­
tation for more extensive drafts from the Exchequer'.
The probate duty yielded in 1888 about £5i millions, with 
the consequence that the additional relief given to the 
local authorities under the new scheme amounted to about 
£2f millions. 13J.
The probate duty grants in Scotland and Ireland 
were allocated by an Act of Parliament (51 & 52 Viet. c. 
60) to specific purposes, but in England and Vales, no 
such arrangement was made. It was in this respect that 
Mr. Goschen*s financial scheme was specially notorious, 
in that, in the latter case, it allowed the grants to go
(1) All excise licences referred to in the Act of 1888 
were specified in the First Schedule of the Act. The 
main part of this revenue was derived from licences 
for the sale of alchoholic liquors, for killing game, 
for keeping dogs and guns, establishment licences, 
etc.
(2) The rate of probate duties at that time was 3#.
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in relief of rates generally, and thus put an end to 
the principle which Sir Robert Peel had wisely sugges­
ted, that imperial grants to local authorities should 
be earmarked for specific purposes, and should depend 
upon the efficiency of the services rendered. The only 
question that attracted the attention of Parliament was 
how the grant should be distributed among the various 
local authorities. (4) For this purpose, three methods 
of distribution at first presented themselves, the choice 
appearing to lie between schemes based on population, 
rateable value,or indoor pauperism, as affording the 
best basis for ensuring that relief should be given 
where it was most required, but after seweral passionate 
debates in Parliament, this was discarded. (5) The 
basis ultimately adopted was the easiest but least equi­
table one. It was determined that the probate grant 
'shall, until Parliament otherwise determine, be distri­
buted among the several counties in England and Vales in 
proportion to the share which they received during the 
financial year ending March 1888, out of the grants paid 
in that year from the Exchequer in aid of local rates'. 
This arrangement was well-nigh absurd. It took parti­
cularity as a basis of generalisation, for, as such grants 
fluctuated from year to year, they constituted a basis 
which was liable to become at any time obsolete and in­
equitable. (6) "To elevate the actual distribution of 
State grants in 1888 into a canon for succeeding years",
(3) In 1894, the probate duties assigned to local autho­
rities were abolished by an Act of Parliament (57 &
58 Viet. c.30). Instead of^&? a grant of an equi­
valent amount was assigned toAthe Local Taxation 
Accounts out of the new 'Estate Duty* derived from 
personal property.
(4) The proportions assigned to the three kingdoms were:- 
England 80#, Scotland 11#, and Ireland 9#— -i.e., the 
proportions in which they'were then bellowed to con­
tribute to the public revenue ae a whole.
(5) The reason of its withdrawal was that, in carrying it 
out, those parts of the country where relief outside 
the workhouse was predominant would receive an unduly 
small share of assistance.
(6) In his contention, Mr. Goschen pointed out that 'no­
thing could be more unjust' than such a scheme of al­
location* 'You must rather look', he said, 'to see 
where the shoe pinches most'. See Hansard, Mar. 26, 
1888, cccxxiv, 295.
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comment ed Dr. Redlich, "was a strange confusion of fi­
nancial ineptitude and a striking testimony to the ty­
ranny exercised in England by established facts over the 
theories, systems, and principles of weak statesmen and 
watery parties". i n
As stated above, the new licence duties on horses, 
carts and wheels, which Mr. Goschen proposed to levy in 
1888 for the benefit of local authorities, were abandoned 
finally owing to violent opposition in Parliament. In 
order to provide some substitute for these, Mr. Goschen 
undertook to impose in 1890 an extra tax of 3d. per bar­
rel ofl bear, and 6d. per gallon on spirits for the fur­
ther relief of local taxation, and to meet the demand 
which had meantime arisen for police superannuation.
These surtaxes or additional duties were calculated to 
produce £1,304,000 annually, and the proportions of their 
distribution among the three kingdoms being the same as 
for the probate duty, England and Wales received £1,043, 
000; Scotland £143,000; and Ireland £110,800, respective-
iy. Ill
The settlement embodied in the Acts of 1888 and 
1890, resulted in the transference of a considerable 
sum from the Exchequer fund in relief of rates. It was 
reported that in 1889-90, £4,805,940 was produced from 
licences, probate, and beer and spirit surtax; (3) while
I
I:
1) Redlich & Hirst,op. cit., Vol.II., p.95.
2) The allocation of these new revenues as provided by 
the Local Taxation (Customs and Excise) Act, 1890,
53 & 54 Viet. C.60J was as followsi- 
A) England and Wales— - £
Police superannuation...............    • .300,000
In relief of rates or for technical
instruction....................  743.000
Total...............  £1,043,000
(B) Scotland---
Police superannuation...........     40,000
In relief of rates or for technical instruction
.............  48,000
School fees..........................  40,000
Medical, &c. officers...............   15.000
Total................. £143,000
(C) Ireland--
Hational school teachers .........  78,000
Intermediate education..............  40.000
Total..................... £110,800
(3) Of this, £4,968,239 was from licences and probate,
and £1, 040,376 from beer and spirit surtaxes.
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in 1891-92, it amounted to £6,429,079. (1)
On account of the expansive nature of the as­
signed revenues, it was generally thought, at the time, 
that the sums they yielded would at least keep pace with 
the increasing expenditure of local administration.
This proved, in the event, however, to he too optimistic a 
view. Within a decade of the institution of the scheme, 
further installments of relief had to he conceded to the 
agricultural interest (2) and movements were developing 
in every locality for further Exchequer contributions. 
Apparently, the primary purpose of the GoBchen System, 
to check further raids hy local authorities upon the 
national exchequer, was not heing fulfilled.
In 1896, a Royal Commission,presided over hy 
Lord Balfour of Burleigh was appointed to consider the 
whole system of Imperial and local taxation, in order to 
suggest alterations in the law which would make real and 
personal property contribute equitably to the funds rai­
sed for local purposes. Its final report, published in 
1901 (Cd.638), contained a Majority Report and a Minority 
Report.
The commissioners all agreed that something 
should be done towards the relief of the ratepayers. Ac­
cording to their unanimous opinion, services carried out 
by local authorities should be divided into two classes— ■- 
1national or onerous* and ’local or beneficial*. The 
cost of services which belong to the former class, such as 
poor relief, police, criminal prosecution, education, and 
the maintenance of main roads, should not fall entirely 
upon local resources, but should be imposed preponderantly 
on the national exchequer; because, on the one hand, * 
such administration does not confer special benefit on 
special places*, and, on the other hand, ’the State in­
sists on its being carried out, and on a certain standard 
of efficiency being reached*. (3)
As to the manner in which Exchequer subventions 
were to be made, the two reports differed. The Majority 
Report advocated the retention of the system of assigned 
revenues in a modified form. It suggested that in addi­
tion to the estate duty grant, the beer and spirit sur-
(1) House of Commons Paper, 168 of 1893,p.xlv.
(2) Under the Agricultural Rates Act (1896) and the Tithe 
Rentcharge (Rates) Act (1899). Sees- below, i>fe. 133-3+.*
(3) Cd.638, 1901, p.12.
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taxes, and the local taxation licence duties, certain 
stamp duties and the inhabited house duty should be 
appropriated in relief of rates. These revenues were 
to be paid to the Local Taxation Account as usual; but 
instead of that fund being distributed to counties and 
COUMTY boroughs, grants were to be made direct for 
"national” services to the administering authorities.
The Minority, represented by Sir Edward Ha­
milton and Sir George Murray,on the other hand,adopted 
the separate recommendations of the Chairman to the 
effeet that eaeh of the “national” services ought to be 
the subject of a “block grant”,that is, a grantin respect 
of the whole of the service, not of certain branches of 
it. The basis^ advised for the grant to each service
was the annual expenditure, and the total of the grant
for the country was to be about half of the total expen­
diture. As for the method of distributing the grants, a 
“formula” was devised to modify the amount received by 
each local authority according to the amount actually 
spent by the local council, the number of the population, 
and the rateable value of the area. But the last factor
was to operate, not as in the Goschen scheme to give more
to the wealthier areas, but to give more to the poorer 
areas. All grants were to be charged on the Consolidated 
Fund and paid as required to the executive authorities.
(Z)
The Commissioners, however, were again in gene­
ral agreement that all grants should be paid direct to 
the spending authority, (3) that there should be proper 
guarantees for efficiency and economy, and that agricul­
tural land should be assessed at one-half of its value 
for onerous services. (4)
(1) This was then a new idea alien to the Majority’s con­
ception. Taking the poor law as an example, while the 
Majority favoured grants in respect of Union officers’ 
salaries, pauper lunatics, epileptics, maintenance and 
education of Poor Law children, sick and infirm in in­
firmaries and workhouse wards, teachers in Poor Law 
schools, and school fees of pauper children, the Mi­
nority recommended that the whole field of Poor Law 
administration should be taken together in determi­
ning the grant.
(2) Cd.7315, 1914, pp.3-4.
(3) It will be seen that the Commission unanimously re­
commended a return to the system of direct grants; 
and that, while recognising elementary education as 
a “national service”, they left it outside the ar­
rangements which they recommended.
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To realise their respective schemes, the net increase of 
Government subventions was estimated at £2,570,000 by 
the Majority, (5) and £1,525,000 by the Minority. (6)
None of the recommendations made by the Hoyal Commission 
in favour of a fceturn to the system of direct grants, 
however, was explicitly accepted. But, in the meantime, 
a modification in the original system of assigned reve­
nues took place through a series of enactments which 
stereotyped the yield payable to local authorities from 
some of the taxes involved.
Under the Finance Act of 1907 (7 Edw.7, c.13) it 
was provided that in the event of an increase in the 
rate of any duty belonging to the assigned revenues 
(other than beer and spirit surtaxes), the amount pay­
able to local authorities should be calculated at the 
rate in force at the commencement of the Act, and that 
ahy increase in the yield of the revenues was to be di­
verted from the local authorities to the Exchequer.
This provision was repealed in the case of certain li­
cences in the following year (7), but the trend conti­
nued, for by the Finance Act of 1910 and the Revenue 
Act of 1911, it was laid down that the sum payable to 
the Local Taxation Account in respect of the duties on 
carriage licences (including motor licence®); the duties 
on intoxicating liquor licences; and the Local Taxation 
(Customs and Excise) Duties, should be equivalent to the 
sum produced by the relative duties in the financial 
year 1908-09.
The effect of stereotyping the amount payable 
to the Local Taxation Account in this way, thus preclu­
ded the local authorities from receiving, in future, the 
advantage fro® the natural expansion of these duties an­
ticipated when the Goschen Scheme was introduced in 1888 
--an expansion which had then been expected to keep pace 
with the increasing expenditure of the services requiring 
nat ional subventions•
Ten years elapsed after the publication of the 
Report of the Balfour Commission, with no direct action 
on the part of the Government to implement its proposals. 
In April, 1911, however, a departmental committee was 
appointed by Mr. Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, ’to inquire into the changes which (had) taken
(5) Cd.638, 1901, p.32.
(6) Ibid., p.141.
(7) Finance Act, 1908.
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place in the relations between national and local taxa­
tion since the Report of the Royal Commission on Local 
Taxation in 1901; to examine the several proposals made 
in the Reports of that Commission, and to make recommen­
dations on the subject for the consideration of His Ma­
jesty’s Government, with a view to the introduction of 
legislation at an early date’.
The Committee, under the Chairmanship of Sir 
John A. Kempe, issued their report in 1914, making re­
commendations, inter alia, on the subject of State sub­
ventions to the following effects-
(a) That, having regard to the changes which had 
taken place since the introduction of the As­
signed Revenues System in 1888, a considerable 
increase in the amount of State subventions to 
local authorities was justifiable and necessary.
(b) That the Assigned Revenues System, under which 
a large proportion of the existing subventions 
were paid, should be abolished, and that in 
future all State assistance to local authori­
ties should take the form of direct grants 
from the Exchequer.
(c) That such grants should only be made in res­
pect of ’semi-national’ services, i.e., ser­
vices which, though administered locally, yet 
partook of the characteristics of services ad­
ministered by the State.
(d) That the more important services to be included 
in the category of semi-national services 
should be education,poor relief, police, main 
roads, public health, criminal prosecutions, 
and mental deficiency. (1)
(e) That all grants be conditional on the efficient 
administration of the service in respect of 
which they were to be given, and be made subject 
to a general power of reduction and regulation 
on the part of the supervising Government De­
partment. (2)
It was the intention of the Government to act up­
on the recommendations of the Committee. Accordingly the 
Finance Bill of 1914 was drafted to rewise the system of 
grants and to pay direct to the spending authorities 
grants made-upe* based upon these recommendations. But
(1) Cd.7315, 1914, p.100.
(2) Ibid., p.102.
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the War broke out, and the Bill was withdrawn.
The assigned revenues system, as it had been 
originally conceived, however, was in any case moribund. 
Even at the time of its inception, it had never been 
comprehensively adeauate for all the services receiving 
exchequer support, (1) and alongside the assigned reve­
nues there was growing, persistently, a system of sup­
plementary grants from the exchequer to finance new ser­
vices, usually on the basis of a percentage of their 
cost to the local authority. (2) Most of the revenues, 
moreover, had been stereotyped into fixed grants by this 
time, which had essentially alter/ed their character. 
Nevertheless, the system of assigned revenues persisted, 
until it was finally interred under the Local Government 
Act of 1929.
1) C.f. The education service. See below. Ch.IX, Sect.l.
2) The additional grants in aid of major services are 
described in the subsequent chapter. The miner
■grantsi which should be mentioned here» are -set out
4n the Appondix.
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CHAPTER IX.
EXCHEQUER GRANTS BETWEEN THE TWO GREAT FINANCIAL 
REFORMS (1888-1929)
In the period between the two great financial 
reorganisations of 1888 and 1929, a considerable expan­
sion in State-aided local services took place. Their 
development was piecemeal and uncoordinated, and gave 
rise to an improvised and varied system of exchequer 
contributions. Alongside the system of assigned reve­
nues, there grew up other types of financial assistance, 
in some eases based upon the units of service supplied 
by the local authorities---a sum for each pupil in 
school, or for each house built---, but more often, in 
this period, based upon a percentage of the costs incur­
red in the localities. An outline is presented of the 
development of the system of grants in the more important 
services during this time, fcr)
I. Exchequer Grants and Educational Development.
Goschen1s Act of 1888 had no influence on the
education grant. While other grants were mostly aboli­
shed, and replaced by the new system of assigned reve­
nues, the grant in aid of elementary education and for
the maintenance of industrial and reformatory schools 
remained untouched. The grant in this service originated 
in 1833, but the amount and scope of the assistance was 
increased from time to time, notably in 1846 and 1862.
In the former case, a payment was first made out of the 
Education Vote towards the erection of normal and train­
ing schools for teachers in England; in the latter, a 
type of capitation grant was provided, based mainly on 
the results of attendance at schools and the results of 
individual examination of the children in reading, wri­
ting, and arithmetic. This sort of Merit Grant, however, 
had the unsatisfactory effect of restricting the develop­
ment of .teaching in higher subjects, and a Royal Commis­
sion was, accordingly, appointed in 1886 to inquire into 
the matter and making suggestions for reform. The Report
Fqj the minor cervices-,— see the Appendix .
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of the Cross Commission, issued two years later, recom­
mended a new code which consolidated former grants in a 
single block grant known as the "annual grant". (1)
In the period between the Report of the Cross 
Commission and the end of the century, several beneficial 
measures were adopted. In 1891, a Fee Grant of 10s. a 
yeaf for every child, over three and under fifteen years 
of age, was made under the Elementary Education Act for 
the purpose of inducing the managers of schools to forego 
fees, so that the compulsory attendance principle would 
be rendered practicable. (2) In 1892, the system of pay­
ment by results was entirely abolished. In the following 
year and in 1899, special grants were made to assist 
schools for blind and deaf children and for defective and 
epileptic children respectively. Meanwhile the Elementary 
Education Act of 1897 provided an increased aid grant for 
scholars in necessitous areas, and the Voluntary Sdhools 
Act of the same year contributed a sum of 5s. per child 
attending voluntary schools and relieved those schools 
of the obligation to pay local rates.
(1) This grant was based on the average attendance of all 
scholars whose attendance were recognised by the Boa­
rd of Education. The rate of grant was 22s. for each 
unit of average attendance, except in the Infants* 
Department, or an Infants* Division in which the ave­
rage attendance exceeded 20; in this case the grant 
was at the rate of 17s. per scholar. Thus the local 
education authorities had a direct pecuniary interest, 
not only in getting as many children to schoolias pos­
sible, but also in getting them to attend as regularly 
as possible.
(2) The receipt of the Fee Grant imposed certain restric­
tions on the charging of fees, and a few schools, 
therefore, declined the grant, prefering to charge
a substantial fee. In most of the schools receiving 
the grant, no fees at all were charged; but where 
fees were charged, the grant might be subject to de­
duction ff the total amount of the fees so charged 
had exceeded a certain limit.
(3) Councils of non-county boroughs with a population of 
over 10,000, and of all urban districts with a popu­
lation of over 20,000, were constituted the local edu­
cation authorities for elementary education within the 
their respective districts, unless they relinquished 
these powers to the county council.
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In the opening yearsjof this century, the most 
important development as regards national services ad­
ministered hy local authorities was, perhaps, the pass­
ing of the Education Act of 1902 (2 Edw.7, c.42). Un­
der the provisions of this Act the old school hoards 
and school attendance committees were dissolved, and the 
county and county borough councils were constituted local 
education authorities, charged with financial responsibi­
lity for educational purposes* (3) The whole service of 
education was brought under municipal and county adminis­
tration, local authorities being also charged with the 
control of non-provided schools and the provision of fa­
cilities for higher education*
As for the expenses incurred under this arrange­
ment, the Act provided that the whole proceeds of the 
residue of the beer and spirit taxes, which hitherto had 
been applicable either to technical education or in re­
lief of rates, at the option ofl the local authorities, 
should now be definitely allocated to higher education; 
and a new aid grant, calculated upon the relation in 
each area between the number of elementary scholars and 
the assessable value, was introduced* (4) Local autho­
rities were also given extended rating powers for this 
purpose.
The improvement in the education service in 
Great Britain after 1902 was considerable. It was not, 
moreover, confined to the purely academic aspect. The 
Education (Provision of Meals) Act, 1906, authorised 
local education authorities to supply meals, in necessi­
tous cases, for children attending school; while the 
Education (Administrative Provisions) Act, 1907, provided 
for the medical inspection of school children, and gave 
powers for attending to their health and physical condi­
tion. Under the latter Act, education authorities were
(4y Under Sect. 10 of the Act of 1902, the new Aid Grant 
consisted of two parts: (a) a fixed grant of 4s. per 
scholar in average attendance; and (b) a variable 
grant of 1-J-d. per scholar for every 2d. by which the 
produce of a Id. rate fell short of 10s. per scholar. 
Thus the grant depended partly on the average atten­
dance and partly on the produce of a Id. rate; and 
the rate of grant per scholar was higher or lower 
according as the sum found by dividing the produce of 
a Id. rate by the number of scholars was lower or 
higher.
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also authorised, inter alia, to provide scholarships, 
vacation schools, vacation classes, play centres and 
other means of recreation during holidays and at other 
times. For some years after these services were intro­
duced, no State subvention was supplied, until, in 1912- 
13, under Regulations of the Board of Education, provi­
sion was made for grants of one-half of net expenditure 
incurred, (l)
The complicated system of education grants was 
greatly revised in 1918. After the Education Act of 
that year, the method of payment was left primarily to 
regulations issued by the Board of Education,under which 
an annual consolidated grant for elementary education 
was used instead of the former grants. The new grant was 
made payable according to the Fisher Formula, which, sub­
ject to certain exceptions, (2) was as follows:-
(a) Thirty-six shillings each unit of average at­
tendance in public elementary schools.
(b) Three-fifths of the expenditure on teachers* 
salaries in these schools.
(c) One-half of the net expenditure on special 
services, namely, school medical services, 
provision of meals, schools for the blind, 
deaf and defective children, etc.
(d) One-fifth of the remaining net expenditure on 
elementary education.
(e) Less product of a rate of 7d. in the £.
The old grants for higher education were con­
tinued under the regulations, except that a change might 
be made, when necessary, to provide a deficiency grant 
so as to bring the grants up to 50# of the net approved 
expenditure. These separate grants for higher education 
were, however, replaced by a consolidated grant of 50# 
of net expenditure from the 1st. April, 1921.
(1) In addition to these, there were some minor improve­
ments in this period which are worth mentioning, In 
1906, a new Necessitous Area Grant for educational 
purposes was introduced. Three-fourths of the sum 
expended was to be relieved in cases where the net 
cost to the rates in thhese areas exceeded Is. 6d. 
in the £. In 1907, a block grant of £100,000 was 
provided by the Appropriation Act for grants in aid 
of building new council schools.
(2) The grant had a maximum and a minimum limit; and there 
were increased grants for highly rated areas.
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II* Measures to Relieve Agricultural Distress.
In 1893, Mr. Henry Fowler, the President of the 
Local Government Board, presented a report to the Trea­
sury on the subjent of local taxation, ’with special 
reference to the proportion of local burdens borne by 
urban and rural ratepayers, and by different classes of 
real property in England and Wales”. In this report, 
which was chiefly a continuation of Mr. Goschen*s re­
port of 1871, there were outlined the following eonclu- 
sions:-
(1) The increase of the rates during the last 20 
years was largely due to the additional ex­
penditure in education and sanitation, espe­
cially after the Education Act of 1870 and 
the Public Health Act of 1875.
(2) The increase in Exchequer contributions since 
1888 was to a great extent offset by the abo­
lition of turnpike tolls and of the London 
coal and wine duties, etc.
(3) As the grant in aid had gone mainly towards 
the relief of hereditary burdens on land, it 
was the occupiers, and not the landowners, 
who were overburdened by the rates, (l)
The conclusion of Sir Henry’s report was streng­
thened by the recommendations of a Koyal Commission on 
Agriculture advocating the relief of agricultural dis­
tress. In response to this cumulative encouragement, an * 
Agricultural Rates Act was passed in 1896 to ease the 
burden of the rural ratepayers by diverting into the Lo­
cal Taxation Account another sum from the yield of the 
Estate Duty on personal property. This sum, amounting 
for England to about £1,330,000, was to be paid directly 
to all spending authorities, (2) in order to enable them 
to tax the occupiers of agricultural land within their 
districts at one half only of its rateable value, without 
incurring any loss of revenue. Similar Acts were passed 
to make proportionately ’equivalent grants’ to local
(1) See House of Commons Paper, 168 of 1893, p.li; ”As 
far as local taxation was concerned, the position of 
landowners had improved since 1888, while the burdens 
on occupiers of houses had greatly increased”•
(2) Chiefly county councils, county boroughs, boards of 
guardians, and rural district councils.
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purposes in Scotland and Ireland. (1)
The defects of this arrangement (2) were notable.
It was not directed as a relief on account of national 
services, but was granted for half of all rural rates, 
irrespective of origin or destination. As the sum was 
fixed, moreover, it could not meet increases in charges; 
and wherever an increase occurred, the grant from the 
Local Taxation Account proved insufficient to redress 
the deficiency caused by the exemption of agricultural 
land from half the burden of the rates. Finally, though 
these grants might have done something to redress the 
inequalities of the agriculturalist and his manufacturing, 
trading or residential neighbour in the same rating area, 
they did nothing tb rectify the disparity of rates in 
different rating areas.
The occupiers of agricultural land enjoyed a fur­
ther exemption in rates under the Agricultural Rates Act 
of 1923, when the abatement of one-half made under the 
Act of 1896 was increased to three-fourths the poundage
(1) Act 59 & 60 Viet, c.37 for Scotland and Act 59 & 60 
Viet, c.41 for Ireland. The Act for Scotland dif­
fered in some respects from its English analogue.
In England, the whole of the rates to which the A- 
gricultural Rates Act, 1896, applied, were paid by 
the occupiers, and the Act provided for their exemp­
tion to the extent of one-half of those rates, but 
confined the exemption to the land, leaving the buil­
dings connected with the land assessable at their 
full annual value. In Scotland, however, where the 
rates to which the Agricultural Rates, &c. (Scotland) 
Act, 1896, applied, were divided between owners and 
occupiers, the exemption was confined to the occupiers’ 
share of the rates, but the amount of the exemption 
was fixed at 5/8 of the occupiers’ rates, and was 
given not only in respect of the land, but of the 
buildings also. See also:- Final Report of Department 
tal Committee on Local Taxation, 1914, Cd.7315, p.
56; and Alban, Lamb & Imrie, Scottish Local Govern­
ment Finance and the Law Relating Thereto, 5th ed., 
1924, p.109.
(2) The Tithe Rentcharge (Rates) Act, 1899 (62 & 63 Viet. 
c.17), extended to the owners of tithe rentcharge 
attached to benefices, an exemption similar to that 
granted to the occupiers of agricultural land by the 
Agricultural Rates Act.
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of other occupiers. In view of the deficit in the pro­
duce of rates arising from this reduction, a grant was 
made from the Rational Exchequer, but whereas the grant 
made under the earlier Act had been fixed according to 
the lewd loss in the initial year, now, a variable grant 
was provided based upon the actual loss. (1)
These grants were discontinued under the Local 
Government Act of 1929, which completely derated agricul­
tural lands and buildings.
III. Financial Aid towards Highway Administration.
The Develppment and Road Improvement Funds Act, 
1909 (9 Edw.7, c.47.), set up a new central authority, 
the Road Board, with large powers for the construction 
and improvement of roads. A revenue consisting of the 
proceeds of the new petrol tax and of the surplus pro­
ceeds of the duties on motor car and carriage licences 
after paying the stereotyped amounts to the local autho­
rities were assigned under its control for the betterment 
of highway facilities. This revenue‘was directed to be 
paid into a Road Improvement Fund, out of which the Road 
Board was authorised to make grants and loans to local 
highway authorities.
After the outbreak of war in 1914, however, all 
revenues formerly assigned to the Road Improvement Fund 
were diverted to the Exchequer. The Road Board itself 
was abolished under the Ministry of Transport Act, 1919, 
and a Road Advisory Committee set up for consultation 
with the Minister of Transport. The Minister was now 
empowered to make advances by way of grant or loan to 
any local authority for the construction, improvement, 
or maintenance of railways, roads, bridges, etc. With a 
view to securing the appointment of a better qualified 
type of road officer, he might also defray half the sa­
lary of the engineer and surveyor of a local authority 
responsible for the maintenance of roads, and half the 
establishment charges in respect of his department,on 
condition that the appointment, retention and dismissal 
of these officers and the amount of the charges were
TTT In Scotland, where the rates were paid by both agri­
cultural owners and occupiers, a special arrangement 
was necessary. See:- Memorandun on the Financial 
Resolution, Cmd.3031/1928, p.3. Also:- The Rating 
(Scotland) Act, 1926.
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subject to bis approval. Under the provisions of the 
Roads Act, 1920, county and county borough councils were 
made responsible for the licensing and registration of 
mechanically propelled road vehicles, but the whole cost 
of administration was made payable by the Exchequer. All 
proceeds from the sale of these licences were paid into 
a Motor Tax Account from which the Road Fund was financed, 
to be drawn upon by the Minister of Transport for grants 
to highway authorities. (1) For the loss of fees and 
charges previously received by the local authorities for 
licensing mechanically propelled hackney carriages, a 
compensatory grant was provided.
In a circular dated 22nd May, 1922, it was inti­
mated that the grants towards improvements or maintenance 
of classified roads and bridges would be 50$ of the ac­
tual expenditure upon estimates approved by the Minister 
in the case of Glass I roads and bridges, and 25$ in res­
pect of Class II roads. This was later increased to 60$ 
for Class I and 50$ for Class II, in addition to which 
the roads formerly scheduled as district roads were also 
admitted for grants at 25$.
The scope of road expenditure qualifying for 
grants was enlarged by the Road Improvement Act in 1925, 
when the cost for pedestrian crossings, light signals, 
aquisition of toll roads, planting trees on highways, 
etc., was all admitted as qualifying for contributions 
from the Exchequer.
(l) But the Road Fund was constantly ’raided’ by the Trea­
sury. In 1927, a sum of £7,000,000 was transferred 
to the Exchequer and one-thied of the annual proceeds 
equivalent to £5,000,000 per annum earmarled for tran­
sfer to the Exchequer as representing the taxation 
of ’luxury* expenditure as contrasted with road taxa­
tion. In 1928, a further sum of £12,000,000 was trans­
ferred to the Exchvquer. In April, 1935, the Chancel­
lor appropriated for his budget the Soad Fund Balance 
of £4,470,000. The Finance Act, 1936, provided for 
the moneys previously paid into the Road Fund to be 
paid to the Exchequer, and for the Road Fund to be 
financed out of money provided by Parliament, thus 
giwing Parliament annual control over the amount of the 
expenditure out of the Fund. See J.J. Clarke, op. cit. 
p.656.
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IV. Public Health Under State Subvention.
A serious attempt was made, with the passage of the 
Rational Insurance Act, 1911, (1 & 2 Geo. 5, c.55) to deal 
with the problem of the improvement of health and provi­
sion for unemployment among the working classes. It was 
thought that this attempt would help to diminish the ope­
ration of two leading causes of destitution, and thus tend 
to reduce the charge upon the poor rate.
The Act directed a general campaign against tuber­
culosis, conferring sanitorium benefit upon insured per­
sons. This entailed further expenditure by local autho- . 
ritieB, but, towards meeting the cost, a sum of £1,500,000 
was provided by the Finance Act, 1911, for capital grants 
to assist the erection of sanitoria and dispensaries in 
the United Kingdom. In addition, an Exchequer grant, 
equal to one-half of the net expenditure (including loan 
charges) on the treatment of the disease, was given to 
the local authorities in 1912. ill
Under the Mental deficiency Act, 1913, the duty 
of providing for the care of mental defectives was imposed 
upon local authorities towards the cost of which an Exche­
quer grant of not more than £150,000 annually was provided 
for distribution in such a manner as the Home Secretary 
with the approval of the Treasury recommended. After the 
first World War, more ample provision was made (2) with 
a grant of 50$ of the approved net expenditure in respect 
of obligatory duties payable to the local authorities 
concerned. The grant was originally administered by the 
Home Secretary, but with the transfer of the Board of 
Control to the Ministry of Health in 1920, the adminis­
tration was transferred to the Minister. This percentage 
grant was discontinued under the Local Government Act of 
1929.
Several special-eewviees health services were 
also catArid for. The importance of maternity and child 
welfare work impressed the Government from an early date. 
fat the beginning of the present century, efforts were 
made to reduce infant mortality, and the appointment of 
female health visitors was not uncommon. On the 30th
(l) The payment of sanatorium benefits ceased in 1920; 
and under the Public Health (Tuberculosis) Act, 1921, 
county and county borough councils were made respon­
sible Bor the treatment of the diseases. A block 
grant^baded upon the amount previously received from
-138-
July, 1914, a circular was issued by the Local Government 
Board, intimating that "an estimate had been laid before 
Parliament for a grant to %e be distributed by the Board 
in aid of the expenditure of local authorities and volun­
tary agencies in respect of institutions or other provi­
sion for maternity and child welfare”. The purpose of 
this grant was to stimulate more extended and systematic 
action on the part of local authorities, and county coun­
cils and sanitary authorities were invited to submit 
schemes. (3)
The Notification of Births Act, passed in 1907, 
was extended and made compulsory in all areas in 1915.
This increased the possibilities of child welfare work 
greatly. According to the revised Act, the birth of each 
infant had to be notified to the medical officer of health 
within thirty-six hours of its birth. In this way it be­
came possible for the authorities to make early and re­
peated visits to the parent, for the giving of counsel 
on the health of the mother and her child.
Another circular dated 29th July, 1915, intimated 
that the Government had agreed to provide annual grants 
of one-half the cost of the whole or any part of approved 
maternity and child welfare schemes. The scope of this 
service was further enlarged, in 1918, by the Maternity 
and Child Welfare Act of that year. (4)
A grant was provided in 1919 to encourage lowal 
education authorities in the work of midwifery training. 
The grant was at first £8 10s. for each trainee, but later 
it was increased to the amount of £35 for a full course, 
and £20 for a course of less than one year. As for prac­
tising midwives attending approved courses, grants of £20 
per trainee for a long course, and £1 per week for a 
short course, were payable. Under the provision of Memo­
randum Mo. 101 issued by the Ministry of Health in 1925, 
grants were also made for the institutions recognised by 
the Department for training health visitors. This grant 
was fixed at £20 per successful trainee.
national insurance funds^was provided. This was 
again discontinued under the Local Government Act 
of 1929.
(2) By the Mental Deficiency and Lunacy (Amendment) Act, 
1919, Sect.1.
(3) The whole circular and the required elements to be 
comprised in the scheme can be seen in Sir Arthur 
Hewsholme’s celebrated book: The Ministry of Health, 
1925, London, pp.209-212.
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Following on the issue of the Report of the Royal 
Commission on Venereal Diseases which sat from November, 
1913, to February, 1916, the Local Government Board is­
sued regulations and a medical memorandum on the 13th 
July, 1916, giving practical effect to the most important 
recommendations of the Commission. In accordance with 
the regulations, the responsibility of providing means 
for the prevention and treatment of venereal diseases 
was imposed upon local authorities; and a grant of 75$ 
of the approved net expenditure incurred was given by 
the Government. As a result of this large contribution, 
provision of facilities for treatment of the diseases 
was rapidly obtained throughout the country.
Prior to 1920, the/ welfare of the blind was pro­
vided chiefly by voluntary charitable agencies. The 
Blind Persons Act of that year, however, imposed upon the 
county and county borough councils the responsibility of 
improving blind welfare. Grants from the Ministry of 
Health were made for certain approved items, namely,
Items Amount per person per year
Augmentation of wages of Workshop Employees.....£20
Augmentation of Earnings of Home Workers....... £20
Towards salaries of Home Teachers...............£78
Expenses of Homes for the Blind  ...........£5
Book production, 2s.6d. per volume; Magazines, 2d. 
per copy.
These grants, also, were discontinued under the 
Local Government Act of 1929.
V. The Genesis of the Housing Grants.
Another important service which, in this period, jo­
ined the rank of the grant-aided activities of local au­
thorities was housing. Prior to 1919, the cost of provi­
ding housing accommodation by local authorities had been 
entirely a local charge. But in view of the severe hou­
sing shortage due to the first World War, the Housing and 
Town Planning Act, 1919, imposed upon local authorities 
the responsibility of preparing and submitting schemes 
for the provision of houses where the necessity existed. 
Under the provisions of the Act, the Government, entering
(4) For detailed provisions of the regulations, see ibid. 
pp.213-214. Except for the training of midwives and 
health visitors, grants for maternity and child wel­
fare were discontinued under the L.G.A., 1929.
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for the first time into a housing partnership with local 
authorities, undertook to provide, on the one hand, for 
an Exchequer contribution equal to the annual cost on 
housing schemes approved by the Minister of Health, in 
excess of a local rate of Id, in the £, and, on the other, 
for a 50$ grant in respect of the expenditure on approved 
slum clearance schemes.
Both these bases proved to be so expensive to 
the National Exchequer, that in 1923 the former was a- 
bandoned in favour of a relatively small grant of £6 
per house per annum for twenty years, (1) but this ar­
rangement failed to provide a sufficient number of houses 
for letting, and so the rate of grant was again increased 
to £9 and the period to 40 years by an Act passed in 1924 
with a still higher rate of £12 10s. for houses in agri­
cultural parishes. (2) The rate of grant was slightly 
reduced in 1927, and it was discontinued by the Housing 
(Financial Provisions) Act, 1933. (3)
For the owners of premises in rural areas, more©/ 
over, a grant waB provided, under the Housing (Rural Wor­
kers) Act, 1926, towards expenditure on reconditioning 
cottages to make satisfactory housing accommodation for ru­
ral workers or persons of the same economic condition.
The grants were administered by the county and county 
borough councils, (4) with a 50$ contribution from the 
Ministry of Health of the estimated loan charges which 
would have to be borne by the local authority if loans 
for twenty years were raised for the purpose. The Act 
was originally passed for five years, but it has been 
extended by subsequent Acts.
VI# The Geddes and the Meston Committees,
and their Proposals on Exchequer Grants.
The slump which followed the short-lived post­
war boom, and the great increase in national expenditure
(1) Housing Act, 1923.
(2) Housing (Financial Provisions) Act, 1924.
(3) In 1927, the grant was reduced, for houses completed 
after the 1st. October of that year, to £7 10s. per 
annum; those in agricultural parishes £11. Under the 
Act of 1933, an exception was provided for those 
houses which were in schemes submitted or substantial­
ly ready to be submitted to the Minister of Health be­
fore the 7th December, 1932, and completed by the
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after 1919,aroused a wave of public opinion in favour 
of economy. This led to the appointment by Sir Robert 
Horne, then Chancellor of the Exchequer,of a committee 
under the Chairmanship of Sir Eric Geddes, to make 
"recommendations lb r effecting forthwith all possible 
reductions in the national expenditure on Supply services? 
The final report of the committee, presented on 21st 
February, 1922, made a fierce attack on the percentage 
grant system (l) "The advantage claimed Ibor the per­
centage gxant $rstem", the Report runs, "is that it 
provides a stimulus to authorities to improve the effie 
ciency of thftir services; in fact, it is a money-spending 
device." (2) The Committee therefore suggested that fixed 
grants, or grants based on some del:nite unit, should be 
adopted in order to "increase the incentive tu local 
authorities to. economise". Proposals were made also ftor 
the reduction of education grants by £18,000,000, public 
health grants by £2,500,000> mid police grants by over 
£1,500,000.(3) These recmmendations were, however, to use 
Mr. Clarke’s words-too ’drastic* and too * unscientific’,' 
and the Goverment umok no step to put them into operation.
Following the report of the Geddes Committee, 
another Departmental Committee, presided over by Lord 
Meston, was appointed in 1922 to inquire into the system 
for payment of local grants once more*and to make re­
commendations as to alternative methads# The Committee 
heard considerable evidence upon the subject, and a draft 
report was prepared, but not published. (4)
30th June, 1934.
(4) The grant made by the local authorities in this con­
cern might not exceed either two-thirds of the cost 
of the works or £100 per house.
(1) According to the result of their inquiry, the total 
cost of social services had risen from £86,500,000 
in 1913-14 to £243,500,000 in 1921-22. "Various 
causes have contributed to these enormous increases
 but there is one factor of administration which,
in our opinion, has materially affected the cost to 
the taxpayer, and that is the development of the per­
centage grant system." See First Interim Report of 
the Committee on National Expenditure, Cd.1581/1922, 
p.105.
(2) Ibid., p.105.
(3) J.J. Clarke, op. cit., p.675.
(4) One of the main reasons for the non-publication of 
the report was the fact that the bulk of the evidence
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So far as the grant-in-aid system was concerned, 
it is now known that most of the evidence favoured the 
retention of a percentage system, with minor improvements 
and safeguards. (5) Though it was generally recognised 
that percentage grants would inevitably lead to close 
central control, and that they were based upon expendi­
ture irrelevant of the needs of special areas, they were 
still regarded as preferable to the assigned revenues 
system which was established on a basis rendered obsolete 
long ago by changed conditions.
submitted to the Committee bore against the policy 
which the Government and the Chancellor of the Ex­
chequer, Mr. Churchill, with backing from the Trea­
sury, had determined to pursue, namely, the intro­
duction of a block grant designed to limit the com­
mitments of the Exchequer over a period of years.
See C. H. Wilson, Essays in Local Government, 1948, 
p.129.
(5) The Coxmaittee thought that some standard of effi­
ciency should be adopted to relate services and 
grants and that the utilization of figures of 'nor­
mal' cost might provide such a standard. "We (i.e. 
members of the Meston Committee) have drawn atten­
tion to the very great variation in the price which 
is paid for services in different localities. Unde­
niably there is certain inefficiency in the percen­
tage system as it now operates, and we have argued 
that if we could adopt a different method, by arri­
ving at a unit of cost, which would give us an ef­
fective comparison area by area, we should then find 
out not only how we could get a far better return 
for the money but how we could make the service much 
more efficient than in many cases it now is" Han­
sard 196, C.291. See Mr .William Graham's attack on 
block grant policy in the debate on Finance Bill, 
1926.
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CHAPTER X.
THE FINANCIAL REORGANIZATION OP 1929 and THE 
BLOCK GRANT SYSTEM.
It might have "been due to the British aversion 
to making too drastic a change that, after having the 
reposts of a Royal Commission in 1901 and a Departmental 
Committee in 1914, hoth advocating considerable changes, 
nothing was done to carry any wholesale reforms into 
effect until 1929. Perhaps innovation would have been 
postponed still longer had it not been that the Govern­
ment was forced to pay attention to the means of com­
pensating local authorities in consequence of a derating 
policy, the discussion of which led to a review of the 
whole system of grants-in-aid. The result was seen in 
the Local Government Act of 1929, which dealt in great 
detail with an entirely new system of subsidisation 
based upon the main suggestions of the Minority Report 
of 1901 and the Kempe Committee in 1914. (1)
In June, 1928, a Government White Paper, con­
taining ’proposals for reform in local government and 
in the financial relations between the Exchequer and 
local authorities’, was issued by the Ministry of Health.
(2) The Government declared that, in order to further 
the revival of agricultural and the basic industries, 
which were then in a difficult position, they intended 
to derate agricultural, industrial, and transport pro­
perties. It was intimated that from the 1st. October, 
1929, agricultural land and agricultural buildings would 
cease to be rated? and industrial and freight transport 
hereditaments would be rated at only one-quarter of 
their net annual value, as defined by the existing laws.
(3) As this derating policy would cause a great loss 
on the part of the local authorities, it was, in conse­
quence, necessary to make a considerable increase in the 
amounts to be distributed as Exchequer grants.
The financial relations between the central and 
the local authorities had been for a long time the sub­
ject of controversy. The Geddes Committee on National
(1) See above pp.
(2) A corresponding White Paper was issued by the Scot­
tish Office at the some times Cmd.3135.
(3) Cmd.3134/1928, pp.3-4. It was estimated in the
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Expenditure in 1922 had condemned the percentage grant 
system as fa money-spending device, hut not an economi­
cal system1, H i  and the Government had also found that 
the percentage grants for health services, and the main­
tenance of roads, incurred excessively close supervision 
by the Central Department of the work of the local au­
thorities to whom they were paid. (2) It was pointed 
out that fchese grants were not related closely to the 
needs of local authorities, but to their expenditure, so 
that the Treasury really had very little control over 
the amount for which it was liable, and those areas which 
were poorest, and least could least afford to maintain 
an adequate standard, were just those which received the 
least assistance from national funds. To the other forms 
of grant, it was objected that, the assigned revenues 
were related neither to the needs nor even to the ex­
penditure of the local authorities; while the grants un­
der the Agricultural Rates Acts, again were not related 
to the need for public services, but only to expenditure.
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The Government, therefore, came to the conclu­
sion that a necessary accompaniment of the derating 
scheme was a modification of the basis and method of 
Government contribution to local services, including 
arrangements to meet the case of the ’necessitous areas* 
and those authorities whose finances were on too narrow 
a basis. (4) A proper system for distributing Exchequer 
grant8, the Government agreed, should be based on the 
principle that a fair contribution should be made from 
the Exchequer towards the cost of local services, but 
that local authorities should retain complete financial 
interest in their administration. Such a system should, 
moreover, be adapted to the special needs of the areas 
concerned, permitting the greatest freedom of local ini­
tiative, while, at the same time, providing for suffi­
cient control and advice from the Central Department to
White Paper that had $he derating proposals been in 
operation in the year 1926-27, the loss of rates in 
England and Wales would have amounted in round fi­
gures to £24,000,000 for the year.
(1) Cmd.1581/1922, p.107.
(3) Cmd.3134/1928, p.12.
(2) The Minister of Health pointed out, when dealing with 
the proposals embodied in the Local Government Act,
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ensure a reasonable standard of efficiency. (5)
With the intention of putting an end to the in­
definite and chaotic system of Exchequer grants, with 
its many defects, the Government proposed to abolish, 
as from the 1st. April, 1930, the following Exchequer 
grants:-
(i) The assigned revenues grant; (6)
(ii) The grants under the Agricultural Hates Acts, 
1896 and 1923.
(iii) The percentage grants in aid of health ser­
vices! (7) Tuberculosis, Maternity and Child
■(iv*) Welfare, Welfare of the Blind, Venereal Di­
seases, and Mental Deficiency;
(iv) The classification grants for Class I and 
Class II roads in London and county boroughs 
(large burghs in Scotland), and the grants 
for the maintenance of scheduled roads in 
county districts. (8)
1929, that the system of percentage grant impairs 
the independence and vigour of local authorities, 
since what is assisted item by item must be scru­
tinised in detail by the assisting authority. See 
R. Sutcliffe's Presidential Address before the Con­
ference of I.M.T.A. in June, 1946. Reprinted in 
Local Government Chronicle, 1946, p.626.
(4) Cmd.3134,p.5, "If the case of necessitous areas is to 
be met, a new method of distribution of Government 
grants and reorganization of administrative arrange­
ments are both requisite. Change in the areas of 
functions of some Authorities is the only way in 
which a remedy can properly be found for the diffi­
culties of those authorities whose resources would
be inadequate to enable them to meet their needs 
under the new conditions".
(5) Ibid., pp.12-13.
(6) The portions of the Assigned Revenue Grants formerly 
applied to education and police services, amounting 
to about £3,800,000 in England and Wales, and £700, 
000 in Scotland, were to be abolished just the same; 
but, it was decided that the equivalent of the grants 
applied to these services was to be paid by the Board 
of Education and Home Office out of voted moneys.
Cmd.3134/1928, p.13. Moreover,it was decided that in 
making such arrangements, the Local Taxation Licence 
Duties levied by the county and county borough coun­
cils in England and Wales which did not pass through
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The derating scheme and the proposals for grant 
reform were cr^talised in the Local Government Act of 
1929, (9) when a central fund or pool was formed, known 
as the "General Exchequer Contribution", out of which 
new block grants were to be made.
The fund was divided into two parts: the one was
devoted to making up the losses which the local authori­
ties suffered from the derating provisions of the Act 
and through the discontinuation of certain previous 
grants; and the other was a sum of money which was voted 
by Parliament to cover any further growth in local go­
vernment services generally, and which was to be allo­
cated on a complicated formula designed to meet the need 
of the poorer areas. This formula became known as the 
"weighted population" formula.
In this case, the weighted population of a coun­
ty or county borough was determined by adding to the po­
pulation of the area* further figures based on the follo­
wing factors
(i) the number of children under five years of age,
(ii) the rateable value of the area,
(iii) the number of unemployed persons, and
(iv) (in case of counties only) the number of per­
sons per mile of road (the 'sparsity'factor).
The employment of this imaginary figure ensured 
that the shares of grant for those areas suffering from 
the disadvantages of these factors would be proportio­
nately increased. (10) These factors in particular, 
were adopted for reckoning the share of grant for se­
veral reasons. The rateable value denoted directly the 
financial capacity of the area; the number of children 
under school age affected the cost of child welfare ser­
vices; the number of unemployed was rela+e>d to the bur­
den of public assistance, and possibly of health services, 
and also affected the recoverability of rates levied; 
while the sparsity of population had an important bearing 
on the cost of road maintenance, street lighting and se­
werage. (11)
the Local Taxation Account, such as licences to deal 
in game, licences to kill game, licences for dogs, 
guns, armorial bearings and male servants, amounting 
in 1928-29 to about £1,400,000, would remain leviable 
by these authorities, and would be retained by them; 
while the Local Taxation Licence Grants for Scotland 
were discontinued.
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The amount of the "block grant was to be fixed
for definite periods three years in the first period,
four years in the second, and five years thereafter--
a general review being made at the end of each period 
so as to revise the grant both in total and for each 
authority, and to allocate more money to meet the ex­
panding costs of local services. In order not to make 
too violent a break with the past, and cause a distur­
bance in local finance, however, the application of the 
formula was designed to be gradual. For the first two 
fixed grant periods, ending by 1937, the charge on the 
grant was to cover 75$ of the loss of income due to de­
rating and discontinued grants, the remainder being dis­
tributed according to the formula. From 1937 to 1942 
only one-half of the 'losses' were to be made good, all 
the balance of the pool available going into the formula. 
For 1942-47 a quarter of this loss was to be made; and 
from 1947 onward, when the transition was completed, the 
whole of the fund would be distributed according to the 
formula.
Thus it is quite clear that the main purpose 
of the block grant system as worked out by the Act of 
1929 was to relieve necessitous local authorities from 
their heavy burden of rates and to help them to accom­
plish more satisfactorily the important services requi­
red of them.
T?) The grants in aid of port sanitary services and of 
training of midwives and health visitors, as well as 
the Highlands and Islands (Medical Service) Grants 
for Scotland,were to be continued on the same basis 
as used at that time.
(8) Cmd.3134, p.12.
(9) See Parts V & VI of the L.G.A., 1929, for England 
and Wales, and Parts II & III of the L.G. (Scotland) 
Act, 1929, for Scotland.
(10) As to the more detailed explanation of the method by 
which the weighted population was calculated, see 
E.L. Hasluck, Local Government in England, 1936, 
Cambridge, pp.243-6. Also H.E. Carlson, British 
Block Grants and Central-Local Finance, 1947, pp.37- 
54.
(11) "In deciding what characteristics should be adopted 
(in the formula) and what weight should be given to 
each, the aim has been so to adjust the distribution 
of this new revenue as to make the assistance vary 
with the need for local government services in any
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The total sum to be distributed annually as the 
new grant in aid for the first fixed grant period was 
made up of the following amounts:-
(i) The total loss of rates on the part of the 
looal authorities due to derating, calcu­
lated according to the 'Standard Year', (l) 
This was estimated at £22 millions.
(ii) The total of the discontinued grants, amoun­
ted to approximately £16 millions.
Besides these, a new sum of money amoun­
ting to £5 millions for England and Wales and £750,000 
for Scotland was added to make a General Exchequer Con­
tribution of £43^ - millions. (2)
For subsequent fixed grant periods the General 
Exchequer Contribution was revised in order to maintain 
its ratio with the expenditure of local authorities ot­
herwise falling on rates. As a result of this arrange­
ment the Contribution was increased to £44 millions for 
the second fixed grant period, (3) which commenced in 
1933, and, after certain adjustments, to £46 mns. pew 
annum for the third period, which was due to end in 
1942 but was extended owing to the war. From that time 
onwards, the Exchequer's liability under the 1929 Act 
remained, (subject to a relatively small amount, payable 
in additional and supplementary grants), fixed at £46 mns. 
per annum until the recent innovation in the grant system 
by the Local Government Act, 1948.
area in relation to the ability of the area to meet 
the cost*. See Government Paper, Cmd.3134/1928, p.
14.
(1) The year 1928-29 was taxen for the purposes of the 
scheme as the Standard Year. The amount of loss due 
to derating was calculated as if it would have been 
incurred by all local authorities in that year on the 
assumption that the proposed local government charges 
had been in operation at that time, and that the va­
luation list in force on the 1st of October, 1929, 
had also been in force at that time.
(2) The operation of the 1929 Act inevitably led to some 
loss or disadvantage on the part of some authorities. 
In these few, particular cases, the Act provided, in 
addition, supplementary grants for their compensation.
(3) An additional amount of £350,000 was provided by the 
L.G. (General Exchequer Contributions) Act, 1933.
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The distribution of the General Exchequer Contri­
bution was made in the first place between county and 
county borough councils. When once the county boroughs 
had received their share, there was no need for any fur­
ther calculrtions, and they were able to apply their 
share immediately in aid of the general fund. But the 
sum allocated to the counties had to be divided between 
the county councils and their constituent units---muni­
cipal boroughs, urban districts and rural districts. In 
this case, the duties placed upon the county councils 
had been increased by the Act of 1929 (1) to such an ex­
tent that a full half of the county grant was alloted to 
the county councils; the other half being distributed 
amongst the smaller units.
Theisharing between county districts in general, was 
done simply on the basis of actual population, as the ac­
tivities of the county districts were mainly confined to 
public health services, the costs of which were chiefly 
dependent on population alone. But, within this system, 
as between urban and rural areas, it was estimated that 
expenditure on public health in densely populated dis­
tricts was higher than in the country. Moreover, under 
the 1929 Act, rural districts were relieved of all res­
ponsibility for maintaining their highways, the full bur­
den of which had been transferred to the county councils.
(l) The important alterations made in the 1929 Act which
increased the duties of the county councils were:-
(a) Boards of Guardians in England and Wales and Pa­
rish councils in Scotland were abolished and the 
administration of the poor law was transferred to 
the councils of counties and county boroughs (in
Scotland large burghs) as from 1st April, 1930,
in England and Wales and 16th May, 1930, in Scot­
land.
(b) The administration of all highways in rural dis­
tricts and of certain highways in boroughs and 
other urban districts forming part of administra­
tive counties (other than London) (in Scotland--
small burghs) was transferred to the county coun­
cils as from the same dates.
(c) In Scotland the administration of education was 
transferred at the same time from ad hoc autho­
rities to the councils of counties and large 
burghs, and there was a large measurs of consoli­
dation of public health activities of minor autho­
rities in the hands of these councils.
- 1 5 0 -
In consequence, it was provided that municipal boroughs 
and urban districts were to receive in proportion to 
their populations five times the amount given to rural 
districts. (2) These grants were paid directly from 
Whitehall to the spending authorities just as was the 
case before the operation of the Goschen scheme.
Although under thiB arrangement all the percentage 
grants for public health services were abolished, and the 
control of the Ministry of Health through these grants 
simultaneously terminated, local authorities were by no 
means freed from central supervision. On the one hand, 
grants in aid of specific services, such as police, edu­
cation, housing, highways and bridges, still remained un­
affected by the Act; on the other hand, the Act also gave 
the Minister of Health ample power to reduce the block 
grant itself to any local authority under certain condi­
tions.
According to Section 104 of the Act, it was pro­
vided that:
’The Minister may reduce the grant payable in res­
pect of any year under this Part of this Act to any 
council by such amount as he thinks just, if--
"(a) he is satisfied, either upon representations 
made to him by any association or other body of per­
sons experienced or interested in matters relating to 
public health, or without any such representations, 
that the council have failed to achieve or maintain a 
reasonable standard of efficiency and progress in the 
discharge of their functions relating to public health 
services, regard being had to the standards maintained 
in other areas whose financial resources and other re­
levant circumstances are substantially similar, and 
that the health or welfare of the inhabitants of the 
area of the council or some of them has been or is 
likely to be thereby endangered; or
(2) The calculation of the block grant for county dis­
tricts was as follows: one half of the total appor­
tionments of all counties divided by the aggregate 
estimated population of all counties provided a stan­
dard figure in penee per head (12s.6d. for the first 
fixed grant period, 12s.2d. for the second) which, 
when multiplied by the unweighted population of the 
district, gave the apportionment of the general ex­
chequer grant for each borough and urban district.
In the case of rural districts, one-fifth of the stan­
dard sum for the urban areas (2s.6d. for the first
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"(b) he is satisfied that the expenditure of the 
council has been excessive and unreasonable, regard 
being had to the financial resources and other rele­
vant circumstances of the area; or
"(c) the Minister of Transport certifies that he 
is satisfied that the council have failed to maintain 
their roads or any part thereof in a satisfactory con­
dition;
"Provided that, whenever the Minister make such a 
reduction, he shall make and cause to be laid before 
Parliament a report stating the amount of the reduc­
tion, and the reasons thereof"•
It is important to note that the reduction 
stated above did *fcot depend upon the arbitrary will of 
the Minister. Such a measure had to result from admi­
nistrative inefficiency or financial wastefulness on the 
part of the local authority; and the criterion used to 
measure and judge the efficiency of a council was the 
average standard of similar local authorities. In prac­
tice, moreover, the Minister seldom exercised this power 
of reduction owing to the wide scope which the block 
grant covered, which meant that sanctions could not be 
used as freely and definitely an in the case of the per­
centage grant.
The block-grant system, however, had its merits. 
It gave local authorities considerable freedom from me­
ticulous control from Whitehall and they gained more au­
tonomy in the execution of their services as a result.
In addition, whereas reductions in the case of the per­
centage grant invariably meant that the punishment fell 
on one particular section of the ratepayers, and that 
perhaps the most innocent and most necessitous, a reduc­
tion under the block grant system inflicted a loss that 
was evenly shared by the whole body of ratepayers. It 
seems, therefore, to have been more justifiable to reduce 
the block grant than the percentage grant. (1)
The system was subject to periodical review.
In accordance with Sect. 110 of the Local Government Act, 
1929, the Minister was required, in consultation with re­
presentatives of local authorities, to order an investi­
gation to be made before the 31st March, 1937, into the
fixed grant period and 2s.5 l/5d. for the second) was 
the figure taken to be multiplied by the unweighted 
population of a rural district to provide the amount 
of the grant. See Clarke, op.cit., p.683.
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system for distributing the General Exchequer Contribu­
tion, and to cause a report on the investigation to be 
laid before Parliament. The investigation was according­
ly completed in 1936; and a report was presented (H. C. 
42).
The subject of investigation fell into two main 
parts, viz., (a) the method of apportionment of the Ge­
neral Exchequer Contribution in so far as it was made on 
the basis of the formula of weighted population; and (b) 
the method of allocation within each county of the amount 
apportioned to it.
In The first main part of the investigation, an ex­
amination was made of the distribution of the block grant 
in the first and second grant periods with a view to as­
certaining the extent to which the original intention of 
the Act of 1929 was being attained. The general conclu­
sions on this point wvre to the effect that while the 
distribution of the grant had substantially accorded with 
the original purpose of the Act, some modification of the 
formula was necessary to check tendencies which would in 
the third grant period operate to the disadvantage of 
needy areas. (2) Various suggested additional factors for 
the formula were examided, such as the numberof old age 
pensioners, the number of children of school age, and the 
number of persons in receipt of out-relief; but it was 
not found practicable to secure a wholly satisfactory 
distribution by such means. It was therefore finally re­
commended that the formula should remain unchanged in its 
basis, but that increased weight should be given to the 
unemployment and sparfity factors.
As regards the second main part of the investi­
gation, the method of grant allocation within each of 
the counties, it was found that each of the suggested 
new methods created anomalies and difficulties of its 
own, and did not produced better results than the exis­
ting method. In these circumstances it was recommended 
that no change should be made in this part of the grant 
distribution scheme.
(1) G.M. Harris, Municipal Self-Government in Britain, 
pp.207-9.
(2) The aim of the ’block* grant was to relieve poor au­
thorities at the expense of those which were well-off. 
But as a matter of fact, the difference brought about 
was not very great by 1937. In Glamorgan, for ins­
tance, although in several areas there was a 7s. drop
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Effect was given to the recommendations contained 
in the report, by the Local Government (Financial Provi­
sions) Act, 1937, which introduced a revised formula of 
block grant distribution, (4) and increased the annual 
amount of the General Exchequer Contribution for the third 
grant period by £2-^  millions. The effect of this adjust­
ment was to give considerably increased assistance to the 
poorer areas. It was calculated that the necessitous 
counties and county boroughs would receive a sum equal to 
about 50$ of the total additional assistance afforded to 
local authorities generally, whereas the expenditure of 
these areas and their population both represented only 
17$ of the whole. (5)
The General Exchequer Contribution was to have 
come up again for revision on 1st April, 1942, the ap­
pointed date for the fourth fixed grant period to begin. 
(6) Owing to the war-time situation, the revision was 
postponed and the block grant stabilised under the Local 
Government (Financial Provisions) Act, 1941. In the mean­
time, the expenditure of local authorities was increasing 
so rapidly that the proportion of grant to rate-borne ex­
penditure, originally very adequate, was becoming insuf­
ficient. As a temporary measure pending the recalcula­
tion of the main grant, an Interim Supplementary Exche­
quer Contribution payable for the three years commencing 
on 1st April, 1945, was introduced, (7) in addition to 
the normal stabilized grant of 1941. The total amount 
of this Interim Supplementary Contribution was £10 mns. 
for 1945-6, £11 mns. for 1946-7 and £12 mns. for 1947-8.
in rates between 1928-29 and 1936-37 (as against a 
national average gall of lid.), 12 out of the 24 
rating authorities still had rates exceeding 20s. See 
Labour Party: Local Government Handbook, 1946, pp. 
101-102.
(3) Ministry of Health Report, Cmd.5516/1936-37, pp.166-7.
(4) The * super-weighting1 for unemployment as introduced 
by this Act benefited necessitous county boroughs gr­
eatly, while the strengthening of the density factor 
chiefly favoured needy counties.
(5) Cmd.5516, pp.168-9.
(6) Under the Local Government Act, 1929, as amended by 
the Local Government (Financial Provisions) Act, 1937.
(7) In the Local Government (Financial Provisions) Act, 
1946.
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The apportionment of this sum amongst counties 
and county boroughs for the year 1945-46 was to take 
place in two stages. In the first place, the new grant 
of £10 mns. was to be added to the produce of a rate of 
8d. in the £ over the whole country. The total amount 
thus obtained would be approximately £19.280 mns. This 
sum would then be apportioned among the counties and 
county boroughs in proportion to their expenditure in 
1942-43 out of rates, block grant, and any sum advanced 
to local authorities in financial difficulties as a re­
sult of air-raids or other war conditions. The second 
step was to deduct from this apportioned sum the amount 
of the produce of a rate of 8d. in the £ (in 1942-43) 
in each locality. This distribution formula thus took 
into account total expenditure as a measure of need and 
the produce of a rate in the £ as a measure of financial 
resources, and its result was greatly in favour of the 
poorer areas where the produce of an 8d. rate was pro­
portionately low. (1)
For the next two years when the sums of £llmns. 
and £12 mns. would be available, the rates in the £ en­
tering into the calculation were to be 9d. and lOd. res­
pectively, and the total expenditures those for 1943-44 
and 1944-45.
The grants which county councils had to pay 
to county districts were , like the capitation grants 
under the 1929 Act, a fixed national sum per head of 
unweighted population based on the Registrar Generalfs 
estimate of population for 1936. The sum per head in 
non-county boroughs and urban districts was 24d., 27d., 
and 30d. for the three years, with 1/3 of those sums, 
i.e., 8d., 9d., and lOd. respectively in rural districts.
(l) If the £10 mns. had been distributed evenly it would 
have brought a reduction of about 8-J- d. in the rates, 
but under the system of weighted distribution men­
tioned above, it resulted in Merthyr Tydfil (rates 
29s.) receiving 2s.9d., West Ham (rates 21s.6d.) 
receiving ls.9d., and Carmarthen (average county 
rate 19s.Id.) receiving 2s.Id.. On the other hand, 
Bournemouth (rates 9s.) received -J-d. benefit, Black­
pool (rates 11s.), l£d. benefit, and Surrey (average 
county rate lls.2d.), 3d.benefit. See H. Townshend- 
Rose and H. R. Page, Local Government Up to Bate, 
1939-45, 1946, pp.21-22.
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Where the sum allocated to the county was not sufficient 
to do this, the county council was required to pay the 
balance out of its share.
C H A P T E R  XI.
GRANTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1929.
1. NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR EDUCATION. The derating scheme embodied 
in the 1929 Act had no effect upon the special percentage grant 
for education. Since 1918 the grant for elementary education had 
been paid in accordance with the Fisher formula, with some minor 
exceptions designed for the benefit of the needy areas, or to meet 
special requirements, (lj Owing to the great Depression which 
spread all over the world in 1930 anc 1931, however, special 
measures were taken, which merit a short digression. The House of 
Commons passed by 468 votes to 21 a resolution----
"That this House consider that, having regard to 
the present burden of Taxation in restricting 
industry and employment, the Government should 
at once appoint a small and independent Committee 
to make recommendations to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer for effecting forthwith all practicable 
and legitimate reductions in the national expenditure 
consistent with efficiency."
Following the passing of this resolution, a Committee 
headed by Sir Earnest May was appointed on the 17th March, 1931, 
after consultation between all parties, with the following terms 
of reference:-
"To make recommendations to the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
for effecting forthwith all possible reductions in the National 
Expenditure on Supply Services, having regard especially to the 
present'JJrrospective position of the revenue... and to indicate the 
economies which might be affected if particular policies were 
either adopted, abandoned or modified."
The Committee made a profound invis ti gat ion of the expen­
diture of grant services administered by local authorities as well 
as that of services directly administered by the Government.
In their Report, published in July, 1931, (2) they pointed out that
(1) See cufccve, (>.132/„
(2) Cd. 3920/1931.
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tne total grants spent in the current year throughout Britain 
were as follows
Exchequer Contributions to bocal Revenues 1951 Estimates
(including grants for poor law, health £
and mental deficiency...................  46, 400,000
Education................................  56,800,0 00
Roads............................. . 33,000,000
Housing..................................  14,500,000
Police...................................  12,000,000
Agriculture (including Forestry
Development Fund and §eet Sugar subsidy) 5,400,000
Grants and Loans for Unemployment works.. 3,600,000
Miscellaneous............................  900,000
£172, 600,000
This represented an increase of nearly £70,000,000 
over expenditure in 1924, although they agreed that £26,000,OQO 
of this increase was due to the effect of the derating scheme. 
This was, however, a great burden to the Exchequer, and the 
Committee recommended a universal reduction in all the separate 
Exchequer grants other than the block grant. (1) Their proposals 
were chiefly enacted in the Economy Act, 1931, which required
(inter alia) changes in the Education Grants.
Following the passing of the Act, several Orders in 
Council were issued for the alteration of factors in the 
Fisher Formula to meet the situation. Accordingly, the grant 
for teachers* salaries was reduced by a 10 per cent economy 
cut, the deficiency grant for elementary education was abolished, 
and the increase in the grant for reorganization and develop­
ment was withdrawn. (2) This,however, did not last long. For 
the Budget of 1934 soon restored half of the cut and that of 
1935 the other half.
After the restoration of the economy cuts, there was 
little significant change in the system until, with the outbreak 
of World War II. on the 3rd September, 1939, the Ebard of Educat­
ion decided to simplify its grant system, by stabilizing the
Til l*or further details see Clarke, op. cit. p. 677^
(2) In 1929 the grant percentage payable in respect of the
expenditure incurred on reorganization and development 
had temporarily been increased from 2(K to 50^
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proportion between Exchequer grants and the net recognised 
expenditure of local authorities for educational purposes.
It was, accordingly, provided in the Elementary Grant 
Provisional Regulations, 1939, that the grants payable for 
any year thereafter would bear the same proportion to the 
net recognised expenditure for that year as the grant for
1937-38 bore to the net recognised expenditure for that 
year.
Special provisions were made for feeding schoolchil­
dren. From the 1st July, 1940, an increase in the grant 
was made to facilitate the provision of free meals in 
schools, the percentage grant applying to the whole expen­
diture being raised by 20 per cent. As a result the grants 
varied between 50 per cent and 92 per cent of the whole 
expense. In the following year, the percentage was again 
increased, now to 30 per cent more than the standard per­
centage, with a minimum of 70 per cent and a maximum of 
95 per cent. In addition, the whole cost of the provision 
of milk in schools was made a State charge. From the 1st 
January, 1942, a subsidy of 3d. per meal in secondary sch­
ools was provided; and, from the 1st May, 1943, the whole oo 
cost of capital expenditure for providing school canteens 
was borne by the State, (1).
Still during the war period, a White Paper was issued 
(July, 1943, Cmd. 6458) presenting a scheme for educational 
reconstruction, regarded as capable of enabling Britain 
to ’possess a system of education superior to that exist­
ing in any country in the world at present and beyond 
the wildest dreams of the pioneers of education* (2). In 
spite of the difficulties of the time, an important 
Education Act was passed in the succeeding year, to carry 
this scheme into effect.
Great improvements were envisaged, the principles 
of which may be briefly described as follows;-
( a) Free medical service was given, under the Act to 
all pupils in attendance at County Schools and to senior 
pupils in attendance at any other educational establish­
ment maintained by the authority.
(1) It is a happy thought that, at the same time,even in 
the stress of war, grants at a rate of 50 per cent of the 
cost of acquisition and establishment for museums and art 
galleries were also made available by the Minister of 
Education.
(2) Words spoken by Earl of Selbo^rne in the House of Lords 
on 5th August, 1943.
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(o) T^e school-leaving age was; raised to 15, and 
it was to be raised to 16 as soon as the Minister thought 
it desirable.
(c) All schools for children below the age of 11 
were to be called Primary Schools, and the maximum size of 
classes in these schools was fixed temporarily at 40; it 
was ultimately to be reduced to 30 for all schools.4
(d) All schools for children over the age of 11 
were to be Secondary Schools. These schools were also to (1) 
be free to pupils if the schools received money from the rates.
( e) The a4ministration of both primary and secondary ftJ( 
education was to be concentrated solely in the hands of county/, 
county borough councils.
(f) The scholarship examination at the age of 11 
was abolished, and all children were to be educated in the 
secondary schools according to their aptitude and ability.
(g) Local authorities were obliged to provide 
nursery schools for children from the age of 2 upwards; 
they has also the duty to provide special education for 
pupils who suffered from disability of mind or body.
(h) Responsibility was imposed upon local education 
authorities to provide milk and meals for all children in 
schools.(2).
( i) The authorities might provide board and lodging, 
where necessary, to allow a pupil to receive the benefit of 
any school or county college, or might provide transport or 
pay travelling expenses for a pupil. They might also provide 
a necessitous pupil with clothing.
It was estimated that the total cost of carrying out 
these reforms for England and Wales alone would ultimately 
reach an annual figure of £79,750,000 greater than that 
before the war. Moreover, an additional amount of £18,000,000 
had to be defrayed under the new Burnham salary scales.
Of these, the Exchequer would meet nearly 2/3 of the total 
spm, leaving an amount of some £35£ mns. to be raised by 
local authorities. (3).
Tne new grant regulations to finance the scheme, 
comprised four kinds of grant, termed main grant, additional 
grant, milk and meals grant, and teachers* training grant.
As the administration of both primary and secondary education 
services was# made entirely the concern of the county and 
county boroughs^, the grants for these two branches were now 
combined.
XT] TEe direct grant grammar""schools iIgFE~sT!li~charge fees7 
But local education authorities would meet the fees of the 
children they selected for the 25% ‘free places* and 25i 
•reserved Blaces** Parents of boys admitted to ‘residency 
places* would pay fees on^ a scale graduated according to their 
means, with the Exchequer meeting the balance.
(2) Labour Party, Local Government Handbook, 1946, 2nd. ed. , pp. 
68-9.
(3) Ibid. p. 72.
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The main education grant was calculated on the net 
recognisable expenditure after excluding expenditure ranking 
for one of the other branches of the education grant mentioned 
above. After 1st April, 1945, when the Education Act, 1944, 
came into operation, the main grant was fixed for each author­
ity at the percentage which its grant bore to expenditure in
1938-39, increased by adding 5$. (l). This arrangement 
resulted in a variation in the proportion of grant awarded, 
according to the needs of the several authorities. The propor­
tions used for the main grants for counties in 1946-47, for 
example, ranged from 44.0599$ for East Sussex to 64.2456$ for 
Durham County and 64.7116$ for Glamorgan. The difference 
between the grants fqr county boroughs was still greater.
These ranged from 33.9833$ for Bournemouth to 65.4579$ in 
St. Helens and 68.2759$ in Merthyr Tydfil, the highest percen­
tage being more than twice the lowest figure. (2).
An additional grant was payable also to authorities 
of the poorer and more sparsely-populated areas, (3)provided 
that, added to the main grant it should not bring the total 
grant to more than 75 per cent of the authority* s net recog­
nisable expenditure; nor leave as a charge on the rates an 
amount below the product of a 54d. rate for the year. In the 
event, only thirty to forty of the poorest authorities qual­
ified for a share of the additional grant, which amounted to 
nearly £2,000,000 in 1946-47.
For expenditure incurred by local education authorit­
ies on the provision of milk and on establishing and equipping 
premises and transport facilities for the provision of meals, 
a 100 per cent grant was made available. As for other expen­
diture on meals, the grant was fixed at 30$ above the standard 
percentage laid down for the year 1937- 38, with a minimum of 
70 per cent and a maximum of 95 per cent. But from 1st, April,
11) The average percentage of the Standard Year (1938-39/ for
the whole country was about 49$ which, increased by 5, became
5 4*.
(2) See the First Schedule to the Education (Local Education 
Authorities) Grant Regulations, 1946.
(3) The 1946 Regulations provided for the following two spec­
ified conditions under which an authority was capable of rec­
eiving the grant.
(a) A grant of 2s. in respect of each pupil included in 
the average number on the registers for the educational year 
1945-46 for each unit by which that average number divided by 
the road-mileage fell short of 15; or
(b) A grant of 6s. in respect of each pupil for each penny
by which the product of a penny rate for the year commencing 
1st April, 1946, divided by the average number aforesaid fell 
short of 36d.
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1947, free mid-day dinners were given in schools in addition 
to free milk, the grant for these meals becoming 100 per cent.
Training colleges were maintained only by a minority 
of local education authorities. As all other authorities 
benefited from their services, it was provided that the whole 
expenditure upon them should be reimbursed in full to the 
authorities which incurred it, and then covered by contribut­
ions from all education authorities.
The formula governing the distribution of the main 
education grant to local authorities under the regulations 
of 1939 and 1945 was replaced from 1st April, 1948, by a new 
formula, (1) devised with regard to the following considerat­
ions :
(a) The old complicated formula based upon prewar 
factors was to be replaced by a simple formula which related 
the grant to the current number of children to be educated in 
the area and the current capacity of the area to pay for their 
education,
(b) Since the expenditure of authorities was rising 
to meet the cost of educational reforms, the new formula was 
to include a higher rate of grant on net recognisable expend­
iture than in the previous case.
(c) A rate-deducting factor was to be used to secure 
a more equitable share of the total grant for tfce poorer 
authorities. (2). 7
In furtherance of this policy, the new main grant 
was distributed in accordance with the following foimula:-
£6 for each unit of the average number of primary 
and secondary scfeool pupils on the register in the area of 
the authority for the year, plus 60 per cent of the net 
recognisable expenditure, less the product of a rate of 
3Gd. for the year for which the main grant was payable. (3).
T"l) For ScotlandTfhe~Iducation Author! ties (Scotland) Grant 
Regulations, 1948, No. 96l( S. 69), The Education (Local Educat­
ion Authorities; Grant Regulations, 1948 (No. 334jtkaU w«Hi i
(2) Ministry of Education Circular, No. 156, 1947. y*Ui
(3) In Scotland, it was intimated in the Scottish Education 
Circular No.l30(llth May, 1948) that the amount of the rate 
deduction in the formula for the year 1948-49 was to be the 
product of a rate of 21d. It was provided that the Secretary 
of State for Scotland had the power to vary this amount of 
rate deduction for the calculation of the main grant in Qrder 
that the total amount of the grants payable in any year,*WJfe 
adjusted, as nearly as possible, to the estimated resources 
of tne Education (Scotland) Fund in that year.
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The additional grant payable under:ithe old Regulat­
ions was to be discontinued with the introduction of the new 
Exchequer Equalisation Grant which was designed to provide 
comprehensively for the special needs of poorer areas by 
bringing rateable value per head of weighted population in 
each such area up to the average for the whole country. (lj.
H r  In addition to the main grant to be distributed in 
accordance with the above formula, authorities continued 
to receive the following grants at rates and under con­
ditions similar to those which applied previouslyi 
School Milk and School Meals Grant, Training College Grant, 
Emergency and Special Training Grant, Air Raid Shelter 
(Removal; Grant, Temporary Defence Works (Removal) Grant, 
and School Contributions Grant (in Scotland).
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II HIGHWAY GRANTS AND THEIR RECENT DEVELOPMENT. Under the 
locai Government Act of 1929, the maintenance grants for 
classified roads and bridges in London and county boroughs 
and the maintenance grants for unclassified roads in counties 
were all discontinued. County councils, however, were
still able to receive percentage grants for the maintenance 
of tneir classified roads and the improvement of their unclass­
ified roads, and grants were still payable out of the Road 
Fund to county and county borough councils for new constructions 
and major improvements in roads §nd bridges, including the 
establishment of traffic signals. Upon this arrangement there 
was subsequently superimposed a series of measures, extending 
the system of highway subventions, normally on the bases of 
providing a percentage of thp relevant expenses incurred by 
the local authorities.
Even at the time of the 1929 Act, toll charges were 
still an embarrassment to road users. In January, 1934, however, 
the Minister of Transport declared (2/ that special grants of 
75 per cent were to be paid on the cost of freeing privately 
owned toll bridges and of reconstructing weak private bridges 
on classified roads when done by local authorities. The Minister 
was also to pay a grant of 60 per cent on the costs of freeing 
Glass I roads, and 50 per cent for Class II roads, from toll 
charges. ft)
This was followed by measures to further road safety.
In 1935, a grant of 60 per cent was paid towards approved 
expenditure on the installation and maintenance of traffic 
light signals and on the provision, maintenance, and lighting 
of speed limit signals by local authorities other than the (3) 
Corporation of London, metropolitan boroughs and county boroughs.
Tl) the Ministry of Transport Circular 606, 1947, the
Ministjry again asked highway authorities to cooperate with him 
in a new drive to free toll roads and bridges. It was reported 
that in 1947 there remained four bridges subject to toll on 
trunk roads. These were at Conway, Selby, Durham and Old Shore- 
ham, and there was one length of trunk road subject to toll, 
the Port Madoc-Minffordd embankment, between Caernarvon and 
Merionethshire.* The Minister was prepared to make grants for 
this pufpose at the normal rates of 75, 60 or 50 per cent, 
according to the classification of the road or bridge.
(2) Circular 591 (Road).
(3) Circular 416 (Roads).
In addition (Circular 420, 1935) it was intimated that 
a grant at a rate of 60 per cent would be made to county 
and county borough councils in respect of pedestrian 
crossing-places and speed limit signs constructed within 
a stated time.
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Road improvement was aided, in July, 1935, when 
the Minister of Transport declared that. an increase of 
grant by 75 to 85 per cent for the improvement of trunk 
roads and bridges, and by 60 to 75 per cent for the provis­
ion of dual carriageways and cycle tracks would be avail­
able for highway authorities, (l).
In 1936, also, under the Trunk Roads Act, the basis 
of grants for major improvements and construction of new 
roads and bridges, in built up are as^  was revised. In this 
adjustment 50 per cent of the cost of road works including 
lamd and buildings was to be paid by the Minister in the 
case qf Class I roads, and 33 and 1/3 per cent in other 
c ases.
Finally highway grants were handsomely improved by 
a general increase made available from 1st April, 1946.
For expenditure on highway maintenance (in counties), and 
for improvements and the other items of grant aided expend­
iture described above, a grant of 75 per cent was provided 
for Class I roads, 60 per cent for Class II, and 50 per 
cent for a new Class III; while expenditure on trunk roads 
was to be met wholly from national funds.
{ T T  At the same time,for the provision of snow ploughs^ s 
grant of 50 per cent of the net eaqjenditure was provided.' 
The Restriction of Ribbon Development Act, 1935, also 
provided grants to compensate local authorities for the 
costs of road improvement as a result of the adoption of 
standard widths.
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III. HOUSING UNDER STATE SUBVENTION^. A fresh attack was 
made on the slum-clearance problem in 1930. (1) Under the 
Housing Act of that year, Exchequer contributions.were 
made available in the form of annual payments for^jp years, 
towards expenses incurred by a local authority in dealing 
with unhealthy areas, or in causing the demolition of 
insanitary houses, or in providing and maintaining 
housing accommodation rendered necessary by this action.
The basis of the grants was no longer fixed as an amount 
per house, as under previous Acts, but as an amount per 
person displaced, for whom alternative housing accommodat­
ion was provided. (2) This was amplified>in 1935>by 
the introduction of a new grant for the abatement of over­
crowding, based on the number of flats or houses supplied. (3;
Grants for slum clearance and overcrowding abate­
ment under previous Acts, however, were consolidated in 
the Housing {Financial Provisions; Act, 1938, when the 
unit per person basis was discarded, and a new subsidy of 
£5 los. per house for 40 years was used^(Subject to certain 
ad jus tments.) [ 4;
U 7  for earlier_ a11empts^ see prevlous~page,/3?.
 ^2/ The normal grant was ^ £2 5s. per person, and in agri­
cultural parishes £2 10s.' As for rehousing accommodation 
provided in tenement buildings of more than three storeys 
built on the site of a cleared area or on other sites the 
cost of which exceeded $3,000 Per acre, a special high 
rate of grant at £3 10s. per person was provided, ckah
(3) Details of which, were as follows:- (note :Clarkeyp. 666)
"I a) In blocks of flats of not less than three storeys, on 
expensive sites, a contribution payable for forty years, 
upon a scale graduated according to the cost of the 
developec^site, commencing at £6 a year per flat where 
such cost/between £1,500 and £4,000 per acre and increasing 
by £1 for each £1,000 increase in site costs up to £6,000 
and thereafter by £1 for each £2,000 increase or part of 
£2,000. Building after 1st February, 1935, qualified for 
the grant.
(b) In new houses or flats otherwise than on sites of 
high value a contribution not exceeding £5 per jpea* for a 
period not exceeding 20 years, subject to the Minister's 
satisfaction that the expense incurred would otherwise 
impose an undue burden on the district.
(c) In houses for members of the agricultural population 
a contribution of not less than £2 or more than £8 payable 
annually for 40 years.11 ghe grants
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Under this system of Governmental assistance, the drive 
in house building was remarkably successful. From 1935 
onwards, output reached the target of over 1,000 houses 
per(da^, and it was claimed that the shortage incurred 
by World War I had to a great extent been made good on 
the eve of World War II. This bright prospec t, however, 
was ruined by the second war, which not only brought 
house building to a standstill, but subjected over 4j 
million houses to damage from enemy action. Half a 
million families were rendered homeless and four million 
families sustained some damage to their homes, (l) a 
situation made more acute through a post-war shortage 
of labour and housing materi als. ( 2).
With the intention of stimulating local authorit­
ies to tackle the post-war housing problem with the 
utmost vigour, the Government* made great concessions in 
Exchequer grants under the Housing Act of 1946. (3). The 
new Act provided for a much higher rate of national 
subsidies than those available under the former Acts; 
and the subsidy period, moreover, was extended from 40. 
to 60 years.
(4) The grants payable under this Act were prolonged 
until 1st October 1947, for all new accommodation, by 
the Housing (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1944.
(1) J.H.Iright, The Present Housing Situation, see 
Local Government Chronicle, No. 4196, Hay 1948, p. 484.
(2) In 1939 the total labour force for house building 
was 900,000, of which less than one half was engaged 
upon the erection of working-class houses. The rest w- 
ere spread over every other form of building. But after 
the war, even in 1947, the total building strength was 
only 600,000 men to cover all forms of building work.
Ibid., p. 484.
(3) _ The Government's Housing programme in 1946 
contemplated the building of 4 million houses by local 
authorities and private enterprise over the next 10 
years, and the Minister of Health laid down, as a gen­
eral guide to local authorities for the time being, that 
4 houses should be provided by the authority for 
every one which they permitted by licence
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In making up the standard amount of subsidy it was 
estimated that the annual deficit over 60 years on a 
standard three-bedroomed house of 900 square feet would 
be £22. Of this amount^ £16 10s. was to be borne by the 
State and £5 10s was to come from the rates, a ratio of 
3 to 1 which was applied also to a sliding scale of sub­
sidies for flats. These subsidies were, in this case, 
payable in respect of dwellings provided for general 
housing, as well as of houses and flats provided for slum 
clearance, and the relief of overcrowding. (1)
With a view to meeting the special problem arising 
from the low earnings and low rents of the agricultiral 
population, a special standard amount of Exchequer con­
tribution of £25 108. per annum was payable for each house 
provided by a county district council for this section of 
the population, while the rate fund contribution was only 
£3. 12)
For flats on expensive sites the standard amount 
of the Exchequer grant was higher still. It ranged from 
£28 10s. per flat where the cost per acre of the site as 
developed was between £1,500 and £4,000 up to £35 5s. where 
the cost was between £10,000 and £12,000 per acre, with an 
additional £1 10s for each further £2,000 in the cost per 
acre, the annual rate fund contribution by t£e local 
authorities being l/3 of £he Exchequer grant. (3)
T3) (cont* d from previous page) license to be provided by 
or on behalf of private owpers. See kocal Government 
Chronicle, May 25, 1946.No.4145,p.447. ;
(1} J.P. Macey:Post-war Housing Finance. See Public Admini­
stration, Autumn issue, 1946, pp.166-7.
(2) Similar considerations arose in certain urban and 
rural districts where the rent-paying capacity of the ten­
ants was abnormally low. 3n such districts where further 
high expenditure on housing would impose an undue burden 
upon the rates, the special standard amount^ ref erred to 
abovejmight be payable at the discretion or the Minister.
(3) Where a block of flats included at least 4 storeys and 
lifts had to be installed, an additional £7 per flat was 
payable annually and there was am additional £3 10s. in the 
rate contribution. The •flat* rate of grant was also payable 
for a house provided on an expensive site on which blocks
of flats were also erected.
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In any of these cases, the rate contribution 
payable by a local authority might be reduced up to one- 
half of the standard amount if the Minister was satisfied 
that the local authority was one which levied both a high 
general sate and a high housing rate. Where the Minister 
used his discretion to grant this relief, there would be 
a corresponding increase in the Exchequer contribution.
After tue passage of the Act, house building in 
Britain was carried on with speed. According to the Min­
istry of Health’s official returns, the number of houses 
completed was rising from month to month. Ifc was estimated 
at 31st March, 1948, that since the end of the war some 
39 6,000 houses, both permanant and temporary, had been 
built, and there wdse another 239,709 houses under construct­
ion. Between October, 1947, and February, 1948, the monthly 
figure fluctuated between 15,000 and 17,000; but in March 
the total was 20, 367, and if temporary houses were added, 
the figure was 23,319.(1).
In the meantime, however, th e re  was a universal 
complaint that the subsidies give on by the Government had 
not been able to keep pace with the rising of building 
expenditure. It was pointed out that when the cost of a 
house as estimated under the Act of 1946 was compared 
with the actual costs of 1943* there was left a gap some­
where in the region of £300. (2) Government, therefore, 
was asked to offer a more generous contribution in order 
to make good the deficitj. it was expected that a new 
scale of housing grants would l?e made to meet this urgent 
requirement in the near future.
Tl) Municipal Journal, , Vol. LVI., No. 2883, May 14 th, 1948, p. 875, 
(2) M. A.R. Kerrell-Vaighan, a paper read before the 
Regional Conference held by the National Housing and 
Town Planning Council at Cambridge in the Spring of 1948.
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IV. GRANTS IN AID OF RURAL WATER SUPPLY. Following the 
lessons of the drought which took place in 1933, the 
Minister of Health was empowered in 1934 to make grants
in aid of local authorities to pfcovide or improve supplies 
of water in rural areas. The grant was limited to £1,000, 
000 for England and Wales, and it was to be used only when 
the authority concerned was in urgent need of help after 
considering the reasonable charges on consumers and 
contributions from the county council and rural district 
council. The grants were normally lump sum payments 
towards capital costs, but in some special cases annual 
payments for a period of not more than 20 years could be 
made.
Exchequer aid for this purpose was increased, 
however, under the Rural Water Supplies and Sewerage Act, 
1944, when the Minister of Health was empowered to make 
grants towards local authorities for their expenditure 
on approved works in providing piped water supplies in 
rural areas and in improving sewage disposal. The con­
tribution was to be made in the form of a lump sum pay­
ment in order to reduce the capital sum needed by local
authorities. The total amount of the grant reserved by 
the Government to be distributed was £15 millions, and 
there was no fixed rate of grant. With a view to imple­
menting the Act, local authorities were asked to submit 
schemes for these purposes so that they could be carried 
out after the war if they acquired Ministerial approwal. ( l)
V. TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING. The publication of the 
Report of the Barlow Commission on the Geographical 
Distribution of Industrial Population in 1940 ardused
a nation-wide interest in the problem of town and country 
planning. There had been frequent complaints that the
housing problems in Britain were mainly the result of a
"casual haphazard and unplanned development of centres of 
population carried out in the past". In order to aviid
nr To a question pui by lir. furton in the Souse of 
Commons on 27th May, 19 48, Mr. Bevan, the Minister of 
Health, replied that at that time 656 rural water supply 
schemes for 3,052 parishes at an estimated cost of 
£23,457,000 were under consideration. In addition,
1,061 schemes relating to 2, 146 parishes at an estimated 
cost of £12,221,000 had been approved since July, 1945.
He had information of 350 completed schemes for 609 
parishes at an estimated cost of £1,619,000; the amount 
of Exchequer grant in respect of those schemes was £46,000. 
See Local Government Chronicle, No. 4290, June 5, 1948,p. 523.
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a continuance of this kind of "sprawling and uncontrolled 
development", it was clear that some sort of intelligent 
and constructive planning should be made.(l;.
The report made recommendations for the redevelopment of 
congested areas, for the decentralization of industry and 
population from the larger cities, and for thepprovision of 
a reasonable balance of industrial employment throughout 
the country. It also showed that the problem was incapable 
of solution unless a central machinery with initiative and 
control for national planning were set up. (2) This concep­
tion was further intensified and developed by the Scott 
Report on Land Utilization in Rural Areas ( 1942;, and the 
Uihwatt Report on Compensation and Betterment ( 1942;. In 
consequence of their proposals, the Minister of Town and 
Country Planning Act was passed in 1943, and the old plan­
ning functions of the Ministry of Health were transformed 
to a newly established Ministry of Town and Country Planning 
which had the power to secure "consistency and continuity 
in the framing and execution of a national policy with 
respect to the use and development of land". This was soon 
followed by a provision making development everywhere sub­
ject to planning approval. (3)
For the immediate future, the most important 
measure was the Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, which 
was more particularly concerned with ’blitzed* areas (i. e, 
areas suffering from extensive war damage), ’blighted* 
areas (i.e., areas suffering from bad layout and obsolete 
development; and ’overspill’ areas (i.e., areas which a 
local authori ty tdevelops for housing purposes outside its 
own boundaries;. To facilitate the redevelopment of such 
areas, including the relocation of papulation and industry, 
the Act empowered local planning authorities, with the
IT] Prior to this Report there were a series of Parliament- 
ary statutes concerning this problem, viz., the Housing,
Town Planning, etc., Acts, 1909 to 1923, which were consol­
idated in the Town Planning Act, 1925, and in turn reincorp­
orated in the Town and Country Planning Act, 1932.
(2) K.B.Smellie, A History of Local Government, 1946, London.
p. 109.
(3; The Town and Country Planning (Interim Development;
Act, 1943.
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consent of the Ministerf to acquire land by compulsory 
purchase, at the same time providing grants towards the 
cost of acquisition and clearing of land for dealing wiith 
war damage. In respect of expenditure on the purchasing 
and clearing of land with the aim of relocating population 
in industry, or replacing open space, the grant was to be 
the amount of the total loan charges for the first two 
years, and half the loan charges for the second two years. 
The period for grant purposes could be extended to 10 or 
15 years if the Minister found it necessary. (l)
It should be noted that the payment of an Exchequer 
grant in this respect was by no means a free contribution. 
Local planning authorities were obliged, as a condition of 
the grant, to furnish the Minister with full information 
as tq the probable financial outcome of proposed develop­
ment. It was further provided that tfeere was to be a 
review every five years of the financial effect of redevel­
opment , in order to ascertain whether repayment of the 
grant to the Treasury should be required in virtue of a 
net gain in consequence of development. (2)
rij It was also provided that local planning author!ties 
might make contributions towards expenses incurred by 
highway authorities under the Act, and an Exchequer 
grant was available in respect of such contributions.
(2; A modification in this system of grants was introduced 
under the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, when the 
Minister was empowered to make a grant to local authorities 
to compensate them for expenditure incurred in the acquis­
ition and clearing of land for the re-development of areas 
of extensive war damage, or areas of bad^Mayout or obsolete 
development. The grant was to be paid over a 60-year 
period, instead of the 10 or 15 years laid down in the 
Town and Country Planning Act, 1944.
For details see: £ocal Government Chronicle, no,4197,
June, 1947, p.50i;
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VI. STATS RESPONSIBILITIES IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND OUT»RELIEF, 
Following the conviction that ” a person ought to 
be able to receive medical and hospital help without being 
involved in financial anxiety", (l) the National Health 
Service Act,designed to establish in Britain a comprehensive 
health service, was passed in 1946 and came into operation 
on the 5th July, 1948.
Under the Act, health services were to be divided 
into two parts, the one being under the control of the 
Minister of Health, and the other provided by local author­
ities. Central administration was instituted for the man­
agement of hospitals, including the necessary medical, 
nursing and specialist services. Central departments were 
also made reppsnsible for the provision of a general medical 
service of family doctors, and the provision of medicines, 
dental treatment, and ophthalmic services. The Minister 
was authorized to take over all the hospitals formerly 
administered by ilocal authorities, and also the voluntary 
hospitals, (2)£wrth the exception of teaching hospitals^ 
they were to be , administered on his behalf by Regional 
Hospital Bmards.
The Health services to be provided by local health 
authorities under the Act were as follows
(a) Provision of Health Centres where doctors and dentists 
might practice, and information made available on health 
matters.
(b) The care of expectant and nursing mothers and of 
children under school age.
(c; The provision of midwifery services.
(dj Health visitors.
(ej Provision for home nursing when required.
(fj Arrangements for vaccination against smallpox and 
immunisation against diphtheria*
(g) Provision of ambulance services.
(hj Arrangements for the prevention of illness, the care 
of persons suffering from illness and their after-care.
(1) Provision of domestic help for needy households. (3)
( l> Mrjlneurin Bevan* s statement in the House of Commons 
when moving for the 2nd reading of the National Health 
Service Bill on 30th April, 1946.
(2) Hospitals for this purposes included any institution 
for the reception and treatment of persons who were ill 
or mentally defective, maternity houses, sanatoria, and 
places where treatment during convalescence was given^and 
included clinics, dispensaries or out-patient departments 
other than school health service clinics, maternity and 
child welfare clinics or clinics in the general practitioner 
and non-specialist class. See Lo. Go. Chronicle 1947.p. 1045.
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The local health authorities under this Act were 
county and county borough councils. Though the county 
councils lost their hospitals to the Ministry of Health, 
they took over services which were formerly provided by 
the county district councils such as health visiting and 
ambulances, and in some areas care of mothers and young 
children, midwifery and domestic help.
Generally speaking, there were to be no fees or 
charges payable by the patient at the time of treatment 
except in certain circumstances particularly prescribed 
in the Act, The cost of this National Health Service 
scheme was to be financed from three principal sources, 
namely, (a; National funds, (b) Local rates with the 
help of Exchequer grants, and (c> The annual sum of 
£32,000,000 from money paid by insured persons and their 
employers under the general National Insurance Scheme.
The whole cost of the hospital management and 
central health administration, the specialist and other 
centrally organised services; the cost of the family 
practitioner services; and half the cost of the local 
health authority services were to be borne by the National 
Exchequer, Local rates were only to bear half of the 
cost of the local health services. (1)
Another historic statute was the National Assis­
tance Act., brought into force on 5th July, 1948, which 
marked the end of the Poor Law with its liie of nearly 
400 years. This constituted the final step in a com­
prehensive scheme of assistance and welfare services by w 
which the Labour Government planned to increase social 
amenity and security. (2)
W )  (Previous page) A duty was imposed upon the” local 
health authority to provide the first 7 of these services; 
in the last case, the service was optional; and in the 
last but one it was optional except where the Minister 
might make it obligatory.
(1) T.S.Newman, Guide to the National Health Service Act, 
1948, 2nd., ed., London, p,9.
(2)The earlier steps in this framework of social legislation 
were the Family Allowances Act, National Insurance (Indust­
rial Injuries) Actfc National Insurance Act and the National 
Health Service Act.
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It was decided that the central government 
should take over all the following services:- 
(a; Unemployment Assistance paid by the former Assistance 
Board to unemployed persons normally engaged in insurable 
occupations and not qualified for unemployment benefit, 
paid also to those drawing unemployment benefit who found 
the amount insufficient for their needs.
(b) Supplementary pensions paid by the former Assistance 
Board to old age pensioners and aifeo to widow pensioners, 
if they were over 60 or their pensions included an allow­
ance in respect of a child.
(c> Blind domiciliary assistance paid by local authorities 
to registered blind persons.
(d) Tuberculosis treatment allowances paid by local author­
ities ( at the cost of the Exchequer; to certain persons 
suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis.
(e; Outdoor relief under the Poor Law, paid by the counties 
and county boroughs to those in need, who could not be 
assisted under any of the other four schemes, (l)
By this arrangement the costs of former Poor Law 
services were, thus, made entirely a national charge. Those 
who were in need, and whose needs were not met by nation­
al insurance or from some other source, would receive 
financial aid from the National Exchequer.
While* relieving their financial burdens in Poor 
Law services, the Act at the same time placed a duty upon 
county and county borough councils to provide residential 
accommodation for persons who, by reason of age, infirmity 
or any other circumsta nces, were in need of care and 
attention they could not otherwise get, and temporary 
accommodation for people in urgent need of it owing to 
unforseen circumstances, such as fire, flood or eviction.
It also gave these councils powers, which the Minister of 
Health could convert into duties, tp provide specialised 
welfare services for blind, deaf, dumb and other handicapped 
persons. (2)
Users of the councils* homes would pay for their 
board and lodging and other amenities which might include 
clothing, tobacco and sweets, books and other recreations.
The charge would vary between the full cost and a minimum 
of 21s. a week, according to the resident’s ability to payl 3; 
Those who could^afford the minimum charge and(such was the 
new philosophy) at the same time have 5s,per week left as 
pocket money would be helped from central funds by the 
newly established National Assistance Board.
U) Local Government iSironicle, no. 4220, Nov, 157194^'."p. 1(511“
(2) Cmd. 7248/1947.
(3) Ministry of Health Circular, no. 87, 1948.
CHAPTER XII.
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGT. 1948. AND THE EQUALISATION GRANT.
From as far back as June, 1946, tne Minister of Health 
had repeatedly announced that the Block Grant system, as laid 
down in the Local Government Act, 1929,* and amended and re­
adjusted by various subsequent Acts, had proved to be comple­
tely outmoded, and that a new Equalization Grant was to take 
its place, with Government assistance in the future to be 
used in such a way as to wipe out inequalities between local 
authorities. (1) A good opportunity for the introduction 
of the policy of the Government presented itself when the 
National Health Service Act of 1946, and the National Assis­
tance Act, of 1948 had to be brought into operation, as, 
providing as they did for the transfer of hospitals and 
health services and the termination of the Poor Law, they 
inevitably called for a major rearrangement of central 
and local financial relationships. (2).
Accordingly, the Local Government Act of 1948 was 
passed for an entire alteration of the Exchequer grant system 
It was provided that after 1st April of the same year, in 
England and Vales, and 16th May in Scotland, the block grants 
should be replaced by an equalization grant, subject to trans­
itional provisions covering the period up to 5th July, 1948, 
when hospitals and outdoor relief were to be transferred from 
local authorities.
It was the intention of the Government that the new 
grant should serve as an equalizer of rates, so that it 
would be possible to bring about a greater measure of unifor­
mity in services rendered by local government, without
nr TJie Sinister Tor tEe first time~del 1 ared the Grovernmenf* s 
intent^ lo alter the block grant system at the Institute of 
Municipal Treasurers and Accountants Conference in Torquay. 
(June, 1946)
(2) It was estimated that after the transfer of the cost Vf 
out relief and hospitals to the State, Local authorities in 
England and Wales alone would be relieved of an annual 
expenditure of £65 mn, which was more than the block grants 
and the supplementary grants of £57 mn, in 1946 - 47.
See Cmd. 7253/1947.
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imposing excessive burdens upon the inhabitants of the 
poorer areas. Under the provisions of the Act, the 
Exchequer grant was made available only to those local 
authorities whose rateable value per head of weighted 
population was below.the average for the whole country.
This average was to be determined by reference to the 
average rateable value per head of weighted population 
in England and Wales, (1) the weighting being achieved 
by adding to the actual figure for total population 
aiA further figure of the children under 15 years of 
age in the areas concerned. (2) All local authorities 
which fall below the average would qualify for the grant 
to make up the deficiency; while richer areas with rateable 
value above the average would receive nothing at all, 
although they would enjoy a financial benefit where the 
saving in respect of hospital and Poor Law services 
exceeded their share of the discontinued block grant.*
As a corollary to tne great importance put up­
on the rateable value of each area in the calculation 
of these new equalisation grants, it was necessary that 
valuations should be done in such a fashion as to taring 
about equality between different local authorities.
Tne Act, therefore, also provided for central valuation 
in order to secure reliable rateable values as a measure 
of local resources.
It is also worthy of note that under the Act the 
former system of fixed grants, as revised at 5 year 
intervals was abolished, and an annual revision substituted. 
It was estimated that if the changes had operated in the 
year 1946-47, the total of the equalisation grant for 
England and Wales would have been about £33 millions in 
place of the £57 millions payable under the block grant
XT) in Scotiand, the rateable value to be credited~to 
each county and large burgh was the amount necessary to 
give an average rateable value per head of weighted 
population equal to the average rateable value per head 
of weighted population in England and Wales, increased 
by 25j£; to allow for the difference in the valuation 
levels in the two countries. See Cmd.7256/1947.
(2) In the case of a county, wbere the population per 
mile of road was less than 70, there was added/a further 
figure of one third of the additional population needed 
in order that the population divided by the mileage of 
roads should be 70. The actual population was to be 
calculated in accordance with, the Registrar-General* s 
estimated population for 1945; the number of children 
under 15 with his estimates for mid-1945;apd _road mileage 
with figures as in 1936. See Cmd. 7256/1947.p. 4.
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and supplementary grants. Taking the transfer of hospitals 
and out-relief into consideration, however, there would 
have been, in spite of the reduction, an estimated net 
saving of rates, based on 1946-47 figures, of about £39 
millions a year. (1).
For the first five years of the scheme commencing 
1st April, 1948, the Act provided also for transitional 
grants. The transitional grant in the first year would 
be such as to ensure to each county as a whole and to 
each county borough in England and Wales a gain equivalent 
to a rate of 6d, (3; after taking into account the transfer 
of the costnof hospital and Poor Law services, the new 
equalisation grants, and the new education grant adopted 
by the Minister of Education. Transitional grants were 
to be of the order of £900,000 in England and Wales and 
£267,000 in Scotland for the first year, and then scaled 
down by one-fifth each year until they finally disappeared 
in the fifth year." i#) & )
While equalisation and transitional grants were not 
to be paid to county district councils directly from the 
Ministry of Health, the Act provided that each county council 
in Great Britain, outside London, (4) should make^annual 
payments to each of its county district councils." These 
grants would continue to be paid on a capitation basis, the 
rate of capitation grant for municipal boroughs and urban 
districts being obtained by dividing the total of the 
equalisation grants paid to counties (outside London) by 
twive the population in those counties; while that for 
rural districts was to be one-half of that for the other 
distrie ts.
As indicated above, it was estimated that, (») if 
the new scheme for the Exchequer equalisation gr^nt to
II) Local Government Chronicle/ Ifo. 4219, itov. 8,1947, p.9887 
,&) The Times, Oc t. 28,1947, p. 4,
r3) In Scotland, the gain will be equivalent to a rate 
of 4/ 4/5d.
(4) There will be a special arrangement for London made by 
the Minister of Health after consultation with the authorities 
concerned. As no Exchequer equaHsat^on grant is payable to 
London, it is proposed that the L.C.C. shall distribute a 
certain proportion of its net gain accruing from the transfer 
of the L.C.C. hospitals to the State^in subvention of the 
metropolitan boroughs.
(5) In the White Papers entitled Financial Relations between 
the Exchequer and Local Authorities, England and Wales
(Cad.7253/1947) and Scotland (Cad.7256/1947).
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local authorities and the other proposed financial and 
administrative changes had operated in 1946-47, the 
total grant in England and Wales would have been £33,212, 
121. Of this, counties would have reciived £26,511,186 
and county boroughs £6,700,935; while the corresponding 
amount in Scotland would have been £5, 175,134, of which 
the counties* share would have been £4,072,691, and the 
large burghs* share £1,102, 443.
The average rate levied for the whole of England 
and Wales in 1946-47 was 15s. 5d., whereas, had the changes 
operated, the amount would have been 12s, 9d., thus ach­
ieving a net saving of 2s.8d, In Scotland, the average 
rate levied in 1946-47 was 13s.7d. Under new conditions 
it would have been 10s.7d., with a net saving of 3s.Od.
Areas which would have received large sums in 
equalisation grants are as follows:-
England and Wales.
Counties. County Boroughs.
West Riding £2, 689, 490 Birmingham £611,078
Durham £2,134,832 Kingston-
Glamorgan £2,009, 229 upon-Hull £396,057
Lancas ter £2,069,191 Sheffield £362, 264
S t af f o rd £1, 552, 467 Stoke-on-
Trent £319,359
Sunderland £269,00 4
Gateshead £232, 233
St. Helens £228,153
Middlesbrou­
gh £219,016
Merthyr
Tydfil £208,142.
Scotland
Counties Large Burghs.
Lanark
Ayr
Abe rde en 
Fife
Sti rling 
Argyll
£567, 338 
£476,457 
£346, 634 
£339,730 
£200,051 
£158,628
Ross & Croat. £154, 556 
W. Lothian £149.293
Paisley 
Greenock 
Motkerwell 
Co atb ridge 
Dundee 
Airdrie 
Hami Iton 
Xirkcaldy
£120,632 
£113,507 
<&W. £106,794 
£ 95,319 
£ 75,809 
£ 72, 789 
£ 66,895
£ 54.677
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If changes in expenditure and grants had been 
effective in 1946-47, local authorities which would have 
been able to reduce their rates by 7s or more in England 
and Wales and 4s, or more in Scotland are shown in the 
following tables:- (l)
England and Wales.
Counties County Boroughs.
Cardigan 13s. 6d. Jlerthyr Tydfil
Monmouth 9s lud Wals all
Glamorgan 9s. 2d. West Bromwich
Pembroke 8s,9d. Stoke-on-Trent
Montgomery 8s.7d. Gateshead
Carmarthen 8s.4d. Kings ton-upon-
Isle of Ely 7s.9d. Hull
Holland (Lines) 7s. 5d. Barnsley
15s
9s
9s
8s
8s
7s
7s
. 8d#
*2d.’ 
.9 a,
. 8d♦
.7d;
Scotland,
Large Burghs.Counties
iSTuiEerland 
Lanark 
Orkney 
Banff 
Aberdeen 
Berwick 
Wigtown 
Zetland
iftoss & Cromarty
Clackmannan
Cai thness
Argyll
Inverness
Ayr
14s . 7 d. 
6s, 5d. 
6s.5d.. 
6s,4d, 
5s,9d. 
5s^8d, 
5s, 4d. 
5s, Id* 
4s,lid, 
5 s, 3d 
4s. 9d. 
4s.7d. 
4s..7d, 
4s, 2d.
Airdrie 
Hamilton 
Coatbridge 
Arbro ath 
Dumbarton 
Paisley 
Glasgow
8s. lOd, 
8s.: Id. 
8s.Id* 
4s. 8 d. 
4s%7d. 
4s. 2d. 
4s. 0.
f 1) Under the new arrangement, no exchequer equalisation 
grant was payable to Glasgow and Edinburgh, but these two 
towns would be relieved of the transferred burdens of 
£4,084,100 and £739,100 respectively, thus still achieving 
a rate deduction of 4s.Od. for Glasgow and 5d. for Edinburgh.
P A R T  III.
THE EMPLOYMENT OF EXCHEQUER GRANTS.
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C H A P T E R  XIII.‘
THE FUNCTIONS OF EXCHEQUER GRANTS.
People are apt to regard Exchequer grants merely as 
•doles* used by the Government to relieve ratepayers at the 
expense of taxpayers. Mr. Gladstone, for instance, was one 
of the great statesmen in BritAAh history who could never 
appreciate the device of national subvention. He denounced 
it because he thought it unwise to transfer the burden of 
local expenditure from a fund supported by property to a 
fund supported by property and- labour jointly. In his address 
to the Midlothian electors in September, 1885, he emphasized 
that in the reform of local government, one of the first 
objects to be aimed at was to put an end to the ’gross injust­
ice* of charging upon labour, through the medium of the Con­
solidated Fund, local burdens which the laws have always 
•wisely* treated as incidental to property. (lj. Although we 
should admit that there is an element of truth in Mr. Gladst­
one’s statement, he had, however, missed the main point.
The driving force of the great agitition for grants- 
in-aid in 19th century Britain, did not spring from selfish­
ness on the part of the ratepayers who should, but failed to, 
satisfy themselves with the burdens which the laws had*wisely* 
imposed upon them, ^uite the contrary, it was the injustice 
of levying local rates solely out of real property which 
formed the impetus of the movement. Statesmen were reluctant 
to use the ’doles*; but the grievances of the agricultural 
interest were so great that they could not avoid it. Thus 
throughout the 19th century the grant system ’developed 
primarily as a means for appeasing the agricultural interest, 
which not only lost heavily through the repeal of the Corn 
Laws, but also had to pay large increases in rates to provide 
public health services to meet the new urban development. (2).
Although it is true that the generation and development 
of & he grant system was chiefly a result of the political 
agitation of tne landed interest; it is, however, equally true 
that the grants were not just doles contributed without any
TTj The Times” 19th £eptimber, 1885.
(2) W,I. Jennings, principles of Local Government Law, 3rd ed., 
1947, London, p.199.
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further purpose. There were in fact other motives behind 
the making of grants which turned out to be of vital import­
ance to the British system of government and administration.
It was by means of national subvention, that the Central 
Government in London was given a chance to keep an eye on 
local administration - a matter of nation-wide significance, 
and yet vested by tradition solely in the hands of tne 
local authorities. In order that some of the services in 
this internal administration should be maintained at^satis- 
factory standard, the grant system was needed, to serve as a 
stimulus to local authorities in their exertions for improve­
ment, and as a measure of control to compel them to improve.
Briefly, the objects of the grant-in-aid system may 
be summarised as follows
(1) To assist local authorities financially in their 
administration of services of a national or semi­
national character.
(2) To correct, as far as possible, inequalities in
the local taxation system, both those existing be­
tween individuals and between districts.
(3) To secure to the Central Government a gegree 0f 
supervision and control over the administration of 
the national or semi-national services with the idea 
of inducing a national minimum of efficiency.
(4) To enable the Government to disseminate its 
accumulated experience amongst local bodies admin­
istering the services with a view to raising the 
general standard of efficiency and economy, and j
(5) To encourage local authorities to carry out 
effectively particular policies of the Government, 
such as to provide work for unemployment relief, etc. (lj
*In fact, judged by actual day-by-day results’*, wrote 
Sydney Webb some forty years ago, "the grant-in-aid, whether 
we like it or not, has become a governmental instrument of 
extraordinary potency for good or ill, of greater actual 
importance in the lives of the people than parts qf the 
Constitution to which more attention is directed”.(2) If this 
was true at that time, how true is it in these days when (
local ratepayers depend more and more on the National Exchequer'
for the relief of their excessive burdens?
nr ~See r. H7Burton, Local:El thori ty Mnance, Iccounts and 
Auditing, 2nd rev. ed., 1932, Vol. II., pp. 684-5. Also 
Pinal Report of the Departmental Committee on Local 
Taxation, 1914, Cmd. 7315, p. 19.
(2) Sydney Webb, Grants-in-Aid, 1911, London,p.2.
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I. Grants as a Means of Assisting Local Services of _
National Importance. Local government has long since ceased 
to be a mere matter of -local inhabitants providing benefits 
for themselves, as isolated units exercising their rights.
It is now more and more to be regarded as an artificial 
entity created by the State for the administration of community 
services, and exists, so to speak, as a corporate body by the 
favour of, and in accordance with, the law, having its rights 
and duties orientated towards the attainment of the common 
weal. (1) Local authorities may exercise only the specified 
powers fixed by Parliament. They c an do only what the State 
allows them, anc have to do what the State requires of them.
In the scope of local affairs, since there are not a 
few services which tend to affect fiirectly or indirectly the 
common well-being of the whole nation, these services have 
become more or less obligatory, and Parliament has required 
local authorities to undertake them, and demanded that a 
certain standard of efficiency in them should be obtained.*
For the performance of these services, nevertheless, local 
authorities have had to meet the greater part of the local 
expense, which has expanded year after year in consequence 
of ever-increasing duties.
The education service (as an example of a national 
service, locally administered) has shown great increases 
of expenditure in the last sixty years. It was estimated 
that in 1884-5 the educational expenditure in England and 
Wales averaged only 2slld per head of population^ in 1904-5, 
it was 13s. 2d. ; in 1932-3 it reached 41s.ld., ovepli-’times 
as much as in 1884-5.(2) 5 '
It should be poinied out that these increases were 
due mainly to the various Acts passed by Parliament which 
attempted to improve educational facilities and efficiency.
Thus the increase in 1904-5 was due to the Education Act 
of 1902 and in particular to the new charge on local funds 
for voluntary schools; and that in 1932-3 was chiefly a 
result of the progressive measures required of local author­
ities after the enactment of the Education (Provision of 
Meals) Act, 1906, and the Education (Administrative Provisions? 
Act, 1907. The figure has no doubt swollen enormously Aa
XT, J. W.Grice, National ancT Local' Finance, 1910,'pp. 6-7~
(2) Sir Gwilym Gibbon, The Expenditure and Revenue of
Local Authorities. See Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, Vol.XCIX., Part III, 1936, pp. 462-463
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in recent years following the enforcement of the Education 
Act of 1944.(1)
It has been much the same in the case of other 
national services. Thus in 1904-5, the expenditure per head 
of population on the public health service was 6s,; in 1924- 
25, 16s, lid. ; aad in 1932-3 it became 22s. lid. The corres­
ponding figures on highway undertakings were: in 1884-5,
4s. lid. ; in l$04-5 8s. Id. ; and in 1932-3, 23s. 3d* while those 
on police were: in 1884-5, 2s, 7d.; in 1914-5, 4s. 5d.; in 
1924-5, 9s. 10d. ; and in 1932-3, 10s.8d. (2)
Here, the offer of Exchequer grants is appropriate.
Apart from the fact that this enormous increase in expenditure 
has proceeded entirely beyond the resources of the local 
ratepayers, there is the weightier reason of justice. Without 
assistance ratepayers would be unduly burdened by these
services services which are carried out in the interests of
the community at large rather than that of any particular 
locality, and which are indistinguishable in principle from 
many of the services which the flentral Government admini­
sters, and of which the national Exchequer# bears the entire 
cost. If they are not suitable, for political, administrative, 
or other reasons, to be taken over by the Central Government, 
then it is only right that the expenses of such services 
should be wholly defrayed, or defrayed to a large extent, from 
national sources, (3)
Services such as police, education, and main roads, 
as well as public health and poor relief, are national or 
semi-national in character, Education^is really a national 
service because children are the citizens of the future, and 
it is to the benefit of the nation that its citizens should 
be well-educated. The expenditure on main roads is rightly 
a national charge, because the principle communication lines 
which link up every part of the country are indispensable for 
the social facility and economic prosperity of the whole 
nation. The police forces are provided, just as the army
T I T  During the period from ' to 1547-5^ Efie net expenHI
iture of local education authorities rose from £93 mns. to 
£189 mns. See Ministry of Education Annual Report, 1947.
(2) Sir Gwilym Gibbon, ibid., pp. 463-470.’
(3) Cd. 638/1901, p. 111.
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and navy, chiefly to protect the people from violence and 
loss of property from external and internal enemies. As the 
expenditure on the latter is supported wholly by national 
funds, there is no reason why the support of the former 
should be placed as a special burden on the local holders 
of real property. (1)
Thus in all these services, serious deficiences in 
any particular local area may react unfavourably on the cond­
ition of the nation as a whole, and there is, moreover^ a 
legal obligation on the part of the local authorities, enforce 
able by the Central Government, to maintain a minimum effic­
iency. It is therefore for the benefit of the community at 
large that national funds should be used in the form of 
Exchequer grants to assist these services of national 
importance.
II. Grants as a Means of Remedying Local Rate 
Grievances. XnHerent defects of the British local taxation 
system are the inequality of rate burdens among inhabitants 
of the same locality and the disparity in rate poundage as 
between different areas. The original aim ip employing 
Exchequer grants was to remedy these defects.
It is always a matter of complaint by the ratepayers
that under the present system of local taxation, it is only
one class of property, namely, the immovable property, 
which bears the burden of local rates, an arrangement which 
is only remotely related to ability to pay. Occupation of 
real property might have been a reliable guide to wealth in 
the days when the rating system first came into being, but 
it is by no means the case nowadays.
If we observe the matter from the point of view of 
tue owners, the grievance is indeed apparent. Properties 
from which people may be able toghin profits are multifarious 
in variety. To single the owners of rateable property out 
for taxation, to the mxclusion of owners of other properties, 
is a deviation from the principle of equality and justice.
Thus we oftpn see that a man who derives a large income
from capital invested in movable property is taxed 
local purposes at a much less amount than his near neighbour 
who derives a small income from capital invested in immovable
r if E. L. Has luck, Local Government in England, 1936, 
Cambridge, p. 216.
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property. The system was especially unjust before the 
enforcement of the derating scheme under the Local Govern­
ment Act, 1929, when ratepayers who had an interest in 
farming, or were ehgaged in certain industrial undertakings, 
bore an undue share of local burdens, simply because they 
has to use an amount of real or immovable property very 
large in proportion to their profits. Compared with other 
affluent profit-makers who had no need to own or occupy 
any rateable property except a house in which to live, they 
seemed definitely at a disadvantage.
On the other hand, from tihe point of view of an 
occupier, the grievance is' even greater. AS the existing 
system of local finance takes no account of anything but 
the ’consumable commodity called a house* or of the rateable 
value of the premises on which people carry out their 
business, it possesses a notorious characteristic of bad 
taxation in that it bears heaviest on those least able to 
pay. It operates with special unfairness on the wage- 
earning and lower micdle classes, and this , is especially 
true with the ratepayers who have large families and are 
obliged to live in big houses. Although rich people as a 
general rule do live in magnificent and highly assessed 
houses, it can hardly be said that the type of residence 
really bears any relation to the wealth of its occupant.
"A millionaire1*, writes Mr. Hasluck, "who retires to a 
peaceful country life in a tiny rural cottager pays less in 
rates than many labourers who inhabit the mean houses 
adjoining the factories in which they workn.(l/
The proportion of the expenditure defrayed by the 
wage-earning classes on house accommodation to their total 
income is much greater than that of the wealthier classes.
It is worthy of mention that some investigation has been 
done in London, Southampton and Sheffield on this subject, 
and the conclusion is that before Yorld War II. a person 
who earned £150 a year paid over 5 per cent of it in 
rates, whereas a person with an income of £10,000 a fear 
paid less than 2 per cent. (2) This figure represents 
a serious inequality in rate burdens. In the absence of 
a minimum standard which qualifies for exemption from
Til JS.L. riasluck7 op7cIt77~p72187 iTJT
(2) Labour Party, Local Government Handbook, 2nd ed. JP.98.‘
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contributions in the rating system, the tenants no matter 
how poor they might be*have to pay their share. It is true 
that ample steps have oeen taken to reduce the percentage 
of levy to a very small amount in the case of the smallest 
and cheapest type of dwelling, but the fact remains that 
•a man who is living at bare subsistance level will find 
the imposition of even a few shillings of rates a disaster*. to
The services ptovided by local authorities are 
enjoyed in common by all the local inhabitants, irrespective 
of whether they are owners or renters or lodgers. The 
amenities of public parks, libraries, municipal orchestras, 
etc., are a pleasure to everyone in the locality. The 
convenience of street lighting and a clean and smooth road 
surface is a benefit to people of all classes. Yet it is 
only the people in possession of rateable property who are 
charged with the burden of local taxation. In this case 
grants from the national funds, which are levied upon a 
very wide basis of taxation on all kinds of prope&ty, are 
a wise method of adjustment in the absence of a complete 
change in the local taxation system.
Apart from the inequality of rate burdens in each 
local area, the burdens also vary enormously between diff­
erent parts of the cduntry and between different authorities. 
This is due in some cases to the manner in which the author­
ities spend their money. Some authorities spend more on 
local government services than others, and the extravagance 
or parsimony they show, determines in part, the scale of 
local finance. In other cases it is due to the disparity 
in the relative wealth of the different localities concerned. 
A locality in which there is a large amount of valuable 
property can raise the same amount of money by levying a 
much lower rate in the pound than is necessary in a place 
where the property is of a poorer type. In Britain, a 
general standard of local government is normally required 
by the Central Authority irrespective of the wealth of 
the area, and local authorities are left with little 
choice in the mode of their expenditure. In conseq uence 
the second factor, that of relative wealth is of far more 
importance than the first.
If a similar standard of local services is to be 
attained, *even with administaation of equal strictness, 
equal honesty and equal economy*, the wealthier area can 
reach it without strain, while the poorer one must levy a
11) Ch-a r K e B arr at 11 hoeal AutHorityi “T94&-.-P. 138-.
S. L. Has luck, op.cit. p.217.
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high rate to manage it. (1) For example, the large burghs 
of Airdrie and Dumfries in Scotland have almost an equal 
population, (in both cases about 26 thousand) but whereas 
the rateable value of Airdrie is only £172,641, that of 
Dumfries is £229,501. ( 2) A penny rate in Airdrie brings 
in only £719, while in Dumfries it realizes £956. If a 
scheme costing £10,000 is to be carried Mut in both burghs, 
the former town has to raise the money by levying a Is. 2d. 
rate, while the latter needs only to levy a lOd. rate.
This difference, however, is not great enough to show the 
true extent of the difficulty. Better examples can be 
found in England and Wales. Thus the populations of Merthyr 
Tydfil and Carlisle are of abdut the sane size. But as the 
rateable value of Carlisle practically doubles that of 
Merthyr Tydfil, the rate burden of each inhabitant in the 
latter also doubles that of the former. (3) A much more 
acute difference exists between Bournemouth and Middles­
brough where the populations are also of equal size. (4)
The rateable value of tne former is £1,984,349, whilst that 
of the latter only amounts to £763, 686. Hence, with the 
same number of people to provide for, the two county borough 
councils have a very unequal amount of wealth to draw upon 
for their services.
The distressed situation of the poorer areas in 
collecting money for their administration has been aggravated 
in the past by the fact that they have normally had more 
services to provide than their richer neighbours. Wealth 
is actually in inverse relation to needs. The result has 
been that *fcere the income or accumulated wealth of the 
inhabitants has been low, the cost of local administration 
per head has been correspondingly high. Professor and Mrs. 
Hicks have made it plain that there was one particular servic< 
namely, the domiciliary Poor Law relief, which imposed the 
greatest relative burden on the poorer areas. They discovere< 
that in the localities where expenditure on domiciliary 
relief was low, the rates were also low; whilst high rates
nr Charles Barrait, Your Local Autlority, 1946, p. 128.
(2) The Scottish Municipal Annual, 1948, p. 4 & p. 31.
(3) The corresponding figures of population, rateable value 
and rates for 1947-8 of the two county boroughs are as 
follows:- Carlisle: 60, 250; £463,461; 16/6. Merthyr Tydfil: 
60,340; £235,532; 30/— .See The Municipal Year Book, 1948.
p.588 and p.692,
(4) 137,000 in Bournemouth and 139,500 in Middlesbrough.
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were i n e v i t a b l y  a r e s u l t  o f  heavy r e l i e f  e x p e n d i tu re .  
" D o m ic i l i a r y  poor r e l i e f ” , they  w r i t e ,  " i s  sheer e x p e n d i tu re  
on p o v e r t y ;  and e x p e n d i tu re  on p o v e r ty ,  l o c a l l y  f in a n c e d  
f a l l s  on the  p o o r ” . ( l )  I n  the case o f  M e r th y r  T y d f i l  f o r  
example, i n  1936-37 the r a t e  e q u iv a le n t  f o r  th e  n e t  expend­
i t u r e  on t h i s  s e r v ic e  was 14s .9d , w h ich  was more th a n  the 
average t o j a l  r a te  f o r  a l l  c o u n ty  boroughs i n  Bngland and 
Wales f o r  t h a t  y e a r .  (2 )
The p ro b le m  i s  c u m u la t iv e .  Where th e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  
a l lo w s  i t s  ra te s  to  become a b n o rm a l ly  h ig h ,  th e re  i s  a 
tendency  to  e m ig ra te  and ^hus p re s e n t  the  re m a in in g  r e s id e n ts  
w i th  g r e a te r  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  M oreover, i n d u s t r y  a vo ids  t h i s  
a rea , so t h a t  th e re  then  deve lops  a more seve re  q u e s t io n  
o f  unemployment, c a u s in g  an u n a v o id a b le  in c re a s e  i n  the c o s t  
o f  s o c i a l  s e r v ic e s ,  and a c o r re s p o n d in g  decrease i n  l o c a l  
incom e.
Under these  c i rc u m s ta n c e s ,  the r e l a t i v e l y  p o o r  a reas  
would i n  a g e n e ra l  case, have l o c a l  s e r v ic e s  f a r  b e h in d  the 
c u r r e n t  s ta n d a rd .  Th is  would be i n  many ways u n d e s i r a b le  
and th e  Government has made i t  a d u ty  o f  th e se  a u t h o r i t i e s  
to  p r o v id e  and m a in ta in  t h e i r  s e r v ic e s  to  a p r e s c r ib e d  
s ta n d a rd  d e s p i te  the f a c t  t h a t ,  w i th o u t  akh is ta n ce  t h i s  wou ld  
mean th a t  some l o c a l i t i e s  would have to  i n c u r  a r a te  te n  
o r  even tw e n ty  t im es  as g re a t  as o th e r s ,  (3 )  and f a r  beyond 
t h e i r  c a p a c i t y .  The s o lu t i o n  appears to  be e i t h e r  to  
c o n v e r t  the charge i n t o  a n a t i o n a l  one, as adopted  in  the  
case o f  the r e c e n t  n a t i o n a l  h e a l t h  an4 n a t i o n a l  a s s is ta n c e  
s e r v ic e s ,  o r  to  e q u a l is e  the burden on ra te p a y e rs  i n  d i f f e r ­
e n t  areas by the  use o f  Exchequer g r a n ts .  I n  v ie w  o f  th e  
i n s t i n c t i v e  s c e p t ic is m  on the  p a r t  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  peop le  
tow a rds  b u re a u c ra cy , the C e n t r a l  A u t h o r i t y  has done more 
i n  accordance w i th  the  l a t t e r  d e v ic e  tha n  w i th  the former.* 
Excnequer g ra n ts  have been used l i b e r a l l y  to  meet the needs 
o f  the  p o o re r  areas, e s p e c ia l l y  th ro u g h  the  G e n e ra l Exchequer
TTJ J .R . & U.K. H icks ,  op. c i t .  p. 40.
(2 )  Labour P a r ty ,  op. c i t .  p . 98. B e a r in g  t h i s  i n  m ind, i t  
i s  n o t  d i f f i c u l t  to  un d e rs ta n d  why i n  t h e i r  a t te m p t to  equa­
l i s e  l o c a l  r a te  burdens by Exchequer g ra n ts  i n  1948, the 
Government had to  n a t i o n a l i s e  the  P oor Law s e r v ic e  a t the same 
t im e .
(3 )  Sydney Webb, op. c i t . ,  pp. 16-17.
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Gr an t and th e  E q u a l i s a t i o n  G ran t p r e s c r ib e d  i n  the L o c a l  
Government Acts o f  1929 and 1948 r e s p e c t i v e ly .  (1 )
I I I .  G rants aa Sec u r in g  a Na t i o n a l  M in im um o f  E f f i c i e n c y  
i n  L o c a l  S e rv i ces . The t h i r d  o b je c t  o f  H xchequer g ra n ts  
i s  to  b r in g  a l l  the  im p o r ta n t  l o c a l  s e r v ic e s  th ro u g h o u t 
the community up to  a n a t io n a l  minimum o f  e f f i c i e n c y .  These 
are a few l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  who are  too  i n d o le n t  o r  i n e f f i c ­
i e n t  to  p r o v id e  adequate s e r v ic e s  f o r  t h e i r  l o c a l i t i e s .
There are many more who, i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e i r  w i l l i n g n e s s  to  
ach ie ve  b e t t e r  a d m in is t r a t io n ,  f i n d  them se lves  too po o r 
to  cope w i th  t h e i r  u rg e n t  re q u ire m e n ts .  Exchequer g ra n ts ,  
th e r e f o r e ,  are n e ce ssa ry  to  se rve  as a s p u r  to  the  fo rm er 
and a s ta y  to  th e  l a t t e r .  They are, m o re o v e r  an e f f e c t i v e  
means by which the  Government can p roceed  to  s u p e rv is e  and 
c o n t r o l  l o c a l  a f f a i r s ,  o th e rw is e  e n t i r e l y  o u ts id e  t h e i r  
i n f l u e n c e .  W ith  th e  a s s is t a  nee o f  g ra n ts  and the c o n s ta n t  
t h r e a t  o f  t h e i r  w i th d ra w a l ,  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  B r i t a i n  
are  p la c e d  i n  a s i t u a t i o n  where the y  must p e r fo rm , and 
p e r fo rm  w e l l .
I n  the  days when B r i t a i n  was o v e rw h e lm in g ly  a r u r a l  
community, each l o c a l  a re a  was a lm o s t in d e p e n d e n t and 
i s o la t e d  from th e  o u ts id e  w o r ld .  L o c a l s e r v ic e s  were then  
s h e e r ly  o f  l o c a l  co n ce rn  and, g e n e r a l l y  s p e a k in g , the  
common o b je c t  o f  l o c a l  anthoxttes was to  keep the  ra te s  as 
low as p o s s ib le .  Bad s e r v ic e s  m ig h t  be o f  g re a t  in c o n v e n ­
ie n c e  to  the  in h a b i t a n t s  o f  the  l o c a l i t y ,  b u t  few  p e o p le  
grum bled about them. I t  was o n ly  when Government D ep a rt­
ments began to r e a l i z e  the im p o rta n ce  o f  i n t e r n a l  a d m in i­
s t r a t i o n ,  and th o u g h t  i t  n e ce ssa ry  to  p u t  p re s s u re  on 
l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  to  r a is e  t h e i r  s e r v ic e s  to  a minimum 
s ta n d a rd ,  so t h a t  th e re  would be an e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  
aljL to  have a h e a l th y  body and educated m ind, t h a t  f i n a n c i a l  
a s s is ta n c e  tow ards l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  was fo u n d  in d is p e n s a b le .
The r e l a t i o n  o f  each l o c a l i t y  to  th e  n a t io n  as a 
who le  has become c lo s e r  and c lo s e r .  A t the  p r e s e n t  t im e  
as Lo rd  P a s s f ie ld  a s s e r t s : -  (2 )
. . . . W e  can no t a f f o r d  to  l e t  th e  i n h a b i t a n t s  o f
L i t t l e  P a d l in g to n  s u f f e r  th e  p e n a l t i e s  o f  t h e i r
own ig n o ra n c e  o r  t h e i r  own p a rs im on y , because
r  1) See Above p p t7S*-7y.
(2) Sydney Webb, o p . c i t . p . 2 3 .
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the consequences f a l l ,  n o t  on them a l jn e ,  b u t a lso  upon 
th e  n e ig h b o u r in g  d i s t r i c t s ,  upon everyone who passes th ro u g h  
t h e i r  b e n ig h te d  area, upon a l l  those  who have in t e r c o u r s e  
w i th  them, even upon the  community as a w ho le , whose 
f u t u r e  c i t i z e n s  the y  are  p ro d u c in g .  We see t h i s  c l e a r l y  
enough when i t  i s  a q u e s t io n  o f  i n f e c t i o u s  d is e a s e .  We 
ca n n o t a l lo w  L i t t l e  P a d l in g to n  to  be f r e e ,  i f  i t  chooses,
to  have as much s m a l l - p o x  and e n t e r i c  f e v e r  n o t  to  say
c h o le r a  and bubon ic  p la g u e  as i t s  i n h a b i t a n t s  choose to
s u b m it  to ,  r a t h e r  th a n  ta k in g  p r e v e n t a t i v e  measures w h ich  
th e y  d i s l i k e .  We have e q u a l ly  no reason  to  p u t  up w i t h  
the h o r r i b l y  bad roads which are a l l  th e y  may w ish  to  pay 
f o r .  I f  the y  are  p e r m i t te d  to  b r in g  up t h e i r  c h i l d r e n  i n  
ig n o ra n c e ,  to  l e t  them be e n fe e b le d  by n e g le c te d  a i lm e n ts ,  
and to  s u f f e r  them to  be d e m o ra lise d  by e v i l  co u rses , i t  
i s  n o t the  L i t t l e  P a d l in g t o n i t e s  a lone  who w i l l  have to  
b e a r  the i n e v i t a b l e  c o s t  o f  th e  d e s t i t u t i o n  and c r i m i n a l i t y  
thus produced. Hence, modern a d m in is t r a t i v e  s c ie n c e  i s  
fo r c e d  to  re c o g n is e  t h a t  we are a l l ,  i n  th e  p l a in e s t  sense, 
•members one o f  a n o th e r * . ^
L o c a l autonomy i s  d e s i r a b le  i n  t h a t  i t  tends to  
im prove  the  q u a l i t y  o f  democracy. B u t when the common good 
o f  th e  n a t io n  i s  th re a te n e d  by the  m a la d m in is t r a t io n  o f  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  l o c a l i t y ,  the  freedom o f  l o c a l  i n h a b i t a n t s  
• t o  do what they  l i k e  w i t h  t h e i r  own’ must be r e s t r i c t e d  
i n  o r d e r  to  s a fe g u a rd  o r  prom ote n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y . 1 I n  
modern t im e s , l o c a l  democracy can be s u s ta in e d  o n ly  on 
c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  a n a t io n a l  minimum o f  e f f i c i e n c y  
i n  l o c a l  a d m in is t r a t io n  has been a ch ie ve d  th ro u g h o u t  the 
w ho le  community, and a n a t i o n a l  minimum c a n n o t i n  p r a c t i c e  
be e n fo rc e d  w i th o u t  a g r a n t - i n - a i d .  i t  i s  q u i t e  n a t u r a l  
t h a t  i n  a backwatd r e g io n  th e re  i s  a r e lu c ta n c e  to  ta c k le  
th e  more c o m p l ic a te d  o r  the  more c o s t l y  s e r v ic e s ,  and, i f  
i t  i s  r e q u i re d ,  f o r  th e  sake o f  the  whole n a t io n ,  • to  
u n d e r ta k e  p r e v e n t iv e  measures w h ich  i t s  i n h a b i t a n t s  d i s l i k e ,  
to  make roads o f  b e t t e r  q u a l i t y  than th e y  t h i n k  necessa ry , 
to  p r o v id e  sch o o ls  and c a re  o f  the c h i l d r e n  i n  excess o f  
what i s  l o c a l l y  c o n s id e re d  s u f f i c i e n t * ,  th e re  must be an 
inducem ent o r  a com pensa tion .
Through th e  g r a n ts ,  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  are a u to ­
m a t i c a l l y  b r o u g h t  under th e  s u p e r v is io n  and c o n t r o l  o f  the 
Government Departm ents  conce rned . T h e i r  a c t io n  i n  the 
g ra n t-a d d e d  s e r v ic e s  are s u b je c t  to  the c r i t i c i s m  and 
d i r e c t i o n  o f  the  a id in g  A u t h o r i t i e s .  I f  s e r v ic e s  are
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s u c c e a s f u l l y  done, th e y  re c e iv e  the s t im u lu s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
encouragem ent; i f  o m i t te d ,  th e re  is  a p e n a l t y  i n  the r e d u c t ­
i o n  o r  w i th d ra w a l  o f  g ra n ts .  The power and the  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  
o f  the  g r a n t - i n - a i d  system  can be seen i n  a com parison  between 
th e  c o u n ty  c o n s ta b u la ry  and the  i n f a n t  w e l fa re  s e rv ic e s  a t  th e  
b e g in n in g  o f  the  c e n tu r y .  i ‘he p o l ic e  s e r v ic e  had by t h a t  
t im e  reached a s a t i s f a c t o r y  c o n d i t io n ,  s im p ly  because th e  
Home O f f i c e  had the  weapon o f  Exchequer g ra n ts  to  s t im u la te  
l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  to  a t t a i n  the p r e s c r ib e d  s ta n d a rd ;  w h i le  
th e  C h i ld r e n  Act o f  1908, owing to  i t s  l a c k  o f  c o n n e c t io n  
w i th  any g r a n t - i n - a id ,  remained, l i k e  a l l  i t s  p re d e ce sso rs ,  
f o r  a lon g  t im e  a dead l e t t e r .  "D u r in g  th e  l a s t  hundred 
y e a rs ’* w r i te s  P ro fe s s o r  Hobson ’* the c e n t r a l  governm ent has 
l i t e r a l l y  bough t th e  r i g h t  to  in s p e c t ,  to  c r i t i c i s e ,  to  
s u g g e s t ,  to a u d i t ,  and to  r e g u la te  p a r t i c u l a r  s e rv ic e s  o p e ra te d  
by l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .  P o l ic e ,  e d u c a t io n ,  h o u s in g , h ighways, 
and p u b l i c  h e a l t h  c o u ld  ne ve r have r i s e n  to  t h e i r  p re s e n t  
l e v e ls  w i th o u t  the im p o s i t io n  o f  n a t io n a l  minimum s ta n d a rd s  
by the  c e n t r a l  de pa r tm en ts , e n fo rc e d  v e r y  l a r g e l y  th ro u g h  th e  
p e rs u a s iv e  power o f  the  p u rs e " .  ( l )
IV  G rants  as S e rv in g  to  D isse m in a te  th e  E x p e r ie n c e  o f  C e n t r a l  
D ep artm en ts . I n  many a f f a i r s ,  c e n t r a l  de pa r tm en ts  possess 
a b re a d th  o f  v ie w , and a v a r i e t y  o f  e xp e r ie n c e  beyond t h a t  
to  be a c q u ire d  by the a d m in is t r a to r s  o f  any l o c a l i t y ;  and th e  
p rob lem  i s  to  b r in g  a l l  th e se  q u a l i t i e s  to  he a r upon l o c a l  
a d m in is t r a t io n ,  w i th o u t  o f f e n d in g  l o c a l  autonomy o r  c u r t a i l ­
i n g  l o c a l  i n i t i a t i v e .  ( 2) J . S . M i l l ,  w i t h  t h i s  in  mind, expound­
ed the  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l  i n  h is  g re a t  essay 
*0n L i b e r t y * ,  m a in ta in in g  t h a t : -
" t h e r e  sh o u ld  be a c e n t r a l  s u p e r in te n d e n c e ,  fo rm in g  
a b ra n ch  o f  th e  g e n e ra l  governm ent, which, s h o u ld  have a r i g h t  
to  know a l l  t h a t  i s  done, and i t s  s p e e ia ld u t y  s h o u ld  be t h a t  
o f  making the knowledge a c q u ire d  i n  one p la c e  a v a i la b le  f o r  
o th e r s .  Emancipated from  the p e t t y  p r e ju d ic e s  and na rrow  
v iew s o f  a l o c a l i t y  by i t s  e le v a te d  p o s i t i o n  and com prehens ive  
sphere  o f  o b s e rv a t io n ,  i t s  a d v ice  wou ld  n a t u r a l l y  c a r r y  more 
a u t h o r i t y ,  b u t i t s  a c tu a l  power as a permmnejit i n s t i t u t i o n  
s h o u ld . . . . b e  l i m i t e d  to  c o m p e l l in g  th e  l o c a l  o f f i c e r s  to  obey 
th e  laws l a i d  down f o r  t h e i r  g u id a n c e " .
CIT W7A. Robson, TEi B r i t i s h  System o f  Government, 2nd. ed, 1945, p3C 
(2 )  Sydney Webb, op. c i t . , p. 21.
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4 s to r e  o f  i n f o r m a t io n  on q u e s t io n s  o f  l o c a l  go ve rn ­
ment i s  a v a i la b le  to  the  c e n t r a l  departm en ts  from  many 
s o u rc e s . They r e c e iv e  a g re a t  mass o f  r e p o r t s  from  Govern­
ment in s p e c to r s  w h ich  o f t e n  serve as a good g u id e  to  the  
m e r i t s  and d e m e r its  o f  d i f f e r e n t  types o f  m anagem ent,/W h ite ­
h a l l  i t s e l f  abounds i n  h i g h l y  s k i l l e d  s p e c i a l i s t s ,  whose 
ad v ice  i s  in v a lu a b le  in  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  l i n e s .  There are , 
m oreover, the d e t a i l e d  r e tu r n s  and s t a t i s t i c s  fo rw a rd e d  to  
W h i te h a l l  by th e  L o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  and 5 from  t im s  to  t im e , 
the  f in d in g s  o f  s p e c ia l  i n q u i r i e s .  {1 )  5
rescrwir
W ith  t h i s  g re a t  p w w »  o f  in fo r m a t io n ,  c e n t r a l  d e p a r t ­
ments can do much to  h e lp  lo c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .  T h is  h e lp ,  how­
e v e r  i s  n o t  always v e ry  w e l l  re c e iv e d ,  f o r  the  l o c a l  a u th o r ­
i t i e s  are je a lo u s  o f  t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  r i g h t s  o f  a d m in is t r a t ­
i v e  freedom, and are  o f t e n  p r e ju d ic e d  a g a in s t  any e x t e r n a l  
s u g g e s t io n  o r  c r i t i c i s m ,  no m a t te r  how b e n e v o le n t  the  i n t e n t ­
io n  m ig h t  be. I t  i s  notnuncommon f o r  th e  c i v i l  s e rv a n ts  who 
keep se n d in g  o rd e rs  and h in t s  and c i r c u l a r s  o f  a d v ice  to  be 
th o u g h t  o f  b y  many o f  the  lo c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  as * a body o f  
fu s s y ,  meddlesome a rm c h a ir  c r i t i c s *  who know n o th in g  b u t  
how to  c re a te  * h i g h - f a l u t i n g  th e o r ie s *  and p r e s c r ib e  im p o s s ­
i b l e  s ta n d a rd s*  f o r  l o c a l  e x p e r ts  *who have a l l  the r e a l  
know ledge*. TherW have even been some c o u n c i ls ,  i t  is  s a id ,  
where i t  was th e  custom to  o r d e r  the c l e r k  to  th ro w  a l l  th e  
d e p a r tm e n ta l  c i r c u l a r s ,  i n t o  the w a s te -p a p e r  b a s k e t ,  as 
soon as th e y  a r r i v e d .  (2 )
Th is  a t t i t u d e  i s  h a r d ly  d e fe n s ib le .  The o p in io n  o f  
th e  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y ,  though by no means a lways r i g h t ,  can 
a t  l e a s t  se rve  as a re fe re n c e  w o r th y  o f  s e r io u s  c o n te m p la t io n  
by the  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .  the l o c a l  a u th o r i tW fM j w r i t e s
Mr. Has lu c k ,  " t h a t  re g a rd s  the D epartm ents  as so many obnox­
io u s  enemies, whose o rd e rs  are re s e n te d  and whose a d v ice  i s
s c o f f e d  a t ,  i s  to  use a w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d  b u t  h i g h l y ^ i l l o g -
i c a l  p h ra s e -— * c u t t i n g  o f f  i t s  nose to  s p i t e  i t s  face*.* 
W h i te h a l l  has much o f  v a lu e  to  o f f e r  to  th e  l o c a l  a d m in is t r a t ­
o r .  W ealthy m u n i c i p a l i t i e s — -may be a b le  to  a f f o r d  to  em ploy 
e x p e r ts  who can t a l k  on e q u a l term s w i th  the  s p e c i a l i s t s  o f  
W h i te h a l l ,  b u t  i n  th e  case o f  th e  v a s t  m a jo r i t y  o f  l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s ,  i t  i s  o b v io u s  t h a t  the a r r a y  o f  t a l e n t  a t  the 
d is p o s a l  o f  th e  Departm ents must have many th in g s  to  te a ch  
th e  l o c a l  o f f i c e r s ,  however cap ab le  and e f f i c i e n t  the y  may
Tl5 See:- H as luck , opTclt.p. I2i. 
(2 )  I b i d .  p. 129.
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prove  them se lves to  be i n  d e a l in g  w i th  r o u t in e  p r o b le m s . . . .  
Harmonious c o - o p e r a t io n  between the l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  and 
W h i te h a l l  i s  n o t d i f f i c u l t ,  i t  can le a d  to  v e ry  l i t t l e  harm, 
and i n  the g re a t  m a jo r i t y  o f  cases, i t  leads  to a c o n s id e r ­
ab le  amount o f  g o o d " . ( l )
Thus, i f  e f f i c i e n c y  and economy a re  to  be p rom oted 
in  the  le s s e r  l o c a l i t i e s  where th e re  i s  a la c k  o f  q u a l i f i e d  
s p e c i a l i s t s ,  some measure must be adopted i n  o r d e r  to  ge t 
r i d  o f  l o c a l  o b s t in a c y  and p i jg u d ice . As com p le te  l o c a l  
autonomy i n  B r i t a i n  has always been accompanied by com p le te  
f i n a n c i a l  independence, th e  o n ly  th in g  t h a t  can be done to 
e n fo rc e  D e p a r tm e n ta l  i n s t r u c t i o n ,  w i th o u t  in v o k in g  s t ro n g  
l o c a l  a n t ip a th y  and in d ig n a t io n ,  is  to  ♦ b r ib e * .  I t  i s  by 
g r a n t s - i n - a id  a lone th a t  the ex tended  wisdom a t t r i b u t e d  to  
the  c e n t r a l  de partm en ts  can be p u t  s u c c e s s f u l l y  a t  the d i s ­
p o s a l  o f  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .
V. Grants as a Means o f  E n f o r c ing P a r t i c u l a r  Government 
Pol i c i e s .  A p a r t from  the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  c e n t r a l  a d m in i­
s t r a t i v e  wisdom is  h ig h e r  than t h a t  o f  a s m a l l  l o c a l i t y ,  
th e re  i s  a n o th e r  reason f o r  the use o f  Exchequer g ra n ts ,  
namely, to  gu ide  l o c a l  a d m in is t r a t i o n  i n  a d i s i r e d  d i r e c t i o n .  
S e rv ic e s  u n d e r ta k e n  by l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  may be e i t h e r  o f  
an im m edia te  b e n e f i t  o r  o f  a d i s t a n t  i n t e r e s t .  There i s ,  
however, as a r u le ,  an i n c l i n a t i o n  i n  the  l o c a l i t i e s  to  l$y 
s p e c ia l  s t r e s s  on the  fo rm e r  a t the expense o f  the  l a t t e r .  
Even i f  th e  d e p a r tm e n ta l  d i r e c t i o n  has made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  
some s o r t  o f  e x p e n d i tu re  is  p r e f e r a b le  to  a n o th e r ,  i t  i s  a 
f a c t  t h a t  • some l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  w i l l  a t  a l l  t im e s  be 
backward i n  d is c a r d in g  th e  worse and a d o p t in g  the b e t t e r  
a l t e r n a t i v e * . ( 2 )  I t  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  
the  c e n t r a l  depa rtm en ts  to  p re v e n t  tho se  l a r g e r  o r  more 
d i s t a n t  i n t e r e s t s  from b e in g  hampered by to o  much i n j u d i c i o u s  
o r  d e t r im e n ta l  l o c a l  e x p e n d i tu re  on a f f a i r s  o f  m in o r  im p o r t ­
ance. W ith  th e  h e lp  o f  a f i n a n c i a l  inducem ent, the y  may 
le a d  the l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  to  ta ke  up the morei im p o r ta n t  
ta s k  which th e y  m ig h t o th e rw is e  o v e r lo o k ,  f o r ,  a c c o rd in g  $6 
th e  r u le  t h a t  tho se  who pay the p ip e r  may have a r i g h t  to  
c a l l  the  tu n e , the  p o l i c y  o f  tae  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  may w e l l  be 
changed where th e re  ins a g r a n t - i n - a id .
nr ibid.p. i3i.
(2) S. lebb, op. cit.,p. 21.
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W ith  such an e f f e c t i v e  weapon in  t h e i r  hands, th e  
c e n t r a l  depa rtm en ts  can s u c c e s s fu l l y  encourage and d i r e c t  
s e r v ic e s  i n  a manner th e y  t h in k  d e s i r a b le  f o r  the  w e l l - b e in g  
o f  th e  community.
I n  the  f i r s t  decade o f  t h i s  c e n tu ry ,  f o r  example, 
when the  Government p a id  s p e c ia l  a t t e n t i o n  to  the im prove­
ment o f  the  Poor Law m e d ic a l  s e rv ic e s  i n  S c o t la n d ,  a la r g e  
p r o p o r t io n  o f  th e  t o t a l  g r a n t - i n - a i d  to  the  S c o t t i s h  p a r i s h  
c o u n c i ls  was d i r e c t e d  towards t h is  end. I t  was e s t im a te d  
th a t  f o r  th e  y e a r  1911 the Lunacy G ra n t^  and th e  M e d ic a l 
R e l i e f  G rant a lone , wh ich am&unted to  £115,500 and £20 ,000  
r e s p e c t i v e ly ,  c o n s t i t u t e d  more tha n  h a l f  o f  th e  t o t a l  sum 
o f  £244,0  00 a l lo c a te d  f o r  th e  whole p a r o c h ia l  s e r v ic e s ,  ( l )
The r e s u l t  was th a t  th ro u g h o u t S c o t la n d  a number o f  s c h o o ls  
f o r  t r a i n i n g  Poor Law nurses  were s e t  up im m e d ia te ly  and 
a system o f  t r a in e d  s i c k  n u rs in g  e s ta b l i s h e d .  The a d m in i­
s t r a t i o n  o f  Poor Law m e d ic a l  r e l i e f ,  b o th  in d o o r  and o u td o o r ,  
thus ga ined an im m ed ia te  and l a s t i n g  im provem ent such as 
had ne ve r been seen i n  S c o t la n d  b e fo re .
C e n t r a l  depa rtm en ts  may a lso  use Exchequer g ra n ts  
as a means o f  s o lv in g  the prob lem  o f  unemployment.' As f a r  
back as 1920, an Unemployment G ran ts  Committee was a p p o in t ­
ed to  make g ra n ts  towards works o f  p u b l i c  u t i l i t y  c a r r i e d  
o u t  by l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .  The com m ittee  had a r i g h t  to  
s e le c t  th e  schemes to  be a s s is te d  and th e  amount o f  h e lp  
to  be g iv e n .  There was a ls o  a t im e  l i m i t  w i t h i n  wh ich the  
g r a n t - a id e d  works were to be acco m p lishe d .
Th is  scheme h e lp e d  to  p r o v id e  a g r e a t  d e a l o f  work
f o r  th e  unemployed, and a t  $he same t im e  le d  l o c a l  expend­
i t u r e  tow ards a d e s i re d  end. I t  was l a t e r  ex tended, on 
s e v e r a l  o cca sp io n s^  w i th  g ra n ts  made more and more generous 
i n  o r d e r  to  cope g e n e r a l l y  w i th  an in c r e a s in g  prob lem  o f  
unemployment, and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  w i th  th e  t r a n s fe re n c e  o f  
s u r p lu s  la b o u r  from  the depressed a reas . (2 )  The campaign 
c u lm in a te d  in  the  y e a r  1930-31, when the w o r ld -w id e  eco­
nomic c r i s i s ,  f o l l o w in g  upon the p ro lo n g e d  d e p re s s io n  o f  
th e  p o s t -w a r  y e a rs ,  overwhelmed B r i t a i n ,  Thousands o f  
6 __
(1 )  I b i d ,  pp. fHe gran Ifor  m e d ic a l  r e l i e f " "  was made ""
to  each p a r is h  c o u n c i l  d i r e c t l y  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  to  i t s  a c t u a l  
e x p e n d i tu re ,  w i t h  an e x t r a  bonus f o r  th e  p r o v i s i o n  o f
t r a in e d  s i c k  n u rs in g  i n  the Po:>r Houses.
(2 )  R ep o rt o f  Jhe Committee on N a t io n a l  E x p e n d i tu re ,  1931,
Cmd. 3920, pp. 136-7 .
- 1 9 5 -
w orke rs  were d r iv e n  o u t  o f  employment, and th e  Government, 
i n  an a tte m p t to  m i t i g a t e  the e v i l  appea led to  l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  to c o o p e ra te  w i th  them i n  a v ig o ro u s  e f f o r t  
to  p ro v id e  as much work as p o s s ib le .  There were, however, 
souie s p e c ia l  n e c e s s i to u s  areas whose re s o u rc e s  were so 
d e p le te d  t h a t  i t  was v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  them to  u n d e r ta k e  
f u r t h e r  commitments, even f o r  n e ce ssa ry  s e rv ic e s ,  w i th o u t ,  
an enormous g r a n t  from  the  t r e a s u r y .  Hence, i n  J u ly ,  1930, 
a v o te  o f  £500,000 was g ra n te d  by P a r l ia m e n t  to  be used f o r  
m e e t in g  the  whole c o s t  o f  schemes o f  w ork  f o r  r e l i e v i n g  
unemployment id  these  areas d u r in g  the w in t e r .  Of t h i s  
amount, £400,000 was d i s t r i b u t e d  by the  M in i s t e r  o f  H e a l th  
to  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  s e le c te d  n e c e s s i to u s  areas i n  
Eng land and Wales, and £60,000 was a l l o c a t e d  to  S c o t la n d .
I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  note th a t  even i n  t h i s  s i t u a t ­
io n ,  the  g ra n ts  were used o n ly  to  a s s is t  works o f  p u b l i c  
n e c e s s i t y  which were o f  a n o n - re v e n u e -p ro d u c in g  c h a r a c te r ;  
and th e y  were l i a b l e  to  be w ith d ra w n  i f  th e  works were 
n o t  p r o p e r l y  execu ted . I n  o r d e r  $o encourage economy, 
the  Government a lso  dec ided  t h a t  ? i n  c a r r y in g  o u t  the schem­
es, any excess e x p e n d i tu re  o ve r  the approved e s t im a te  had 
to  be borne by th e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y ,  and any s a v in g  was to  
be r e ta in e d  by them. (1 )
Th roughou t the  h i s t o r y  o f  th e  s u b je c t ,  the  q u e s t­
io n  o f  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  l o c a l  t e x a t io n  has been r e ­
ga rded  as p re d o m in a n t ly  a q u e s t io n  o f  the  n a t i o n a l  r e l i e f  
o f  l o c a l  bu rdens . P a r l ia m e n t  and s u c c e s s iv e  Governments 
have un a n im o u s ly  c o n c e n t ra te d  t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  upon the  
e x te n t  to  w h ich , and th e  manner i n  w h ich , th e  ra te p a y e rs  
are to  be a s s is te d  by the  ta x p a y e rs .  C o n se q u e n t ly ,  th e  
Exchequer c o n t r i b u t i o n s  tow ards  l o c a l  expenses have been, 
as a r u le ,  c o n s id e re d  m a in ly  as a d e v ic e  by w h ich the 
bu rd e n  o f  r e a l i t i e s  c o u ld  be b a la n ce d  by t h a t  o f  p e rs o n a l­
t i e s .  U n t i l  r e c e n t l y  the  a d m in is t r a t i v e  s ig n i f i c a n c e  o f  
these  f i n a n c i a l  argamgaiants was g e n e r a l l y  ig n o re d .  I t  
s h o u ld  n o t ,  however, be o v e r lo o k e d ,  f o r  i t  i s  c h i e f l y  by 
means o f  the  g r a n t - i n - a i d  system  th a t  the c e n t r a l  d e p a r t ­
ments are ab le  to  e x e rc is e  t h e i r  power o f  c o n t r o l  e f f e c t ­
i v e l y .
XT) M i n i s t r y  o f  H e a lth  SeporTJ 1930, -  3l7<Tmd. 393^. pp. 171-73
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C H A P T E R  XIV.
SERVICES SUITABLE FOR EXCHEQUER GRANTS. No la rg e  S ta te  can 
a d m in is te r  a l l  i t s  s e r v ic e s  s o le l y  th ro u g h  i t s  c e n t r a l  p o l i t ­
i c a l  mechanism. E co n o m ica l and e f f i c i e n t  a d m in is t r a t io n ,  
demand some s o r t  o f  d e v o lu t io n  i n  the management o f  p u b l ic  
a f f a i r s ,  and these  n e c e s s i t a t e  some d i v i s i o n  o f  la b o u r  between 
c e n t r a l  and l o c a l  governm ent. I n  consequence an im p o r ta n t  
p ro b le m  a r is e s ,  as t o  how the  bu rdens o f  a d m in is t r a t io n  and 
f in a n c e  may be most a d va n ta g e o u s ly  a p p o r t io n e d  between th e  
two.
G e n e ra l ly  spe ak ing , i t  would appear t h a t  s e rv ic e s  w h ich  
are  o f  n a t i o n a l  im p o r ta n c e  shou ld , on p r i n c i p l e ,  be p u t  u n d e r  
the  c o n t r o l  o f  the c e n t r a l  governm ent, w h i le  those  o f  m e re ly  
l o c a l  i n t e r e s t  sh o u ld  be made a l o c a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  There 
i s ,  a ls o ,  the f i n a n c i a l  c o r o l l a r y  th a t ,  from th e  p o in t  o f  v ie w  
o f  the  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y ,  the* onerous* e x p e n d i tu re ,  t h a t  i s  the  
e x p e n d i tu re  on s e r v ic e s  which are p e rfo rm e d  i n  the i n t e r e s t  o f  
the  com m unity  a t la r g e  and do no t as a r u le  c o n fe r  any d i r e c t  
b e n e f i t  upon the  i n d i v i d u a l  ra te p a y e r  and ta x p a y e r  i n  a p a r t i c ­
u l a r  l o c a l i t y ,  s h o u ld  be met from money le v ie d  upon the who le  
n a t io n .  On the o th e r  hand, th e  ’ b e n e f i c i a l *  e x p e n d i tu re ,  i . e .  
e x p e n d i tu re  on s e r v ic e s  l o c a l l y  a d m in is te re d  w hich are d i r e c t l y  
b e n e f i c i a l  e i t h e r  to  the  i n d i v i d u a l  ra te p a y e r  o r  to  h is  immed­
i a t e  n e ig h b o u rh o o d >s h o u ld  p r o p e r l y  be d e fra y e d  o u t  o f  the  fu n d  
c o n t r i b u t e d  by th e  l o c a l  i n h a b i t a n t s . ( 1) I n  o th e r  words, the  
d e s id e r a ta  as between n a t i o n a l  and l o c a l  f in a n c e ,  as Lord  
F a r r e r  p o in te d  o u t  f i f t y  y e a rs  ago, a re ; t h a t  n a t i o n a l  r e c e ip t s  
and n a t io n a l  e x p e n d i tu re  sh o u ld ,  so f a r  as p o s s ib le ,  be k e p t  
d i s t i n c t  from lo c a l  r e c e ip t s  and l o c a l  e x p e n d i tu re ;  and t h a t  
the  a u t h o r i t y  which re c e iv e s  taxe s  s h o u ld  be re s p o n s ib le  f o r  
t h e i r  e x p e n d i tu re ,  and, p e r  c o n t r a , th a t  the a u t h o r i t y  w h ich  
a d m in is te rs  the  e x p e n d i tu re  sh o u ld  c o l l e c t  and have c o n t r o l  
o f  the  taxes  o u t  o f  w h ich  i t  i s  p a id .  (2 )
(1J Report by Sir is. H a m il to n  and Sir G. M u rra y , Cd.6387 
1901, p. 123.
(2 )  G .9 5 2 8 /1 8 9 9 ,p . 69. The R oya l Commission o f  1869 a lso  
fo rm u la te d  th e  same p h i lo s o p h y  in  words w hich have become 
c l a s s i c ; " P u b l ic  e x p e n d i tu re  sh o u ld  be c h i e f l y  c j n t r o l l e d  by 
th o se  who c o n t r ib u t e  to  i t .  Whatever con ce rn s  the whole 
n a t io n  must be d e a l t  w i th  n a t i o n a l l y  w h i le  w h a te ve r  concerns 
o n ly  a d i s t r i c t  must be d e a l t  w i th  by the  d i s t r i c t " . Q u o t e d  by 
S i r  George Newman, The H e a l th  o f  th e  P eop le , A C e n tu ry  in  
M u n ic ip a l  P ro g re s s ,  pp. 164-165.
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I n  t h i s  way the most econom ica l and e q u i t a b le  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  c a p i t a l  o v e r  th e  c o u n t r y  can be secured , and the r e l a t i o n  
o f  c e n t r a l  and l o c a l  f in a n c e  most r e a d i l y  s i m p l i f i e d .
On these p r i n c i p l e s ,  i t  i s  r i g h t  t h a t  th e  g re a t  
n a t i o n a l  s e r v ic e s  such as the management o f  f o r e ig n  p o l i c y ,  
the  m a in tenance  o f  the  armed fo r c e s ,  the p o s t a l  s e r v ic e ,  the 
c e n t r a l  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  j u s t i c e ,  and o th e r  f u n c t io n s  o f  a 
l i k e  n a t i o n a l  c h a ra c te r ,  s h o u ld  be a d m in is te re d  by the n a t io n ­
a l  government and f in a n c e d  o u t  o f  g e n e ra l  ta xe s  p a id  by the 
whole n a t io n ;  and t h a t ,  on the  o th e r  hand, s e r v ic e s  such as 
p a v in g  and l i g h t i n g  the  s t r e e t s ,  w a te r  s u p p l ie s ,  c e m e te r ie s ,  
m a rk e ts ,  b a th s ,  p a rk s ,  l i b r a r i e s  and museums, e t c . ,  wh ich  are 
m a in ly  o f  l o c a l  i n t e r e s t ,  sh o u ld  be d is c h a rg e d  by l o c a l  
b o d ie s  and p a id  f o r  by r a te s  le v ie d  on the l o c a l  in h a b i t a n t s .
A l l  cases, however, are no t so e a s i l y  d e a l t  w i th .
T a k in g  th e  whole range o f  p u b l ic  s e r v ic e s  i n t o  c o n s id e r a t io n ,  
i t  i s  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  no t e n t i r e l y  im p o s s ib le ,  to  draw 
any l o g i c a l  and p r e c is e  l i n e  between the a p p r o p r ia te  o b je c ts  
o f  n a t i o n a l  and l o c a l  e x p e n d i tu re .  Between the two c la s s e s  
o f  a d m in is t r a t i v e  a c t io n  in d ic a t e d  above, th e re  i s  a g re a t  
v a r i e t y  o f  s u b je c ts  wh ich  are  p a r t l y  n a t i o n a l  and p a r t l y  
l o c a l ,  and w h ich  i t  i s  im p o s s ib le  to  f i t  i n t o  e i t h e r  o f  the 
above groups. The s a n i t a r y  s ta t e  o f  any d i s t r i c t ,  f o r  example, 
i s  o f  g re a t  im p o r ta n c e  to  the h e a l th  o f  th e  group o f  p e rso n s  
i n h a b i t i n g  the  d i s t r i c t ,  and y e t  i t  i s  a ls o  a m a t te r  o f  s e r io u s  
co n ce rn  to  t h e i r  ne ig h b o u rs  o r  even the whole community, 
ow ing to  the  ten de ncy  o f  many d is e a s e s  to  s p re a d .  S i m i l a r l y ,  
i n  the case o f  th e  p o l ic e  s e r v ic e ,  the i n h a b i t a n t s  o f  a l o c a l ­
i t y  have o b v io u s ly  a s p e c ia l  i n t e r e s t  i n  the re p re s s io n  and 
d e t e c t io n  o f  c r im e  w i t h i n  t h e i r  l o c a l i t y ,  b u t  i t  i s  a ls o  a 
m a t te r  o f  g re a t  con ce rn  to  the  whole com munity t h a t  no p la c e  
i n  the c o u n t ry  sh o u ld  h a rb p u r  law  b re a k e rs  o r  a l lo w  f a c i l i t i e s  
f o r  t h e i r  o p e r a t io n s .  (1 }
A p a r t  fro m  the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i n  the  
case o f  s e r v ic e s  o f  an in te r m e d ia te  c h a ra c te r ,m o re o v e r ,  
o p in io n  as to  the n a tu re  o f  the s e r v ic e s  the m se lve s  changes 
as a r e s u l t  o f  a l t e r e d  s o c ia l ,  p o l i t i c a l  and economic c o n d i t ­
io n s .  Modern means o f  com m un ica t ion , f o r  in s ta n c e ,  t o g e th e r  
w i t h  the  in c r e a s in g  m o b i l i t y  o f  th e  p e o p le  have b ro u g h t  i t
nr See P r o f . S id g w ick *  s answers to  tEe q u e s t io n s  p u t  by  ~ 
the R oya l Commission on L o c a l  T a x a t io n ,C ,  9528/1899, p. 106.
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about t h a t  some s e rv ic e s  which were fo r m e r ly  rega rded  
as t y p i c a l l y  l o c a l  have g r a d u a l ly  become n a t i o n a l  o r  semi­
n a t i o n a l  i n  c h a ra c te r .  Thus i n  the 17th and 18th c e n tu r ie s ,  
when in te r c o u r s e  between peop le  o f  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  the  
com munity was d i f f i c u l t  and ra r e ,  a l l  the s e r v ic e s  a d m in i­
s te r e d  by lo c a j.  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  B r i t a i n  were p r a c t i c a l l y i 
re g a rd e d , n o t  i n a p p r o p r ia t e l y ,  as m e re ly  l o c a l  concerns." 
P oo r r e l i e f  and p u b l i c  h e a l t h  s e r v ic e s ,  now c o n s id e re d  as 
p re d o m in a n t ly  o f  n a t i o n a l  im p o rta n ce , were then  the  s o le  
c a re  o f  p a r o c h ia l  o v e rs e e rs  and p a id  f o r  o u t  o f  p a r o c h ia l  
fu n d s .  I t  was o n ly  when pe op le  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  a d e f i c ie n c y  
i n  c e r t a i n  s e r v ic e s  i n  any l o c a l i t y  c o u ld  th r e a te n  tne 
s e c u fc i ty  and w e l fa r e  o f  the whole com munity th a t  p u b l i c  
o p in io n  began to  re g a rd  them as n a t i o n a l  o r  s e m i- n a t io n a l  
s e r v ic e s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  the  s e r v ic e s  w h ich  are now deemed to  
be b e n e f i c i a l  o n ly  to  p a r t i c u l a r  l o c a l i t i e s  may, i n  due 
co u rse  o f  t im e , a lso  c la im  the r i g h t  to be g r a n t - a id e d  
because o f  t h e i r  e v e r -g ro w in g  im p o r ta n c e .  The f o l l o w in g  
e x t r a c t  from a c u r r e n t  w r i t e r  se rves  as a comment on t h i s  
p o in t .  ( 1)
. . . . E v e n  in  such a m a t te r  as s t r e e t  l i g h t i n g ,  
though the  m a jo r  p a r t  o f  th e  b e n e f i t  goes to 
r e s id e n ts  i n  the  im m edia te  v i c i n i t y ,  i t  may be 
taken as t r u e  t h a t  an E ng lishm an exp ec ts  to 
f i n d  adequate l i g h t i n g  i n  the th o ro u g h fa re s  o f  
eve ry  u rban  c e n t re  t h a t  he has to  v i s i t  f o r  
pu rposes o f  b u s in e s s  o r  p le a s u re .  I t  i s ,  i n  
f a c t ,  r a t h e r  h a rd  to  f i n d  much i n  th e  way o f  
a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  i s ? p u r e ly  l o c a l  i n t e r e s t  and 
concern , PMrhaps the most d e f i n i t e l y  l o c a l i s e d  
o f  m u n ic ip a l  a c t i v i t i e s  are th o s e  co n n e c te d  
w i th  m e re ly  p le a s u r e a b le  a m e n it ie s — - t h e  p r o v is io n  
o f  o rn a m e n ta l p a rk s ,  c o n c e r ts  and e n te r ta in m e n ts ,  
and t e n n is - c o u r t s ,  b o w lin g  g reens, and b a th in g  
p o o ls .  But even he re  i t  may be argued t h a t  the 
p r o v i s io n  o f  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  s p o r ts  and games, 
m u s ic a l  and d ra m a t ic  c u l t u r e ,  and even such 
r e la x a t io n  as i s  a f fo rd e d  by th e  o f f e r  o f  b e a u t i f u l  
f lo w e r -g a rd e n s  and s e a s id e  c o n c e r t - p a r t i e s ,  i s  
a m a t te r  o f  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t .
ITJ 27 L. Has lu c k ,  op. c l  t7 7 ~Pp7 216177
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Thus,many o f  the  s e r v ic e s  a d m in is te re d  by l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  have a tendency  to  become i n c r e a s in g l y  o f  
n a t i o n a l  concern , and may even, f i n a l l y ,  be t r a n s f e r r e d  to 
th e  c a re  o f  the C e n t r a l  Government. M eanwhile , d u r in g  
th e  p rocess  o f  s lo w  and g ra d u a l  t r a n s i t i o n ,  the  l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  face  a c o m p l ic a te d  s i t u a t i o n .  They have to  be 
re s p o n s ib le  f o r  v a r io u s  k in d s  o f  s e rv ic e s - -s o m e  a d m in is te re d  
a t  t h e i r  own d i s c r e t i o n ,  and some r e q u i r e d  and, i n  a 
c e r t a i n  degree, c o n t r o l l e d  by the  Government. " L o c a l  a u th o r ­
i t i e s " ,  w r i t e s  P ro fe s s o r  Cannan, "p e r fo rm  sojie s e rv ic e s ,  
e . g . ,  re fu s e  and sewage rem ova l^  the b e n e f i t  o f  which i s  
a lm o s t c o n f in e d  to  the  l o c a l i t y .  They p e r fo rm  o th e r  s e r v ic e s  
e . g . » the p r o v i s io n  o f  p o l i c e ,  which is  o f  p r im a ry  b e n e f i t  
to  the  l o c a l i t y ,  b u t i s  a ls o  <af g r e a t  b e n e f i t  to  the r e s t  
o f  the  c o u n t ry  and w o r ld .  They p e r fo rm  a t h i r d  s e t  o f  
s e r v ic e s ,  e . g . ,  th e  p r o v i s io n  o f  a n i g h t ’ s bo a rd  and 
lo d g in g  f o r  v a g ra n ts ,  which are o f  no s p e c ia l  b e n e f i t  to  
th e  l o c a l i t y ,  b u t  are o f  b e n e f i t  to  the com m unity at 
l a r g e " .  (1)
I n  the pe rfo rm ance  o f  s e r v ic e s  i n  w h ich a p redom in ­
a n t sha re  o f  th e  b e n e f i t  can be d i r e c t l y  t r a c e d  to  pe rsons 
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  a rea, the l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  i s  
i t s e l f ,  the m a s te r .  I t  i s  o b l ig e d  to  pay f o r  th e se  s e rv ic e s  
e n t i r e l y  from lo c a l  fu n d s ,  and thu s  l e f t  f r e e  to  manage 
them a c c o rd in g  to  i t s  own d i s c r e t i o n  and i n i t i a t i v e .  On 
th e  o th e r  hand, i n  th e  p e rfo rm an ce  o f  s e r v ic e s  o f  n a t i o n a l  
o r  s e m i- n a t io n a l  im p o rta n c e  such as e d u c a t io n ,  p o l i c e ,  
e t c . ,a l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  i s  a * q u a s i c o n t r a c t o r  w i t h  the  
S ta te *  (2) and The Government kas a r i g h t  to  i n s i s t  on 
t h e i r  b e in g  c a r r i e d  o u t  w i th  a c e r t a i n  s ta n d a rd  o f  e f f i c ­
ie n c y .  But as the re q u ire m e n ts  o f  the Goverhment o f t e n  
cause s u b s t a n t ia l  in c re a s e s  i n  e x p e n d i tu re ,  i t  wou ld  be 
g r o s s ly  in e q u i t a b le  to  f in a n c e  them e n t i r e l y  o u t  o f  l o c a l  
fu n d # . The S ta te  sh o u ld  c o n t r i b u t e  the whole o r  a p a r t  
o f  the c o s t  o f  th e  s e r v ic e s  in  accordance w i th  th e  degree 
o f  t h e i r  im p o r ta n ce  to  th e  n a t io n  and w i t h  the need o f  
th e  l o c a l i t y .
( l j  C. 952371899,p . 174.
(2 )  F in a l  R e p o rt  o f  the  D e p a rtm e n ta l Com m ittee on 
L o c a l  T a x a t io n ,  Cd. 7315/1914, p. 11.
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Thus, the c la s s  o f  s e r v ic e s  s u i t a b le  f o r  Exchequer 
g ra n ts  i s  one in te r m e d ia te  between the s e r v ic e s  which are 
c a r r i e d  o u t  and c o n t r o l l e d  a lm ost e n t i r e l y  by l o c a l  a u t h o r i ­
t i e s  i n  the  i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  l o c a l i t i e s  and the 
s e r v ic e s  w h ich  are c a r r i e d  ou t e n t i r e l y  by the S ta te  i n  the 
i n t e r e s t s  o f  the n a t io n  as a who le . These s e r v ic e s  are 
c h a r a c te r iz e d  by the f a c t  th a t  w h i le  th e y  are a d m in is te re d  by 
l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  the  S ta te  has at the  same t im e  a s u f f i c i e n t  
i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e i r  e f f i c i e n c y  to  j u s t i f y  a c la im  to  s u p e rv is e  
t h e i r  a d m in is t r a t io n .
I n  v ie w  o f  th e  c o n s id e r a t io n s  o u t l i n e d  above, i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  enumerate w i th  p r e c i s io n  w hich s e r v ic e s ,  now i n  
th e  hands o f  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  ought to  be long  to  t h i s  c la s s .  
F o r  the  t im e  b e in g , as lo n g  as p u b l i c  o p in io n  i s  s t i l l  a g a in s t  
too much c e n t r a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  i t  i s  f a i r l y  sa fe , to  say t h a t  
the  g r a n t - a id e d  s e r v ic e s  s h o u ld  n o t  be extended  too  f a s t .  I t  
sh o u ld  no t be o v e r lo o k e d  th a t  tha  l o c a l  r a t e  i s  the o n ly  
s o u rce  o f  revenue which a l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  can c la im  as i t s  
own, and t h a t  c o n t r o l  o f  revenue i s  a v i t a l  e lem en t in  
d e te rm in in g  the e x te n t  o f  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  and a d m in is t r a t i v e  
f r le d o m .  I n  making b e n e f i c i a l  e x p e n d i tu re  e n t i r e l y  a l o c a l  
cha rge , l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  can a t  le a s t  p re s e rv e  a c o m p le te ly  
f r e e  a d m in is t r a t i o n  i n  th e se  s e l f - s u p p o r te d  s e r v ic e s .  No 
Exchequer s u b v e n t io n  i s  d e s i r a b le  i n  t h i s  rea lm  o f  lo w a l 
governm ent so lo n g  as i t s  absence does n o t impose too  g r e a t  a 
burden on the r a te - p a y e r s .  I n  consequence, t a k in g  i n t o  con­
s id e r a t i o n  f i n a n c i a l  e q u i t y  and a b i l i t y  on th e  one hand, and 
a d m in is t r a t i v e  freedom on the  o th e r ,  i t  would appear t h a t  
the  s e r v ic e s  w hich a t p re s e n t  sh o u ld  be re g a rd e d  as most 
s u i t a b le  f o r  l i b e r a l  a s s is ta n c e  from  th e  E xchequer are as 
f o l lo w s  : -
1
a) P o l i c e ;
b) E d u c a t io n  ( a l l  b ranches)
C) Main Roads;
d) H ous ing  f o r  p o o re r  w o rke rs  and i n  backward r e g io n s ;
(e )  Town and C o u n try  P la n n in g ;  and
( f )  That p a r t  o f  th e  p u b l i c  h e a l th  s e r v ic e s  which i s
s t i l l  o p e ra te d  by l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .
;i T I / .
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The g r a n t s - i n - a id ,  employed i n  the  l a s t  hundred y e a rs  
as o u t l i n e d  above, hav4 been bo th  e x te n s iv e  i n  scope and r i c h  
i n  v a r i e t y ,  and have been s u b je c t  to  c o n s ta n t  r e v is io n  and ad­
ju s tm e n t  i n  accordance w i th  the needs and e x p e d ie n c ie s  o f  th e  
t im e . In  s p i t e  o f  t h e i r  In c o n s id e ra b le  c o m p le x i ty ,  however, 
th e re  are s e v e r a l  main fo rm s i n t o  w h ich  the  g r a n ts  may be 
c l a s s i f i e d .  Some o f  the systems may be e x c e l le n t  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
b u t  bad i n  p r a c t i c e .  O the rs  may be u s e f u l  to  serve  one end, 
y e t  u n d e s i r a b le  when a p p l ie d  to  the  o th e r .  There are, m o reove r 
accompanying the o p e r a t io n  o f  each system, a g re a t  number o f  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  JhSxpected by i t s  ad voca tes . I t  may, th e r e fo r e ,  be 
p r o f i t a b l e  to  c o n s id e r  some o f  th e  advantages and d isa d va n ta g e s  
o f  the  v a r io u s  fo rm s, ta ke n  by the B r i t i s h  g r a n t - i n - a id .
1^ The Percentage G ra n t S ystem. The p e rc e n ta g e  g ra n t  system
o p e ra te s  th ro u g h  a g ra n t  to  the  L o c a l A u t h o r i t y  e q u iv a le n t  to  
a s p e c i f i e d  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  i t s  n e t  approved e x p e n d i tu re  upon 
the  p a r t i c u l a r  s e r v ic e  u n d e r c o n s id e r a t io n .  T h is  system has, 
i n  the  p a s t ,  been most p o p u la r l y  used and re g a rd e d  as compara­
t i v e l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  i n  p r a c t i c e .  I t  has co ve red  a v e ry  b road  
f i e l d  o f  l o c a l  government s e r v ic e s ,  B e fo re  the  passage o f  the  
1929 A c t, a lm os t the  whole o f  the  p u b l i c  h e a l th  s e rv ic e s  p r o ­
v id e d  by l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  were g r a n t - a id e d  on a p e rce n ta g e  
b a s is .  At p re s e n t ,  i t  i s  l i b e r a l l y  used, i n t e r  a l i a  i n  road 
m a in tenance  and road  im provem ent. The c h a r t  b e lo w  shows fcow 
t h i s  system is  s t i l l  i n  ample u s e . (1 )
C o n t r o l  A u t h o r i t y G ra n t -a id e d  S e rv ic e P e rce n ta g e .
M i n i s t r y  odt E d u ca t­ p h y s ic a l  t r a i n i n g  &
io n . r e c r e a t io n 50
Museums f o r  e x h ib i t s  
P r o v is io n  o f  m i l k  &
50
meals
E s ta b l is h m e n t  & e q u ip ­
ment o f  p rem ises  & 
t r a n s p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s  
f o r  the p r o v i s i o n  o f
100
me a ls
Emergency t r a i n i n g  f o r
100
te a c h e rs 100
Removal o f  a i r - r a i d  
s h e l t e r s  & te m p o ra ry
de fen ce  works 100
nr ITSiefly based on C la r k e ,Outlines of L o c a l  Government o f  
th e  U n i te d  Kingdom, 16 th  ed., 19 49,
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C o n t r o l  A u t h o r i t y G ra n t -a id e d  S e rv ic e P ercen tage .
M i n i s t r y  o f  H e a lth P o * i  H e a lth  Expenses 
R u ra l  r e c o n d i t io n in g  
B u i ld in g  s o c ie t y  lo s s e s  
R u ra l  w a te r  s u p p l ie s  
Loc a l  h e a l t h  s e rv ic e s  
under N a t io n a l  H e a lth  
S e rv ic e  Act. 1946.
50
50
50
v a r ia b le  
50 L2±
M i n i s t r y  o f  A g r i ­
c u l t u r e  and f i s h e r ­
ie s
Cost o f  a d m in is t r a t io n  
o f  County A g r i c u l t u r a l  
Commi t te e s  
S m a ll H o ld in gs
A g r i c u l t u r a l  e d u c a t io n - -  
C a p i t a l  c o s t  
Annual expenses 
Compensation f o r  s la u ­
g h te r  o f  tu b e r c u lo s is  
c a t t l e
Land d ra in a g e  works
100
Pre 1926 schemes, 
100$ annual lo s s  
P os t 1926 schemes, 
75$ annua l lo s s .
75 *
66 2 /3
75
Up to  3 3 -1 /3 $  c o s t  
o f  approved works.
M i n i s t r y  o f  Labour J u v e n i le  employment 
c e n tre s 75
Home O f f i c e P o l ic e  & Pensions 
T r a in in g  p r o b a t io n  
o f f i c e r s
O th e r  p r o b a t io n  expen­
d i t u r e
Approved sch o o ls
50
100
4 7 f  to  48f
50
t r e a s u r y R e g is te r  o f  e le c t o r s to
Development Com­
m is s io n e rs
Development o f  econom­
i c  re so u rce s v a r ia b le  Jdfri
M i n i s t r y  o f  T rans­
p o r t
Road fun d  l ic e n c e s  & 
r e g i s t r a t i o n
Roads and b r id g e s -----
County m a in te n a n c e ; 
C lass  I  
C lass  11 
C lass  I I I
C o n s t r u c t io n  & im p ro ­
vement
Dua l c a r r ia g e w a y s  and 
c y c le  t ra c k s  
R e c o n s t ru c t in g  p r i v a t e  
b r id g e s
100
75
60
50
33 to  85 
60 -  75 
75
(2 )  See above C h .X I s e c t ,  v l .  See a p pen d ix 4
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C o n t r o l  A u t h o r i t y G ra n t -a id e d  S e rv ic e Perc entage.
F re e in g  t o l l  b r id g e s 75
W eigh ing m achines-----
C a p i t a l  c o s t 25
M a in tenanc e 50
P o r ta b le  w e ig h b r id g e s
( c o u n t ie s  o n ly * 60
T r a f f i c  s ig n a ls  ( c o s t
& m a in tenance 50
P e d e s t r ia n  c ro s s in g s 60
F re e in g  t o l l s :
C lass  I 75
C lass  I I 60
C lass  I I I 50
M a jo r  road ahead s ig n s
(e x c e p t  c o u n ty  boroughs)
C1 as s I *^r
C lass  I I 60
C lass  I I I 50
Speed l i m i t  s ig n s  (e x c e p t
c o u n ty  bo roughs) 60
Snowploughs & ad apt h i  io n  o f
v e h ic le s  t h e r e f o r 50
S a la ry  & t r a v e l l i n g  expenses
o f  h ighw ay s u rv e y o rs 50
R e g is t r a t i o n  & L ic e n s in g  o f .
v e h ic le s 100
M i n i s t r y  o f  T rans­
p o r t  ( c o n t * d ;
V a r ia b le  b o th  
i n  p e r io d s  & 
i te m s :  25-90( 4)
M i n i s t r y  o f  Town & 
C o u n try  P la n n in g
E x p e n d itu re  on a c q u i s i t i o n  
& C le a r in g  o f  la n d  f o r  r e ­
deve lopm ent under 1947 Act
Some advantages o f  t h i s  system are  o b v io u s .  As i t  i s  a 
ty p e  o f  d i r e c t  g ra n t  earmarked i n  each case f o r  a s p e c i f ie d  
s e r v ic e ,  the government d e pa r tm en ts  can a d ju s t  i t ,  w i th  g r e a t  
d i s c r im in a t i o n ,  i n  such a way as to  encourage th e  deve lopm ent 
o f  th e  s e r v ic e  in  any d e s ire d  d i r e c t i o n .  They can s t im u la te  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  l o c a l i t y  to  c a r r y  o u t  a s p e c ia l  s e r v ic e ,  and can 
even e n fo rc e  a desirab lA  re fo rm  which wou ld n o t  o th e rw is e  be 
r e a l i s e d .  Thus? a t one t im e  th e y  may a f f o r d  s p e c ia l  f i n a n c i a l  
f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  slum c le a ra n c e ,  w h i l s t  a t a n o th e r  th e  sewerage 
and the  sewage d is p o s a l  may r e q u i r e  s p e c ia l  a t t e n t i o n .  Under 
t h i s  system o f  g ra n ts ,  m oreover, though th e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  
a p p ro v a l  o f  e x p e n d i tu re ,  the  c e n t r a l  d e p a r tm e n ts  are ab le  to  
s u p e rv is e  e f f e c t i v e l y  the  s e r v ic e s  which th e y  s u b s id is e ,  and 
r e q u i r e  th a t  a c e r t a i n  s ta n d a rd  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  s h o u ld  be m ain­
ta in e d .  In  a word, the  P ercen tage  G ran t System i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
u s e f u l  f o r  s e c u r in g  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  the a d m in is t r a t i o n  
o f  v i t a l  s e r v ic e s ,  and f o r  encouSlng l o c a ^ l  e x p e r im e n ts  i n  the  
i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  community.
aad?* cii . i x  5<§g^ r : ------------------------------------------------------------
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At the same t im e , the system has the advantage o f  en­
a b l in g  go-ahead a u t h o r i t i e s  to  p la n  t h e i r  main s e r v ic e s  b o ld l y  
w i t h o u t  h a v in g  to  b e a r  a c r i p p l i n g  f i n a n c i a l  bu rde n . Where the 
enormous c o s t  o f  a g r e a t  and im p o r ta n t  u n d e r ta k in g  i s  beyond the
powers o f  o r d in a r y  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  the o f f e r  o f  a h igh  p e rce n ­
tage  g r a n t  i s  o f  g re a t  v a lu e .  W ith  a c e r t a i n  f i x e d  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  
the  e x p e n d i tu re  borne by the S ta te ,  the l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  are 
a b le  to e s t im a te  the n e t  f i n a n c i a l  e f f e c t  upon the l o c a l  r a te s  o f  
any new scheme, and, as th e y  are a ided  on a c o s t  b a s is ,  th e y  tend 
to  p r o v id e  the s p e c i f i e d  s e r v ic e  as a d e q u a te ly  and e f f i c i e n t l y  as 
p o s s ib le  i n  o r d e r  to  g a in  a g r e a te r  s u b s id y .  As a r e s u l t ,  trfe 
P e rce n ta g e  G ra n t System i s  r e a l l y  the most p o w e r fu l  means by 
w h ich  the Government can e n fo rc e  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  pe rfo rm ance  o f  
t h e i r  p o l i c y  i n  l o c a l  a d m in is t r a t io n .
There is  a f u r t h e r  advantage in v o lv e d  i n  t h i s  method o f
m ak ing  g ra n ts .  I t  tends to  in c re a s e  P a r l ia m e n ta ry  s o n t r o l  o v e r
th e  Government depa rtm en ts  wh ich  make the g r a n ts  and i n d i r e c t l y  
o v e r  l o c a l  government i n  g e n e ra l .  L o ca l a u t h o r i t i e s  o f t e n  argue 
t h a t  P a r l ia m e n t  does n o t  c o n t r o l  l o c a l  e x p e n d i tu re  as i t  a lways 
does in  the  case o f  the  c e n t r a l l y  a d m in is te re d  s e rv ic e s .  I n  r e s ­
p e c t  o f  the e x p e n d i tu re  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  a d m in is t r a t io n ,  P a r l ia m e n t  
i n s i s t s  on the  re q u ire m e n t  th a t  the M in i s t e r  o f  the  Crown con­
ce rn e d  s h a l l  be r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  a l l  p ro p o s a ls  f o r  in c re a s e d  
ch a rg e s , as w e l l  as d e t a i l e d  e s t im a te s .  But a B i l l  im p o s in g  
cha rges  on the ra te s  may be p rom oted  by a p r i v a t e  member, and 
passed w i th o u t  any e s t im a te  o f  th e  expense in v o lv e d  b e in g  sub­
m i t t e d ;  and e x p e n d i tu re  may be fo r c e d  upon J lo c  a l  a u t h o r i t y  by a 
governm ent ^departm ent w i th o u t  P a r l ia m e n t ’ s knsw ing  a n y th in g  o f  
th e  m a t te r .  Here the use o f  the p e rc e n ta g e  g r a n t  w h ich r e q u i r e s  
the  annua l v o te  o f  the  House o f  Commons enab les  P a r l ia m e n t  to 
e x e rc is e  a c o n t r o l  o v e r  the a c t io n  o f  governm ent d e pa r tm en ts  i n  
re g a rd  to  the  l o c a l  s e r v ic e s  a f f e c te d ,  and o v e r  the  l o c a l  expend­
i t u r e  on these s e r v ic e s  g e n e r a l l y . (1 )
I n  s p i t e  o f  the  m e r i t s  s t a t e j  above, th e  p e rce n ta g e  g r a n t  
system  is ^ n e s e r th e le s s ,  open to c r i t i c i s m .  I t  may in d uce  the  
l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  to  a d m in is te r  t h e i r  s e r v ic e s  w i t h  the  o b je c t  o f  
e a rn in g  as much g r a n t  as p o s s ib le  r a t h e r  than  o f  p ro m o t in g  the  
b e s t  i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  s e r v ic e .  At l e a s t ,  the  system has been a 
c o n t r i b u t o r y  cause o f  th e  w i l l in g n e s s  o f  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  to  
embark on e xp ens ive  p r o je c t s .
The Geddes Com m ittee on N a t io n a l  E x p e n d i tu re  (2 )  unanim­
o u s ly  a s s e r te d  in  1922 t h a t  i t  was the deve lopm en t o f  the
( i y  P in a l  K e p o rt  oT  the  D e p a r tm e n ta l  Committee on L o c a l  T a x a t io n *  
Cd. 7315/1914, p. 22.
(2 )  See above^ j )^ ) . /V O - I fX .
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p e rc e n ta g e  g ra n t  system which had m a t e r i a l l y  a f f e c te d  the b u r ­
den o f  the  ta x p a y e r  d u r in g  the  p e r io d  between 1913 and 1922.
They condemned i t  as a m oney-spend ing  d e v ic e .  "The v ic e  o f  the  
p e rc e n ta g e  g ra n t  sys tem ", th e y  a l le g e d ,  " i s  t h a t  th e  l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t y ,  w h ich  a lone  can r e a l l y  p r a c t i c e  economy in  those 
s e r v ic e s ,  lo se s  much o f  i t s  in c e n t i v e  to  reduce e x p e n d i tu re ,  
e s p e c ia l l y  when the l a r g e r  p r o p o r t io n  i s  p a id  by the ta x p a y e r  
th ro u g h  the E xcheq ue r" .  (1 )
The system was a ls o  s a id  to  be l i a b l e  to  weaken th e  con­
t r o l  o f  government d e p a r tm e n ts  o v e r  the commitments o f  l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  on g r a n t - a id e d  s e r v ic e s ,  as the  d e c id in g  v o ic e  as 
to  how much money s h o u ld  be spe n t was t h a t  o f  the  l o c a l  a u th o r ­
i t i e s ,  n o t  th a t  o f  the  Government o r  P a r l ia m e n t .  I t  was th e r e f o r e  
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  the Government to  frame t h e i r  e s t im a te s  o f  expend­
i t u r e  i n  the g r a n t - a id e d  s e r v ic e s  owing to  the  f a c t  t h a t  these  
were based on a n t i c i p a t i o n s  n o t o f  what the  d e p a r tm e n t i t s e l f  
w ou ld  do, bu t o f  what hundreds o f  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  m ig h t do. (2 )
n j c  371581719227" p 7 l0 5 l
( 2 ) D u r in g  th e  second, re a d in g  o f  the  Economy (M is c e l la n e o u s  P ro -  
v i s i o n s )  B i l l ,  March 18 th , 1926, Mr. C h u r c h i l l ,  then C h a n c e l lo r  
o f  the  Exchequer, condemned the p e rc e n ta g e  g r a n t  system  and 
exp ressed  the Government’ s i n t e n t i o n  to  adopt a b lo c k  g ra n t  
sys tem  as f o l l o w s t h e  g ra n ts  are, as I  say, m o s t ly  based 
upon the  pe rce n ta g e  system . More than  h a l f  th e  money i s  s u p p l ie d  
by th e  T re a s u ry  in  accordance w i th  Acts o f  P a r l ia m e n t .  N e a r ly  th e  
whole a d m in is t r a t i o n  i s  i n  the hands o f  th e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  
s u b je c t  to  Government r e g u la t io n s ,  in s p e c t io n ,  a u d i t ,  e tc .  I n  
consequence, the  e x p e n d i tu re  a p a r t  from l e g i s l a t i o n  to  a l t e r  th e  
s c a le  o f  g ra n ts  i s  l a r g e l y  u n c o n t r o l l a b le .  The l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  
c a l l  the tune  and i t  o n ly  rem ains to  c a l c u la t e  the  p e rce n ta g e  
upon w hich the  Exchequer pays the p ip e r .  I  t h i n k  I  am j u s t i f i e d  
i n  s a y in g  i t  i s  a v e r y  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  f i e l d .  I t  i s  the c o n s id e re d  
p o l i c y  o f  H is M a je s ty ’ s G overnnent to  c o n v e r t  the  system o f  p e r ­
cen tage  g ra n ts  in t o  a system o f  b lo b k  g ra n ts ,  t h a t  is  to  say, to  
pay d e f i n i t e  sums in s te a d  o f  p e rce n ta g e s  to  the  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  
to  g iv e  those a u t h o r i t i e s  in c re a s e d  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  powers, to  
make them re s p o n s ib le  f o r  any e x tra va g a n ce  o r  any u n d u ly  b o ld  
e n t e r p r i s e  to  wh ich the y  may commit th e m se lve s , and to  g iv e  them 
100 p e r  c e n t  o f  any economies th e y  may them se lves  be a b le  to  
e f f e c t . . .  . t h e  o n ly  aim which  the Government have i s  to  p r o t e c t  
th e  Exchequer f ro m  an i n d e f i n i t e  and an u n c o n t r o l l e d ! #  in c re a s e  
i n  th e  f u t u r e  i n  t h i s  s p h e re , . . .  "See Hansard 193, c . 285.
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A n o th e r o b je c t io n  f r e q u e n t l y  ra is e d  a g a in s t  the p e rc e n ­
tage g r a n t  system is  th a t^ a s  most o f  the  g ra n ts  are based on 
approved e x p e n d i tu re ,  i t  i s  l i a b l e  to  e n t a i l  d e t a i l e d  s u p e r v is ­
i o n  on the  p a r t  o f  governm ent d e pa r tm en ts . A d e t a i l e d  s c r u t i n y  
o f  l o c a l  government accounts and a c a r e f u l  e x a m in a t io n  o f  a l l  
new e x p e n d i tu re  would tend  to  o v e r lo a d  the c e n t r a l  machine and 
d im in is h  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  the sense o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  the l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s .  There would aheo be an enormous in c re a s e  in  the 
a d m in is t r a t i v e  c o s ts  b e s id e s  those r e s u l t i n g  from  th e  mere 
r e l i e f  o f  l o c a l  bu rdens .
The system, b e in g  based s im p ly  on e x p e n d i tu re ,  bears no 
r e la t i o n s h ip  to  th e  needs o f  the  l o c a l i t y .  P oor areas which are 
hampered by meagre l o c a l  re so u rce s  r e c e iv e  le s s  g r a n t  than  t h e i r  
r i c h  n e ig h b o u rs  m e re ly  because they  are in c a p a b le  o f  spend ing  
la rg e  sums. I t  thus  c re a te s  a tendency  f o r  the  p la c e  where ass­
i s t a n c e  i s  b a d ly  needed to  be dojmed to p o o r  s e r v ic e s ,  w h i l s t  
w e a l th y  areas a re , pe rhaps , encouraged to  spend t h e i r  money ex­
t r a v a g a n t l y .
These a re , however, i n  many cases, dangers  a t te n d a n t  
upon a c a re le s s  use o f  th e  system r a th e r  th a n  in e s c a p a b le  d e fe c t s .  
The charges w hich the Qeddes Committee made a g a in s t  p e rce n ta g e  
g r a n ts  were o v e r s t a t e d . (1 )  The in c re a s e  o f  th e  c o s t  o f  the soc­
i a l  s e r v ic e s  d u r in g  th e  p e r io d  th e y  re v ie w ed , (2 )  was n o t  e n t i r e ­
l y  due to  f i n a n c i a l  i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  on th e  p% rt o f  th e  l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  under t h i s  system . The im provem ent o f  the  s e rv ic e s  
b o th  i n  q u a l i t y  and q u a n t i t y ,  the  d e p r e c ia t io n  o f  the  v a lu e  o f  
the  pound s t e r l i n g  ow ing to  the war, and o th e r  causes, made a 
g r e a t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  towards the s w o l le n  f i g u r e .  I n  f a c t ,  l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  w i l l  r a r e l y  r i s k  t h e i r  own p u rs e  i n  i r r e s p o n s ib le  
ve n tu re s ^  and w he reve r th e re  i s  such a danger, th e  Government 
a lways has eve ry  means to  che ck  i t .  ’’ P ro v id e d 1*, ob se rve d  the  
D e p a r tm e n ta l  Committee on L o c a l  T a x a t io n  i n  1914, **tha t a s u f f ­
i c i e n t  sha re  o f  the c o s t  o f  each s e r h ic e  i s  l e f t  to  be borne 
l o c a l l y ,  we do n o t  a n t i c i p a t e  t h a t  such in c re a s e s  w i l l  a p p ro x ­
im a te  to  e x tra v a g a n c e 1*. (3 )  We can assume t h a t  i f  th e  system d id  
p la y  a p a r t  i n  c a u s in g  enormous in c re a s e s  i n  the  c o s t  o f  s o c i a l  
s e r v ic e s ,  i t  was c h i e f l y  the i n t e n t i o n  o f  th e  Government t h a t  
t h i s  s h o u ld  be so. (4 )  G r a n t s - in - a id  can be used to  r e t a r d  expen­
d i t u r e  as w e l l  as to  encourage i t .  I t  i s  the  Government who must 
seek  to  c o n t r o l  the  d e v ic e ,  and n o t  to  be c o n t r o l l e d  by i t .
rsr THe to  £a l  c o s t  o f  ik e  s o c i  a l  s e r v ic e s  had, a c c o rd in g  to  t h e i r  
e s t im a te  , r i s e n  from  £ 8 6 ,5 00 ,0 00  i n  1913-4  to  £2 43 ,500 ,000  in
i.921-22.A )See above p.
3) Cd. 7315/1914, p . 22.
4) C e n t r a l  s u p e r v is io n  and th e  s t ip u lh t io n  t h a t  e x p e n d i tu re  had 
to  be ’ approved* to  q u a l i f y  f o r  g ra n ts  se rved  to  p re v e n t  any 
s e r io u s  e x tra va g a n ce .
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Again, though i t  i s  n a t u r a l  t h a t  l o c a l  s e r v ic e s  which are 
l a r g e l y  fe d  by Exchequer g r a n ts  p r o p o r t io n a te  to  e x p e n d i tu re  upon 
th e m |s h o u ld  be c o n t r o l l e d  by the Government, th e re  i s  no reason 
why the  c o n t r o l  sh o u ld  be m e t ic u lo u s .  I t  i s  o n ly  the b ro a d e r  
is s u e s  o f  p r i n c i p l e  and p o l i c y  th a t  shou ld  conce rn  the c e n t r a l  
d e p a r tm e n ts ,  and n o t  the  d e t a i l e d  s u p e r v is io n  o f  e v e ry  t r i v i a l  
i te m .
I n  g e n e ra l,  p e rce n ta g e  g ra n ts  o f  n e c e s s i t y  c o n t in u e  to  be 
p a id  i n  re s p e c t  o f  c o s t l y  s e r v ic e s  where the m a in tenance  o f  an 
adequate s ta n d a rd  o f  s e r v ic e  i s  im p e ra t iv e ,  as th e y  a r c h e s t  means 
by w h ich  an e f f i c i e n t  a d m in is t r a t io n  Can be prom oted. I t  sh o u ld  
be th e  o b je c t  o f  such g ra n ts ,  however, i f  p r o p e r ly  a rranged , n o t 
m e re ly  to  reduce the burden o f  these  s e r v ic e s  to  a l e v e l  w i t h i n  
the c a p a c i t y  o f  l o c a l  re s o u rc e s ,  bu t a lso  to a ch ie ve  a c o n s id e ra b le  
degree  o f  e q u a l i z a t io n  o f  the r a te  burden o f  these  s e rv ic e s  as 
between one area  and a n o th e r .  The ’ w e igh ted *  p e rc e n ta g e  g ra n t  i n  
a id  o f  e d u c a t io n  seems to  have been des igned  to  s e rve  t h is  doub le  
pu rpo se . B u t t n i s  was s t i l l  n o t  adequate. I t  would be an im prove ­
ment i f  some d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power were g iv e n  to c e n t r a l  departm en ts  
to  in c re a s e  the g ra n ts  a c c o rd in g  to  needs w i t h i n  c e r t a i n  p r e s c r ib e d  
l i m i t s ,  so t h a t  th e y  c o u ld  b r in g  each s e r v ic e  u n d e r adequate con­
s i d e r a t i o n .  Then, un der t h e i r  s p e c ia l  a s s is ta n c e ,  i t  would be 
more easy f o r  the  h e a v i l y - r a t e d  a reas to  c a r r y  o u t  necessa ry  re ­
fo rm s and im provem ents .
I L . _  The U n i t  G ran t System. Under t h i s  system, the g ra n t  i s  f i x e d  
as a u n i fo rm  amount p e r u n i t  o f  s e rv ic e ^  chosen as a b a s is  f o r  
c a l c u la t i o n ,  { e .g .  £8 10s. p e r  t r a in e e  un de r the M idw ives  T r a in ­
in g  R e g u la t io n s ,  1919; £9 p e r  house f o r  40 y e a rs  i n  re s p e c t  o f  
the h o u s in g  schemes u n d e r  the  Hous ing ( F in a n c ia l  P r o v is io n s )  A c t, 
1924; e t c . )  Th is  method o f  a s s is ta n c e  i s  s im p le  and easy to  c a l ­
c u la te ,  and the g ranV  p a id  has a d i r e c t  c o n n e c t io n  w i th  the s e r ­
v i c e  s u p p l ie d ,  maki ng fii f f i c u l t  f o r  l o c a l  e x tra va g a n ce  to  in c re a s e  
th e  burden o f  the  ta x p a y e r .  There i s ,  m oreover, le s s  need o f  
Government s u p e rv is io n  than i n  the case o f  the p e rc e n ta g e  g r a n ts .  ( } ]  
The U n i t  G ran t would, i n  f a c t ,  be an i d e a l  s e r v ic e ,  d id  i t  n o t  
c a r r y ,  i n  a d d i t io n ,  c e r t a i n  in h e r e n t  d e fe c ts .
I n  the f i r s t  p la c e ,  to  a r r i v e  a t a s u i t a b le  b a s is  i n  r e ­
g a rd  to  any p a r t i c u l a r  s e r v ic e  i s  by no means an easy ta s k .  There 
are p le n t y  o f  s e r v ic e s  w h ich  can h a r d ly  be c a lc u la t e d  a p p r o p r ia t e ly  
by u n i t s .  The u h i t  chosen to  fo rm  the b a s is  f o r  g ra n ts  s h o u ld
(1 )  J . H. B u r to n ,  L o c a l A u t h o r i t y  F in ance , A ccoun ts  arid A u d i t in g ,
2nd & re v .  e d . , 1932, v o l .  I I . , p . 687.
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be more o r  le s s  s ta b le  by n a tu re  and o f  such a c h a r a c te r  t n a t  i t s  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  re p re s e n ts  the  im p o rta n ce  o f  the  s e r v ic e  as a who le .
I t  i s  o n ly  when the b a s is  adopted can f u l f i l  these two re q u ire m e n ts  
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  th a t  the u n i t  g ra n t  system can be expec ted  to  work 
we 11.
Second ly , the c o s t  o f  p u b l ic  s e r v ic e s  w i l l ,  as a r u le ,  
change from t im e  to t im e .  I f  the u n i t - g r a n t  system i s  used, i t  i s  
a p p a re n t t h a t  i f  Exchequer c o n t r i b u t io n s  towards l o c a l  s e r v ic e s  are 
to  keep pace w i th  cha ng in g  e x p e n d i tu re ,  the amount o f  the g r a n t  p e r  
u n i t  w i l l  have tof be r e v is e d  f r e q u e n t l y .  And f r e q u e n t  r e v is i o n  
i n e v i t a b l y  causey, g re a t  d e a l o f  a d m in is t r a t i v e  t r o u b le  and f i n a n c i a l  
chaos. '
The system i s ,  m oreover, open to  c r i t i c i s m  in  th a t  the  ex­
p e n d i t u r e  p e r  u n i t  i s  l i a b l e  to  be a f f e c t e d  by many f a c t o r s  o th e r  
than  the  competence o f  the  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  conce rned , and t h a t  i t  
v a r ie s  from  p la c e  to p la c e  w i t h i n  v e ry  wide l i m i t s .  To use the  
average e x p e n d i tu re  as a common b a s is  would thus  in c u r  g re a t  i n ­
j u s t i c e .  A d i f f e r e n t  l o c a l i t y  has a d i f f e r e n t  e n v iro n m e n t. Cond­
i t i o n s  i n  an i n d u s t r i a l  a re a  u s u a l l y  bear no resem b lance  to  those  
i n  a r e s i d e n t i a l  o r  an a g r i c u l t u r a l  a re a ; and in  re s p e c t  o f  each 
area, th e re  are im p o r ta n t  v a r ia t i o n s  o f  re q u ire m e n ts .  I t  would 
r e q u i r e ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  many a d ju s tm e n ts  i n  the use o f  t h i s  system , f o r  
e x c e p t io n a l  and ch a n g in g  c i rc u m s ta n c e s  to  be met. The a d ju s tm e n ts  
n e c e s s a ry  cou lc  e a s i l y  make the system so c o m p l ic a te d  th a t  i t  m ig h t  
i n  f a c t  become unw orkab le  o r  in e q u i t a b le .
" I t  must no t be f o r g o t t e n " ,  r e p o r te d  th e  D e p a rtm e n ta l 
C om m ittee on L o c a l  T a x a t io n  i n  1914, " t h a t  t h i s  system  has lo n g  
p r e v a i l e d  i n  c o n n e c t io n  w i th  e d u c a t io n ,  and has taken  s t ro n g  r o o t  
t h e re .  Even th e re ,  however, the f i g u r e s  which have been l a i d  
b e fo re  us o f  the d i f f e r e n t  r a te s  o f  e x p e n d i tu re  p e r  c h i l d  i n  
a t te n d a n c e  i n  the areas o f  th e  v a r io u s  e d u c a t io n  a u t h o r i t i e s  sug ges t 
v e r y  s t r o n g l y  th a t  a more e l a s t i c  system would le a d  to  a more 
generous p o l i c y  and a h ig h e r  s ta n d a rd  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  i n  n o t  a few 
c a s e s " .  (1 )
I I I . T h e  Ass igned  Revenues S y s tem. I n  1888 the  system o f  ass igned  
revenues was in t r o d u c e d  by M r . T a f t e r w a r d s  Lo rd )  Goschen, u n d e r  
w h ich  the jprpceeds o f  c e r t a i n  government taxe s , m a in ly  c o n s is t i n g  
o f  th e  b u lk  o f  the E x c is e  L ice n se s , o n e - h a l f  o f  the P ro b a te  D u t ie s ,  
and the  e x t r a  s u r ta x e s  on b e e r  and s p i t i t s ,  were a l l o c a t e d  to  l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  in  p la c e  o f  the  o l d e r  p e rce n ta g e  g r a n ts .  (2 )  For t h i s
RTTTd7“ 7315/1914, “p.'s 2.Fo rjS ie t a i l e d  a cco un t o f  the scheme, see above C h a p .V I I I .
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purpose a fund , known as the L o c a l T a x a t io n  Accoun t, was e s ta b ­
l i s h e d ,  c o n ta in in g  a l l  the proceeds o f  the ass igned  revenues, 
o u t o f  wh ich  payments were to  be made, th ro u g h  the  i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y  
o f  c o u n ty  and c o u n ty  borough c o u n c i ls ,  i n  a id  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  s e r v ­
i c e s .  The L o c a l T a x a t io n  Account was to  be k e p t  s e p a ra te  from  
th e  T re a s u ry  accoun t so t h a t  S ta te  and l o c a l  f in a n c e  c o u ld  be 
d i s t i n g u is h e d  c l e a r l y .  A p a r t  from a s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  i n  the method 
o f  a c c o u n t in g ,  Mr. Goschen a ls o  co n te m p la te d  t h a t ,  under t h i s  
scheme, th e re  would be th e  advantage t h a t  the re s o u rc e s  o f  l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s  would grow a u to m a t ic a l l y  as a r e s u l t  o f  the n a t u r a l  
in c re a s e  i n  the y i e l d  o f  th e  ass igned revenues so t h a t  they  c o u ld  
meet th e  expand ing  needs o f  l o c a l  s e r v ic e s  and c o u ld  thus  o b v ia te  
the  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  in c re a s e d  d r a f t s  on the Exchequer.
The c h i e f  advantage o f  t h i s  system was t h a t ,  i f  the p r o ­
ceed# o f  such revenues were a b le  to  c o v e r  c o n t in u o u s ly  an e q u i t ­
ab le  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  the  co^st o f  s e r v i c e s ^ i t  p ro b a b ly  wou ld p r o v id e  
the  b e s t  b a s is  f o r  a r e a l  p a r tn e r s h ip  between the c e n t r a l  and the  
l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  the a d m in is t r a t i o n  o f  the n a t i o n a l  s e rv ic e s .
As th e  accounts o f  the  a p p ro p r ia te d  revenues were to  be kept, 
a p a r t  and th e  amount o f  t h e i r  p roceeds was n o t  to  be s u b je c t  to  
any e x t e r n a l  c o n t r o l  o r  l i m i t a t i o n ,  (and a t  the  same t im e j th e re  
was a t r u e  b a s is  f o r  l o c a l  independence I no n e c e s s i t y  f o r  the 
p r e p a r a t io n  and c h e c k in g  o f  tn e  v a r io u s  fo rm s and r e tu r n s  r e q u i r e d  
in  c o n n e c t io n  w i th  a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  g ra n ts  based upon a c tu a l  
exp end i tu r e .
I t  was p o s s ib le ,  m oreover, p r o v id e d  th a t  the  ass igned 
revenues were c l e a r l y  d e f in e d ,  f o r  the in t e r e s t e d  ta x p a y e r  to  
a s c e r ta in  the e x te n t  to  w h ich  he as a ta x p a y e r  was s u p p le m e n t in g  
h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n s ,  as a ra te p a y e r ,  i n  the sense t h a t  he would 
know th e  u l t im a t e  d e s t in a t io n  o f  the cha rges  he had to  meet i n  
the  way o f  n a t io n a l  t a x a t io n .  ( 1)
I n  s p i t e  o f  a l l  thes#  advantages, however, the system o f  
a ss ig n e d  revenues has been a f a i l u r e  i n  the c o u rse  o f  i t s  o p e r ­
a t io n .  The main d e fe c t#  o f  t h i s  system is  t h a t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
to  secu re  a k in d  o f  revenue whose proceeds w i l l  c o n t in u e  to  be 
adequate to meet the re q u ire m e n ts  o f  l o c a l  s e r v ic e s  w i th o u t  the  
n e c e s s i t y  o f  making f re q u e n t  e x t r a  charges to  cope w i th  cha ng in g  
demands. The revenues ass igned  u n d e r the £ 1888 f a i l e d
to  keep pace w i th  th e  in c re a s e d  e x p e n d i tu re ^ f ro m  the normal 
deve lopm en t o f  the  s e r v ic e s  concerned , and w i t h i n  a v e r y  s h o r t
HE) f7 Ogden W h i te ly ,  C o n t r ib u t io n s - from the  C e n t r a l  A u t h o r i t y  
tow a rds  the Cost o f  L o c a l  A d m in is t r a t i v e  S e r v ic e s ;  J o u r n a l  o f  
P u b l ic  A d m in is t r a t io n ,  O c t .  is s u e ,  1923, p. 273.
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p e r io d  o f  t im e , i t  was n e cessa ry  to f i n d  o th e r  means to  f i l l  the  
gap. ( I )
The system o f  a ss ig n e d  revenues i s  a ls o  open to  c r i t i ­
c ism  in  t h a t  th e re  i s  no g u a ra n te e  o f  i t s  s a fe t y  and s t a b i l i t y .  
E xp e r ie n ce  has shown th a t  as these  revenues are sou rces  o f  i n ­
come fo r m e r ly  b e lo n g in g  to  the  Exchequer, &he Government i s  i n ­
c l i n e d  to  a l t e r  them w i th o u t  h e s i t a t i o n  whenever the e x ig e n c ie s  
o f  n a t i o n a l  t a x a t io n  demand i t .  The c o n v e rs io n  o f  a p p ro x im a te ly  
o n e - h a l f  o f  the ass ig ned  revenues i n t o  f i x e d  g ra n ts ,  un de r the  
F in ance  (1909 -10 ) A c t,  1910, and the Revenue Act, 1911, i n  o r d e r  
t o  p re s e rv e  t o  the  Exchequer the proceeds o f  t- ie  in c re a s e d  d u t ie s  
was perhaps an i n e v i t a b l e  tendency, but i t  c o n s t i t u t e d  a r a d i c a l  
d e p a r tu re  from the o r i g i n a l  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  th e  system . (2 )
F u r th e rm o re , exce p t i n  the  case o f  th e  p o l i c e  and some 
m in o r  s a n i t a r y  s e r v ic e s ,  where the  a l l o c a t i o n  m ig h t  be w i th h e ld ,  
th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  th e  revenues was f r e e  from  c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l .  
T h is  had i t s  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  as w e l l  as advan tages . I t  meant t h a t  
* i t  d e p r iv e s  the  com m unity as a who le o f  p a r t s  o f  i t s  p u b l ic  
re s o u rc e s  w i th o u t  s e c u r in g  to  the  n a t io n a l  governm ent, i n  r e tu r n ,  
any p r a c t i c a l  means o f  e n fo r c in g  upon the l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  t h a t  
minimu^m o f  e f f i c i e n c y  which the i n t e r e s t  o f  the  community
r e q u i r e s ,  and w i th o u t  g i v i n g  to  the n a t i o n a l  governm ent t h a t -------
e f f e c t i v e  s t r e n g th e n in g  o f  i t s  c o u n s e l and a d v ice , w i th o u t  w h ich  
i t  i s  p o w e r le ss  to  check  l o / ' c a l  ex tra va g a n ce  and l o c a l  w as te *. (3 )
* I n  the  a d m in is t r a t i p n  o f  n a t i o n a l  s e r v ic e s * ,  s a id  Lord B a l fo u r  
o f  B u r le ig h ,  * i t  i s  o f  th e  u tm o s t  im p o rta n ce  t h a t  th e  C e n t r a l  
A u t h o r i t y  s h o u ld  endeavour to  secure  u n i f o r m i t y ,  e f f i c i e n c y ,  and 
economy; and w i th  t h i s  o b je c t ,  I  am o f  th e  o p in io n  t h a t  i t  s h o u ld  
be in v e s te d  w i th  e x te n s iv e  powers o f  c o n t r o l .  Such powers may 
be most e f f e c t i v e l y  e x e rc is e d  i f  accompanied by a system o f  g ra d *  
i n - a i d .  Those i n  fo r c e  b e fo re  1888 were no doub t a p o w e r fu l  
l e v e r  i n  the  hands o f  th e  O e n t r a l  A u t h o r i t y ,  and were i n  most 
cases d e v is e d  w i th  a v iew  to  g u id in g  l o c a l  a d m in is t r a t i o n  i n  th e  
d e s i r e d  d i r e c t i o n ,  e . fc . , i n  the case o f  p o l i c e  and s a n i t a r y
71) f i e  re  h ad~ been i  n_ 1§3<5“‘ up war ds o f  a m i l l i o  n a ye a r  g r  an te d  by 
the  a d d i t i o n a l  Beer and S p i r i t  D u ties^  c h i e f l y  f o r  p o l i c e  s o p e r -  
ovmwahon ; and a few  y e a rs  la t e r ^  th e re  were aga in  th e  g ra n ts  
made u n d e r  the A g r i c u l t u r a l  Rates A c t, 1896 and the V o lu n ta ry  
S ch o o ls  A c t, 1897, f o r  v a r io u s  l o c a l  pu rp o se s .
(2 )  See a b o v e ,c h a p .V I I I .
(3 )  Sydney Webb, o p . c i t . ,  p .8 5 .
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officers. A system of assigned revenueSjdistributed without re­
gard to service^ rendered it prima facie hardly compatible with 
such objects". (1) ”
In the formation of the assigned revenues system, it was 
thought that so far as concerned the large amount granted out of 
Probate (after 189 4, Estate) Duty, it would have fulfilled the 
purpose of relieving local rates with &he one tax which fell ex­
clusively on realised personality; and taat this would help to 
mitigate the inequity of a local taxation system which was based 
chiefly on reality. But this was a mere delusion. The assignment 
of half the Probate Duty to the relief of rates under the 1888 
ic t was no step towards the fulfilment of thfe objective.
It does not matter what duty the sum assigned is derived 
from, unless the sum is obtained by raising that duty. As the pro­
bate duty remained unaltered, the relief to local rates fell upon 
the Consolidated Fund. It was only as a matter of account that 
the relief thus given to local rates cane out of personality. On 
this point, the parable of Lord Farreu: is apposite, "If you draw 
from one supply pipe of a cistern", he wrote, "you exhaust the 
cistern just as much as if you draw from the cistern itself; and 
if the cistern has to be kept at a certain level, you must increa*^ 
se its other supplies by as much as you draw off". (2) Since the 
probate duty was not increased, the sum granted was not drawn 
from the probate duty; it was taken from the aggregate sum aris­
ing from national taxation.
Finally, the assigned revenues had little connection with 
the requirements of the localities. The larger proportion Af the 
revenues assigned in 1888, and subsequently, were allocated to 
the areas in which the duties were collected, and no special 
arrangement was made for those areas in which requirements exceeds 
ed the average. This defect became glaringly acute as a result 
of the development of local* services, especially in the field of 
public health and education, before the passage of the Local Gov­
ernment Act of 1929.
n r C d .  638/1301," p. 8“
(2 ) C— 9528, 1899, p. 75.
-212-
11 ‘ 31ock Grant or the General Exche^uer Grant System.
In 1929, following the derating of industrial property and 
agricultural land, a system of block grants was introduced) to 
be fixed at a certain annual amount for a number of years. The 
block grant, being based on a specially devised ’weighted pop­
ulation1 formula, was intended to have regard to the needs of 
an area rather than simply to the amount of expenditure on any 
particular service. ( 1) It was, to use Mr. Smellie’s words, more 
a general irrigation than a special watering of some gragrant 
plant.(2)
The chief advantage of the blofck grant system is that 
it facilitates national as well as local budgeting. The nation­
al Government can calculate in definite terms what sum it will 
spend in aid of local services without its commitments being 
affected by fluctuating local expenditure; and the local auth­
orities, similarly, knowing what assistance they will receive 
for several years ahead, are able to plan out a scheme for the 
maintenance and development of their respective services.
It also helps to impose a responsibility on local auth­
orities to achieve economy. For it obliges those who administ­
er services to raise, at their own cost, all expenses in excess 
of the fixed sum. "The fixity of the grant", wrote Sir Edward 
Hamilton and Sir George Murray, "would, we believe, effectively 
counteract any tendency to wastefulness wfcich is not unfrequenW 
ly alleged against State subventions; for, it would bring home 
to all local authorities the full responsibility for raising 
every penny in excess of their share of the annual grant. More­
over , it appears to us to be most desirable that the central 
authority and every local authority should know exactly how 
they stand as regards resources". (3)
Further, the system is flexible in operation, and com­
pared with the percentage grant which aims at a particular ser­
vice, it gives local authorities a freefhand in managing local 
affairs. Central control, indeed, is not entirely removed, but 
the central departments cease to De concerned with expenditure 
in such detail.
fl) For details, see chap.X. ""
(2) K.B. Smellie, A History of Local Government, 19 46, p. 117.
(3) Cd. 638, p. 143.
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As notei above, one of the merits of the percentage 
grant system is that it is capable of encouraging local auth­
orities to spend more money, and it is the best device for ex­
panding local government services rapidly. Since the block 
grant on the other hand is fixed for a number of years, it 
tends, in theory, to restrict large-scale development. It 
would appear tnat percentage grants and blo©k grants both have 
very good uses, and may well be used simultaneously or separ­
ately according to different environments or different stages 
in the development of local services. The Government may 
apply percentage grants to some special services which it 
particularly hopes to improve, anc yet adopt a block grant 
system in respect of general local services. It may also use 
a percentage grant system exclusively in one period so as to 
encourage the development of all the vital services; but, aftey 
a generally satisfactory standard in these services has been 
achieved, turn to use the block grant system in order to suit 
the complex circumstances of local administration. (1) Sir 
Frederick Alban, in addressing the Qonference of the Institute 
of Municipal Treasusers and Accountants at Torquay in May
1947, made the following comment:-(2)
It seemed inevitable that, as a complement to 
the specific grants including of course weighted per­
centage grants tne block grant must continue as an
essential element in the grant distribution system....
Spme might take the view that future Exchequer 
assistance should be in the form of specific grants 
rather than a blobk grant, it was, however, manifest 
that a block grant permitted of a greater measure of 
autonomy being left with the local authorities than 
would be possible under an extension of the specific 
grant system.
To the block grant system, however, there are some 
aerious objections. One of its chief defects is said to be 
the difficulty of arriving at a basis of computation which
(1) "Both percentage and block grants have firmly established 
themselves. The *ejfjifcriments in abolishing or reducing percen­
tage grants have foundered on this fact that they are much too 
potent an instrument for developing and maintaining local ser­
vices at the requisite standard to be relinquished. The per­
centage element which is of importance in initiating a new 
service, however, has tended to give way to e4ualising elem­
ents which are more important ilnce the service Is established 
and Jaarih/ in standards between different becomes a 
prime consideration. In this development the block grant,
whi ch it was hoped would supersede the percentage grant^has^ 
served as a model". See C. H. Wilson, Essays in Local Government,
1948.p.160.
(2) Local Government Chronicle, No. 4203, July, 1947, p. 632.
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will be equitable thraughout the country. A formula, the 
basis of which comprises population, rateable value, mileage 
of road, the number of children under 5, etc., may, in theory, 
be sound; but in practice, it is very misleading. Each local 
area has its own special conditions. The only equitable and 
justifiable way of settling the problem is, therefore, to 
jrjrovide for the separate needs of the authorities with regard 
to some particular services, and not to apply to them a for­
mula whose deciding factors may, in the main, be irrelevant to 
their actual retirements.
The system suffers, also, from the disadvantage that 
the grant, being reviewed only periodically, is unable to cope 
with changing conditions (1) and the ever-expanding expendit­
ure of local services, with the result that in the meantime' 
any extension has to take place at a cost met solely from 
rates. It was calculated that between 193G-51 and 1938-39, 
the formula grant increased by only £4,000,000, whereas the 
total expenditure of local authorities increased by nearly 
£100,000,000, Over the same period, embracing as it did the 
’economy cuts* of 1931, {which removed inter alia the 50 
per cent minimum in the education grantTl the proportion of 
total grants to total revenue fell from 29 per cent to 26 per 
cent and the proportion of rates rose from 33 per cent to 35 
per cent. (2) The situation became even worse when the formula 
grant was stereotyped in 1941 owing to the war.
The block grant is further subject to criticism for 
its complexity, especially as regards the formula; for the in­
convenience of having to make adjustments when the time comes 
for its revision; for being inhibitive of the active interest 
of the local ratepayer; and for not giving enough encouragement 
to careful administration. (3)
Suffice it to say, the General Exchequer Grant system, 
being an outcome of the Local Government Act of 1929, and an 
accompaniment of the derating schemes, was devised to serve 
two purposes at the same time. It was planned, in the first 
place, to make industries profitable and the depressed areas 
more prosperous; and, secondly, to lower the general level of 
rate poundage and to mitigate the disparity of rate burden 
between different localities. Nevertheless, owing to the
("T) Coventry, for example, was said to have expanded from a
population of 185,000 to 220,000 between 1934 and 1938 an
increase in tne region of 19>.
(2) Labour Party, Local Government Handbook, 19 46, p. 102.
(3) Sir Josiah Stamp, The Finance of Municipal Government, A 
Century of Municipal Progress, 1935, p. 386.
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c o u n te rv  a i l i n g  fo rc e s  w h ich  p r e v a i l e d  d u r in g  the t im e  o f  i t s  
o p e r a t io n ,  namely, the G reat re p re s s io n  i n  the t h i r t i e s  and 
the  W orld  War I I . ,  the c la im s  o f  i t s  p r o ta g o n is t s  were r e g r e t -  
a b ly  n o t  f u l f i l l e d .  I t  t r i e d ,  as M rs. H icks  has s a id ,  t o  k i l l  
two b i r d s  w i th  one s to n e ;  b u t  i n  f a c t  f e l l  between two s to o ls .
A lth o u g h  the system was not v e ry  s u c c e s s fu l ,  and c a l l e d  
f o r  a new arrangem ent to  meet the d is t r e s s e d  s i t u a t i o n ,  y e t ,  
i t  d id  som eth ing , f o r  the  good o f  th e  l o c a l  au t h o r i  t i  es. "To 
d e m o n s tra te " ,  w r i t e s  Mrs, H icks , " t h a t  d e r a t in g  and the fo rm u la  
g r a n t  were n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  to  r e - e s t a b l i s h  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o s p e r i t y  
i n  the  d e p re s s io n ,  o r  to  c u re  the  d i s p a r i t y  i n  r a te  poundage, 
i s  n o t  to  p ro ve  t h a t  e i t h e r  measure was u s e le s s .  The p o o re r  
a u t h o r i t i e s  were b e t t e r  o f f  w i th  a s m a l l  g ra n t  d i s t r i b u t e d  i n  
a way t h a t  gave ihem some h e lp  tha n  th e y  w ou ld  have been w i t h ­
o u t i t .  They were a lso  b e t t e r  o f f  w i t h  t h e i r  d e r a t in g  compen­
s a t io n  than th e y  would have been w i th  t h e i r  unnarrow ed r a te  
b a s is ,  because t h e i r  r a te a b le  v a lu e  sh rank , w h i le  th e  compen­
s a t io n  rem ained f i x e d . . .  " ( 1 )
V. The New B lo c k  G ran t o r  the  E q u a l is a t io n  G ra n t System. I t  was 
o r i g i n a l l y  hoped and e xp e c te d  t h a t  the  o p e r a t io n  o f  the  b lo c k  
g r a n t  based on the  w e ig h te d  p o p u la t io n  fo r m u la  un der th e  1929 
A ct wou ld  g iv e  s u b s t a n t i a l  a s s is ta n c e  to  needy areas where (2 )  
r a te  poundages were h ig h ;  b u t ,  t h i s  o b je c t i v e  was n o t  r e a l i s e d .  
I t  was th o u g h t ,  th e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  i f  r a te  poundages were to  be 
made more u n i fo rm  by means o f  a scheme o f  Exchequer g ra n ts ,  
c o n s id e r a b le  w e ig h t wou ld  have to  be g ive n  to  th e  e lem en t o f  
r a te a b le  v a lu e  p e r  head o f  p o p u la t io n .  F o r, i t  had been known 
f o r  a lo n g  t im e  th a t  th e  heavy r a te s  le v ie d  i n  the  p o o re r  a reas  
were g e n e r a l l y  due n o t  ap much to  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  th e  l e v e l  o r  
s ta n d a rd  o f  e x p e n d i tu re  as to  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  th e  r a te a b le  
w a lue  a v a i la b le .  And, to  th e  e x te n t  t h a t  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  had 
to assume a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  p r o v id in g  and m a in ta in in g  s e r ­
v ic e s  o f  n a t io n a l  im p o r ta n c e ,  i t  s h o u ld  f a l l o w  th a t  th e  burden 
on ra te p a y e rs  i n  d i f f e r e n t  a reas  s h o u ld  be a p p ro x im a te ly  eq ua l.
T IT  ft. K. H ic k s ,  ftev iew  on A r th u r  Abel| W T o T ltk in so n  
P o l l a r d  ;D e r a t in g .  See th e  J o u r n a l  o f  P u b l ic  Adm., S p r in g ,  1946, p60
(2 )  Fo r examplte, i n  the  C ounty  Borough o f  M e r th y r  T y d f i l ,  th e  
r a t e  i n  th e  £ le v ie d  i n  the  y e a r  1929-30 was 2 7 s . ,  whereas i n  
Bournemouth i t  was o n ly  7s. A f t e r  the  o p e r a t io n  o f  the Gen­
e r a l  E xchequer G ra n t i n  th e  y e a r  1931-32, however, when the  
r a t e  i n  Bournemouth was s t i l l  7s. in  th e  £, the r a te  i n  Mer­
t h y r  T y d f i l  was as h ig h  as 25*. 4d. Even i n  1947, when the 
I n t e r im  S upp lem e n ta ry  G ran t had been o p e ra te d ,  the  range be­
tween th e se  two c o u n ty  boroughs was fro m  10s. to  30s. See L o c a l  
Gov* t  C h ro n ic le ,  no. 4220, Nov. 1947 ,p. 1021.
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" I f  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  " s a id  S i r  F r e d e r ic k  A lban, "were to  be 
re g a rd e d  as l o c a l  in s t ru m e n ts  f o r  the  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  the p o l i ­
c y  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  governm ent and f o r  th e  m a in tenance  of, a more 9f 
le s s  u n i fo rm  standard^ p f^ s e r v ic e  th ro u g h o u t th e  c o u n t ry ,  i t  was 
d i f f i c u l t  to  ju s  t i fy ^ u fn S e r  w h ich  A u t h o r i t y  A found i t  n e c e s s a ry  
to  le v y  a ra te  o f  say 25s. i n  th e  £, whereas A u t h o r i t y  B, f o r  the  
same range and s ta n d a rd  o f  s e r v ic e s ,  c o u ld  manage on a r a te  o f  
15s. i n  the  £ " .  (1 )
I t  was c h i e f l y  i n  o rd e r  to  do away w i th  the  e x i s t i n g  cl 
d i s p a r i t y  o f  ra te  poundages among d i f f e r e n t  l o c a l i t i e s  and, 
th u s ,  to  make two c i t i z e n s  o f  equa l substance  i n  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  
o f  the  c o u n t r y  c o n t r ib u t e  e q u a l l y  f o r  the  same l o c a l  s e r v ic e s ( 2 )  
t n a t  the  Government in t r o d u c e d  the E q u a l i s a t io n  G ra n t.  In  
d e a l in g  w i t h  the  new g ra n t  system, Mr. Hugh D a lto n ,  then Chan­
c e l l o r  o f  the  Exchequer, made th e  f o l l o w in g  s ta te m e n t  i n  B ishop  
A ukh land on 18 th  May, 1947A-(3)
. . . . w e  in te n d  t h a t  th e  p o o re r  a u t h o r i t i e s  s h a l l  get 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  more h e lp  from  tne  new b lo c k  g r a n t  than 
from  the  o ld ,  and t h a t  th e  r i c h e r  a u t h o r i t i e s  s h a l l ,  
i n  f u t u r e ,  g e t  no b lo c k  g r a n t  a t  a l l ,  though th e y  w i l l  
a l l  b e n e f i t ,  o f  cou rse , by tn e  t r a n s f e r  o f  h o s p i t a l s  and 
o u t - r e l i e f .
The e f f e c t  o f  the  new arrangem ents w i l l  be th a t  
tn e re  shah hi be a f a l l  i n  th e  r a te s  n e x t  y e a r  i n  p r a c t i c a l l y  
eve ry  l o c a l  a i t h o r i t y  a re a  th ro u g h o u t  th e  c o u n t r y .  The 
ra te p a y e rs ,  p r a c t i c a l l y  everyw here , w i l l  be r e l i e v e d  o f  
heavy burdens.
The g r e a te s t  b e n e f i t s  w i l l  come where th e y  are  
most needed, t h a t  i s  to say i n  the  deve lopm en t areas and 
i n  a number o f  th e  p o o r e r  r u r a l  a reas . N ot o n ly  w i l l  h e a v i l y  
burdened ra te p a y e rs  b e n e f i t  from  low er r a te s ,  b u t  the r e ­
so u rces  o f  the  p o o re r  a u t h o r i t i e s  w i l l  be so much in c re a s e d  
t h a t  th e y  w i l l  be a b le  f o r  the f i r s t  t im e  to  u n d e r ta k e  
deve lopm ents  and im provem ents  i n  t h e i r  l o c a l  s e rv ic e s  w hich 
wou ld  p r e v io u s ly  have been beyond t h e i r  powers, w i th o u t  im­
p o s in g  a c ru s h in g  burden on t h e i r  c i t i z e n s " .
TIT ibid.; p7633.
(2 ) Mr. Bevan* s s ta te m e n t d u r in g  tn e  second re a d in g  o f  the L o c a l  
Government B i l l  on 1 8 th  N ov ., 1947.
(3 ) I b i d . ,  p . 500.
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Again, i n  the  debate  on th e  t h i r d  re a d in g  o f  th e  L o ca l 
Government B i l l ,  1948, Mr. A n e u r in  Bevan, The M in i s t e r  o f  H e a lth ,  
g a v e ^ re v ie w  o f  th e  g e n e ra l  p o in t s  in v o lv e d  i n  th e  new g ra n t  s y s ­
tem. He d e c la re d  t h a t  f o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e  in  the  h i s t o r y  o f  
l o c a l  government, the liXChe^uer had become as i t  were, a r a te ­
pa ye r.  Under the  new scheme, th e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  wou ld  le v y  
ra te s  n o t  o n ly  upon i t s  own ra te p a y e rs ,  b u t upon the Exchequer 
i t s e l f  to  the  e x te n t  t h a t  th e  ra te a b le  v a lu e  in  i t s  a re a  f e l l  
be low  th e  average f o r  th e  c o u n t ry  as a whole. Poor l o c a l  a u th o r ­
i t i e s  w ou ld  be i n  a p o s i t i o n  to  b u i l d  up t h e i r  l o c a l  government 
s e r v ic e s  to  th e  same degree as those  who were b e t t e r  o f f .  There 
was a f u r t h e r  advantage th a t  th e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y * s  revenue c o u ld  
be o b ta in e d  from the  c e n t r a l  funds yea r * y  y e a r  in s te a d  o f  hav­
in g  a b lo c k  g r a n t  f i x e d  at the  b e g in n in g  o f  a q u in q u e n n ia l  
p e r io d  w h ich  m ig h t  g e t  o u t  o f  da te  v e ry  q u ic k ly ,  ( l )
The o u t lo o k  f o r  the  new g r a n t  system seems f u l l  o f  p ro ­
m ise , s u p p o r te d  as i t  i s  by the  t r a n s f e r  o f  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n  
o f  h o s p i t a l s  and o u t - r e l i e f  to  the S ta te ,  The Times even s a id  
th a t  i t  has * p repa red  the way f o r  a new and perhaps l a s t i n g  
f i n a n c i a l  p a r tn e r s h ip  between c e n t r a l  and l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s * .
As i t  has now been i n  fo r c e  f o r  o n ly  a few months, i t  i s  s t i l l  
to o  e a r l y  to  see i t s  p ro p e r  r e s u l t .  Wuat we can say a t the 
moment i s  t h a t ,  as a b lo c k  g r a n t  i t  possesses most o f  the m e r i t s  
and some o f  th e  d e fe c ts  a t t r i b u t e d  to  th e  system w i t h  wh ich we 
have d e a l t  i n  the  p re c e d in g  s e c t io n *  I t  i s  b e t t e r  th a n  the  
fo rm e r  b lo c k  g ra n t  i n  t h a t  i t  i s  based upon a s im p le r  fo r m u la  
w h ich  i s  much more easy to  c a l c u la t e  and t n a t  th e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  
the  g r a n t  i s  to  be re v is e d  e va ry  y e a r .
L ik e  the  G enera l Exchequer G ran t, t h i s  e q u a l i s in g  g r a n t  
i s  based on some o b je c t i v e  measure o f  needs. I t  i s  a v a i la b le  
f o r  g e n e ra l  pu rposes , and i s  f i x e d  a n n u a l ly  a t  a d e f i n i t e  amount. 
So, th e re  i s  l i t t l e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  i t  w i l l  le a d  to  i r r e s p o n ­
s i b l e  s p e n d in g  as i s  more l i k e l y  to  happen i n  th e  case o f  p e r ­
ce n ta g e  g ra n ts .  The n a t u r a l  r e a c t io n  o f  c e n t r a l  departm en ts  to  
tne  danger o f  i r r e s p o n s ib le  sp e n d in g  i s  t o  a t te m p t  to  check  i t  
by in c r e a s in g  c o n t r o l .  B u t th e  f i x i t y  o f  th e  amount o f  g r a n t  
i n  th e  new b lo c k  g ra n t  system enables t h i s  dange r to  be avo ided  
and thus  a l lo w s  o f  a g r e a t e r  degree o f  l o c a l  autonomy.
S in c e  th e  p e rc e n ta g e  g ra n ts  have been e x t e n s iv e ly  used 
i n  th e  p a s t  to  the  g re a t  advantage o f  th e  r i c h e r  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  
w i th o u t  any re a so n a b le  check and a d ju s tm e n t a c c o rd in g  to the  
i n d i v i d u a l  needs o f  s p e c i f i e d  s e r v ic e s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  a reas, the
XT) The Loc a l  Government Chronic 1 e, No. 4236,Mar. 6, 1948, p. 217.
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s ta n d a rd  o f  s e r v ic e s  d iv e rg e s  m arked ly  from  p la c e  to  p la c e .  A 
s t r i k i n g  in s ta n c e  o f  t h i s  was seen in  th e  inadequacy  and back­
wardness o f  t u b e r c u lo s is  s e rv ic e s  i n  Wales. (1 ) Such an anomaly 
can be removed o n ly  by means o f  an e q u a l i s a t io n  g r a n t  w h ich  i s  
in te n d e d  to  h e lp  th e  needy r a t h e r  than the w e l l - o f f  a u t h o r i t i e s .
I n  s p i t e  o f  th e  o u ts ta n d in g  m e r i t s  c la im e d  by the ad­
v o c a te s  o f  the  system, however, th e re  are, n o t  a few c r i t i c i s m s  
d i r e c t e d  a g a in s t  i t .  I t  i s  s a id ,  f i r s t  o f  a l l ,  t h a t  the  new 
system , a im in g  a t  e q u a l i s in g  the r a te  burden, f a i l s  to  encourage 
com pe te n t and p r o g r e s s iv e  a u t h o r i t i e s .  T h is  was the o p in io n  
h e ld  by S i r  W. D a r l in g ,  M.P. when he made an a t t a c k  on the B i l l  
w h ich  in t r o d u c e d  the s y s te m :- (2 )
. . . . O n e  cause o f  th e  d i s e q u a l i t y  i n  r a te s ,  wh ich  was r a r e l y  
m en tioned , was the e x tra va g a n ce  and incom pe tence o f  some 
a u t h o r i t i e s ,  and no t the m uch-trum peted  arguments o f  p o v e r ty ,  
unemployment, and th e  l i k e .  The lo n g  re c o rd  o f  s u c c e s s fu l  
b u s in e ss  a d m in is t r a t i o n  o f  E d inburgh  was now p e n a l iz e d  by 
the B i l l .  Economy was d e c la re d  a c r im e  and good a d m in is t r a te  
io n  a m o c k e ry . . . .
The system i s  s a id  to  be q u i te  u n f a i r  because i t  s e rv e s td  
s t r i k e  a double  b low  a t the a u t h o r i t i e s  term ed 1 th e  r i c h e r * .
Not o n ly  w i l l  t h e i r  Exchequer g ra n t  be reduced  o r  te rm in a te d ,  
b u t  they  w i l l  s u f f e r  e n t i r e l y  the lo s s  o f  r a t e  income which th e y  
have h i t h e r t o  re c e iv e d  f o r  th e  d e r a t in g  o f  i n d u s t r i a l ,  f r e i g h t  
t r a n s p o r t  and a g r i c u l t u r a l  h e rm d ita m e n ts , f o r  th e  L o c a l Govern­
ment Ac t o f  1948 d id  n o t c o n s id e r  a t n a l l  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  com­
p e n s a t io n  f o r  t h i s  lo s s .  T ie new scheme, moreover^ does n o t  
ta k e  enough account o f  the  f u t u r e  e x p e n d i tu re  o f  l o c a l  a u th o r­
i t i e s  a n i  f a i l s  to  remedy th e  weakness o f  th e  system o f  l o c a l  
t a x a t io n .  Mr. W a lke r-S m ith ,  M .P .,  f o r  example, was o f  the 
o p in io n  th a t  the  ‘ much trum pe ted* d i r e c t  f i n a n c i a l  advantages 
to  th e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  wewei l l u s o r y .  He b e l ie v e d  t h a t  ra te s  
were l i k e l y  to  r i s e  and t h a t  so f a r  as the new system d id  no t 
p r o v id e  adequate means to  r e s t r a i n  such a r i s e ,  the  r a t e  r e l i e f s  
p r o u d ly  p ro c la im e d  i n  th e  W hite Paper were a$ t h e i r  b e s t  t r a n s ­
i t o r y  and f o r t u i  thu s . (3 )
W h ile  i t  i s  commonly re c o g n is e d  t h a t  the  new scheme has 
s e rv e d  to  make a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  Exchequer a s s is ta n c e  which
(1 )  t f .K 7 H ic k s ,  P u b l ic  F inance , 1§47, p .2 80 "
(2 )  The Times, Nov, 20, 1947, p. 2 .Mr. James Ly thgoe , C i t y  T re a s u re r  
o f  M a n ch e s te r ,  w h i le  d e l i v e r i n g  h i s  p r e s i d e n t i a l  address a t th e  
I . I t . " f *  A. C on fe rence  in  J u ly ,  1948, a lso  r a is e d  th e  q u e s t io n :
"What i n c e n t i v e  does i t  g iv e  to  economy i n  a d m in is t r a t io n  (e x c e p t  
such as i s  c e n t r a l l y  imposed) to th o se  a u t h o r i t i e s  who r e c e iv e  
a s s is ta n c e  i n  th e  fo rm  o f  recoupment o f  t h e i r  f u l l  r a te  pound­
age i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a p r o p o r t i o n - a f  t h e i r  r a te a b le  v a lu e ? ’*.
(3 )  The Times, Nov. 20, 19 4 7. ^9* .
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fa v o u rs  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  weak i n  f i n a n c i a l  re s o u rc e s ,  th e re  
are  a number o f  o b s e rv e rs ,  e s p e c ia l l y  among l o c a l  government 
o f f i c i a l s ,  who are  app re hen s ive  th a t  c e r t a i n  aspects  o f  the  
scheme may p ro v e  in  the  lo n g  run  to  be i n i m i c a l  to the bes t 
i n t e r e s t s  o f  th-e l o c a l  governm ent. In  t h i s  c o n n e c t io n  th e  
R e p o r t  o f  the  C o u n c i l  o f  th e  1 .11.1. A, s u b m it te d  to the  Annual 
G en e ra l f e  e t in g  a t Scarborough  An June, 1948, c o n ta in e d  the  
fo l lo w in g ~ r e m a r k s : - ( 1 )
. . . . • T h e  Exchequer becomes a r a t  e -p a ye r*  in  v a r y in g  degree 
to  most l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  and t h i s  means th a t  i n  many c rs e s  
a s u b s t a n t i a l  p a r t  o f  l o c a l  e x p e n d i tu re  on a l l  s e rv ic e s  i s  
bo rne  d i r e c t l y  by the Exchequer. T h is  c o n d i t i o n  may r e s u l t  
i n  a f u r t h e r  e x te n s io n  o f  c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l  and d i r e c t i o n  o f  
l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  n o t o n ly  i n  s e r v ic e s  o f  a n a t i o n a l  o r  
s e m i- n a t io n a l^ c h a r a c te r ,  b u t a lso  those th a t  are pure ly  
l o c a l  in  c h a p t e r ;  ana th e re  i s  oea e m is g iv in g  in  some 
q u a r te rs  t h a t  l o c a l  independence may be p r e ju d ic e d .
D e a l in g  w i t h  the e s t im a te d  e f f e c t s  o f  the  o p e r a t i o n . o f  
the  new fo r m u la  g ra n t  i n  1948-49, a p ^ e r  e n t i t l e d  Coun ty  R a te s 
and the  E q u a l is a t io n  G rant (2 ) c o n ta in e d  a c o m p a ra t iv e  s u rv e y  ~ 
o f  th e  c o u n t ie s  o f  W o rce s te r ,  Warwick, G lo u c e s te r ,  H e re fo rd ,
Sa lop and S t a f f s .  The p a p e r made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  e v e ry  c o u n ty  
i n  r e c e ip t  o f  the  g r a n t  woula en joy  a b e t t e r  p o s i t i o n  than i t  
would have done had no change taken  p la c e .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  i t  
was a ls o  a p pa ren t,  from t h i s  re v ie w , t h a t  the  fo r m u la  s t i l l  
needed to  be im proved . A lthou gh  the  fo r m u la  u n d e r the new 
scheme in c lu d e s  a w e ig h t in g  o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  f o r  s p a r s i t y ,  i t s  
e f f e c t s ,  a c c o rd in g  tq  th e  paper, i s  e x t re m e ly  s m a l l  e xce p t i n  
a few  Welsh c o u n t ie s .  I t  sugges ted , t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  som eth ing  
s h o u ld  be done f o r  th e * * ru ra l*  county^ e i t h e r  by in c re a s e d  road  
g ra n ts ,  some form  o f  ’ a g r i c u l t u r a l *  g r a n t ,  o r  by a more generous 
w e ig h t in g  o f  the  s p a r s i t y  f a c t o r  i n  the  e q u a l i s a t i o n  g ra n t .
F u rth e rm o re , as the  ra te a b le  v a lu e  has become so im ­
p o r t a n t  in  the  new d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  the  Exchequer g r a n t ,  i t  i s  
e s s e n t i a l  th a t  the  v a lu a t io n  o f  p r o p e r t i e s  shou ld  no lo n g e r  
rem a in  i n  the  hands o f  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Mr. Bevan has remarked 
w i t h  burnout t h a t  " i t  was more than  human n a tu re  c o u ld  s ta n d  to  
a l lo w  them to  d e te rm in e  th e  s iz e  o f  th e  spoon w i th  w h ich  th e y  
w ou ld  scoop up the  Exchequer money". A c e n t r a l i s e d  system f o r  
the  v a lu a t io n  o f  r a te s  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  to  be i n s t i t u t e d  t o  b r i n g
r i )  Loc a l  Government C h ro n ic le ,  tfo. 42527^une 26, 1948., p. 598.
(2 )  P u b l is h e d  i n  N o .4246 o f  th e  L o c a l Government C h ro n ic le ,  1948.
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f o r t h  u n i f o r m i t y  in tthe  s ta n d a rd  o f  v a lu a t io n  th ro u g h o u t  
the  c o u n t ry .  Th is  b e in g  done, th e re  i s ,  however, e ve ry  
reason f o r  th e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  to  f e a r  t h a t  th e  c e n t r a l  
a u t h o r i t y  * wh ich  i s  now to  d e te rm in e  r a te a b le  v a lu e  may, 
by in c r e a s in g  the  l e v e l  o f  assessments, reduce the  s iz e  o f  
th e  spoon*. (1 )
The use o f  the  p o p u la t io n  f i g u r e s  i n  the new system 
i s  a ls o  open to  th e  o b je c t i o n  th a t  th e y  are  m o s t ly  o u t  o f  
d a te .  There has been no census s in c e  1931. I n  v ie w  o f  th e  
w ide movements o f  p o p u la t io n  which o c c u r re d  d u r in g  th e  war, 
the  fo r m e r  e s t im a t io n  i s  no lo n g e r  r e l i a b l e .  I t  i s  ap paren t, 
t h e r e f o r e ,  th a t  a new census must be h e ld  as soon as p o s s ib le  
i ^  th e  e q u a l i s a t io n  g r a n t  i s  to  be d i s t r i b u t e d  e q u i t a b ly .  *
f l )  A lHeraan James Park 'J's p a p e r * The B lo c k  G rant* s u b m it te d  
to  the  Annual C on fe re nce  o f  th e  A s s o c ia t io n  o f  M u n ic ip a l  
C o rp o ra t io n s ,  1947.
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CQNCLUSION.
THE DESIRABILITY OF CONTROL THROUGH GRANTS, Much has been 
s a id ’’ ab o u t  th  e fu  nc t  i  ons o f  th e  g ra n L jfa id  system. ( 1) I t  
h e lp s  to  f l a t t e n  o u t  the most s e r io u s  i n e q u a l i t i e s  i n  the 
bu rden  o f  p r o v id in g  im p o r ta n t  s e r v ic e s  e n t r u s te d  to  l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t i e s ;  i t  a f f o r d s  a p r a c t i c a b le  means f o r  th e  c e n t r a l  
d e p a r tm e n ts  to d is s e m in a te  t h e i r  h ig h e r  a d m in is t r a t i v e  wisdom 
among l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  o r d e r  to  se cu re  g r e a te r  economy 
and e f f i c i e n c y ;  i t  s e rv e s  to  s t im u la te  and a s s is t  backward 
a u t h o r i t i e s  to  p r o v id e  s e r v ic e s  which are o f  more than l o c a l  
i n t e r e s t  up to  a minimum s ta n d a rd ;  and l a s t l y ,  b u t most 
im p o r ta n t  o f  a l l ,  i t  g iv e s  w e ig h t to  th e  c r i t i c i s m s ,  sugges t­
io n s  and i n s t r u c t i o n s  o f  c e n t r a l  d e p a r tm e n ts , and thus b r in g s  
a l l  the  lo c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  which are a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y  in d e ­
penden t by t r a d i t i o n ,  under t h e i r  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l .  W ith  
th e  inducem ent o f  g ra n ts ,  and the c o n s ta n t  t h r e a t  o f  t h e i r  
w i th d ra w a l ,  M in is t e r s  ar'e ab le  to  f u l f i l  t h e i r  g e n e ra l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  P a r l ia m e n t  f o r  the s u p e r v is io n  o f  s e rv ic e s  
e n t r u s te d  to  t h e i r  c a re .
The s a n c t io n s  p ro v id e d  by g ra n ts  and th e  t h r e a t  o f  
t h e i r  rem ova l are h ig h ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  v i r t u e  o f  the 
p e c u l i a r  le g a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  the  B r i t i s h  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y .  I n  
B r i t a i n ,  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  are r e s t r i c t e d  by the p r i n c i p l e  
o f  u l t r a  v i r e s .  They a re  n o t  a l lo w e d  to do a n y th in g  which 
i s  n o t  a u th o r is e d  by law. B u t,  on the  o th e r  hand, where 
powers are c o n fe r re d  by the law, th e re  i s ,  l e g a l l y  speak ing , 
no e f f e c t i v e  method f o r  c o m p e l l in g  a c o u n c i l  to  e x e rc is e  
them. Even whejre a f u n c t i o n  has been imposed as a du ty , 
and n o t  merely^SS* a g i^ e -p o w e r ,  the o n ly  p r a c t i c a l  remedy 
f o r  th e  f a i l u r e  o f  i t s  b e in g  c a r r i e d  o u t i s  a c r im in a l  
p r o s e c u t io n  o r  c i v i l  p ro c e e d in g s  i n i t i a t e d  b y  a p r i v a t e  
i n d i v i d u a l  i n  a c o u r t  o f  law . Even i n  t h i s  case, i t  i s  
o f t e n  h e ld  t h a t  a l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  i s  o n ly  l i a b l e  f o r  m is­
fea san ce  b u t  n o t  f o r  n o n - fe a s a n c e — - t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  i t  i s  
l i a b l e  f o r  n e g l i g e n t l y  d o in g  an a c t ,  bu t n o t  f o r  n e g l i g e n t l y  
f a i l i n g  to  do an a c t .  (2) I n  the l a s t  r e s o r t ,  o f  cou rse , 
the  Government can proceed by way o<f mandamus to  compel a 
l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  to  c a r r y  ou t i t s  s t a t u t o r y  d u t i e s ;  b u t 
t h i s  seve re  p ro c e d u re  w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  i n c u r  bad f e e l in g s  
and a n t ip a th y  from  the  p e c c a n t  a u th o r i ty , *  so i t  i s  r a r e l y  
used.
fl )  See above, 6k . X I I I .  pass im .2) Je n n in g s , L o c a l Government Law, 1947, p. 283.
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The G r a n t - in - a id ,  t h e r e fo r e ,  is  v a lu a b le  as a means 
by w h ich  the c e n t r a l  d e p a r tm e n t*  can in d u ce  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  
to  e x e rc is e  t h e i r  powers a n d m f u l f i l  t h e i r  d u t ie s  w i th o u t  the  
n e c e s s i t y  o f  r e s o r t i n g  to the unaccom odating  measure o f  
l e g a l  p ro c e d u re .  The o ld  id e a  th a t  j u d i c i a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  
c o u ld  p r o v id e  adequate c o n t r o l  f o r  a d m in is t r a t i v e  bod ies  i s  
now e n t i r e l y  o u t - o f - d a t e ,  f o r  a c o n t r o l  wh ich  depends upon 
the  haphazard a c t io n  o f  a p r i v a t e  i n d i v i d u a l  can n o t  s a t i s f y  
modern re q u ire m e n t* .  W ith  the weapon o f  E xchequer g ra n ts ,  
th e  Government can now comfeeol l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  to  c a r r y  p u t  
t h e i r  d u t ie s  even though no s p e c i f i c  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  i n ju r e d  
by the  a u t h o r i t y 1* f a i l u r e  to a c t .
Grants are n o t ,  however, the o n ly  means o f  c o n t rm l 
c o n t r o l .  O th e r  methods have been d e s c r ib e d  and examined 
e lse w h e re  (1 ;  whereby government departm en ts  are ab le  to  
s u p e rv is e  v a r io u s  aspects  o f  l o c a l  a d m in is t r a t io n .  Thus by 
means o f  . r u le s ,  o rd e rs  and r e g u la t io n s  th e y  are ab le  to  
la y  down the g e n e ra l  p r i n c i p l e s  o r  the d e t a i l e d  d i r e c t i o n s  
w i th  which l o c a l  a d m in is t r a t i o n  has to  co n fo rm ; by means o f  
c o n t r o l  o v e r  l o c a l  o f f i c e r s ,  th e y  can cause t h e i r  re q u ire m e n ts  
to  be more f a i t h f u l l y  obse rved  i n  tne  l o c a l i t i e s ;  by means o f  
in s p e c t io n ,  i n q u i r i e s ,  r e tu r n s ,  s t a t i s t i c s ,  e t c . ,  th e y  can 
keep them selves in fo rm e d  o f  th e  w o rk in g  o f  the  system . They 
can b r in g  a l l  l o c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  in t o  th e  am b it o f  law  and 
G overnm enta l p o l i c y  by d i s t r i c t  a u d i t  and the  s a n c t io n in g  
o f  l o c a l  schemes, bye laws and lo a n s , they can a ls o  in d ic a t e  
what i s  th e  most e f f e c t i v e  way o f  w o rk in g  by  i s s u * in g  c i r c u i t  
ars  and pam ph le ts , and th e y  can s e t  up d e p a r tm e n ta l  t r i b u n a l s  
to  s e t t l e  a d m in is t r a t i v e  d is p u te s .
ix
A l l  these  d e v ic e s  are ad m ira b le  when th e y  can /^succest- 
f u l l y  fe* a p p l ie d .  The e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e i r  use, however, 
depends to  a g re a t  e x te n t  upon w h e th e r f i n a n c i a l  advantages 
accompany them. L o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s  are i n c l i n e d  to  be sub­
s e r v ie n t  to  c e n t r a l  d i c t a t i o n  o n ly  when some p e c u n ia ry  
e le m en t is  in v o lv e d .  R u le s , o rd e rs  and r e g u la t io n s  issu e d  
by  the  c e n t r a l  d e pa r tm en ts  are n o t  so f a i t h f u l l y  c o n s id e re d  
and obeyed i f  th e re  i s  no f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n .  Government 
i n s p e c t io n  i s  g r a c io u s ly  welcomed o n ly  i>n those  s e rv ic e s  w h ich  
r e c e iv e  an annua l g r a n t  o u t  o f  Government fu n d s .  The powers 
o f  Government to  c o n t r o l  a p p o in tm e n t and d is m is s a l  are l i m i t e d  
to  the se  o f f i c e r s  wnose s a la r ie s  a re  p a r t l y  p a id  o u t  o f  the
T l )  See above, £h . 117pass im .
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Exchequer. The o th e r  forma o f  c o n t r o l  are s i m i l a r l y  con­
d i t i o n e d .  (1 ) I n  o th e r  words^i i t  i s  the g r a n t - i n - a i d  which 
h e lp s  to  make o th e r  measures e f f e c t i v e  and which i s  the 
p i v o t  o f  c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l .
As we have argued i n  more d e t a i l  e lse w h ere , th e re  
are some q u a l i t i e s  i n  l o c a l  s e l f -g o v e rn m e n t ,  which have a 
s t r o n g  c la im  to  be p re s e rv e d  w hereve r p o s s ib le .  A t th e  
same t im e , however, some measure o f  c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l  i s ,  
pe rhaps , u n a v o id a b le  in  modern c o n d i t io n s .  L o c a l  autonomy 
i n  an extrem e fo rm , a t  tn e  p re s e n t  t im e ,  wou ld  produce 
a d m in is t r a t i v e  an a rch y  and i n e f f i c i e n c y  and would no t a l lo w  
a n a t io n a l  minimum o f  s o c ia l  a m e n it ie s  to  be e s ta b l is h e d  
i n  l o c a l i t i e s  where ig n o ra n c e  and p o v e r ty  are p r e v a le n t .  (2 )
I t  i s  a m e r i t  o f  the  g r a n t - i n - a i d  t h a t  i t  has made p o s s ib le  
a compromise between c e n t r a l  and lo c a l  d i r e c t i o n  th a t  has 
gone f a r  to  p re s e rv e  the  b e n e f i t s  o f  b o th .
I n  g e n e ra l,  c e n t r a l  departm en ts  have n o t  jo in e d  i n  
the  p r a c t i c a l  work o f  th e  g r a n t - a id e d  s e r v ic e s ;  b u t  m e re ly  
watched th a t  tne  work has been p r o p e r l y  and e f f i c i e n t l y  
done. They have t r i e d  to  encourage and a d v is e , sometimes, 
ind eed , i n  r a t h e r  s t r o n g  te rm s , b u t have seldom made d i r e c t  
in t e r v e n t i o n s .
The power o f  the  Government to  w i th h o ld  th e  g ra n t  
has been e x e rc is e d  o c c a s io n a l ly  i n  th e  p a s t ,  a t the  t im e  
when l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  were s t i l l  f a i l i n g  to  p r o v id e  s e rv ic e s  
i n  c o n fo r m i t y  w i th  th e  re q u ire m e n ts  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  d e p a r tm e n ts .  
More r e c e n t l y ,  however, t h i s  power has been b u t  r a r e l y  used, 
ow ing  p a r t l y  t o  the f a c t  t h a t  most o f  th e  g r a n t - a id e d  s e r v ic e s  
have now reached a s u i t a b l e  s ta n d a rd ,  and p a r t l y  to  the 
in c re a s e d  w i l l in g n e s s  o f  th e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  to  pay a t t e n t ­
io n  to  the d i r e c t i o n s  and i n s t r u c t i o n s  o f  the  c e n t r a l  a u th o r ­
i t i e s .  The rem ova l o f  the g ra n t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  has come to  be 
re g a rd e d  as a p o t e n t i a l  t h r e a t  r a t h e r  than  a weapon to  be 
used i n  p r a c t i c e .  Th is  i s  e s p e c ia l l y  t ru e  u n d e r th e  o ld  
b lo c k  g r a n t  and the new e q u a l i z a t i o n  g r a n t  system s. For
TO  The o n ly  e x c e p t io n ,  where c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l  was f u l l y  e x e r -  
c is e d  w i th o u t  th e  o f f e r  o f  a g r a n t - i n - a id ,  was the  case o f  
th e  p o o r  law s e r v ic e s .  There was, however, an e x t r a o r d in a r y  
s i t u a t i o n  ow ing to  the a n t i c i p a t i o n s  o f  n a t i o n a l  b a n k ru p tc y .  
Even so, i t  aroused s t ro n g  a n t ip a t h y  and f i e r c e  o p p o s i t io n  
fro m  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .
(2 )  See Above, Ch. 7. pass im .
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a c c o rd in g  to  the a rrangem en t o f  b o th  these  system s, the  p r im ­
a ry  aim o f  the  Government i s  to  r e l i e v e  the n e c e s s i to u s  areas 
from  the  p re s s u re  o f  e x o r b i t a n t  r a te s  so t h a t  th e y  can p r o ­
v id e  the  saa4 s e r v ic e s  as t h e i r  r ic h J *n e ig h b o u rs .  These g ra n ts  
may s t i l l  be reduced o r  w i th h e ld  when the  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  
have p roved  th a t  th e y  are  un ab le  to  m a in ta in  a reason ab le  
s ta n d a rd  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  and p ro g re s s ,  o r  t h a t  t h e i r  e x p e n d i tu re  
has been e xce ss ive  o r  u n re a so n a b le .  But as the w i th d ra w a l  o f  
a b lo c k  g ra n t  w i l l  have a v e ry  s e r io u s  e f f e c t  upon l o c a l  
r a te s ,  i t  i s  no t l i k e l y  fehat the  M i n i s t e r  w i l l  p u t  i t  i n t o  
p r a c t i c e  v e ry  o f t e n .  I t  can o n ly  be used i n  th e  most s e r io u s  
cases o f  a l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  s h a m e fu l ly  n e g le c t in g  i t s  d u t ie s  
o r  o b s t i n a t e l y  r e j e c t i n g  c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l .  O u ts id e  g e n e ra l 
n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  d e te rm in e d  d i r e c t l y  by the Government, t h e r e f o r e  
the  c o n t r o l ,  w h ich  i n  th e o ry  e x is t s  on acco u n t o f  the c o n d i t io n s  
on w h ich  the b lo c k  g ra n t j is  made, has n o t  i n  f a c t  been g e n e r a l l y  
e x e rc is e d  i n  a way w h ich  c o u ld  be s a id  to  underm ine  l o c a l  
i n i t i a t i v e .
The developm ent o f  the p o l i c e  s e r v ic e ,  f o r  example, 
shows the compromise in  f r u i t f u l  o p e r a t io n .  W ith  the g r a n t -  
i n - a i d ,  the  Home S e c re ta ry  is  able to  s t im u la te  lo c a l  a u th o r ­
i t i e s  to  p e r fo rm  t h e i r  s t a t u t o r y  d u t ie s  up to  the degree 
r e q u i s i t e .  He i s  ab le , by t h i s  f i n a n c i a l  inducem ent* to  
s u p e r in te n d  l o c a l  p o l i c e  fo r c e s ,  and g r a d u a l ly  to  r a is e  th e  
g e n e ra l  s ta n d a rd  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  w i th o u t  a ro u s in g  th e  a n t ip a th y ,  
a s t a t e  p o l i c e  wou ld  p rodu ce . Yet i t  i s  . s i g n i f i c a n t  th a t  
a l th o u g h  he can a p p ly  t h i s  p o w e r fu l  bu t in d ire c t  s t im u lu s ,  he 
can n o t  be re g a rd e d  as a supreme p o l ic e  a u t h o r i t y  i n  the 
C o n t in e n ta l  sense. He has no r i g h t  to  g iv e * o r d e r s  to the 
l o c a l  p o l i c e ;  n o r  has he any power o f  in t e r f e r e n c e  i n  the 
c o n c re te  p o l i c e  a d m i n i i t r a t i o n  o f  c o u n t ie s  and boroughs.
What the  law r e a l l y  g iv e s  to  th e  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  i s  power 
to  f i x  a s ta n d a rd  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  f o r  th e  who le  c o u n t r y ,  and to  
d e te rm in e  w h e th e r the p o l i c e  m a ch in e ry  i s  i n  good o r d e r  and 
f u l l y  adequate to  the pe rfo rm ance  o f  i t s  d u t ie s  imposed by 
s t a t u t e s  o r  a r i s i n g  from  l o c a l  em ergenc ies. I f  the S e c re ta ry  
i s  n o t  s a t i s f i e d  w i th  the  numbers and e f f i c i e n c y  o f  a c e r t a i n  
fo r c e ,  he can s im p ly  w i th h o ld  the g ra n t  and make the  d e f a u l t i n g  
a u t h o r i t y  s u f f e r  a g re a t  f i n a n c i a l  lo s s .  11) Thus th e re  i s ,  a t  
the  same t im e ^ p r o v is io n  f o r  c e n t r a l  c r i t i c i s m ,  and an avo idance
(1 )  The Home O f f i c e ,  u n t i l  r e c e n t l y ,  o f t e n  th re a te n e d  to  use 
t h i s  power. Thus i n  1899, i t  was maid t h a t  b o th  Glasgow and 
M ancheste r, then the second and f o u r t h  l a r g e s t  c i t i e s  in  
B r i t a i n ,  were i n  dange r o f  l o s in g  t h e i r  g r a n t  th ro u g h  i n e f f i c ­
ie n c y .  See R e d l ic h  and H i r s t ,  op. c i t .  , v o l .  1, p. 346.
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o f  those  c e n t r a l  p o l i c e  departm en ts  th a t  have ha rassed  
European p o l i t i c s .
The B r i t i s h  system o f  c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l ,  e x e rc is e d  as 
i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  th ro u g h  g ra n ts ,  has the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  t h a t  
i t s  p o s i t i v e  p ro p o s a ls  are a d v is o ry  and t h a t  i t s  c o e rc iv e  
in s t ru m e n ts  are n e g a t iv e  and i n d i r e c t .  I n  t h i s  way, i t  has 
been a b le  to  make a l lo w a n ce  f o r  an i n i t i a t i v e  th a t  comes 
m a in ly  from the l o c a l i t i e s  and to  p re s e rv e  an a d a p t a b i l i t y  
to  l o c a l  c o n d i t io n s ,  c o n s i s t e n t l y  w i th  a re a so n a b le  sa fe g u a rd  
a g a in s t  i n e f f i c i e n c y .  A c e n tu ry  ago, d i s t i n g u is h e d  peop le  
l i k e  Edwin Chadwick and Tou lm in  Sm ith  q u a r r e l l e d  about the  
fu n d a m e n ta l is s u e  o f  a d m in is t r a t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y  ve rsu s  l o c a l  
autonomy in  r i g i d  te rm s .
I t  i s  l a r g e l y  th ro u g h  the deve lopm en t we have o u t l i n e d  
t h a t - i t h e r e  has been avo id e d  the  awkward d ilem m a o f  a bare  
c h o ic e  between s t r i c t  c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l  and f u l l  l o c a l  autonomy.
The f u t u r e  p ro s p e c ts  o f  the  system, however, are n o t  
q u i t e  so re a s s u r in g .  The compromise, which has h i t h e r t o  
made a c h o ic e  between the  extrem es unneeessa ry? has been 
based upon a d e l i c a t e  and com plex ba lance  t h a t  may no t be 
ca p a b le  o f  b e in g  i n d e f i n i t e l y  s u s ta in e d .  A t the p re s e n t  t im e , 
l o c a l  s e l f -g o v e rn m e n t  may be s a id  to  be s t i l l  i n  a c t io n ,  b u t  
a l re a d y  th e re  have appeared c e r t a in  te n d e n c ie s  w h ich  may i n  
f u t u r e  underm ine i t s  b a s is .  These te n d e n c ie s  d e r iv e ,  n o t  so 
much from  any c o n s c io u s  a t te m p t  to  a l t e r  th e  arrangem ent, as 
from  the p re s s u re  o f  e ve n ts .
The enormous expense o f  th e  w e l fa r e  s ta t e ^  has com ple­
t e l y  o u t s t r ip p e d  l o c a l  f i n a n c i a l  re s o u rc e s .  In  consequence 
s ta te js u b v e n t io n s  and the e x te n t  o f  th e  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  ^ 
have *been b u i l t  up to  the p o in t  where th e  term s o f  the 
p a r t n e r s h ip  between c e n t r a l  and l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  may be d r a s t ­
i c a l l y  a l t e r e d .  An in c re a s e d  g ra n t  means more c o n t r o l ,  and 
though the  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  has no t been g e n e r a l l y  r e s t r i c t e d ,  
t h i s  tendency i s  a p p a re n t i n  some s e r v ic e s .  "The d im in is h e d  
independence o f  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s "  w r i t e s  P ro fe s s o r  Robson, 
fie a r e f l e c t i o n  o f ,  and i s  i n  tu r n  r e f l e c t e d  by, the  d im in ­
is h e d  r o le  o f  l o c a l  sou rces  o f  revenue. Any s tu d e n t  o f  
Government c o u ld  f o r e t e l l  t h a t  i f  th e  T re a s u ry  were asked to  
f i n d  more money f o r  th e  l o c a l  c o u n c i l s  than  t h e i r  own R a t in g  
and Assessment Comm ittees, the v o ic e s  o f  W h i te h a l l  would 
speak more o f t e n  and w i th  g r e a te r  i n s i s t e n c e " ,  (1 )
f l ]  The- D eve lopm ent~of L o c a l  (Stoveniment, 2nd ed. ’  19 48, p. 37.'""
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Tne c o m p le x i ty  o f  modern p o l i t i c a l  and economic a f f a i r s ,  
m oreover, r e ^ u i r e y  the h e lp ,  o f  b u re a u c ra cy . In  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  
demands f o r  t e c h n ic a l  e f f i c i e n c y  and f o r  the  i n t e g r a t io n s  
o f  the  n a t io n *  s economy, may push l o c a l  i n i t i a t i v e  in t o  the  
background as an a n t iq u a te d  lu x u r y .
P a r t l y  from these  demands, and p a r t l y  as a r e s u l t  o f  
tn e  in c re a s e d  burden on the  re so u rce s  o f  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  a 
c o n s id e ra b le  number o f  s e r v ic e s  have i n  re c e n t  y e a rs  been 
removed from  lo c a l  c o n t r o l .  M u n ic ip a l  aerodromes have been 
t r a n s f e r r e d  to the  M i n i s t r y  o f  C i v i l  A v ia t i o n ;  h o s p i t a l s  and 
a l l i e d  s e rv ic e s  to th e  M i n i s t r y  o f  H e a l th ;  t r u n k  roads to  the  
M i n i s t r y  o f  T r a n s p o r t ;  gas and e l e c t r i c i t y  i s  to  be c o n t r o l l e d  
by the  M in i s t r y  o f  F u e l and Power; o u td o c r  r e l i e f  i s  to be 
governed by the  N a t io n a l  A s s is ta n c e  Board ; and v a lu a t io n  f o r  
r a t i n g  w i l l  i n  the  ne a r f u t u r e  a lso  become the  Government’ s 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  Th is  tendency  tow ards c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  o r  
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  i s  s t i l l  i n  p ro c e s s .
The movement i s  u s u a l l y  defended on the  grounds o f  
t e c h n i c a l  e f f i c i e n c y .  " L o c a l  a d m in i s t r a t i o n , "  w r i t e s  Mrs.
H icks ,  "does n o t ,  however, n e c e s s a r i ly  im p ly  l o c a l  c o n t r o l  
o f  th e  e x e c u t iv e  o f f i c e r s .  W ith  modern com m un ica tions  and th e
deve lopm ent o f  the  a d m in is t r a t i v e  machine i t  i s  p o s s ib le -----
a t  any ra te  in  a s m a l l  c o u n t ry  l i k e  B r i t a i n — - f o r  a d e c e n tn a l -  
is e d  n a t i o n a l  a d m in is t r a t i o n  to pay j u s t  as much a t t e n t i o n  t °  
p e rs o n a l  and l o c a l  needs as one th a t  i s  l o c a l l y  c o n t r o l l e d " .
" I n  the i n t e r - w a r  p e r i o d , "  she c o n t in u e s ,  " t h i s  was c o n c lu s ­
i v e l y  de m ons tra ted  by the success o f  the  A s s is ta n c e  Board.
The d is c o v e ry  has l a r g e l y  c u t  the  g round from  u n d e r  the  
argument th a t  i n  B r i t a i n  s o c i a l  s e r v ic e s  r e q u i r e  l o c a l  c o n t r o l .  
Indeed  th e re  i s  <ln a p r i o r i  case f o r  su p p o s in g  t h a t  the 
l o c a l  b ranches o f  a c e n t r a l  de partm en t w i l l  be more s u c c e s s fu l  
i n  p r o v id in g  u n i f o r m ly  good s e r v ic e s  th a n  se m i- in d e p e n d e n t  
l o c a l  a u th o r i  t i e s " .  (1 )  Even on th e  grounds o f  e f f i c i e n c y ,  
however, i t  would appear t h a t  t h i s  movement has p roceeded  as 
f a r  as i t  can s a f e l y  go a t  the moment. Those who have had 
most e x p e r ie n c e  i n  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  p u b l i c  a f f a i r s  a re  
o f  the  o p in io n  th a t  th e re  is  too  g re a t  a te n d e n cy  a lre a d y  
tow a rds  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  and t h a t  the  S ta te  has, as th in g s  are, 
more than enough r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to  be a r. In  p re s e n t  c o n d i t io n s  
a d d i t i o n a l  s t r a i n  upon the o f f i c i a l  m a ch in e ry  may even in v o lv e  
the  r i s k  o f  a b re a kd o w n :-  (2 )
TTJ U. K. H icks^ P u t i l i c F in a n c e ,  1947, London, p . 264.
(2 ) D. N. Ches t e r ,  The E f f i c i e n c y  o f  th e  C e n t r a l  Government, 
p u b l is h e d  i n  the S p r in g  is s u e  o f  btow P u b l ic  A d m in is t r a t io n ,  
1948. See L o c a l  Government C h ro n ic le ,  No. 4237, p . 247.
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Pew c i v i l  s e rv a n ts  o f  s e n i o r i t y  and e xp e r ie n ce  
can be a l t o g e t h e r  happy about the  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  the  
c e n t r a l  governm ent a t  the moment* Bven tho se  who 
watch W h i te h a l l  from  a fa r  can see t h a t  a l l  i s  no t 
w e l l  w i th  the m ach ine . C e r t a in l y  one does n o t f i n d  
the  same p r id e  among one’ s f r i e n d s  i n  the  perm anent 
c i v i l  w e rv ic e  about the  accom pli shments o f  the c e n t r a l  
departm ents  t h a t  one found, say, th r e e  ye a rs  ago.
A c t u a l l y  i t  would be re m arka b le  i f  tne  c e n t r a l  
machine had m a in ta in e d  i t s  h i t h e r t o  h ig h  l e v e l  o f  
e f f i c i e n c y .  I t  i s  o b v io u s  t h a t  the  machine i s  g r o s s ly  
o v e r lo a d e d . . . .
. . . . O n e  o f  th e  main i l l  e f f e c t s  o f  the  t i r e d n e s s  
o f  s e n io r  c i v i l  s e rv a n ts  i s  th a t  by th e  t im e  th e y  have 
com p le ted  t h e i r  d a y - to -d a y  work th e y  have n o t the e x t r a  
ounce o f  energy  to  c o n s id e r  prob lem s o f  lo n g - te rm  
p o l i c y  o r  w h ich  are no t im m e d ia te ly  u r g e n t . . . .
Thus i t  i s  im p e ra t iv e  th a t  i n  o r d e r  to  l i g h t e n  the 
bu rdens o f  c e n t r a l  government, i f  f o r  no o th e r  reason, th e  
p r e s e n t  d r i v e  tow ards  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  s h o u ld  be checked and 
the  g fe a te s t  p o s s ib le  measure o f  p u b l i c  a d m in is t r a t io n  s h o u ld  
be l e f t  to  th e  management o f  the  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .
The p rob lem  o f  l o c a l  autonomy, can no t,  however, be 
d iscu sse d  m e re ly  i n  term s o f  a d m in is t r a t i v e  e xp ed ie ncy . The 
in c re a s e d  s ta t u s  o f  the c e n t r a l  e lem ent may u p s e t  a p a r t n e r ­
s h ip  i n  l o c a l  a f f a i r s  t h a t  has p re s e rv e d  l o c a l  v a r i e t y  and 
e x p e r im e n t,  and a p a t t e r n  o f  d e m o c ra t ic  v a lu e s ,  as w e l l  as 
e f f i c i e n t  g o v e rn m e n t.(1 )  Even Mrs. H ic k s  h e r s e l f  c o u ld  n o t 
deny t h a t  l o c a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , t r a d i t i o n a l l y , ^ a d  a deeper 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  tha n  mere t e c h n ic a l  co n ve n ie n ce . (2 )
"The c o n v in w in g  argum ent", she w r i t e s ,  " f o r
the  p r e s e r v a t io n  o f  l o c a l  autonomy and hence f o r
som eth ing  l i k e  the  p re s e n t  B r i t i s h  l o c a l  government 
s e t - u p - — is  now a lm o s t w h o l ly  p o l i t i c a l .  Recent 
h i s t o r y  s t r o n g l y  sug ges ts  th a t  the power o f  l o c a l  
i n i t i a t i v e  i s  a s in e  qua non o f  the  s u c c e s s fu l  and 
s ta b le  democracy7 The reason f o r  t h i s  i s  th a t  Wee 
l i v e  l o c a l  governm ent ensures an a c t i v e  c o n n e c t io n  
between the  c i t i z e n  and the e x e c u t iv e .  C o m p le x i ty
Tl) this point is discussed in detail above, See Ch. V, passim. 
(2) Op. cit., pp. 265-7.
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o f  p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  i s  a c t u a l l y  a v i r t u e  because i t  m u l t ­
i p l i e s  the  c o n ta c ts  between the governed and the  gove rn ing . '
The danger o f  d e s t r o y in g  these  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n ta c ts  was t r a g ­
i c a l l y  de m on s tra ted  in  France in  1940. To o b l i t e r a t e  a l l  
t ra c e s  o f  them has been a le a d in g  aim i n  the  a u t h o r i t a r i a n  
s t  a te  s. "
A l l  these a d m ira b le  advantages o f  l o c a l  d i r e c t io n ,  
however, w i l l  be s a c r i f i c e d  i f  the m a jo r  s e r v ic e s  which have 
be long ed  to  the l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  are to  be ass ig ned  d e p a ra te -  
l y  to  v a r io u s  t e c h n ic a l  boards i n  London o r  i n  o th e r  re g io n s !  1 
The p rob lem  i s ,  th e r e f o r e ,  how to  c o n t in u e  to  s u s ta in  and 
im p ro ve  a d m in is t r a t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y  un der p re s e n t  c o n d i t io n s  
w i th o u t  im p a i r in g  th e  advantages o f  l o c a l  autonomy.
fentful
As the  e x te n s io n  o f  the  power o f / c o n f r o l  has c h i e f l y  
been the r e s u l t  o f  the  weakness o f l d c a l  f in a n c e ,  the  most 
e f f e c t i v e  means by w h ich  l o c a l  s e l f - g o v e rn m e n t  can c o n t in u e  
to  be p re s e rv e d  would appear to  be th ro u g h  a re fo rm  o f  the  
p re s e n t  r a te  system o r  an in c re a s e  in  the  sou rces  o f  revenue 
a t the d is p o s a l  o f  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s .  (.2) Such a p r o j e c t ,  
however, meets c o n s id e r a b le  d i f f i c u l t i e s .
r n  The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  ihe  danger o f  o v e r - c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  
i s  a l re a d y  re c o g n is e d , and e n l ig h te n e d  o p in io n ,  b o th  
o f  s c h o la rs  and a d m in is t r a to r s ,  i s  f r e q u e n t l y  a s s e r t in g  
th a t  the p r i n c i p l e  o f  l o c a l  s e l f - g o v e rn m e n t  must be 
c a r e f u l l y  guarded. So the e x te n s io n  o f  c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l  
i s ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, matched by a ten de ncy  to  d e v o lv e  
as much power upon l o c a l  governm ent as i t  can p o s s ib ly  
be expec ted  p r o f i t a b l y  to  e x e rc is e .  F o r example, the  
f i r e  s e r v ic e ,  n a t io n a l i s e d  d u r in g  th e  war, has been 
re tu rn e d  to  a p p r o p r ia te  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ;  new respon­
s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  the  h e a l th  c e n t re s  and th e  ca re  o f  the  
aged have been p la c e d  on them; and the  war e xp e r im e n t 
o f  c i v i c  r e s ta u r a n ts  has been p u t  on a permanent b a s is .
On ba la n ce , however, i t  must be a d m it te d  t h a t  some o f  
the  most i n t e r e s t i n g  and im p o r ta n t  work o f  l o c a l  g o v e rn ­
ment has been ta ke n  from i t .
(2 )  A c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  re fo rm  th a t  wou ld  w iden the  f i e l d  o f  
l o c a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  ( b u t  whose e f f e c t iv e n e s s  presupposes 
adequate f i n a n c i a l  re so u rce s  i n  l o c a l  c o n t r o l )  i s  d i s ­
cussed i n  the  Append ix .
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The l o c a l  r a te  i s  le v ie d  upon such a na rrow  b a s is  
t h a t  a la rg e  in c re a s e  c o u ld  h a r d ly  be j u s t i f i e d .  A l o c a l  
income ta x , in s te a d ,  o f f e r s  l i t t l e  chance o f  success as i t  
wou ld  be a lm ost im p o s s ib le  Jo c o l l e c t  i t  on a f a i r  b a s is .
In  the case o f  th e  businessm an who ea rns  h i s  income in  
Glasgow bu t l i v e s  o u ts id e  the c i t y  b o u n d a r ie s  i n  S t i r l i n g ,  
f o r  example, which l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  would re c e iv e  the l o c a l  
income tax? A ga in , howeould the t a x  be a l lo c a te d  i n  the case 
o f  r a i lw a y  companies, warehouses, banks, in s u ra n c e  o f f i c e s  
and many o th e rs ,  whose income i s  no t a l l  earned i n  one p la c e .
The m o b i l i t y  o f  pe rson s  and f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  c o m p l ic a te s  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  the c o l l e c t i o n  o f  the  n a t i o n a l  income ta x ;  on 
a l o c a l  s c a le  the  p rob lem  would be p r a c t i c a l l y  in s u p e ra b le .
P ro fe s s o r  Robson has sugges ted  th a t  i n  o r d e r  to  
p re s e rv e  t h e i r  d i g n i t y  and freedom , l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  s h o u ld  
no lo n g e r  pu rsue  the  one id e a  o f  e x t r a c t i n g  more money from 
th e  Exchequer. They s h o u ld ,  a cco rd in g  to  h is  o p in io n ,  f i n d  
o u t ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,  tae  p o s s ib le  methods o f  a s s i s t i n g  n e c e s s i t ­
ous a u t h o r i t i e s  by s p re a d in g  the cha rge  f o r  c e r t a i n  s e r v ic e s  
o v e r  w id e r  l o c a l  government areas, o r  o f  p o o l in g  the  p roceeds 
o f  a n a t io n - w id e  r a te  f o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  among: l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  
i n  accordance w i th  an agreed fo r m u la  o f  n e e d . ( l )  He has 
m a in ta in e d  t h a t  i f  the  f i c h  and the  p o o r  d i s t r i c t s  were once 
p la c e d ,  so f a r  as p o s s ib le ,  upon the  same f o o t i n g ,  t h e i r  
demands upon the S ta te  w ou ld  be le s s  f r e q u e n t  and p e r s i s t e n t ,  
and, i n  consequence, c e n t r a l  c o n t r o l  would be g r e a t l y  re la x e d . '  
The id e a  i s  v a lu a b le ;  b u t  i t  i s  d o u b t f u l  w he the r the  money 
d e r iv e d  from  ra te s  even u n d e r  t h i s  system would be s u f f i c i e n t  
to  meet the  re q u ire m e n ts  o f  in c r e a s in g  l o c a l  government expen­
d i t u r e .  Even i f  the  t o t a l  l o c a l  expenses were to  be s te r e o ­
typed  a t th e  p re s e n t  ampunt, doub le  the sum o f  l o c a l  r a te s  as ! 
th e y  mow s ta n d  would have to  be le v ie d  in  the  absence o f  the  
Exchequer g ra n ts .  A p a r t  from  th e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  would be 
in e q u i t a b le  th a t  a l l  t h i s  e x p e n d i tu re  s h o u ld  f a l l  s o le l y  upon I 
the  r e a l i t i e s ,  i t  would p ro b a b ly  be im p o s s ib le  to  le v y  such 
h ig h  r a te s .
I n  th e o ry ,  a s im p le r  and more w o rka b le  method f o r  
w id e n in g  th e  sou rce  o f  l o c a l  revenue, w h ich  would a t th e  same 
t im e  f u r t h e r  l o c a l  autonomy i s ,  pe rha ps , a system o f  a ss ig n e d  
revenues . L o c a l b o d ie s  c o u ld  be f u r n is h e d  w i t h  the proceeds 
o f  a d d i t i o n a l  s p e c i f i c  ta x e s ,  r a is e d  f o r  l o c a l  pu rposes and
T I )  lo ^ s o n ^  The Development o f  L o c a l ISovernment, 2nd e d . , 19487 
p. 37.
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o u t  o f  l o c a l  re s o u rc e s .  A la rg e  amount o f  d i s c r e t i o n  b o th  
as to t h e i r  amount and t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  c o u ld  be g ive n  so 
as to  th row  the  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and th e  b e n e f i t  on th e  same 
s h o u ld e rs .  W ith  th e se  a d d i t i o n a l  sources o f  l o c a l l y  c o n t r o l ­
le d  revenue, l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  c o u ld  hope to  f r e e  them se lves  
from  c e n t r a l  s u p e r v is io n .  Yet, as the f a i l u r e  o f  Mr. Goschen*s 
scheme has n o t  been f o r g o t t e n ,  i t  i s  h a r d ly  p o s s ib le  t h a t  t h i s  
would be t r i e d  ag a in . Even i f  t h is n d e v ic e  were to be adopted, 
th e re  wou ld  rem ain  the  g re a t  prob lem  th a t  the  p o o t  and back­
ward l o c a l i t i e s ,  w i th o u t  e x te r n a l  f i n a n c i a l  h e lp ,  would be 
o b l ig e d  to  p r o v id e  p o o r  s e r v ic e s  and wou ld  lo s e  the b e n e f i t  
o f  a d v ice  and s u p e r v is io n  from the Government.
Thus, th e re  would appear to  be no method which can w i th  
advantage take th e  p la c e  o f  the g r a n t - i n - a i d .  I t  i s  consequen t 
l y ,  to  an im proved use o f  g ra n ts  th a t  we must lo o k ,  in  the  
main, f o r  a s o l u t i o n  to  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  I t  has been s u g g e s t­
ed, e lsew here , t h a t  the most s u c c e s s fu l  system  o f  g ra n ts  in  
th e  p a s t  has been a m ix tu re  o f  p e rc e n ta g e  and b lo b k  g ra n ts ,  ( l )  
Th is  system c o u ld  be r e ta in e d  w i th  some changes o f  emphasis.
As l o c a l  s e r v ic e s  in  B r i t a i n  have now g e n e r a l ly  
reached  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  minimum s ta n d a rd ,  the  employment o f  
g ra n ts  s h o u ld  be p r i n c i p a l l y  d i r e c te d ,  n o t  tow a rds  the e n co u r­
agement o f  more and b e t t e r  s e r v ic e s  in  th e  r i c h  l o c a l i t i e s ,  
b u t  tow ards th e  a s s is ta n c e  o f  e x c e p t io n a l  and needy a r e a s . I n  
v ie w  o f  t h i s ,  i t  would appear t h a t  th e re  s h o u ld  be more b lo c k  
g ra n ts  on the fo r m u la  b a s is  o f  need, and le s s  p e rce n ta g e  
g r a n ts .  Th is  system c o u ld  a ls o  be im proved  by th e  e s t a b l i s h ­
ment o f  h p e c i f i d  s f lb a id ie s >f i x e d  a c c o rd in g  to  the  need o f  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  s e r v ic e  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  a rea. The b lo b k  g r a n t  
s h o u ld  be a p p l ie d  to  g e n e ra l  s e r v ic e s  o v e r  w h ich  l o c a l  a u th o r ­
i t i e s  sh o u ld  have a g re a t  measure o f  d i s c r e t i o n ,  the p e rc e n ta g e  
g r a n t  s h o u ld  be used in  th o s e  few s e r v ic e s  w h ich  are i n  g e n e r­
a l  n o t  y e t  up to  a s u i t a b le  s ta n d a rd ;  and the s p e c i f i c  sub­
s i d i e s  may be g ra n te d  to  i n d i v i d u a l  needy areas to  e n ab le  them 
to  p r o v id e  p a r t i c u l a r  s e r v ic e s  beyond t h e i r  own f i n a n c i a l  
a b i l i t y .  I n  the  case o f  the  b u lk  o f  the  b lo fck g r a n t  s e r v ic e s ,  
the  Government sh o u ld  do n o th in g  more tha n  l a y  down broad 
p r i n c i p l e s  f o r  the  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  to  p u rs u e .  When W h i te h a l l  
had s a t i s f i e d  i t s e l f  t h a t  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s  are p e r fo r m in g  
t h e i r  d u t ie s  w i th  v ig o u r  and i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  i t  s h o u ld  a b s ta in
XT) See above, (Jh.X^.
-231-
from  in t e r f e r e n c e  o f  any k in d  exce p t f o r  u r g e n t  cans*.
In  the  case o f  the  s e r v ic e s  which re c e iv e  p e rc e n ta g e  g ra n ts  
o r  s p e c i f i c  s u b s id ie s ,  a c lo s e r  c o n t r o l  may be re q u i re d .
B u t even h e re  the  g e n e ra l  l i n e  to  be fo l lo w e d  s h o u ld  s t i l l  
be to  a l lo w  as much r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  andna independence as i s  
c o m p a t ib le  w i th  th e  b e s t  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e js e rv ic e s .  Where 
th e  s e rv ic e s  are l i a d l y  done o r  a d m in is te re d  i n  d e f ia n c e  o f  
the  g e n e ra l  d i r e o T io n  and a d v ic e  o f  th e  Government, the app­
r o p r i a t e  de pa rtm en t a t  W e s tm in s te r  may s p e c i f y  f a u l t s  i n  
a d m in is t r a t i o n  w h ich  must be removed, and may in  the  l a s t  
r e s o r t  w i th h o ld  o r  reduce th e  g r a n t .
Owing to  th e  g re a t  d i v e r s i t y  o f  c h a r a c te r  shown by 
l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  and the  g re a t  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e i r  c i rc u m ­
s ta n c e s ,  the  same degree o f  c o n t r o l  i s  n o t  ne ce ssa ry  i n  a l l  
cases . Fo r the  most e n l ig h te n e d  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  th e  c h ie f  
work o f  th e . c e n t r a l  departm en t sh o u ld  be to  h e lp  them to  
J J r o f i t  from /Jexperiences o f  one a n o th e r .  I t  sh o u ld  be remem­
b e re d  t h a t  p ro g re s s  i n  i n t e r n a l  a d m in is t r a t i o n  o v e r  the 
l a s t  hundred and f i f t y  y e a rs  has m a in ly  begun in  the l o c a l ­
i t i e s  and a lm o s t a l l  the  a d m ira b le  s e r v ic e s  w hich are now 
p r o v id e d  i n  t h i s  f i e l d  were o r i g i n a l l y  p io n e e re d  by some 
e n t e r p r i s i n g  and p r o g r e s s iv e  towns. F o r the se  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  
th e n , the  u tm o s t freedom to  e xp e r im e n t must be p re s e rv e d .
The more backward and the p o o re r  a reas, w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  
r e q u i r e  more p re s s u re  o r  more f i n a n c i a l  a s s is ta n c e  from  th e  
s t a t e  i n  o r d e r  to  encourage them to  reach  th e  l e v e l  o f  th e  
r e s t  o f  the c o u n t ry ,  though even here th e  le s s  th e re  i s  o f  
d e t a i l e d  in t e r f e r e n c e ,  the b e t t e r  w i l l  be the  q u a l i t y  o f  
l o c a l  e f f o r t .  Such a c o n t r o l ,  e x e rc is e d  w i th  d i s c r im in a t i o n  
and r e s t r a i n t  w i l l  do more good tha n  harm to  l o c a l  a d m in i­
s t r a t i o n .
j 9*»<l
Thus, i f  p ro p e r ly ^ u s e d  i n  the r i g h t  s p i r i t ,  the  g r a n t -  
i n - a i d  i s  s t i l l  ca p a b le  o f  p r o v id in g  f o r  a good p a r tn e r s h ip  
between the  c e n t r a l  government and th e  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  
and th e re  i s  no l i e t t e r  means o f  s e c u r in g  th e  maximum b e n e f i t  
o f  th e  com m unity than  t h e i r  j o i n t  a d m in is t r a t i o n .  The com­
b in a t i o n  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  de pa r tm en t w i th  i t s  accum ula ted  
range o f  in f o r m a t io n  and e x p e r t  knowledge and the  l o c a l  
body o f  c o u n c i l l o r s  and o f f i c i a l s  w i th  t h e i r  l i f e - l o n g , 
know ledge o f  f a c t s  i s  an in f lu e n c e  f o r  th e  common g o jd .  The 
i d e a l  c o o p e ra t io n  between these two e lem ents i s  d e s c r ib e d  by 
Mt: C.W. G. Sady; and h is  account may f i t t i n g l y  c lo s e  o u t  
e x a m in a t io n  o f  th e  s u b je c t .  (1 )
U )  C. t .  G. SaTyj fHe- P r in c ip le s  w iiich  s h o u ld  d e te rm in e  w h e th e r  ' 
a S e rv ic e  R e q u i r in g  L o c a l O r g a n iz a t io n  i s  B es t A d m in is te re d  
by a C e n t r a l  Government Departm ent o r  By a L o c a l A u t h o r i t y .
See P u b l ic  A d m in is t r a t io n ,  v o l .  I l l ,  No. 4 . ,  O c t, 1925. pp. 377-8 .
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...We have taken our good where we found it, and have 
used it. We found in local government direct personal 
interest, initiative, variety, and the proper and widely 
emtended outlet of an instinct for practical affairs. We 
found in central government a greater experience due to a 
wider range, power to enforce, and perhaps most important, 
power to provide money on a larger scale. To transfer a 
service wholly to local government means the loss of financial 
support, for it is unlikely that Parliament would sanction 
the provision of money for a service free entirely from 
central control, and it means tne loss of such a wider exper­
ience as central departments ought always to be willing to 
put at the disposal of their colleagues in local authorities.
To break the tradition of local association with a service 
may be to break a contact between Government and the governed 
that will react at once upon the quality of the service, for 
all the skill in the world will not preserve a central depart­
ment from a detachment. There is another argument, and a 
practical one. Administration is becoming terribly difficult 
owing to its complexity. Parliament rushes through legislat­
ion, and administration has often little time for anything 
but the establishment of the machinery to carry out legislat­
ion. The machinery is all very well and necessary, but it 
can never be anything more than machinery. It must be guided 
and controlled by life. In local authorities, especially on 
the elective principle, there does appear to be the best 
governor for official mechanism.
If, therefore, the antithesis in today's theme implies 
a direct alternative, I think the antithesis is a false one.
I suggest that in all services where there is a local organ­
ization, there is a place for local authority and a place for 
central authority, that the principle of the grant-in-aid 
affords a ready peans of adjusting this relation, for so long 
as local authorities contribute anything to the cost of a 
service they are entitled to the widest proportionate autonomy, 
and so long as central government contributes, it is entitled 
to the minimum of inspection and supervision, and that the 
direction of our joint efforts should be towards consolidating 
and strengthening the power and the efficiency of local govern­
ment with such aid, financial and otherwise, from central gover­
nment as may be needed and possible. ”
a p p e n d i x .
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A Proposed Constitutional Reform far the Widening of tne 
Field of Local AcTIvities. The constfctutional system~Tn 
Britain is dominated throughout by the principle that no 
power can be exercised by any administrative organ unless 
it has been conferred by law; and in the exercise of that 
power, it must obey the rule of law which, in the event of 
dispute, will be interpreted by the ordinary courts of the 
country, (1) In accordance with this principle, the activ­
ities of local authorities are strictly limited. They can 
do no thing£at all unless there exists a specific warranty 
in statute. In other words, they are not entitled to 
experiment freely with whatever municipal trading ventures 
or social services they please. They are allowed to spend 
money from the rate fund only on such activities as are 
expressly or impliedly authorised by their individual Charters 
of Incorporation, or are sanctioned directly or indirectly 
by Parliament, 12)
As we have seen, for the last hundred and fifty 
years>progress in internal administration has mainly begun 
in the localities. Almost all the services which are now 
provided in urban and rural communities were at the begin­
ning pioneered by some ptogressive town, which obtained its 
power to do so by means of promoting Private Bills.' It was 
only when these services had become popular and obviously 
desirable, that Parliament undertook to provide general 
legislation for their universal application.' As the process 
of private local legislation is both toilsome and expensive, 
and every local experiment outside the range of statutes 
involves a fresh application to the legislature, it means 
a tremendous waste of time and money. For example, it was 
estimated that in the five years from 1901, the twenty 
eight London boroughs spent over £70,000 on legislation; 
and in the three years from 1903, the London County Council 
itself spent, in promoting and opposing fills, more than 
£100,000,(3) This has been a cause of universal complaint.
For larger and wealthier authorities are thus hampered in 
their endeavour to achieve a local social reform}, while 
smaller and poorer ones have neither the courage nor the 
ability to try at all.
rij Idward ienks, Prob 1 ems oJ~Local Sovernmen£, p. 204.
(2) Charles Barratt, Your Local Authority, 1946, pp. 3-4.
(3) H. J. Laski, A Grammar of Politics, 1931, 2nd ed. ,p.419.
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Efforts have from time to time, however, been made 
by Parliament to remove the necessity for local councils to 
promote private bills in some cases where general legislation 
has not yet been enacted. A means of shortening the process 
of local legislation by the formulation of a number of 
’Model Clauses* into*Clauses Acts* was adopted. If a local 
authority chooses to make use of this model and insert it in 
a Bill, there is seldom any difficulty in securing the pass­
age of the Bill through Parliament. This has made local 
legislation a much simpler matter; but local authorities have 
still tp promote the Bill. A further device has been estab­
lished, however, in order to relieve local councils of the 
need for promoting a Bill. When Parliament legislates gen­
erally about local government, it often inserts provisions 
which make it possible for local authorities of a specified 
type to adopt the whole or certain parts of the relevant 
Acts, These are, popularly known as the ’Adoptive Acts*.
When several clauses are made adoptive, any authority of that 
specified type is entitled to use them if a simple majority 
of that council resolves to do so. (1) The procedure is a 
very simple one. The council needs only to notify publicly 
the fact that it has adopted them. From that time on, it is 
bound by the adopted law exactly as if the Act had applied 
automatically in the first instance. (2)
JThg^d^evices of ’Clauses Acts’ and ’Adoptive Acts’ 
have notj^>eenr*widely used, for they have been applied only,
Dn a limited scale, in the field of public health services. 
Private Bill legislation, therefore, is still an important 
means for the acquisition of the right, to experiment. In 
recent years, there has been a popular feeling that local 
authorities, especially the larger towns, should have a 
wider field of activities so that they can look boldly 
ahead and anticipate their future needs in a more liberal 
way. There have, in consequence, been demands that they 
should have more chance to experiment freely without 
proceeding through the troublesome and expensive processes 
of promoting private Bills.
It is often suggested that in cases of comparatively 
trivial matters, local authorities should be able to take 
action even if they do not obtain a specific authority to do
rip Bui rural district councils can only adopt an "Act when 
it obtains the sanction of the Minister of Health.
(2) Sir John Maud, Local Government in Modern England, 1932, 
p. *71.
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so by a statute. It is also thought desirable that there 
should be an enabling power with regard to certain matters 
of great importance, especially those relating to culture 
and amenities and the acquisition of land for other than 
existing statutory purposes, (l) Some scholars even go. so 
far as to suggest that the rule of ultra vires should be 
reversed so that ’instead of local authorities being empower­
ed to do only what Parliament expressly sanctions, they 
should be empowered to do anything except that which Parlia­
ment expressly prohibi ts ’ .(2) Professor Laski, for example, 
is of the opinion that a better way to build the relation­
ship between local and central government in Britain is on 
the model of the relation between the States and Washington 
in the American Union, i.e., ’the reserved powers belong to 
the Federal authorities and the residuary powers are within 
£he ambit of State control’. Under this arrangement, then, 
’powers not specifically forbidden to a loc a* authority 
might be exercised by them’. He argues that to bestow the 
residual powers upon local authorities, with some modifications 
’is by no means a leap in the dark’; for ’it has been for the 
last fifty years the secret of the success which has attended 
municipal efforts in Germany*. (3)
In order to afford adequate safeguards against abuse 
of these powers, Professor Laski suggests that one of the 
following devices should be used:-
!
i
(1) There might be a provision for a local referendum; |
(2) All schemes might well assume the character of 
provisional orders which havejbes* submitted to the 
legislative assembly and become inoperative if the i
latter, by resolution, indicates its disapproval of i
the scheme proposed; or |
(3) It m^ght well be made the duty of the appropriate 
department to accompany the laying of the provisional 
order upon the table of the legislature by a memorandum 
in which the proposal, ^specially on its financial side, 
is critically explained.
The first device proposed by Professor Laski has been 
frequently used in some of the States -f the American Union.
It claims the advantage of an ability to inspire the interest
of local inhabitants in local affairs and to assist in pro­
moting direct democracy. This method might be preferable in
XT) S. M. fiarris^  Municipal Self-Soverhment in Bri tain, p. 2987
(2) H. Warren, op. cit., p. 152.
(3) Laski, op. cit., pp. 420-421.
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a relatively small community> but it is probably of little 
use iJa locality where the population is large and where the 
schemed or problems involved are complicated or technical 
in character. Moreover, the referendum itself is a very 
toilsome and expensive device. It might even be more expens­
ive and troublesome than to promote a private Bill.
The second device is simple and good if Parliament 
really has enough time and knowledge to consider the various 
schemes proposed by the local authorities. Parliament, 
however, is already overburdened with major problems and has 
practically no time to spend on the control of local matters. 
Even before the recent war, according to the analysis of Sir 
Stafford Cripps, the House of Commons was so busy that itt 
ha^ l in fact no real control even of delegated legislation.
"In the whole year (in 1937-1938)", writes Sir Stafford,
"only 17 hours was so spent which means of course that more 
than 90 per cent, of the Orders in Council were never review­
ed at all, indeed it is extremely doubtful whether the vast 
majority of members ever knew oftheir exi stence*( 1) If 
Parliament has no time to consider Orders in Council, how 
can it pay adequate* attention to the numerous local schemes 
which are to be submitted for its sanction?
It is, I think, only the th#rd device proposed by 
Professor Laskimwhich is really practicable. It allows 
local authorities ample chance to initiate and perform new 
experiments without running a great risk of suffering from 
their own ignorance. Government departments pay have powers 
to suggest, criticise and advise as regards what local author­
ities should do, and yet under the control of Parliament, they 
will not be able to abuse their power and become partners to 
a * new despotism*. It is in this way alone that local self 
government can thrive and flourish. It should, however, be 
noted here that even were this admirable device adopted, it 
would nht be satisfactory and successful unless local author­
ities had enough financial resources which they themselves 
could control. Freedom is worthwhile only when local author­
ities are financially capable of canying out their beneficial 
schemes.
H I  Democracy tfp-to-bate, 2nd & rev. ed., 1944, p.60.1
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